The Scottish Government and the French Threat, 1792-1802 by Wold, Atle L.

The Scottish Government and the French Threat, 
1792- 1802 
Atle Libaek Wold 
Thesis submitted for the Degree of 
Ph.D. 
University of Edinburgh 
2003 
I hereby certify that this thesis has been composed and written by me. and that i t  is 
entirely my own work. 








1. The Challenge to the Government of Scotland 
2. The Government of Scotland 
3. Political Trials 
4. Military Recruitment 
5. Financial Contributions 
6. Demonstrations of Loyalty 
7. Loyalist Ideology 
Appendices 

















Over the period 1792 to 1802 the British state faced the unprecedented situation of 
fighting a war against France, while simultaneously being challenged on the home 
front by an upsurge of political radicalism and demands for extensive alterations in 
the British political system. In the early part of the period, it was the threat posed by 
domestic radicalism and radical agitation which posed the greatest challenge to the 
L- government. but gradually, as radicalism was defeated and the threat of invasion 
from France increased. the war effort became the main priority and cause of concern 
for the authorities. 
This thesis examines Scotland’s contribution to the British state‘s war against 
Revolutionary France and its struggles against the domestic challenges of the 1790s. 
with a view to establish how the government of Scotland met and handled the 
specific challenges it faced over the course of the decade. and the extent to which the 
Scots rallied to the defence of British state at this time of crisis. Chapter one sets out 
the main challenges facing the authorities in Scotland in this period. whiie chapter 
two addresses the government‘s overall response and policies. Emphasis has been 
placed on the relationship between the central government in London and local 
L- government officials in Scotland. and the degree of interaction which took place 
between the two. Chapter three provides more detail on the political trials which 
followed the government’s decision to bring some of the leading radicals before the 
law courts on a charge of sedition, while chapters four and five address the two 
crucial aspects of the Scottish contribution to the war effort - the recruitment of men 
for service in the armed forces, and the financing of military operations. It is argued 
here that, while Scotland provided more than a proportionate share of men for armed 
service, the Scottish financial contribution was less than proportionate. The last two 
chapters examine the support the government received from the Scottish public. 
Chapter six looks at the various ways in which the Scots demonstrated loyalty to the 
British state at a time of war, and chapter seven discusses the arguments presented by 
loyalist writers in Scotland. 
Sections on naval protection for Scotland, barracks-building and the Scottish 
whisky-industry were omitted from the final version of the thesis to reduce its length, 
1v 
as were some details on the manager system and Henry Dundas. on the law of 
sedition in Scotland. and on the causes of the militia riots in 1797. 
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Introduction 
Over the course of the 1790s the British state was faced with challenges both to the 
preservation of its form of government and to its very existence, of a scale, nature 
and severity which had arguably not been experienced since the Act of Union in 
1707. These challenges were all connected with the French Revolution, and, 
although not all of them were directly caused by events in France, the French 
Revolution formed the backdrop against which all aspects of British life in this 
period needs to be understood. 
In the early part of the decade, the main challenge to the British state was 
domestic, posed by the upsurge of political radicalism. agitation for a reform of, or 
change to, the existing political institutions and form of government in Britain. and 
by politically induced popular disturbances; all of which followed in the wake of the 
Great French Revolution of 1789. On 1 February 1793, however, Britain entered the 
war against Revolutionary France, and, gradually - as radicalism and the domestic 
challenge to the regime was largely defeated over the course of 1792-95. and the war 
begun to make its impact - the main challenge to the British state shifted to the 
external threat posed by the armed might of the French Republic and to the 
implications of fighting a war. For the remainder of the decade, it  was the problems 
related to the war against France - the need to raise large numbers of men for service 
in the armed forces and the unpopularity of such service, as well as the threat of a 
French invasion of the British Isles - which formed the overriding concern for the 
authorities in Britain. Those remnants of domestic radicalism which were still in 
existence were of less importance. 
Whereas extensive work has been done on radicalism and the radical 
movement in Scotland,’ and several historians have investigated the structure of the 
Scottish government in this period,’ fewer attempts have been made to provide an 
See, in  particular: John D. Brims, ‘The Scottish Democratic Movement in the Age of the French 
Revolution’, unpublished Ph. D. thesis (University of Edinburgh, 1983). 
David J. Brown, ‘Henry Dundas and the Government of Scotland’, unpublished Ph. D. thesis 
(University of Edinburgh, 1989); Michael Fry, The Dundas Despotism (Edinburgh, 1992); Holden 
Furber, Henry Dundas: First Viscount Melville 1742-181 1 (Oxford, 193 1 ); and Cyril Matheson, The 
Life of Henry. Dundas: First Viscount Meville 1742-1811 (London, 1933). 
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overall view of the contribution Scotland made to the war against Revolutionary 
France, or to establish the extent to which Scots came to the defence of Great Britain 
at a time of crisis for the British state.’ This thesis attempts to address the issue of the 
Scottish contribution to. and support for, the war against the French Republic by. 
first setting out the main challenges facing the Scottish authorities in the period 1792 
to 1802 in chapter one: then examining how the government of Scotland responded 
to the crisis of the 1790s and attempted to rally the resources of the nation behind the 
war effort in chapters two to five; before looking at the nature and extent of the 
support the authorities received from the Scottish public in general in the last two 
chapters. An underlying theme in this approach has been to investigate Scotland’s 
role and place within the Union of Great Britain, and the extent to which the war- 
time experience of the 1790s served to promote the further integration of Scotland in 
the British state. 
Compared to England, Scotland was late in the day in terms of developing a 
radical movement with significant popular backing following the French Revolution 
in 1789, and Scottish radicals followed largely in the footsteps of those in England. 
Moreover. while disturbances with a political content had taken place in England in 
1791. it took until the spring of 1792 before Scotland followed suit. From then 
onwards. however. the domestic challenge to the regime was as serious a problem for 
the authorities in Scotland, as it was in Great Britain as a whole, and some of the 
most violent and widespread political disturbances of the decade also took place 
north of the border. The most famous of these was the King’s birthday riot in 
Edinburgh in June 1792, but there were also extensive disturbances in Perth and 
Dundee in November the same year. Edinburgh became the centre for the radical 
movement in Scotland, and four radical conventions were held there over the course 
of 1792-93, the last of which came to name itself the ‘British Convention’, and was 
attended by delegates from English radical societies as well as the Scottish. 
Following the forced dispersal of the British Convention, the authorities in Scotland 
discovered the only radical conspiracy of the 1790s - the so-called ‘Pike Plot’, a plan 
The one notable work is that by Henry Meikle, although Meikle did not address the issue of Scottish 
loyalism to any considerable extent. Henry W. Meikle, Scotland and the French Revolution (Glasgow, 
1912). 
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to seize control of Edinburgh Castle - in May 1794, before the scheme could be set 
in motion. The challenges created by the war were largely the same for the whole of 
Britain, and, although there existed a separate French plan for an invasion of 
Scotland, the threat of a French landing on the British Isles was perceived to be a 
national British concern. 
The sudden upsurge of radical agitation and popular disturbances in Scotland 
in the spring of 1792 took most government officials by surprise, and some of them 
were clearly rattled and wrong-footed to begin with. Once the initial confusion had 
been overcome, however, the governing classes of Scotland were gradually able to 
compose themselves and to respond to the challenge. To an extent, this must have 
been due to the fact that the central government figures in Britain, the Prime Minister 
William Pitt. and the Scottish ‘manager’ Henry Dundas. themselves never wavered 
in the face of the crisis of 1792. but remained calm and took firm control of affairs. 
Although the crisis of 1792 was thus overcome. there are clear indications that the 
central government was not entirely satisfied with the conduct of its men on the 
e oround in Scotland. or with the Scottish system of local government in general. and 
this was pa~.? of the reason for the decision to introduce the English system of lords 
lieutenant in Scotland in 1794. Following the widespread disturbances of 1792. the 
central government devised a comprehensive strategy to defeat radicalism, of which 
the more practical elements were master-minded by Henry Dundas. I n  essence, the 
government’s response rested on two main pillars. One was to provide local 
b oovernment officials with a set of instructions and guidelines on how they should 
handle radicalism and respond to political disturbances in their own localities, the 
other to bring the leading radicals - the ‘ringleaders’ - before the Scottish law courts 
on a charge of sedition. Setting up a strategy to defeat radicalism was, however, one 
thing, the practical implementation of the policies another, and it is argued in chapter 
two that central and local government were not always in agreement on how best to 
solve a particular problem. As a consequence of this, there was a certain degree of 
interaction between the two with respect to the day-to-day implementation of 
policies, and, in some cases, local public officials in Scotland demonstrated a 
reluctance to accept those instructions from the central authorities which they 
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perceived to be a matter of English interference in 'internal' Scottish aftairs. In 
addition to its reactive measures. however. the government also decided to give its 
backing to the emerging loyalist association movement. in what amounted to an 
attempt at out-competing the radicals on their own turf by encouraging popular 
support for the state. 
While chapter one thus presents the main challenges which faced the 
e government of Scotland in the 1790s, and chapter two addresses the government's 
overall response and policies. chapter three provides a more detailed discussion of 
the political trials which followed the government's decision to prosecute leading 
radicals for the crime of sedition. It is the main argument of this chapter that. 
aithough the Scottish law courts consistently produced the convictions the 
e oovernment sought, and for that reason were more reliable than the English law 
courts, the political trials staged in Scotland were not an unmitigated success for the 
authorities. The behaviour some of the Scottish judges displayed in court became an 
embarrassment for the government. and rendered the propaganda value of the trials 
highly questionable. In this sense, it can be argued that the Scottish trials proved to 
be a double-edge sword for the authorities, but at the same time, it is clear that the 
government undoubtedly preferred the convictions the Scottish law courts produced 
over the many acquittals obtained at the English courts. In terms of defeating 
radicalism. the Scottish courts therefore proved to be the more potent weapon for the 
government. 
In order to fight a war, men had to be enlisted for armed service and funds 
needed to be raised to finance military operations. Chapters four and five discuss the 
Scottish contribution of manpower for the armed forces and revenues for the 
Treasury respectively. The overall argument presented here is that, while Scotland 
provided more than a proportionate number of men for armed service, the Scottish 
financial contribution was less than proportionate. As far as military recruitment was 
concerned, the government did not pursue a consistent policy throughout the decade, 
but altered its priorities in accordance with the fortunes of war. Thus, in those 
periods when the war was going favourably for Britain, emphasis was placed on 
raising men for the regular armed forces, the Army and the Royal Navy, while at 
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those times when the prospects were bleaker and the threat of a French invasion 
loomed, the government focussed on strengthening the forces for invasion defence. It 
is also clear, however, that, with respect to the forces for internal defence. the 
c/ eovernment’s recruitment policies were marked by a certain degree of trial and error. 
where the mistakes made in the early part of the war were attempted to be rectified at 
a later stage. Since it was recruitment for the defence forces that presented the 
government of Scotland with the more challenging tasks. this forms the main focus 
of chapter four. Particular emphasis has been given to the raising of a Scottish militia 
in 1797. While it is argued here that popular opposition to the militia in Scotland was 
widespread. and that the rioting this produced in 1797 was extensive and serious. it  is 
also stressed that the responses to the Militia Act were more varied than has often 
been allowed, and that there were many Scots who either supported the measure. or 
took a more constructive approach than outright opposition. The case of the 
Edinburgh Militia also points in the direction of a force that was well-disciplined 
once it had been raised. The Scottish financial contribution to the war has been dealt 
with in less detail than the military contribution. This is partly due to the limited 
amount of statistical material which has survixved on tax returns and other financial 
issues in the 1790s. but also because Scotland did not play as important a role in the 
financing of the war, as in the military effort. 
The government’s decision to encourage popular loyalism raises the question 
of the extent to which the Scots responded to this incentive, and gave their voluntary 
support for the government and the war effort. Chapter six examines the various 
ways in which the Scots demonstrated their loyalty to the state in the 1790s, with a 
focus on determining who gave their support, whether a certain demonstration of 
loyalty implied any significant ‘cost’ or sacrifice on the part of those who stood 
behind it, and if Scottish loyalism ever threatened to become a political force outside 
of the government’s control. It is argued here that, while the loyalist association 
movement never seemed to have gained as strong a foothold in Scotland as it did in 
England, the Scots demonstrated their loyalty to the state more forcefully in other 
ways. Among these, loyalist resolutions represent the most extensive source of 
evidence, but other demonstrations can be seen to involve a greater sacrifice. Many 
5 
Scots, for example, made efforts to provide the government with information about 
radicals or presented policy-suggestions of their own making. Others offered their 
personal service to the state - either in a military capacity or otherwise - while a very 
substantial number of Scots gave a voluntary financial contribution to the state, the 
war effort or to other war-related purposes. 
Support for the government was, however, expressed as much by words as by 
actions, and chapter seven examines the arguments presented by Scottish loyalists in 
the political debate of the 1790s. It is essential in this context to stress that Scottish 
pamphleteers took part in a nationwide British debate between loyalists on the one 
hand and radicals on the other. and most of their arguments therefore addressed 
issues of a British concern. Nevertheless. some Scottish loyalist writers developed 
arguments specifically aimed at a Scottish audience, or explained and adapted their 
points, with the intention of making them more readily understandable for ordinary 
Scots. Many also went to considerable lengths to demonstrate why the Scots had a 
particular interest in defending the British political system and supporting for the war 
against France. In the final section of chapter seven, an attempt has been made to 
summarise the Scottish experience of the 1790s. by looking at the issue of 




At the beginning of 
Challenge to the Government 
the 1790s there was not much reason to expect a political 
upheaval of any sort in Scotland, nor that the Scots would launch a challenge to the 
existing political regime. To the extent that there had been any politically motivated 
agitation in Scotland before, it had either been caused by issues concerned with 
religion or religious patronage, or it had been related to the largely middle-class and 
moderate campaign for a reform of the Scottish burghs and election laws.? Although 
1 
some historians have attributed a ‘political awakening’ to the Scots in the immediate 
years following the American War of Independence, there had been few signs of this 
materialising in the shape of active political campaigning by many Scots before 
1789.3 This situation would. however. be dramatically changed as the French 
Revolution gradually made its impact in Scotland. 
Robert Kent Donovan. for example. has argued that Protestant opposition to the Roman Catholic 
Relief Act of 1778 - whereby Catholics were permitted to serve in the British Army for the duration 
of  the American War of Independence - ’brought active, long-lived political awareness to large 
numbers of  Scotsmen for the first time‘. Robert Kent Donovan, No Popen, arid Radiculisni; 
Opposition to Rotnnn Catlinlic Relief in Scotland. 1778-1 782 (London. 1987). p. 7. See also: Frank 
O‘Gorman. The Long Eighteenth Centun.: British Political and Social H i s t o n .  I688 - 1832 (London, 
19971, p. 232. While the fierce opposition to Catholic Relief was a nation-wide phenomenon. disputes 
oker the use of patronage within the Church o f  Scotland - i.e. who would have the authority to 
appoint parish ministers: the local laird or the Presbyterian congregation of the parish - were of more 
local concern. but remained a cause of bitter conflicts throughout the eighteenth century. For 
discussions of church patronage. see two articles by Stewart J. Brown: ‘Church-State Relations in 
Scotland after the Union’, in The Challenge to Westminster: Sovereigntj,, Devolution and 
Independence. eds.. H. T. Dickinson and Michael Lynch (East Lothian. ZOOO), pp. 71-80; and: 
‘Religion i n  Scotland’ [forthcoming]: as well as: John D. Brims. ‘The Scottish Democratic Movement 
in the Age of the French Revolution’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of Edinburgh, 1983), p. 
35: T. M. Devine, The Scottish Nation 1700-2000 (London, 19991, p. 199; William Ferguson, 
Scotland: 168Y to the Present (Edinburgh, 1968), pp. 110-1 1 ,  121, 127; Henry W. Meikle, Scotland 
and the French Revolution (Glasgow, 1912), pp. 35-40; Rosalind Mitchison, A History o f  Scotland 
(London, 1970), p. 354; and Emma Vincent, ‘The Responses of the Scottish Churchmen to the French 
Revolution, 1789 1802’, Scottish Historical RevieB,, 73 (1 994), 19 1-2 15. ’ The campaign for political reform in Scotland began in the spring of 1782 and continued until 1785, 
when - frustrated by the defeat in the House of Commons of the two reform bills emanating from the 
work of the campaigners - the movement ran out of steam, and remained in a subdued state until the 
advent of the French Revolution re-ignited the hopes of achieving reform. See: Brims, Ph.D., pp. 45- 
57; Devine, Scottish Nation, pp. 201-3; and Meikle, Scotland, pp. 11-27. Compared to England, where 
the foundations for extra-parliamentary criticism of the government and the political system had 
existed since the early eighteenth century, and where such criticism had been voiced more openly 
since 1760, Scotland was thus ‘late in the day’ in terms of developing a political opposition of some 
significance. H. T. Dickinson, The Politics of the People in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Basingstoke, 
For the argument on a ‘political awakening’ following the American War, see: Meikle, Scotland, p. 
1-5; and William Law Mathieson, The Awakening of Scotland: a history from 1747 to 1797 (Glasgow, 
1 




I 792: The impact of the F~-eiich Revolutioiz in Scotlnnd 
In Scotland, the French Revolution has been widely credited with re-igniting the 
dormant burgh reform movement and creating an unprecedented interest in political 
matters among all classes of society. For those who had already been campaigning 
for a reform of the political system in Britain. such as the burgh reformers in 
Scotland. the French Revolution served as an inspiration. making them believe that 
reform was now finally a c- genuine possibility. But where the burgh reform movement 
of the 1780s had attracted mainly upper and middle-class support, the revolution in 
France also created a widespread interest in political reform among the ordinary 
people of Scotland.’ With the Scottish press reporting extensively on the revolution 
as the dramatic events unfolded in Paris. the newspaper-reading Scottish public was 
kept remarkably well informed on French affairs? and, although it is clear that ‘the 
Revolution did not create the tensions of late eighteenth-century Scottish society’. it 
seems equally evident that. by its example, ‘it galvanised ordinary people into 
action’.’ In the first two and half years after the fall of the Bastille, however. littie or 
no such direct political action appear to have followed from this new popular interest 
in political reform. While unrest in connection with the French Revolution had 
3 
1910), pp. 76-80, 180. This view has. however. been criticised by Rosalind Mitchison, who has 
argued that Scotland had been ’relatively unaffected by the political unrest of the period of the war of 
American Independence‘. while Robert Kent Donovan has argued that the political awakening in 
Scotland was more due to opposition to Catholic Relief, and John Brims has questioned the whole 
notion of a political ‘awakening’: Mitchison, Histon.  p. 362; Donovan, No Popen>. pp. 307-12; and 
Brims. Ph.D.. p. 1. 
See for example: Lord Cockburn, Memorials of his time (Edinburgh, 1856, and 1977) pp. 45, 80; 
Kenneth J. Logue. Popular Distiirbances in Scotland 1780-181.5, (Edinburgh. 1979), Introduction; 
Meikle, Scotland. p. 44; and Emma Vincent Macleod, ’The Influence of the French Revolution in 
Scotland’. in The Auld Alliance: France and Scotland over 700 Years, ed., James Laidlaw (Edinburgh, 
1999), p. 126. 
4 
Logue, Popular Disturbances, p. 10. 
The Scottish press continued to cover events in France in detail all through the 1790s. The pro- 
government Caledonian Mercun,  for example, devoted large sections to reports on discussions in the 
French National Assembly, the later National Convention and Committee of Public Safety and the 
Directory. In the Caledorziun Merruc  there was an emphasis on factual information, and on reporting 
precisely the statements made by different politicians in the various debates. Most ordinary Scots were 
also literate by 1790, and, although it is uncertain how common it was to read newspapers, the number 
of newspapers published in Scotland had risen sharply in the 1780, which indicates that the readership 
must also have been increasing. There were 27 Scottish newspapers in 1790 compared to only eight in 
1782. Devine, Scottish Nation, p. 203. 
6 
Macleod, ‘Influence of the French Revolution’, p. 126. 
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broken out in England already in 1791 - when attempts to celebrate the anniversary 
of the fall of the Bastille had provoked an anti-reform riot in Birmingham - similar 
celebrations in Scotland at the same time passed quietly! The absence of unrest in 
Scotland in the first years of the French Revolution was, however, brought to a 
dramatic end in the spring of 1792, when a wave of rioting erupted across much of 
the country, and now the disturbances gave every appearance of having a political 
content. 
The Sheriff of Lanark - where the first riot took place at the end of April or 
beginning of May 1792 - wrote a letter to Henry Dundas, the Home Secretary, in 
which he stated that: ‘For Eight days passt [sic],  the Town of Lanark ... of Which I 
am Sheriff has been in a very disagreeable State of Tumult and Disorder’. The unrest 
had started with ‘Incendiary’ letters - threatening the provost and several magistrates 
‘in their Lives and Properties’ - being dropped in the street. and then, on 4 May: 
’One or Two Guns or Pistols loaded with Balls were discharged at the Window of the 
Provosts house and into the Room where he usually Sat and was sitting at the time. 
Two of the Balls pierced the Window boards and passed within a Yard of the 
Provosts Body’ ? Local grievances were ostensibly concerned with a decision made 
by the magistrates to take hold of a part of the ‘Moor’ (open to all inhabitants of the 
burgh). but the real cause. the Sheriff believed, was ‘an almost universal Spirit of 
Reform and opposition to the established Government and Legal Administrators, 
which has wonderfully diffused through the Manufacturing Towns of this County’ . I 0  
The most serious of the politically induced riots which followed was the IOng’s 
birthday-riot in Edinburgh that took place over three days beginning on 4 June (the 
IOng’s birthday), and during which the target of the crowds’ discontent was 
unmistakeably the Scottish ‘manager’, Henry Dundas,’ and other figures of 
authority in Edinburgh. 
Meikle, Scotland, pp. 67, 70-71; Michael Fry, The Dundas Despotism (Edinburgh, 1992), p. 159; 
and Cyril Matheson. The Life of H e n n  Dundas: First Viscoimt Melville 1742 - I811 (London, 1933), 
p.  153. 
National Archives of Scotland [NAS], Home Office Correspondence, Scotland, RH2/4/63 ff. 32-32v, 




For a discussion of the manager-system and Henry Dundas, see: chapter 2, pp. 44-5. 
Logue, Popular Disturbances, pp. 133-43; Michael Fry, Patronage and Principle: A Political 
History of Modern Scorland (Aberdeen, 1987) p. 13; Macleod, ‘Influence of the French Revolution’, 
I I  
12 
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Popular unrest and crowd activity on the King’s birthday was not new in 
Scotland by 1792. The monarch’s birthday had for a long time been a cause of 
celebration for the whole community, and, with often quite large crowds of people 
turning out on the streets to partake in the joyous occasion, there was always a 
potential for unrest (particularly as drunkenness usually played a prominent part in 
the event). Christopher Whatley has demonstrated how these celebrations tended to 
be accompanied by rioting. and that ‘intimidating and aggressive behaviour‘ on the 
day was ‘commonplace ... anything else was unusual‘.” Indeed. in its report on the 
1792 birthday celebrations in Edinburgh, The Times stated that ‘this day (the King’s 
Birthday) passed more peaceably than for many years past’, before quickly adding 
that ‘in the evening’ a full-scale riot had ensued.14 The disturbances which took place 
in Edinburgh in 1792, however, differed markedly from unrest in previous years. 
This was partly because of the political objectives espoused by the crowds - as 
opposed to merely drunkenness and boisterous behaviour - and partly because of the 
build-up to the riot. The first indication that someone were intending to stir up unrest 
had surfaced as early as in May. when a handbill, announcing that the heroes of the 
French Revolution were to be burned in effigy. had been published in Edinburgh.’i 
Then. the week before 3 June (which was a Monday) handbills were posted up in 
public places all over Edinburgh. The Provost, James Stirling, responded by sending 
out patrols of soldiers in the streets in order to remove all seditious material they 
could find, since he himself saw ‘Reason to apprehend that some evil disposed 
persons were using means to excite tumults upon his Majestys birth day’? No  fewer 
than fourteen different placards were taken down and brought to the Provost, all 
containing a message hostile to figures of authority. Some of them were rambling 
p. 127; Meikle, Scotland. p. 81; and Christopher A Whatley, ‘Royal Day, People’s Day: The 
Monarch‘s Birthday in Scotland, c. 1660-1 860’. in People and Power in Scotland: Essays in honour 
of T. C. S m u t ,  eds., Roger Mason and Norman Macdougall (Edinburgh, 1992). p. 170. The riot 
caused serious concern among central government officials in  Scotland, and an extensive 
correspondence has survived in the Home Office papers for Scotland, see: NAS, RH2/4/63. ff. 70-95, 
185, and RH2/4/64, ff. 201 -2, 209. 
Whatley. ‘Royal Day’, p. 177. For Whatley‘s general argument, see: ibid, pp. 171-77. 
The Times, 12 June 1792. This was the only year in the period 1792 to 1802 that The Times 
Logue, Popular Disturbances, p. 134. Logue’s source was NAS, KH2/4/63, f .  31. 
NAS, RH2/4/63, ff. 169-70, Declaration by James Stirling, Lord Provost of the City of Ed 
13 
14 
on the King’s birthday celebrations in Scotland. 
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threats to the lives of the Provost and certain town councillors of Edinburgh. while 
others were urging people to turn out for planned demonstrations where Henry 
Dundas and other senior public officials were to be burned in effigy.17 Whether these 
handbills were instrumental in causing the b n g ’ s  birthday riot. or whether they only 
served to direct and organise already existing discontent may be difficult to ascertain, 
but the riots clearly followed the lead they provided.18 Disturbances first broke out in 
the evening on the IOng’s birthday, when the large crowd of people which had 
t Gathered on the High Street, carried off and set fire to a sentry box. More rioting 
followed, and the Provost was only gradually able to disperse the crowds of people 
by deploying dragoons from the cavalry unit stationed at the castle. The next day the 
city was quiet until about six in the evening when a small crowd gathered outside the 
house of Lady Arniston (Henry Dundas’s mother) in George Square, carrying with 
them an effigy meant to represent Henry Dundas. The effigy was set alight and the 
crowd began pelting the house with various objects, breaking several windows. 
Attempts made by two of the men in the house to disperse the crowd only seemed to 
fuel its anger. and the protesting group was steadily reinforced as more people -joined 
its activities. Eventually, troops from the castle arrived to disperse the crowd. but this 
proved difficult and it was not until shots had been fired and at least one man had 
been killed that the riot subsided. The day after a large crowd again assembled in 
George Square about six in the evening, but the strong guard which had been put on 
duty outside of Lady Amiston’s and the Lord Advocate’s houses, probably 
discouraged further attacks, and the crowd eventually dispersed. l 9  No guard had, 
however, been positioned outside the house of the Lord Provost, and the crowd soon 
reassembled there, before it proceeded to break every window in the house. By the 
time the authorities had been able to respond and had sent troops over to that part of 
town, the crowd had melted away.” After this incident. no further riots took place in 
l 7  One of them stated quite simply that: ‘NOW IS THE TIME TO BURN THE VILLAIN. FEAR 
NOT - YOU WILL BE SUPPORTED’, followed by, ‘Burn the Villain Dundas’. NAS, RH2/4/63, f. 
176. Handbill [original capitals]. 
It has been suggested that it was the defeat of Richard Sheridan’s last motion for burgh reform in 
the House of Commons on 18 April that formed the main cause of the riot. Brims, Ph.D., p. 158. 
Henry Dundas had even resisted Sheridan’s motion to bring his Reform Bill before Parliament in late 
March. The Times. 25 Feb. 1793 
I8 
At the time the Lord Advocate of Scotland was Robert Dundas, Henry Dundas’s nephew. 




Edinburgh. and two weeks later the Lord Provost could report to Henry Dundas that 
the city was in a state of ‘the most remarkable peace and quietness.. In fact. the city 
had turned so quiet that the Lord Provost found himself ‘puzzled to account how. the 
wanton and most unprovoked tumults of the Birthday originated’? Most 
government officials were, however, convinced that political radicals had been 
instrumental in stirring up the riots, and. although no firm evidence could be 
produced to substantiate this claim. from now on, not only did they look for 
connections with political radicals in all subsequent popular disturbances, but they 
also placed the political radicals under increasing scrutiny and pressure.” The 
Edinburgh riot therefore marked a turning point. I t  undoubtedly represented a very 
serious breakdown of order, but of a different kind from those of previous years. 
While in the past, the Edinburgh crowds had tended to take action in support of the 
political status quo, they were now clearly acting against representatives of the ruling 
elite, and the authorities could be justified in viewing this as a potential threat to the 
- -  
existing political regime.’’ None the less. it is not immediately clear how 
representative the attitudes expressed by the Edinburgh crowds on this occasion were 
of the general mood among the Scottish lower orders. Certainly, similar disturbances 
did occur in many other places about rhe same time. Effigies of Henry Dundas were 
burned in Aberdeen, Dundee, Perth, Peebles. and - according to Henry Meikle - in 
‘almost every village in the North of Scotland’;24 but in Banff, attempts made by 
members of a local reform club - the Universal Liberty Club - to stir people into 
action by going about the streets encouraging them to bum effigies on the King’s 
birthday, failed to create much of a disturbance.25 Moreover, in Glasgow. it was 
reported that the ‘rabble’ had burnt effigies of John Wilkes and Thomas Paine at the 
~ ~~ ~~~ 
2’ NAS, RH2/4/64, ff. 201-2, James Stirling to Henry Dundas. Edinburgh 20 June 1792. A few days 
earlier, i t  was reported in The Times that: ‘Every thing has remained quiet in Edinburgh since 
Thursday last’. The Times, 15 June 1792. 
Logue, Popular Disrurbances, pp. 140-41. 
23 Ibid., pp. 144-45. 
Meikle, Scotland, p. 81. It is not entirely clear what Meikle meant by the ‘North of Scotland’. There 
were riots in Aberdeen, but according to Brims, this was not the case for the surrounding countryside: 
‘On the whole the north-east of Scotland was unfriendly towards political radicalism. The 
conservative tradition of that region which stretched back at least as far as the Reformation still 
exerted a powerful influence in the 1790s’. Brims, Ph.D., p. 193. 
22 
24 
Logue, Popular Disturbances, p. 147. 25 
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same time as the Dundases were the main target of the Edinburgh crowds.’” The 
picture which emerges is therefore a complex one of different attitudes in different 
parts of the country. Some areas, such as the east coast from Edinburgh to Dundee, 
seemed to have been moved by events in France and at home into a new popular 
opposition to the government, while the industrialising towns in the west appeared to 
remain unaffected. T. M. Devine has argued that it would be ‘a gross exaggeration to 
suggest that the Scottish people as a whole had become politically disaffected by 
1792’. Rather it would seem that discontent and unrest had a local focus. and 
remained localised to certain centres of radicalism. such as Edinburgh, Dundee and 
Perth.27 
With the exception of one or two disturbances, Scotland remained relatively 
quiet over the late summer of 1792, and it was not until well into the autumn that 
further outbreaks of rioting over political issues occurred.” In the meantime, a wet 
summer and subsequent poor harvest. combined with the adverse effects of the Corn 
Law of 1791, led to food shortages and economic distress,29 while the radical turn of 
the revolution in France on 10 August 1792, and the subsequent French victories 
over Austria and Prussia sparked a new degree of enthusiasm over politics among 
ordinary people in Scotland. Although the shortages of food caused by the poor 
harvest and exacerbated by the Corn Law had created a reservoir of discontent, the 
actual outbreak of disturbances seems to have had more to do with enthusiasm over 
the recent events in France. Most of the disturbances erupted after news of the 
French victory at Jemappes on 6 November had arrived in Scotland, and were 
concerned with crowds of people erecting ‘Trees of Liberty . Unrest in connection 9 30 
with attempts to plant such trees occurred in places such as Stonehaven, Aberdeen, 
Fochabers, Auchtermuchty and Strathmiglo, and in Newburgh. plans of burning 
effigies of several local public officials demonstrated that these disturbances also had 
l6 Whatley, ‘Royal Day’, p. 183. 
28 Logue, Popular Disturbances, p. 149. There was a riot in  Ross-shire in  August, but it was not 
concerned with issues of political reform, see: chapter 2, pp. 47-9. 
Macleod, ‘Influence of the French Revolution’, p. 127. In the words of Michael Fry the Corn Laws 
‘set up an absurdly complex system to discourage imports and encourage exports’. Fry, Dundas, p. 
166. 
The Tree of Liberty was a symbol for the famous principles of ‘liberty, equality and fraternity’, the 
very slogan of the French Republicans, and left little doubt as to what the crowds were celebrating. 




3 1  an anti-establishment aspect to them. There were indications of unrest in other 
places as well. A smaller disturbance had occurred in Forfar? and Lord Adam 
Gordon - the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces in North Britain - had found 
it necessary to station troops at Hamilton. Kilmarnock and Dumfries to retain peace 
and quiet there? In Aberdeen, sailors had blocked the harbour, although it is not 
clear if their action was concerned with political grie\.ances, while at Edinburgh, a 
scuffle had ensued when ‘seven young tradesmen’ had gone up to the castle to drink 
with the soldiers and ’politics unluckily became the topic‘. The authorities suspected 
the tradesmen of trying to convert or hire the soldiers for the radical association ‘the 
Friends of the People’, and they were consequently arrested, with three of them later 
tried for sedition.” A ‘dispute with the seamen at Leith’, which had occurred about 
the same time, had been peacefully resolved by the brave intervention of the 
Countess of Hopetoun. who had herself gone down to the men and advised them ‘to 
abstain from every violence and seek redress with decency and temper’.;“ These 
were. however, minor incidents compared with the riots which took place in Perth 
and Dundee. Perth was a stronghold for reform politics in Scotland, and it was also 
here that the unrest first broke out and persisted for the longest period of time. On 6 
November an effigy - probably meant to represent Henry Dundas - had been carried 
around the streets by a journeyman dyer dressed in women‘s clothes. and, after the 
French general Dumouriez had entered Brussels. an anonymous correspondent 
reported that the people of Perth had ‘gone quite mad about Liberty and Equality’. 
Trees of Liberty were planted and hostility to Dundas was adamant.” The situation 
remained tense for a long time in Perth, and as late as 29 December David Smyth 
wrote to Henry Dundas that: ‘There is still a very violent spirit in the Town of Perth’, 
U 
Logue. Popular Disturbances, pp. 148-49. 3 1  
31 NAS, Home Office, Supplementary papers, RH2/4/207. f. 393-94, Alexander Riddoch, Provost o f  
Dundee, to Robert. Graham Esq., Dundee, 24 November 1792. 
NAS, RH2/4/65, ff. 104-5, Lord Adam Gordon to Henry Dundas, Abbey Edinburgh, 26 November 
1792; and RH2/4/66, f. 182, Private from Adam Gordon to Henry Dundas [’?I, Abbey Edinburgh, 1 
December 1792. 
34 Ibid., ff. 235-36, George Auldjo, Provost of Aberdeen to Lord Adam Gordon. Aberdeen, 5 
December 1792; and ibid., ff. 3 17-3 18, George Auldjo to Lord Advocate. 12 December 1792. 
The Times, 28 Nov. 1792; and Lord Cockburn, An Examination of the Trials for Sedition which 
have hitherto occurred in Scotland (2 vols. Edinburgh, 1888; New York, 1970), 11, 95-6. 
Edinburgh Evening Courant, 19 Nov. 1792. 
Logue, Popular Disturbances, p. 149. Logue cited: NAS, RH2/4/67, ff. 436-38, Alexander Todd to 
3 3  
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Evan Nepean, Public Office Hatton Garden, 20 December 1792. 
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although he himself believed that ‘in a little time the Spirits of men will be calmed, 
and all ground of apprehension at an end in this part of the I(lngdom’.-’8 
Whereas the unrest in Perth was long lasting and sporadic. rioting in Dundee 
was short-lived, but more intense. The disturbances began L on 16 November, and 
concerned the planting of a Tree of Liberty. Once the rioting had got under way. 
however, the focus of the crowds was soon re-directed to more local issues, such as 
the price of coal and the detainment of a shipload of meal in the harbour, and the 
rioting reached it peak when a group of people who had assembled in the harbour 
‘insisted that the shipmasters should sell them [coal] at a certain price’. When this 
was refused the crowd proceeded to break open the hatches and seize a quantity of 
coal, which was subsequently ‘carried to the High street. and there made a bonfire 
of‘? Unrest continued in Dundee for another week, but on 24 November the lord 
provost, Alexander Riddoch, could report that: ‘Ever since Tuesday we have been 
tolerably quiet. The great Body of the People are ashamed of what has happened and 
I find no spirit for Mob or Riot among them a few blackguards excepted?) 
The Dundee riots of November 1792 can be seen to epitomise the very nature 
of political disturbances in Scotland in the 1790s. The immediate occasion for the 
outbreak of unrest was the desire to celebrate the victories of the French 
Revolutionary A m y  by planting Trees of Liberty, and to an extent, this remained the 
driving factor in the disturbances.“ Once people had become involved in the 
activities of the crowd, however, their attention seemed to refocus on other, more 
local concerns, and it is this tendency to concentrate on local issues that was typical 
of many riots in Scotland in the 1790s. Although most disturbances were inspired by 
the news of events in France, or were initiated over issues connected with political 
reform at home. the crowds tended to retain a local focus in 
seemed reluctant to get involved in political issues of a national 
situation in Scotland mirrored that of Britain as a whole. While 
their activities, and 
concern. In this, the 
attempts were made 
38 NAS, RH2/4/67, ff. 500-3, David Smyth to Henry Dundas, Edinburgh. 29 December 1792. 
39 The Times, 21, 30 Nov. 1792; and Logue, Popular Disturbances, pp. 149-5 1 .  
NAS, RH2/4/207, ff. 393-94. See also: Caledonian Mercuq-, 1 Dec. 1792, ‘To the Printer‘, by 
James Stewart, Dundee, Nov. 29. 1792. 
41 Kenneth Logue has argued that: ‘it was the Tree of Liberty which kept the popular activity going, it  
being planted and replanted on three separate occasions’; the Corn Law remained of ‘secondary‘ 
importance. Logue, Popular Disturbances, p. 152. 
40 
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by reformers and radicals all across Britain to create a 'national challenge' to the 
political establishment, there was little sign of this spilling over into a coordinated 
attempt to challenge the authorities through popular direct action. Riots therefore 
remained 'diverse and localised reactions to specific grievances and events' ." 
Moreover. in term of popular unrest, 1792 was to remain a unique year, at least as far 
as Scotland was concerned. Although rioting over political issues would occur later 
in the decade, these disturbances would rarely be as widespread and extensive as the 
rioting of that year." In the summer of 1792. however. no one could know that this 
would be the case, and it was reflected in the way reformers and radicals in Scotland 
responded to the situation that had arisen. 
I1 
The Friends of the People, and the Edinburgh Conlvritioizs oj' 1792-93 
For the those Scots who had been campaigning for political reform for some time, or 
who held radical political opinions. this sudden upsurge of popular support for their 
cause created a problem. Insistent on pursuing a legal campaign for reform, they now 
had to distance themselves from the unlawful behaviour of the rioting crowds.44 
which the authorities were increasingly trying to blame on them? 
A possible answer had. however. been provided by a group of reformist 
Whigs in England. who had formed the Association of the Friends of the People in 
April 1792 in response to outbreaks of rioting in London, Sheffield, and Manchester. 
and the Scottish reformers decided to follow suit. The intention behind the new 
organisation was to provide the discontented with an elite leadership, and thereby to 
channel their interest in reform into a more constitutional direction. In the months 
Malcolm J Thomis, and Peter Holt, Threats of Revolution in Britain 1789-1848 (London, 1977), p. 
27. 
Kenneth Logue has argued that in the case of Scotland. 'disturbances which were overtly political 
... were largely limited to the year 1792 and were dominated by one event, the King's Birthday Riot 
of June 1792 in Edinburgh'. Logue. Popular Disturbances, p. 133. 
42 
43 
Brims, Ph.D., p. 277. 
The general perception among the governing elite at the time was that ordinary people of little or no 45 
education were unable to organise, or even instigate, such sustained outbreaks of rioting as had 
occurred in Scotland since the spring of 1792. If the lower orders rose in revolt, it could only mean 
that disgruntled and mischievous members of the upper or middling orders had been going about 
sowing discontent, and for this, these 'enemies of the government' and not the ordinary man and 
woman were to blame. See: Logue, Popular Disturbances, pp. 140-41. 
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following the inauguration of the Scottish society at Fortune’s Tavern in Edinburgh 
on 26 July 1792, the organisation spread rapidly across Scotland, and by the end of 
September, the Scottish Friends of the People was beginning to resemble a national 
organisation. At a meeting held in Edinburgh later in the autumn, it was resolved to 
call a general convention of all the societies in Scotland, due to meet in early 
December, and ‘the first General Convention of the Delegates from the Societies of 
the Friends of the People throughout Scotland’. as it came to be known. subsequently 
met in Edinburgh on 11 December 1792.” 
46 
From the very beginning of proceedings it was evident that the growing 
suspicion of the authorities, and the emerging opposition from loyalist associations, 
weighed heavily upon the delegates. The purpose of calling a nation-wide assembly 
had been to coordinate the efforts of the Scottish societies in petitioning for 
parliamentary reform, but, in the words of John Brims. the petitioning of Parliament 
‘now took second place to the loyalist reaction and how to respond to it’? Although 
the convention did proceed to draw up a series of resolutions on parliamentary 
reform. the delegates seemed almost as anxious to proclaim their loyalty to IOng and 
Constitution, as they were to forward the case for political reform.‘(’ The most 
controversial event that took place at the convention was the insistence of the 
Glasgow advocate Thomas Muir on reading an address to the delegates from the 
radical ‘Society of United Irishmen’. Muir himself belonged to that section of the 
radical movement which believed that petitioning, in itself - although a very laudable 
means of promoting reform - was insufficient and that it had to be ‘backed by a 
Brims, Ph.D., pp. 163, 173. 176-81, 267. From the very beginning the government succeeded in 
infiltrating the Scottish Friends of the People by building up a network of spies. They would be 
members of the association, or just attend its meetings, and report back to the central Scottish 
government officials such as Robert Dundas and Thomas Elder. The two most famous spies were 
Robert Watt, and ‘J. B.’ - a highly professional infiltrator whose identity has never been established. 
Both operated in Edinburgh were the most important meetings took place. 
47 John Brims. ‘From Reformers to “Jacobins”: The Scottish Association of the Friends of the People’, 
in Conflict and Stability in Scottish Socieh 1700-1 850: Proceedings of the Scottish Historical Studies 
Seminar, University ofStrathclj9de 1988-89, ed.. T. M. Devine (Edinburgh, 1990), p. 41, and Brims. 
48 Brims, ‘Reformers to “Jacobins”’, p. 41. 
j9 At one point it was decided that the delegates should ‘go in small parties’ and sign a resolution 
issued by the loyalist Goldsmiths’ Hall Association, and it was also resolved that the minutes of the 
convention should be published in the press so that no one could accuse the Friends of the People of 
clandestine activities, and their constitutional approach to reform would be clear for all to see. 
46 
Ph.D.. pp. 288-89,291, 294-95. 
17 
50 The national convention and, implicitly, by the threat of revolution’ to be effective. 
appeal from the United Irishmen was. however, rejected on the grounds that it 
bordered on being treasonable.” Despite the increasing pressure from the 
6 Oovernment on the one hand, and Muir’s attempt to move the delegates in a more 
radical direction on the other, the convention persevered with its programme of 
advocating political reform by petitioning parliament, and when the convention was 
adjourned on 13 December, due to reassemble in April, it was mainly done so that 
the delegates could go home to their localities and ‘circulate petitions to be signed in 
favour of a bill to be advanced in parliament’.”’ 
The second convention met as scheduled on 20 April 1793, and, despite the 
secession of the moderate Foxite members earlier in the year and the subsequent 
’radicalisation’ of the movement, the delegates stuck with the moderate strategy of 
petitioning Parliament for reform as it had been set out at the first convention.” More 
radical measures - such as the Glasgow delegate John Sinclair’s attempt to have a 
Declaration of Rights issued by the convention - were opposed and defeated by the 
moderate majority. The delegates did express their opposition to the war against 
France - a potentially dangerous move which rendered them liable to the accusation 
of being unpatriotic - but. overall. the second convention retained the moderate 
outlook of the first assembly.54 Before it was dissolved on 3 May it had been decided 
John D. Brims, ‘The Scottish “Jacobins”. Scottish Nationalism and the British Union’ [hereafter: 
’Scottish Nationalism‘], in Scotland and England 1286 - 1815. ed., Roger A Mason (Edinburgh, 
1987). pp. 250-51; and Nancy Curtin. The United Irishmen: Popular Politics in Ulster and Dublin 
1791-1798 (Oxford, 1994), p. 21. The address from the United Irishmen can be found in: 
Purliunientun- Histon!. 34 (London. 18 19), cc. 615-1 8, ‘Address from the Society of United Irishmen 
in Dublin. to the Delegates for promoting a Reform in Scotland. November 23d, 1792’. 
Meikle, Scotland, pp. 107-9; and Brims, ‘Reformers to ”Jacobins”’, p. 42. The Goldsmiths’ Hall 
resolution was ostensibly intended to throw discredit on the Friends of the People, and the committee 
in charge of the resolution subsequently ordered all names belonging to delegates at the convention to 
be deleted. 
’’ See: Gordon Pentland, ‘Radical Ideologies’ [forthcoming]. 
course of action would be to refrain from holding another convention in the prevailing political 
climate, when the government was likely to see this as a provocation. the Foxites took the 
consequence of their stance and withdrew from further agitation in early April. See: Brims, Ph.D., pp. 
389, 392; Brims, ‘Reformers to “Jacobins”’, p. 43; and E. W. McFarland, Ireland and Scotland in the 
Age of Revolution: Planting the Green Bough (Edinburgh, 1994), pp. 97-8. The loss of the Foxite 
membership undoubtedly deprived the movement of some of its greatest talent, and one consequence 
was that at the second convention ‘the calibre of the delegates was far below that of the previous one’. 
Christina Bewley, Muir of Huntershill (Oxford, 198 1 ), p. 6 1. 
50 
51 
Meikle, Scotland, p. 125. Frustrated over their failure to convince the association that the best 53 
Brims, Ph.D., p. 406; and Brims, ‘Reformers to “Jacobins”’, p. 44. 54 
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to hold another convention in October,” and, in the meantime. the societies were 
encouraged to ‘persevere in the cause of Parliamentary reform until such time as they 
should obtain the end for which they had associated’.’‘ 
Only three days after the assembly was dissolved. the petitions from both the 
Scottish and the English societies of Friends of the People were presented to 
Parliament, together with Charles Grey’s motion for the appointment of a committee 
of enquiry into the state of parliamentary representation. This was the major political 
move the association had been working towards since it was constituted one year 
previously and, at least as far as the Scottish societies were concerned, it was the end 
result of their insistence on adhering to the constitutional road towards reform. The 
intention had been to produce such a barrage of petitions that the House of Commons 
would find it difficult to ignore them. but. in this. both the Scottish and the English 
societies failed spectacularly. Only Edinburgh and Glasgow produced petitions of a 
noticeable size, and in all there were merely 21 petitions sent from Scotland - hardly 
an indication of a nation-wide demand for reform north of the border. The English 
societies did even worse. producing a pitiful 14 petitions for the whole of England.57 
If Parliament was ever likely to have been overwhelmed by the strategy of producing 
a flood of petitions in favour of refcrm, this small trickle would not impress MPs 
and, when the House divided on Grey’s motion, his bill was resoundingly defeated 
by 282 votes to 41 ? Political radicalism now no longer seemed to pose a credible 
challenge to the existing regime, and the defeat of the reform motion in Parliament 
did not spark any popular reaction in Scotland either.s9 No rioting of the kind which 
had erupted in Edinburgh on the IOng’s birthday in 1792 occurred, and the 
Caledonian Mercuv could report that ‘the mobiliv of Edinburgh’ had now returned 
to celebrating the day in ‘their ancient mode of displaying their joy, by heartily 
Brims, ‘Scottish Nationalism’, p. 257. 
Edinburgh Gazetteer, 7 May 1793, cited in: Brims, ‘Reformers to “Jacobins”’, p. 43, and Meikle, 
Brims, ‘Scottish Nationalism’, p. 256. 
Mathieson, Awakening of Scotland, p. 180. 
55 
56 
Scotland, p. 126. 
51 
58 
59 Thomas Elder wrote to Robert Dundas in March 1793 that: ‘The Friends of the People are very 
much humbled and at present are very quiet, their meetings are few & secret, and their friends 
exhausted’. NAS, RH2/4/70, f. 99, Tho. Elder, Lord Provost to the Lord Advocate, Edinburgh, 21 
March 1793. 
19 
pelting each other with dead cats, fish guts, &c’ .~”  The rest of the country also 
remained relatively quiet. and, so far, the authorities both in Scotland and in England 
seemed to have successfully fended off the challenge to the political establishment. 
For the Friends of the People the immediate prospects seemed bleak, but 
those who had not already given up the cause of political reform, began to look for 
possibilities to revive the movement. An opportunity arose on 17 May when Maurice 
Margarot and Thomas Hardy, the chairman and secretary of the radical London 
Corresponding Society (LCS), contacted William Skirving of the Edinburgh Friends 
of the People and requested a closer co-operation between the two societies. In a 
situation where the strategy of petitioning Parliament appeared to have failed, 
Margarot and Hardy looked towards the summoning of a national convention as the 
only viable alternative.6’ It was therefore natural to contact the leading radicals in 
Scotland and. since Skirving - in the capacity of president of the Edinburgh society - 
already had experience in organising such assemblies, they looked to him for 
advice.” For the Scottish Friends of the People, however, this was not an obvious 
choice. Up till this point the Scottish society had only maintained a connection with 
its parent association in London. and not with the more radical English societies such 
as the LCS. But now. when they were ‘unrestrained’ by the moderate Foxites who 
had withdrawn from the society before the April convention. and few other viable 
options seemed to present themselves, the Scottish Friends were prepared to embark 
on the more dangerous course of holding a national convention? Margarot and 
Hardy’s request was therefore met with an enthusiastic reply from Skirving and. over 
the summer, plans for a national convention were beginning to take shape.“ 
Caledonian Mercuni. 6 June 1793 [original italics]. 
A national convention, it was envisaged by radical thinkers. would have three basic purposes. It 
would command or overawe the legislature, demand rather than petition for measures of parliamentary 
reform, and resist a government that refused to accept the convention’s demands. It was central to the 
legitimacy of the convention that it  was truly representative of the sovereign people, because, in the 
words of John Barrell: ‘Parliament, they believed, had no right to reject a petition which spoke the 
wishes of a majority of the people’. John Barrell, Imagining the King’s Death: Figurative Treason, 
Fantasies of Regicide 1793 - 1796, (Oxford, 2000), p. 142. See also: H. T. Dickinson, Liberg, and 
Property: Political Ideology in Eighteenth-Century Britain (London, 1979), pp. 262-63. 
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Meanwhile, some of the central government figures in Scotland were 
surprised at the radical societies’ persistence and longevity. Robert Dundas, for 
example, wrote to undersecretary Evan Nepean at the War Office about the activities 
of the Friends of the People, stating that: ‘I had no idea thev would have stuck so 
long & so well together’? The Scottish authorities had, however. no intentions of 
alleviating the pressure on the political opposition and, in August and September. 
they proceeded to prosecute the two leading political radicals - Thomas Muir and 
Thomas Fyshe Palmer - before the Scottish law courts for the crime of sedition. Muir 
was seen as having a key organisational role in the Scottish radical movement, and 
Palmer was held to have been responsible for instigating the rioting in Dundee the 
previous November.“ In two highly publicised trials. they were both found guilty 
and sentenced to the unprecedentedly harsh punishment of transportation to Australia 
- Muir for fourteen years and Palmer for seven. If these two trials had been initiated 
by the government as a means of countering the domestic political challenge, the 
harsh penalties inflicted on the two convicted radicals ensured that - seen from a 
propaganda point of view - they backfired badly on the authorities. Muir and Palmer 
were admittedly to be removed from Scotland to a place where they could do no 
further harm, but public opinion was outraged at the severity of the sentences. and at 
least in the short term, the political climate became more favourable for the reform 
movement. 67 
The trials of Muir and Palmer did not have the expected effect of further 
subduing the Scottish Friends of the People either, and by early September the 
famous government spy ‘J. B.’ reported that: ‘The Severity of Mr. Muirs Sentence, 
instead of extinguishing the Spirit of the associations, seem to have given new life & 
vigour to them’.68 Towards the end of the month Robert Dundas had to admit that the 
65 NAS, RH2/4/7 1 ,  f. 279, R. Dundas to Nepean, Edinburgh, 2 1 June 1793. 
67 The Times reported on the trial of Muir, and, in  what can reasonably been seen as a balanced and 
sober summary of the proceedings at the High Court, the newspaper nonetheless found reason to 
conclude in more emphatic terms. It stated that Muir had been sentenced ‘to be transported beyond 
seas ... for the space of Fourteen Yeurs!’. The Times, 4 Sept. 1793 [original italics]. For a discussion 
of the two trials and their implications, see: chapter 3, pp. 87-94. 
NAS, RH2/4/72, f. 52, J. B., Edinburgh, 6 September 1793. His views were confirmed by the lord 
provost of Edinburgh, who wrote that ’Muirs Sentence has revived the frequency of the meetings of 
the societies calld friends of the people’. Ibid., f. 43, Tho. Elder to Secretary of State, Edinburgh 
Council Chambers, 7 September 1793. Thomas Elder and James Stirling appear to have alternated in 
McFarland, Ireland and Scotland, p. 95. 66 
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situation - as seen from the government’s point of view - looked as bad as it had 
done a year before? It is likely that the improved political climate. together with the 
revival of the reform movement in Scotland. played a role in the eventual decision to 
summon a national convention, but the decisive factor seems to have been a 
suspicion that Parliament might soon outlaw the holding of conventions altogether.’” 
In July the Irish Parliament had passed a bill making conventions illegal. and by 
autumn it seemed increasingly likely that the British Parliament might follow its 
example. This gave the issue of holding a convention a new degree of urgency and, 
in the view of John Barrell, ‘the fear of an imminent convention bill was probably 
responsible for the fact that the convention was summoned at a K 7 ’  
111 
The British Coiiveiztim 
When the assembly first met in Edinburgh on 29 October 1793, it was poorly 
attended if it was meant to be a national convention. This was partly because it had 
been announced at a very short notice - probably to keep it secret from government 
spies for as long as possible - which made it difficult for the English societies to 
respond quickly enough. and none of the English delegates could in fact make it  up 
to Scotland in time for the opening.” In the absence of the English delegates the 
‘General Convention of the Friends of the People‘. as it was named. was therefore 
‘an exclusively Scottish affair’.74 Although the assembly could hardly be said to 
constitute a national British convention, this did not discourage those who were 
present from pressing ahead with their programme. Business was conducted over 
four days of hectic activity, which even rendered the government spy exhausted by 
73 
holding the office of lord provost. Elder was provost: 1788-90, 1792-94 and 1798-1800, whereas 
Stirling held the position: 1790-92, and 1794-98. See: DNB. 
NAS, RH2/4/72, ff. 86-88, R. Dundas to Henry Dundas [‘My Dear Sir’], Edinburgh, 28 October 
1793. See also: Brims, Ph.D., p. 467. 
Brims, ‘Reformers to “Jacobins”‘, p. 45; and Pentland, ‘Radical Ideoiogies’ . 
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73 See: William Cobbett [and T. B. Howell]: A Complete Collection of State Trials and Proceedings 
for High Treason and other Crimes and Misdemeanours from the Earliest Period (11631 to the 
Present Time (18201, [hereafter: ST, followed by volume number] (London, 1809-1 826), 23 ( 18 17), c. 
391. 
74 Brims. ‘Scottish Nationalism’, p. 257. 
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the end,” and which demonstrated that internal frictions and disagreements were still 
noticeable - the absence of Foxite reformers and the. by now. more coherently 
i h  radical nature of the assembly notwithstanding. Two petitions - one to the king for 
an end to the present war, and another to the House of Commons for the introduction 
of universal manhood suffrage and annual parliamentary elections - was the main 
outcome of the convention, together with a decision to ‘cultivate a more close union 
with England’ .77 Only shortly after the assembly had been dissolved. the 
representatives of a few English societies arrived in Edinburgh and, at a meeting held 
on 6 November. it was decided to call back the members of the late Convention for a 
new one to be held on the 19‘h of the same month.78 
At the reconvened convention. the English delegates quickly moved to the 
forefront and assumed leading roles in the assembly. Maurice Margarot of the LCS 
presented one of the first motions of the convention. when he moved, ‘that a 
committee be furthwith appointed to consider the means, and draw up the outlines of 
a plan of general union and corporation between the two nations in their 
constitutional pursuit of a thorough parliamentary reform‘ .79 This motion, which was 
seconded by Joseph Gerrald, was immediately passed by a unanimous vote, but the 
setting up of a ‘Committee of Union‘ and a more thorough debate over the 
ramifications of this union of English and Scottish radicals was postponed for a few 
days to allow organisational matters to be handled.”” In terms of setting the agenda of 
the convention, the lead thus taken by Margarot and Gerrald at the very opening of 
the proceedings was to be symptomatic of the subsequent debates on this and other 
issues. The English delegates - together with William Skirving - led the way with 
radical proposals, and the majority of delegates followed on behind, most of the time 
enthusiastically, but on occasion also more hesitantly. Probably because of this new 
and radical lead provided by the English delegates, the fourth convention came to 
J. B. wrote lengthy reports on the proceedings at the convention. and complained about the long- 
lasting debates. NAS, RH2/4/72, f 169. J .  B., 29 October 1792: and RH2/4/73, f. 184, J. B., 
Edinburgh, 1 November 1793. 
76 Brims, Ph.D., pp. 479-80. 
490-9 1 .  
78  Brims, Ph.D., p. 495. 
*’ Brims, Ph.D., p. 498; and Brims, ‘Scottish Nationalism’. 258. 
75 
ST, 23, c. 413. The whole minutes are covered over cc. 391-415. See also: Brims, Ph.D.. pp. 483, 77 
ST, 23, c. 417. I 9  
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differ markedly from the previous three assemblies, and the most striking and 
important difference was the adoption of so-called ‘French forms?’ It began with 
the delegates addressing each other as ‘citizens’, a term used by the French 
Revolutionaries, and widely recognised as carrying revolutionary connotations. Then 
on 23 November, when the debate on Margarot’s motion on unity was brought to a 
conclusion, the delegates agreed unanimously to the ‘Union of the People of the two 
nations’,82 and upon this decision, Alexander Scott - the editor of the radical 
newspaper the Edinburgh Gazetteer - ‘proposed that all the members should rise up 
and join hands, as a proof of the union betwixt England and Scotland. which are now 
joined as Britain’. This was subsequently done. and, while showing clear signs of 
being carried away by enthusiasm over this gesture, the delegates proceeded to agree 
to a motion from the English delegate Charles Sinclair, ‘that henceforth the 
convention should be styled the British Convention of the Delegates of the People, 
Associated to obtain Universal Suffrage and Annual Parliaments‘ .’-’ The joining of 
hands in a gesture of unity in this manner bore a striking resemblance to events that 
had taken place in France in the summer 1789. It could be likened to the Tennis 
Court Oath in Paris on 20 June when - seized by enthusiasm - the Third Estate had 
risen and declared that they would not disband until they had drafted a constitution 
for France. Moreover, by re-naming themselves ‘the British Convention’. the 
delegates in Edinburgh also seemed to be assuming a role equivalent of that held by 
the National Convention in France. Precisely why Sinclair decided to present this 
motion, and how far the delegates had comprehended the implications of giving the 
assembly such a name, is uncertain. In John Brims’ view it was first and foremost a 
matter of an ‘unfortunate’ choice of word, but the immediately following events 
indicated that the delegates had, at least, developed a certain taste for the kind of 
procedures used in the French National C o n ~ e n t i o n . ~ ~  They began dating the 
‘French forms’ was term of abuse adopted by the authorities, and later used in the sedition trials 81 
against the leading delegates at the convention. See: chapter 3, pp. 128-29. *’ Brims, Ph.D., p. 500. 
ST, 23, cc. 426-27. 
According to John Brims: ‘It implied that the delegates considered themselves to be the 
representatives of the nation, and therefore suggested that the convention meant to challenge the 
sovereignty of parliament, whereas all that was intended was an affirmation of Anglo-Scottish radical 
solidarity in the struggle for democratic reform’. Brims, Ph.D., p. 500. 
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proceedings of the assembly from ‘the first year of the British Convention’, 
described their meetings as ‘sittings’ and adopted a committee structure which was 
arguably based on that of the French Convention.85 For some Scottish delegates this 
was becoming disturbingly radical and, on 25 November, citizens Alexander 
Mackenzie and Waiter Hart moved ‘that it be recommended to the different societies 
throughout the country, to copy the bill of rights into their minutes books, as a basis 
for their proceedings’ .86 None the less, Margarot and the English delegates continued 
to press ahead with their radical program. and it was particularly the threat of a 
convention bill that preoccupied them. Possibly spurred on by the ease with which he 
had got his first motion accepted, Sinclair urged the delegates to show solidarity with 
their radical brethren among the United Irishmen, who were now in an ‘oppressed 
state’ due to the Convention Act passed by the Irish Parliament. This was agreed to, 
but a motion presented by Alexander Callander, calling for the convention to ‘assert 
its right’ in case a similar bill was introduced in Britain, was not immediately 
adopted.*7 The proposal was met with some resistance and debated for several days 
before a refined version drafted by Sinclair was eventually passed by a unanimous 
vote. Sinclair’s final proposal provided a careful outline of how the convention 
should conduct its business in the eventuality of parliament passing a convention bill. 
Since such an Act was held to be ‘totally inconsistent with the first principles and 
safety of society, and also subversive of our known and acknowledged constitutional 
liberties’, the convention should pay no heed to it, nor accept it as legitimate, and 
should therefore ‘continue to assemble and consider of the best means by which we 
can accomplish a real representation of the people and annual election, until 
compelled to resist by superior force’. In the event of a forced dispersal of the 
convention, a secret committee chosen by the assembly should immediately take 
over the control of affairs, and appoint a place at which the delegates were to 
reconvene. Similar action was also to be taken if Parliament passed a bill suspending 
Habeas Corpus - or its Scottish equivalent the ‘Act for preventing Wrongous 
Imprisonment’ - if there was an invasion, or an ‘admission of foreign troops 
Barrell, Imagining, p. 15 1. 
ST, 23, c. 430. 






whatsoever into Great Britain’ .88 For the time being, however, Sinclair’s resolution 
was not included in the minutes, nor did the Edinburgh Guzetteer mention it in its 
reports on the proceedings of the convention. To do so was viewed as too dangerous, 
and a blank space was consequently left in the minutes due to be filled at the close of 
the convention. 89 
The authorities - well informed by the ever-reliable J .  B. - were following the 
unfolding of events at the convention with growing anxiety. When the official 
minutes of the convention from 25 November to 2 December appeared in the 
Edinburgh Gazetteer on 3 December, they confirmed the reports of the spy. and 
appeared ‘so strong’ to Robert Dundas and the Solicitor-General, Robert Blair, that 
they ‘agreed to take notice of them’.’o The necessary warrants were obtained, and 
early on 5 December the Lord Provost of Edinburgh moved in to arrest Margarot, 
Gerrald, Skirving. Scott and Callender, together with two of Scott’s employees at the 
Edinburgh Gazetteer. Later the same day, Thomas Elder appeared at the head of 
thirty constables at Blackfriar‘s Wynd, and dispersed a meeting of about 100 
members of the convention who had assembled there. One further arrest was made 
when the Sheffield delegate Browne created a small scene by seizing the president‘s 
chair, and refused to vacate it, but otherwise the break-up of the meeting went 
quietly. The delegates now demonstrated that they were prepared to adhere to those 
resolutions they had just recently given their support for, and the same evening they 
reassembled at Canongate Lodge, where - on the morning of 6 December - they 
were accompanied by those who had been arrested (and now released on bail). This 
‘Convention of Emergency’, however, was soon interrupted by the Sheriff-substitute 
of Edinburgh, who held orders to disperse it by force. Margarot and the others who 
had been released on bail were arrested again, but the majority of delegates were 
once more allowed to walk away. No further attempts to reconvene the convention 
ST, 23, c. 61 1 .  ‘Invasion’ presumably meant a French invasion, and ‘admission of foreign troops’ 
that the British government would allow mercenary forces to land on British soil, but neither of these 
two points was clarified at the convention. 
89 Barrell, Imagining, p. 154. 
’’ NAS, RH2/4/73, ff. 250-53, R. Dundas to Henry Dundas [‘My Dear Sir’], Edinburgh, 6 December 
1793. John Brims has argued that ‘the authorities were . . .  not prepared to move against the 
convention solely on the strength of J. B.’s intelligence reports’, but only when their accuracy was 
confirmed in the Edinburgh Gazetteer. Brims, Ph.D., p. 507. 
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appear to have taken place, and the British Convention of the Delegates of the People 
came to an end.” 
IV 
The ri?spotisesfrolzi the Edinburgh uuthorities, m d  the ‘Pike Plot ’ 
After the dispersal of the convention. the authorities lost little time in bringing before 
the Scottish law courts those they perceived to be the main culprits. Of the 
approximately 169 delegates at the British Convention, less than ten had been 
arrested by Thomas Elder on 5 and 6 December. and only seven were charged with 
sedition.”’ Not all of them did in the end stand trial, but the central figures - 
Skirving. Margarot, Sinclair and Gerrald - were all prosecuted before the High Court 
in Edinburgh.”’ The trial against Skirving. which must have been prepared very 
quickly, took place as early as 6 and 7 January. and the next trials followed in rapid 
succession. although the last case. that against Gerrald, dragged on until 13 March. 
Only Sinclair escaped conviction, when the case against him was abandoned. and the 
other three were all found guilty and sentenced to the same fourteen years 
transportation as Muir had been awarded half a year earlier? 
Unlike the fierce reaction which had followed the trials of Muir and Palmer. 
the sentencing of Skirving. Margarot and Gerrald seems to have excited little public 
indignation - at least from the middle and upper classes. This may partly have been 
because the sentence of transportation did not cause the surprise it had done at 
Muir’s trial, but it also seems clear that - this time - public opinion was on the side 
of the government. The general reaction to the proceedings of the British Convention 
was one of outrage, and even the moderate reformers and Foxites agreed that this had 
little to do with constitutional reform, and looked far more like attempting to foment 
revolution on the French Yet, although there was no outburst of rioting on 
the scale and intensity seen in the spring and autumn of 1792, indications can still be 
NAS, RH2/4/73, ff. 250-53; and Barrell, Zmagining, pp. 156-7. 
The three who did not stand trial were Callander and Scott - both of whom absconded - and 
For further detail on the trials, see: chapter 3, pp. 95-106. 
It was held as an aggravating factor that the Convention had been copying the forms of the French 
91 
92 John Brims estimated the number of delegates to have been 169. Brims, Ph.D., p. 497. 




Revolutionaries, now that Britain was at war with France. See: Devine, Scottish Nation, pp. 208-9. 
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found of a continuing reservoir of popular discontent, sufficient to fuel a significant 
popular reaction and opposition to the trials. There was certainly popular support for 
Margarot. who, on his way to and from the courtroom and the Inn where he was 
staying, was escorted not only by his friends, but also by a sizeable and noisy crowd 
of people carrying a Tree of Liberty ‘in the shape of the letter MY.”’ This had first 
occurred when Margarot went to the Court of Justiciary a few days before his trial 
was due to commence, and was repeated on the day the trial began. Thomas Elder, 
the lord provost of Edinburgh, had responded quickly to the first incident by issuing 
a proclamation warning the public against any further disturbances. and on the day 97 
the trial was due to start, the Edinburgh Evening Cournrzt reported that ‘in 
consequence of the riotous proceedings on Thursday last ... every precaution was 
taken this day by the Lord Provost. Magistrates, and the Sheriff. to prevent a similar 
breach of good order and police’. Constables were ordered out, and the crowd which 
accompanied Margarot was ‘immediately dispersed, the arch demolished, and its 
supporters taken into custody’ .98 
Signs of mounting tension were surfacing in other parts of the country as 
well. On the same day as Margarot was first followed by a crowd on his way to the 
courthouse, a handbill encouraging people to take up arms against the government 
was discovered in Perth? About ten days later, a handbill with a similar message 
was found posted up on a window shutter in Glasgow, and just over a week after 100 
that, another handbill, this time urging people to ‘remember the trusty friends in 
c 
Cockburn, Exanzination, ii ,  23-5: and Meikle, Scotland, p. 145. 
Caledonian Mercun.  1 1  Jan. 1794. Elder‘s proclamation was dated 10 January - the day after 
Margarot first appeared at the Court of Justiciary - and stated that: ‘all such as may be found 
contravening this Proclamation . . . will be taken into custody, and proceeded against in  terms of law, 
as riotous and disorderly persons. disturbing the public peace’. 
Edinburgh Evening Courunt, 13 Jan. 1794 [ 13 January was a Monday]. The editor of the newspaper 
clearly disapproved of the incident, as he concluded the report with the words: ‘A trial by jury is one 
of the most inestimable blessings of our excellent constitution. and any insult or slight thrown upon it 
but il l  accords with the character of Britons’. See also: Caledonian Mercun.  13 Jan. 1794; and The 
Times, 19 Feb. 1794. According to Elder’s proclamation, similar disturbances had also taken place at 
Skirving’s trial a few days earlier. 
NAS, RH2/4/74, ff. 62-3, James Paton, Sheriff Clerk of Perthshire to Lord Methvin, Perth. 9 
January 1794. Robert Dundas would later write that Perth had been ‘a Nest of Sedition & Jacobinism’ 
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RH2/4/74, ff. 107-8, Robert Grome to William Honyman, Glasgow, 19 January 1794, the handbill 








101 Edinburgh’. appeared in Hamilton. The latter two were both towns in the west, and 
the impression that something was fomenting in western Scotland was picked up by 
Robert Dundas, who - in a letter to his uncle written on the day before Margarot’s 
trial was due to begin - stated that ‘Paisley & its neighbourhood are in a very 
unpleasant situation . His view was reinforced a week later by Gilbert Hamilton, 
the lord provost of Glasgow. who reported that in his city. radicalism ‘seems now to 
be reviving’. I o 3  Nevertheless, none of these incidents appears to have been followed 
by any major disturbances. The eastern regions of the country also seemed calm. 
but below the peaceful surface. discontent was simmering and came to the surface at 
the Edinburgh theatre in the middle of April. 
102 
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The theatre was staging a political play entitled The Royal Martyr. which 
appears to have been seen as provocative by many radicals. During one 
performance a scuffle ensued when ’on calling for the tune of “God Save the IOng” 
. . . some persons refused to pull off their hats‘. This argument within the walls of the 
theatre was then brought outside. and appears to have escalated into riot which lasted 
for several days. The authorities took the incident very seriously and, on 14 April. 
Thomas Elder issued a proclamatlon with stark warnings against any future 
repetitions of the ‘VIOLENT and RIOTOUS PROCEEDINGS [which] took place in 
the Theatre Royal of this City’. A reward of fifty guineas was even offered for any 
information leading to the apprehension of those ‘DISAFFECTED EVIL DISPOSED 
PERSONS‘ who had stirred up the d i s p ~ t e . ” ~  No further incident similar to the 
theatre riot occurred, but one month later it was reported that ‘some young fellows’ 
105 
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Ibid., ff. 116-17. R. Dundas to H. Dundas, Edinburgh. 27 January 1794. 
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1794. Caledonian Mercun,, 22 Feb. 1794. 
Meikle, Scotland, p. 147. 
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had ‘perambulated the streets’ of Edinburgh carrying with them a ‘Tree of’ Liherh‘. 
They had been hostile and violent to passers by who refused to ‘pay obedience‘ to 
the tree, and on one occasion ‘a recruit was severely wounded by them’. The 
‘fellows’ in question were apprehended and sentenced by the magistrates to pay a 
fine, and this appears to have been the end of the matter.Io8 The real litmus test for 
determining the degree and strength of discontent in Edinburgh, however, was as 
always the King’s birthday, and, by and large, the day was reported to have passed 
without any serious incidents occurring. The editorial of the Caledorziuiz Merciiq7, for 
example, stated that ‘upon no occasion has his Majesty’s birthday been celebrated in 
this city with more fervent loyalty than yesterday’ and ’we are happy to say that no 
disturbance happened’.’”’ The absence of disturbances was bought at a price 
however. No fewer than 400 ‘gentlemen‘ of the city had voluntarily enrolled 
themselves as constables with the task of preventing any ’riot or disorder’. and had 
patrolled the streets during the day.’” Yet. these newspaper reports did not tell the 
whole truth. One smaller disturbance hud taken place. as Thomas Elder reported to 
Henry Dundas: 
I have much satisfaction in telling you that notwithstanding the 
threatenings and many alarming informations of the intentions of the 
Friends of the People on the Kings Birthday, it passed over without 
disturbance and the only unpleasing circumstance is that a few boys 
broke 9 panes of glass in The L.[ord] Justice Clerks house. 111 
The Lord Justice Clerk was Lord Braxfield, the presiding judge on the bench in the 
High Court in Edinburgh. and the man who had conducted the trials against Muir, 
Skirving. Margarot, Sinclair and Gerrald. 
Edinburgh was not the only place in the east of Scotland where there were 
signs of popular discontent following the trials of early 1794. One anonymous 
observer in East Lothian wrote a long letter on 28 May, pointing out how: ‘There 
now exists, in some Districts of this County . . . a desperate, sullen, and factious Spirit 
of impatience and of discontent, in the minds of a number not altogether 
The Times, 16, 21 May 1794 [original italics]. 
Caledonian Mercury, 5 June 1794. 
Edinburgh Evening Courant, 5 June 1794. 






contemptible, of the lowest Class of People’.’’’ The author of the letter believed the 
cause of this factious spirit to be that ‘artfull. wicked and designing Men from 
Edinburgh and latterly also from England’ had been going about in the county and 
had ‘poisoned’ the minds of the good people. Further on in the letter he clarified who 
these ‘men from Edinburgh’ were, by making an explicit reference to Margarot and 
Gerrald, both of whom were supposed to have ‘fraternized’ with people in the county 
during the previous Christmas. The kind of political discontent referred to was not 
exceptional for East Lothian, but the letter also contained more worrying 
information. Although the author himself could not confirm their accuracy, he had 
come across rumours that the desperate and sullen faction in East Lothian was also 
armed. No weapons had yet been seized since there had not been any investigation or 
search for arms, but. in Prestonpans, clay moulds for casting bullets had been found, 
and children had been seen using musket bullets ‘as play things’.”’ The indication 
that someone was in the process of providing arms was given a concrete 
manifestation with the unveiling of a plan which came to be known as the ‘Pike Plot’ 
in May 1794. 
The break-up of the British Convention and subsequent trials against its 
leaders aimed a heavy blow to the radical movement. Many local societies of the 
Scottish Friends of the People simply closed down as members deserted the 
movement, and it also rendered them far more cautious than they had ever been 
before. A number of societies still continued to meet, but, in the words of John 
Brims, ‘they sought safety in secrecy’, and ‘by early 1794 the reform movement had 
virtually disappeared underground’. l 4  No further openly publicised conventions 
were contemplated for the immediate future, and the British Convention never met 
again. Nevertheless, this did not necessarily imply a cessation of activities, and many 
delegates were determined to continue the work they had started. In Edinburgh, it 
resulted in the forming of a second ‘Committee of Union’, this time consisting of 
about one hundred members from the four surviving societies of the Friends of the 
People in the city.”’ The members of the committee continued to meet in secret 
NAS, RH2/4/208, ff. 759-62, In Lord Tweeddale’s of 30 May 1794, Scotland. 
Brims, Ph.D., pp. 517-18. 
Barrell, Imagining, p. 252; and Meikle. Scotland, p. 15 1.  
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while the trials were being conducted at the High Court, and they may have played a 
role in fomenting some of the discontent which surfaced in Scotland during that 
period. Particularly in the case of the handbills which had appeared early in January, 
the wording of some passages was very conspicuous. The handbill which had been 
found in Perth, for example, made references to ‘the present measures pursued by the 
wretched Guelph, and his abandoned and profligate Ministry’, adding that ‘the Aera 
of an important Revolution is at last come’, and asked the question ‘Shall we be free 
or shall we be Slaves’? More crucially, it seemed to openly encourage people to take 
up arms against the government: 
They call you Rebellious, and seditious because you will only be taxed 
by your own Representatives - make good your claims by our courage 
or seal the loss with all your blood. 
There is no more time to deliberate - When the Oppression 
hand labours incessantly in forging chains for you - Silence would be 
a crime and inaction a disgrace, the preservation of the rights of 
Britons is your supreme law - it would be the most abject of Slaves, 
who in the Danger in which Britain is involved would not do his 
outmost to preserve it. 
- To Arms - To Arms 
- Any Arms will do. I I6 
There is no direct or clear evidence linking this (anonymous) handbill to the Scottish 
Friends of the People or the Committee of Union, but the wording of some passages 
- such as the reference to ‘the present measures’ of the government. and the part 
about taxation ‘by our own Representatives‘ - is at least very striking. The final 
encouragement to people to take up arms was also an indication of what was to 
come. 
Although little is known about the activities of the committee in the first two 
to three months of 1794, it is evident none the less that some of its members were 
contemplating armed insurrection as the only viable strategy for the future. The most 
prominent of these members was Robert Watt, the former government spy, who had 
now converted to the radical cause and joined those he had previously been spying 
NAS, RH2/4/74, f. 63, [Handbill enclosed with letter from:] James Paton to Lord Methvin. Perth, 9 116 
January 1794. 
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on.’” Watt had been amongst those who had taken the initiative to form a new 
committee after the dispersal of the British Convention. and he had quickly risen to 
become one of the leading figures in that society. In this capacity he suggested the 
setting up of a secret sub-committee of seven to be delegated all the powers of the 
mother society, and his dramatic proposal was met with the approval of the other 
members, who agreed go ahead with this plan. Consequently, on 5 March, the 
‘Committee of Ways and Means’, as it was entitled, was duly elected, with Watt as 
the chairman. Watt appears to have been the only person who sat on both 
committees, and this - combined with the fact that he was in charge of the sub- 
committee - enabled him to control not only the policy of the society, but also its 
funds. At a meeting of the sub-committee in April. it became clear that he was 
determined to use this powerful position to pursue the case for an armed insurrection. 
The meeting had been called for the purpose of electing a delegate to another 
convention, and two of the members who strongly disapproved of the idea of holding 
further conventions. had withdrawn from the committee prior to the meeting.’ 
Possibly because he may now have thought that any potentially wavering members 
were gone, and those who remained could be relied on, Watt finally presented his 
scheme for seizing power in Edinburgh. The plan was to have bodies of armed 
Friends of the People stationed at specific key-points in the city, set fire to the Excise 
Office. and then wait for the soldiers in the Castle to come out to help extinguish the 
fire. Once the soldiers had arrived, the armed citizens were to seize them, and then 
march on the castle. Since the castle was the key to control of the city, its capture 
would render the Friends of the People masters of Edinburgh, and hopefully serve as 
118 
According to Watt himself, he had been convinced by the cause of radicalism. but there are also 
indications that his ‘conversion’ may have had more to do with a quarrel with his employers over the 
issue of pay. The government had earlier decided to ‘dispense’ with his services as a spy, due to his 
excessive claims of expenses, and it is likely that Watt bore a grudge against the authorities because of 
this. Fry. Dundus, pp. 171-2; Banell, Imagining. p. 257; and Meikle, Scotland, p. 152. 
Of the other members, four were also former delegates to the British Convention; David Downie, a 
Catholic goldsmith and jeweller, Arthur McEwan a weaver, William Bonthrone or Bonthorne a 
teacher and Alexander Aitchison who was a medical student. The two members who were not ex- 
delegates were John Edmonds Stock, an English Unitarian medical student, and William Burke ‘of 
whom little is known’. Barrell, Imagining, p. 252. 
‘ I 9  This new convention had been suggested by the secretary of the LCS, who had sent out a circular 





an example and an encouragement to radicals in England.”” Naturally, for an armed 
uprising to take place, weapons would have to be procured, and it was through the 
chance detection of a batch of pike-heads in Watt’s house that the conspiracy was 
eventually unravelled. This occurred as late as 15 and 16 May, and the search of 
Watt’s house - it is important to note - had not been conducted because he was 
under government suspicion.”’ The disclosure of the ‘Pike Plot’ had thus little to do 
with solid investigation on the part of the authorities. 
Compared to the situation prior to the forming of the Committee of Union. it 
seems odd that the authorities should have remained unaware of Watt’s plans for so 
long, not the least because J. B. was still in their employment and spying on the 
Friends of the People. Yet, at the same time, it is possible that the absence of any 
action to stop the preparations had more to do with a failure to take the plot seriously. 
than to any lack of information. The authorities had certainly been given due warning 
that some sort of conspiracy was in the making, in the form of an anonymous letter 
written to the Lord Provost of Edinburgh as early as 26 March. In a long and 
remarkably accurate account, ‘A Young Man’ described the activities and 
organisation of the Committee of Union in detail: 
The flame of Liberty is now begun again to spread very extensively. as the 
mad reformers are beginning to execute their plan if possible, however there 
is perhaps an excuse for it, as the last full moon has had a wonderful1 effect 
upon them . . .  I am informed, by one who is to be depended on. that there are 
eighteen Societys in this city and many in Leith, who meet on different days 
of the week, excepting the Fridays; on which day they have a Convention 
which is held in a Room, taken for the purpose at Simons square.”’ 
Simons Square was where the Committee of Union met and the author of the letter - 
who claimed to have attended the meetings of the ‘Convention’ in question three 
Watt himself believed that once the initiative had been taken in Edinburgh, the radical societies in 
England would follow suit. McFarland, Ireland and Scotland, p. 117. McFarland’s source of 
information was: The last Speech, Confession, and Dying Declaration of Robert Watt, p. 14, a text 
Robert Watt wrote four days before his execution, and-in which he explained the plan behind the Pike 
Plot in detail. The whole declaration can be found in: NAS, RH2/4/77, ff. 239-54. 
Instead, it was connected with the bankruptcy of a manufacturer from Musselburgh, and a. creditor 
eager to apprehend goods he believed the manufacturer had hidden away. The creditor was an 
Edinburgh magistrate, and the information he had come across, was that a trunk originating with the 
Musselburgh-manufacturer had been carried into Watt’s house. Barrell, Imagining, pp. 253-55. 





times - made reference to two individual members of that society. In his view. 
citizens ‘Stock and Burke are the leading men of this Convention’, and he described 
them as ‘Students of Medicine, both from England’. Stock and Burke were members 
of the Committee of Ways and Means, which suggests that the information provided 
by the letter was largely correct. Whether the authorities believed this account is, 
however. a different question altogether. No investigation seems to have been 
instigated on the basis of the report, although the letter contained further alarming 
information. In connection with Stock and Burke. the writer pointed out that at one 
meeting, a ‘man rose, and declared that a Reform would never be granted unless by 
taking up arms and demanding it. and ever seemed to wish the people to do so . 
With the authorities not seeming to take this case seriously it was left until the 
accidental discovery of the pike-heads before the plot was revealed.’” 
9 12; 
Once the full extent of the conspiracy had been exposed, the task of choosing 
a response to the plot stood before the government. It was decided that this planned 
insurrection - although it was never materialised - qualified as an act of treason. and 
that the main conspirators should be prosecuted as traitors. Several people had by 
this stage been involved in the production of arms. but only Watt and Downie were 
eventually tried before the courts.”‘ Both of them were found guilty and sentenced 
to suffer capital punishment. Watt was hanged and quartered, but Downie was 
pardoned, and this meant that Watt was the only person to be executed for a political 
offence in Scotland during the 1790s. 136 
The trials against Watt and Downie were conducted from the middle of 
August until the beginning of September 1794. By the time they had both been 
convicted, the Scottish Friends of the People were already in decline, and, by the end 
12’ Ibid. 
Subsequent investigations were set in motion in other parts of the country to see if  the plot had 
‘extensions’ out of Edinburgh, but none were found. Edinburgh Evening Courunt, 16 June, 1794. 
It is quite possible that the authorities would have prosecuted Scott and Burke as well, had they not 
absconded just as the plot was revealed. Barrell, Imagining. pp. 253-54, 256. A number of other 
conspirators were also arrested, including McEwan, Bonthrone and the main manufacturer of pikes, 
Robert Orrock. None of them were ever formally charged with any crime, but they were nevertheless 
sent to prison for six months or more, held under warrants issued by the Lord Advocate on basis of the 
act suspending the Act anent Wrongous Imprisonment of 1701 (the suspension act had been passed on 
23 May). Brims, Ph.D., p. 559. See also a report on the arrests in: The Times, 21 May 1794. 
See for example: Devine, Scottish Nation, p. 209. The two trials are dealt with in more detail in 




of the year the association had all but ceased to exist. Whoever was still committed 
to pursuing radical policies was not doing so openly and, over the course of the next 
three years there are few if any signs of radical activity in Scotland. Those who 
refused to give up the cause of radical reform of the political system were 
increasingly drawn towards the revolutionary agenda of the shadowy society of the 
United Scotsmen. Modelled upon the United Irishmen, their Scottish namesakes 
were also members of a secret society, and probably committed to revolution in 
Britain, but they were never able to command anything even approaching the 
numerical strength of the Irish society. More solidly lower class than the Friends of 
the People, the United Scotsmen nevertheless failed to attract the support of a 
significant proportion of the Scottish lower classes, and, as Elaine McFarland has 
pointed out, the United Scotsmen ‘at their height probably never attracted more than 
a few thousand members. active and nominal‘.”’ 
117 
In this situation, where the radical societies were going rapidly downhill and 
their members were either giving up their activities entirely, suspending them for the 
foreseeable future or joining secret revolutionary societies. the government 
proceeded to tighten the screw on .the political opposition outside Parliament even 
further. The two so-called ‘gagging-acts’ - the Treasonable Practices Act and 
Seditious Meetings Act - both passed in the autumn of 1795 were designed 
specifically for the purpose of silencing the radicals.’29 Although they were hardly 
ever used, the very existence of these two acts reinforced the pressure on the political 
radicals, who were already intimidated by the outcome of the sedition trials. The 
consequence was that, by the end of 1795, the government had largely won the 
battle. The challenge from the domestic threat of radicalism appeared to have been 
successfully defeated, and the radical societies were never able to regain the 
momentum they had wielded in 1792-94. As the domestic challenge to the British 
Macleod, ‘Influence of the French Revolution‘, pp. 129-30; Brims, Ph.D., pp. 559, 564-66; and 
McFarland, Ireland and Scotland, pp. 152-54. 
McFarland, Ireland and Scotland, p. 166. According to the United Scotsmen’s own estimates, they 
had a total membership of 2871 by May 1797, which had increased by a further 653 by September the 
same year. Since the society went into decline after 1797, this figure probably represents the peak of 
membership. McFarland, Ireland and Scotland, p. 168. 
Ian R. Christie, Wars and Revolutions: Britain 1760-1815 (London, 1982), p. 228; and Frank 
O’Gorman, ‘Pitt and the “Tory” Reaction to the French Revolution 1789 1815’, in Britain and the 





state subsided, however, the threat posed by the war against Revolutionary France, 
and the domestic effects and implications of waging that war, became increasingly 
pressing. For the remainder of the decade, it was this external threat that constituted 
the main challenge to the British state. 
V 
The Challenge o j  War 
The main challenges created by the war against Revolutionary France were largely 
the same for the whole of Great Britain, and can therefore be dealt with more briefly 
than the domestic challenge posed by radicalism and politically induced rioting. 
Although the government did face problems of a specifically Scottish nature with 
respect to military recruitment - which could be seen as war-related ‘challenges’ 
facing the government during this period - in the context of this chapter. the focus is 
nevertheless on the problems that were more directly a consequence of the war. They 
were the threat of an invasion, and the domestic problems related to growing war- 
weariness among the public at large, and harvest failures. 
i )  The Threat of Invasion 
From the very beginning of the war, the possibility of a French invasion of the 
British Isles formed the main external challenge or threat to the British state. In the 
early years of the conflict. however, Britain was largely on the offensive, and the 
invasion defences that were put in place were more of a precautionary measure, than 
a matter of absolute necessity.’” There was a brief invasion scare in England in 
1794, but by and large, concern about invasion was not too pressing during the first 
two years of the w a d 3 ’  Over the course of 1796, however, the danger of invasion 
increased significantly, and, especially after the failed French attempt at landing an 
invasion force at Bantry Bay in Ireland in December that year, defence against 
130 For more detail on the different systems of invasion defence that were devised during the war, see: 
chapter 4. 
John Ehrman, The Younger Pitt, ii: The Reluctant Transition (London, 1983), 6 1 1. 131 
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invasion became the overriding war-priority for the government. Its concern was 
now increasingly for Ireland more than for mainland Britain, and rightly so. 13' 
Throughout the rest of the war the authorities seem to have persisted in the 
view that an invasion would probably come in Ireland, or alternatively in England, 
and there are fewer indications that Scotland was believed to be a likely target for a 
landing."3 This is not to say that the defence of Scotland was ignored, however. 
Certainly, since the government took the threat of invasion very seriously indeed. the 
same general principles and measures for defence against invasion were 
implemented both north and south of the border, but it was nevertheless perceived to 
be less likely that an enemy landing would take place in the north of Britain. than in 
the south.'" Two reasons were distance and weather conditions. It was expected that 
- with the same measures for landed defence implemented throughout Great Britain 
- the French would not wish to hazard the long and difficult voyage across the rough 
waters of the North Sea, and the concomitant problems of establishing a good supply 
line. This became less of a problem for the French with the Dutch surrender in 1796, 
and the invasion attempts in Lreland seem to indicate that distance was not in the end 
a particularly great concern for the French. Another problem for an invader, 
however. was the geography of Scotland, which it was believed would make i t  
difficult for an invasion force to operate effectively. On the other hand, the low 
number of Royal Navy warships stationed in Scottish waters at any time during the 
war made the Scottish coast more vulnerable to a landing, than was the case in most 
parts of southern England. If the government thought it less likely that French 
landing would take place in Scotland, than in England, Ireland or Wales, its attitude 
was not justified by the deliberations made by the French republican government. 
Henry Dundas had himself received worrying information from one of his 
correspondents - a man who had been a captive of the French - as early as 1794. The 
For a general discussion of the war, see: Christie, Wars and Revolutions, pp. 2 15-56; or O'Gorman, 
Long Eighteenth Centuv,  pp. 233-42. 
Ehrman, Pitt, ii, 61 1, 635, 641-2; and John Ehrman, The Younger Pitt, iii: The Consuming struggle 
(London, 1996), 5 ,  28, 109, 120. 
J. R. Western, 'The Recruitment of the Land Forces in Great Britain, 1793-99', unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis (University of Edinburgh (1953), pp. 13-32. The absence of a Militia force in Scotland meant 
that 'the rhythm of preparation there was throughout the war different from that of England', but by 





correspondent had overheard conversations on the subject of invasion, and he wrote 
to Dundas that he had ’heard much talk of invading Britain’, and that the French 
‘intended the expedition chiefly in Scotland, as they know there was no regular 
militia there to oppose them’. On the basis of this intelligence. the correspondent 
urged Dundas ‘not to lose a Moment in putting the Country in a proper State of 
defence’.’3s Furthermore, Henry Meikle did a search of the French projects of 
invasion, and his findings revealed that the French government did consider Scotland 
as a suitable place for landing an invasion force. 136 
The launching of an invasion of Britain first became a serious consideration 
for the French leaders after the more stable government of the Directory had been 
established in 1795.’” To begin with, the Directory kept an open mind as to where 
an eventual landing should take place, and it decided to send secret agents to all three 
countries in order to gain knowledge about them and investigate where a landing was 
most likely to be met with local support. These investigations had only got under 
way, when contact with the United Irishmen seem to have convinced the Directory to 
focus solely on Ireland, resulting in Hoche’s expedition of December 1796. When 
this attempt at invasion came to nothing. the Directory devised new plans for a 
landing in Ireland, involving the Dutch fleet and land-forces, and due to be launched 
in the spring of 1797.’38 Because of the delays caused by bad weather and Admiral 
Duncan’s effective blockade, however, the Dutch fleet had not been able to sail at the 
critical moment of the mutiny at The Nore, and this caused the commanding Dutch 
general, Daendels. to become increasingly doubtful about the chances of pursuing the 
project to a successful end.’39 As an alternative, he drew up a plan for an invasion of 
Scotland over the period of 9 to 21 August, and this plan was subsequently adopted 
for the Dutch fleet based at the Texel. Since the British authorities were at this point 
expecting a landing in Ireland, the plan had the advantage of surprise, although it is 
NAS, RH2/4/208, ff. 678-80, George Young to Henry Dundas, Girvan, 15 February 1794. 
Meikle, Scotland, chapter VIII, ‘French Projects of Invasion’. 
Zbid, pp. 161, 167. The Committee of Public Safety had considered ‘the extermination of England’ 
Zbid, pp. 167-171. 
For a discussion of the two serious naval mutinies at Spithead outside Portsmouth. and at the The 
Nore, a base in the Thames estuary, in April and May 1797, see: Christie, Wars and Revolutions, pp. 
239-41; and Ehrman, Pitt, iii, 28. 
136 
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as early as 1793, but no precise plans had been drafted at that point. (bid, p. 165. 
139 
39 
not certain how successful the Dutch troops would have been at manoeuvring within 
Scotland, had they ever reached Scottish shores. Admiral Duncan’s defeat of the 
Dutch fleet at Camperdown, however, ensured that the plan could never be put to its 
test. 140 
ii) War-weariness. and harvest failures 
The strains of a war which, for most of the decade. was going very badly for Britain. 
soon made their mark on the British population, and the growing war-weariness that 
resulted became a problem of some significance for the government from about the 
middle of 1794 onwards. Emma Vincent Macleod has argued that - with respect to 
the war - public opinion in Britain was never ‘entirely committed to one cause or the 
other over the whole period of the 1790s’, but tended to change in accordance with 
the fortunes of war?’ Consequently. in those periods when prospects were bleak and 
Britain faced a serious threat of invasion, the war was deeply unpopular with large 
sections of the British public, and the government struggled to sustain morale. 
an extent, there was little the authorities could do about this other than to hope for an 
improvement in the situation, but there was one issue which tended to have an 
influence on people’s attitude to the war - the supply of food - that could be 
addressed more readily. 
143 To 
The 1790s saw some of the most unseasonable weather of the whole of the 
eighteenth century, resulting in a number of harvest failures which at times led to a 
serious scarcity of grain. The wet summer of 1792 has already been mentioned, but 
C. J. Woods, ‘A  Plan for a Dutch Invasion of Scotland, 1797’, Scottish Historical Revie&), 53 
(1974), 108-9. E. W. McFarland has argued that: ‘Daendels almost certainly exaggerated the ease with 
which he could manaeuvre 30,000 men in the Scottish interior, sustaining themselves off the land 
without antagonising the local population‘, McFarland. Ireland and Scotland, pp. 174. Henry Meikle 
has argued that in 1797: ‘It was known that the French had designs on Scotland, and privateers began 
to appear off the coasts’. Meikle, Scotland, p. 179. Precisely what Meikle meant by ‘designs’ may not 
be entirely clear. but his source of information - a letter from Robert Dundas to the Home Office - 
makes no mention of invasion, and is only concerned with the activities of a single French privateer, 
the ‘Bounaparte’. NAS RH2/4/80, ff. 24-5, R. Dundas to the Duke of Portland, Edinburgh, 15 
February 1797. 
Emma Vincent Macleod, A War of Ideas: British Artitudes to the Wars Against Revolutionan 
France 1792-1802 (Aldershot, 1998), p. 195. For the overall discussion of this issue, see: ibid., pp. 
I 8 1-200. 
There was also a group of people known as ‘The Friends of Peace’, who demonstrated more 
organised and persistent opposition to the war. See: J. E. Cookson, The Friends of Peace: Anti-war 





far more serious crop failures occurred in 1794, 1795, 1799 and 1800. In effect, 
Robert Wells has argued, this meant that famine conditions applied in Britain in the 
periods 1794-96 and 1799- 1801 A better produce in 1796 helped to alleviate the 
situation somewhat in the early part of 1797 until the relatively poor harvest of that 
year. 1798 was again a year of normal yield. before the last year of the century also 
saw the worst harvest of the decade. The critical situation which followed as a 
consequence in early 1800, was then carried over into 1801 by the mediocre harvest 
yield of 1800. The most serious harvest failures of the 1790s - those of 1795 and 
1799 - were also nation-wide phenomena. and there was therefore little English 
wheat to be shipped up to Scotland when the rye crops failed there. I44 
Although wet summers and poor harvest yields were hardly the fault of the 
authorities. the scarcity of grain served to exacerbate the strains of war already 
widely felt, and to reinforce the growing war-weariness and discontent over a 
struggle to which there seemed to be no successful end within the near or even 
foreseeable future. For the authorities, however, the most immediate problem to be 
faced following a failed harvest was the possibility of food riots. The poor accepted 
bad harvests and their consequences, so long as the authorities did not let farmers and 
grain merchants make undue profits from a natural crisis, and food riots therefore 
tended to erupt whenever people felt that someone were trying to profit on the 
situation, and the authorities did not intervene. Most often, the riots were directed 
against attempts at moving or exporting grain, but many disturbances also took the 
form of direct attacks on grain dealers and their properties, or enforced sale of meal 
at prices fixed by the rioters (usually at a 'fair' or pre-dearth level).'" In Scotland, 
the most critical periods with respect to food riots were the spring of 1796 and 
autumn of 1800, when meal mobs staged widespread disturbances in many parts of 
the country. Although the sharpest increase in the price of meal took place over the 
course of 1799 and the early part of 1800, 146 the highest concentration of food riots 
was in the period between January and March 1796, when Scotland experienced no 
14' Roger Wells; Wretched Faces: Famine in Wartime England 1793-1801 (Gloucester, 1988). pp. 1- 
10. 
O'Gorman, Long Eighteenth Century, pp. 266-7, and Logue, Popular Disturbances, p. 30. 
Ibid., pp. 24-32. 




Edinburgh rose by 358%. Ibid., p. 26. 
41 
fewer than 11 serious disturbances of this kind.'j7 Since they were undoubtedly far 
more numerous than, for example, political disturbances or unrest connected writh 
military recruitment. food riots could have been expected to have held a prominent 
position on the government's list of domestic challenges. but the indications are that 
the activities of meal mobs caused the authorities far less concern than did the 
crowds planting Trees of Liberty and burning Henry Dundas in effigy in 1792. The 
scarcity of grain in 1796 was reported upon extensively in the correspondence 
between the Home Office in London and local public officials in Scotland. and it is 
interesting to note that of more than 65 letters sent from Scotland concerning scarcity 
of grain, not a single one mentioned either radicals or radicalism by a word.'" By 
comparison. a report on what was ostensibly a food riot in Inverness in 1793. held 
that 'Want of Provisions . . . was only the Specious pretext for this formidable rising', 
and it was rather thought that 'Pains [sic] Book . . . & its damnable Doctrines' was the 
real cause of the riot.'59 
The difference in attitudes to food riots in 1793 and 1796. as it emerges from 
these letters, is symptomatic of the Scottish authorities' perception of the challenges 
to their rule in the 1790s. It was the reform movement and the activities of the 
political radicals that they were most concerned about, and disturbances with 
political overtones which were seen as the most serious. The next four chapters will 
address the government's responses to the challenges it faced in the 1790s. 
Ibid, p. 30. See also: Devine, Scottish Nation, p. 216. 
NAS, RH2/4/79. Volume 79 covers the whole of 1796, and all but a few of the letters are 
concerned with the issue of grain-shortage, although a number of them deal with several issues in 
addition to the scarcity of food. 
NAS, RH2/4/70, ff. 175-8, Ballies William Mackintosh, William Inglis, Alexander Macintosh and 






The Government of Scotland 
In the 1790s the British state faced a crisis of unprecedented proportions. Not only 
was the British government fighting a war, which - for most of the decade - went 
badly for Britain, but the authorities also had to deal with a challenge to the political 
regime on the domestic front in the shape of political radicalism and popular 
disturbances. This chapter aims to look at how Scotland was governed during the 
years of domestic turmoil and war against revolutionary France, and to place the 
government of Scotland within a wider British context. In doing so we will be 
focussing mainly on the measures the government adopted to respond to and defeat 
the domestic challenge, but also on those efforts which were made to rally the 
support of the nation behind the government and its policies. 
An argument can be made for stating that the government of Scotland was in a more 
robust state in 1792. than it had ever been before since the Act of Union in 1707. 
Although the Treaty of Union had created a single British state. it did not necessarily 
follow that it created a uniform system of government within this new state, nor had 
the Union agreement addressed the issue of how Scotland would be governed as a 
constituent part of Great Britain. Since no immediately obvious solution presented 
itself at an early stage, and it remained difficult to devise a system which would cater 
to both Scottish interests and those of the central government in London, the 
consequence was that the executive part of the government of Scotland remained in a 
1 
The Union settlement merely stated that the Scottish Privy Council - the central executive body in 
Scotland before the union - was to be kept, but at the mercy of what the British Parliament at 
Westminster would ‘think fit’ for the long-term government of the country. No more than about a year 
had passed before Parliament decided to abolish the Scottish Privy Council, and it was done without 
providing for any replacement. Alexander J.  Murdoch, ‘The People Above ’: Politics and 
Administration in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Scotland (Edinburgh, I980), pp. 1-3; and P. W. J. Riley, 
The English Ministers and Scotland 1707-1 727 (London, 1964). pp. 15-6. The Scots were given 
representation in the English Privy Council in 1707, which was then re-named ‘the Privy Council for 
Great Britain’, even though the Scottish Privy Council was still in existence. Ibid., p. 28. 
1 
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decidedly fluid state for much of the eighteenth century.: Gradually. however. a 
viable alternative was developed in the shape of the informal ‘manager’ system.’ 
The idea was for the position as manager to be held by someone who was 
loyal to the government, and had substantial influence among the Scottish elite. The 
manager would need to be well acquainted with Scottish law, the Scottish election 
system and traditions of government in general. so that he could provide the 
b aovernment with advice on Scottish affairs. To reinforce his position. ministers 
would leave him in charge of most of government patronage for Scotland.‘ Anyone 
who looked for a position in the public sector. was aiming at a political career at 
Westminster or merely wanted to influence decision-making in one way or another. 
would thus have to go through the manager - or at least that was the intention. In 
return for his control of government patronage. the manager would be expected to 
ensure that Scottish MPs and peers sided with the government in most divisions in 
Parliament, thereby creating a substantial bloc-vote in both H0uses.i By and large. 
the manager system suited both Scottish interests and those of the government in 
London, but in order to function satisfactorily, managership relied heavily upon the 
personal abilities of whoever was appointed manager.” It was therefore first with the 
rise of Henry Dundas in the 1780s as a particularly successful manager that the 
Murdoch, Peoplc Abo\,e. p. 3; Riley. Enplislz Mirlisrers. pp. 90, 290; and John Stuart Shaw. The 
Politiccil His ton*  ( f  Eighteenth-Centrin, Scotland (London, 1999). pp. 26-7. David Brown has argued 
that the abolition of the Scottish Privy Council ‘left a vacuum in Scottish government’. David J.  
Brown. ’Henry Dundas and the Government of Scotland’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of 
Edinburgh. 1989). p.  20. 
7 
3 
Murdoch. People Abo1.e. pp. 4-6. 
Since the Treaty of Union secured the continuance of both the Scottish legal and electoral systems. it 
was useful for the central government in  London that the person in charge of Scottish affairs was well 
acquainted with Scots law and election procedures. 
’ David J. Brown, ‘The Government of Scotland under Henry Dundas and William Pitt‘, Histon, 83 
(1998). 266; Brown, Ph. D., pp. 23-25; Murdoch, People Above. pp. 6-8; and Shaw. Political Histnn, 
David Brown has argued that the Scottish elite remained ‘divided on the merits of management’, and 
p. 35. 
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that ‘its return after a seventeen-year absence [ 17831 was not universally welcomed’. Brown, 
‘Government of Scotland’, Histnn, 83 ( 1998). 270. See also: Brown, Ph.D., pp. 83, 91. For the 
majority of Scots, however, the manager system must have been preferable. They might well have 
disliked the person who held the position at a particular time, but at least having an identified Scottish 
manager ensured that the London-based government would address Scottish issues, and that was more 
important. See: ibid., pp. 22-23; and Murdoch, People Above, p. 10-1 1.  For the government, the 
system meant that the deployment of patronage to influence the outcome of Scottish elections could 
be left in the hands of a Scot with firsthand knowledge of the electoral system in Scotland, a solution 
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system became entrenched and a that a lasting solution to the executive of Scotland 
seemed to have been r e a ~ h e d . ~  
When rioting broke out in the spring of 1792, however, it was the local public 
officials - the government's men on the ground - who had to face the problem in the 
first instance and at first hand. No matter how loyal to Henry Dundas the majority of 
the political nation in Scotland may have looked on paper, and how far local public 
officials depended on government patronage for their position, it was only when the 
system was put to a serious test in 1792 that it would become clear if the structure 
would remain sound when placed under strain. The first issue which needs to be 
addressed is therefore the initial response from the local government representatives 
in Scotland. 
I1 
Tlir initial respoiise 
The sound state of the central government in Scotland at the beginning of the 1790s 
notwithstanding. the sudden outburst of radical political activity. coupled with 
politically induced popular disturbances, not only took the authorities by surprise. but 
also caught them badly prepared. There was initially no clear strategy of responding 
to the menace and, at the local level. some public officials appear to have been 
wrong-footed to begin with. Although there were only a minority who were seized 
by outright panic. many were undoubtedly brought to the brink of panicking, and this 
was particularly evident in some of the cases where the local sheriff or magistrate 
had to stand face to face with a crowd of angry people. 
The initial surprise, tendency to panic and consequent confusion, which 
marked the reaction of government officials at some of the earliest disturbances was 
most obvious in connection with the k n g ' s  birthday riots in Edinburgh in 1792.8 
The career of Henry Dundas has been the object of extensive research, and in addition to those 
works already mentioned, more information can be found in :  David J .  Brown, '"Nothing but Strugalls 
and Coruption", The Commons' Elections for Scotland in 1774', in The Scots and Parliament, ed., 
Clyve Jones (Edinburgh, 1996), pp. 100- 19; Holden Furber, Henry Dundas: First Viscount Melville 
1742-181 I (London, 193 1); Michael Fry, Patronage and Principle: A Political History of Modern 
Scotland (Aberdeen, 1987), pp. 10-1 9; Michael Fry, The Dundas Despotism (Edinburgh, 1992); and 
Cyril Matheson, The Life of Henry Dundas: First Viscount Melville 1742-181 1 (London, 1933). 
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For a discussion of the riot, see: chapter 1, pp. 9-1 2. 8 
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Among the first reports on the disturbances was a letter from Lord Adam Gordon to 
Henry Dundas, sent the day after the IQng’s birthday, in which Gordon found reason 
to inform Dundas about ‘an unpleasant Riot’ which had occurred the day before and 
expressed his concern about ‘the bad spirit which rather seems, to gain ground in this 
country’. He also put forward his ‘most earnest wish, that measures may be taken, 
effectually to restore the Tranquillity of the Country - some of which - I have not 
failed, upon former occasions, to point out to His Majestys Ministers’.’ James 
Stirling, the Lord Provost of Edinburgh, expressed similar concerns some days after 
the riot had come to an end, pointing out that ‘everything remains, and there is thank 
God every reason to expect will continue peaceable and quiet’.“’ An investigation 
into the causes of the riot was launched subsequent to order being restored. and a 
total of seventeen declarations were collected from different people in the city 
(including the sheriff John Pringle and James Stirling) who had either been exposed 
to the anger of the crowds. or knew something about the build-up to the disturbances. 
Most of these declarations expressed a sense of astonishment and horror at the recent 
events, such as that by Admiral Adam Duncan, who - at the head of a party of 
soldiers - had been exposed to a stone-throwing crowd, which screamed ‘Damn them 
they dare not fire‘; or Hugh Warrender, a Writer to the Signet in the city, who 
narrated that an ‘attack upon himself and Mr Pringle was such, as certainly would 
have put them in hazard of their lives had they not found shelter when they did’.” 
Nevertheless, even after all this information had been collected and many different 
National Archives of Scotland [NAS], Home Office Correspondence: Scotland, RH2/4/206. ff. 335- 
38, Adjutant General’s Office, Edinburgh, 5 June 1792 [‘From Adam Gordon to Henry Dundas’, is 
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views had been heard, John Pringle was still at a loss to establish the origins of the 
disturbances - which he claimed was a cause of ‘distress’ for himself.” Not the least 
because ‘there is at present not even a grumble’, he wrote to Henry Dundas in late 
June, he found himself ‘still puzzled to account how, the wanton and most 
unprovoked tumults of the Birthday originated’. ’’ 
Similar reactions to those which were manifested on the King’s birthday in 
June. again came to the fore during a riot in Ross-shire later in the summer, although 
the element of surprise was not as marked by then. The unrest had begun in late June, 
and was only an escalation - albeit a serious one - of a long-standing dispute in the 
Highland-counties of Ross-shire over the introduction of sheep farming. ’‘ The 
disturbances centred on the estates of Sir Hector Munro of Norvar - who had been 
deeply involved in the introduction of sheep farming in the area - and by the end of 
July, Munro deemed the situation critical enough to notify the Edinburgh 
authorities. He called a meeting of the local Freeholders and Justices of the Peace. 
which authorised him to ask the Lord Advocate for five hundred infantry and three 
troops of Cavalry to be immediately despatched up north for the purpose of subduing 
the mounting insurrection. Military reinforcements - Munro believed - would enable 
the local authorities to seize and ‘bring the ringleaders of the present Commotions to 
justice’, and thereby hopefully suppress the disturbances. In his letter to Robert 
Dundas. Munro made no attempts to disguise his concern about the situation, or what 
the outcome would be without military assistance: ‘The Sheriff will explain to your 
Lordship that we are at present so completely under the Heel of the Populace that 
should they come to Bum our houses, or destroy our Property in any way their 
Caprice may lead them to we are incapable of resistance’. Munro believed the unrest 
had been ‘fomented by the People of Sutherland Shire’, the neighbouring county, and 
that they were ‘peculiarly active in carrying their present desparate Plans into 
execution, which makes the Case still more alarming’ . I 6  Even more disturbing news, 
however, were sent by Donald MacLeod of Geanies, the sheriff-depute of Ross, who 
15 
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informed Robert Dundas that the insurrectionists appeared to be in the process of 
arming themselves. and that ‘a Person from Sutherland had Come to lnverness a few 
days Ago, & had purchased Gun Powder to the Value of 216 Stg’.” Robert Dundas 
responded by authorising the deployment of troops to quell the disturbances, before 
informing his uncle in London about the situation and his own actions.I8 The reply 
from Whitehall was an unequivocal endorsement of the strategy which had been 
adopted and indeed, having considered the ‘Outrages committed in the County of 
Ross’, Henry Dundas decided it was ‘indispensably necessary that the most vigorous 
and effectual measures should be taken for bringing these daring Offenders to 
punishment’. He praised the ‘Gentlemen of the County’ for their handling of the 
disturbances so far, and promised that if the regiment the Commander in Chief had 
already sent should prove insufficient for quelling the disturbances, ‘additional 
strength’ could be instantly despatched from England.I9 In the meantime, a smaller 
revolt in Inverness-shire had been broken by the determined action of the local 
landowners. but the Ross-shire rebellion proved harder to subdue, and in the eyes of 
sheriff-depute MacLeod, the situation was in danger of spiralling out of control. 
a letter to the Inverness-shire authorities and landed men, where he requested their 
assistance in a concerted action against the insurgents, he wrote that: ‘You can be no 
Stranger to the Tumults, Commotions. and actual Seditious Acts that are going on in 
this County at this time; the Flame is spreading; what is our Case to-day, if Matters 
are permitted to proceed, will be yours To-morrow’. MacLeod also stressed that he 
had the backing of the Lord Advocate ‘to proceed against the Insurgents, should it be 
necessary, to the last Extremity’. The response from Inverness-shire was favourable, 
and the proprietors there not only agreed to gather their ‘Adherents . . . at any place of 
Rendezvous’ in order to assist the sheriff of Ross in ‘suppressing the Seditious 
Commotions’ he had referred to in his letter, but also to raise funds to defray 
expenses, and place additional troops, arms and ammunition from Fort George at the 
30 In 
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sheriffs disposal.’’ The concerted action was successful, and on 10 August Robert 
Dundas could report to London that ‘Tranquility . . .  is in a fair way of being 
immediately restored’.’’ Three days later he wrote that the rebellion had been 
‘completely quelled’ .’-? 
The reactions of the local authorities to the Ross riot were symptomatic of the 
responses which were to come elsewhere in Scotland in similar situations of popular 
unrest, but also revealed many of the key characteristics and weaknesses of local 
government in Scotland. Although they knew that those who were involved in the 
disturbances were chiefly concerned with the spread of sheep farming, MacLeod and 
others still found reason to stress what they believed to be a seditious element in the 
disturbances, and for particular reasons. Following the political rioting of the spring 
of 1792. Eric Richards has pointed out, the Highland lairds were alarmed at the 
thought of the north becoming ‘contaminated with radicalism imported from the 
south’? The first explanation that sprung to mind among the Highland landowners 
in the summer of 1792 was therefore that radicals had been at work, going about and 
sowing discontent in the minds of ordinary people. This suspicion of radical 
infiltration was a view generally held by local government officials facing popular 
disturbances at the time. but in the case of the Ross-shire riot, it rested on particularly 
flimsy evidence. As Lord Adam Gordon later found reason to point out in a private 
letter to Henry Dundas: 
If I was to hazard an opinion upon the matter - It is a decided one - 
that no disloynlty - or spirit of rebellion - or dislike to His Majesty’s 
Person, or Government - is in the least degree concerned - in these 
tumults - and that they have solely originated - in a (too well founded) 
apprehension - that the landed proprietors in Rosshire, and some of the 
adjacent Highland Counties - were about to let their Estates to shee - 
farming - by which means - all the former tenantry would be ousted. f 5  
NAS, RH2/4/64, f. 27 1 ,  Resolution by ‘a Meeting of the Freeholders, Commissioners of Supply, 
Justices of the Peace, Heritors, and Gentlemen of the County of Inverness’, Inverness. 6 August 1792, 
[the resolution includes MacLeod’s letter, which is dated: Dingwall, 3 August 1792.1. 
-- Ibid., f. 272, R. Dundas to H. Dundas, Edinburgh, 10 August 1792. 
23 Ibid., ff. 278-79, R. Dundas to H. Dundas, Edinburgh, 13 August 1792. 
24 Richards, Highland Clearances, p. 88.  
25 NAS, RH2/4/64, f. 291, Private letter, Lord Adam Gordon to Henry Dundas. Fort George, 19 




In the same letter, Adam Gordon stressed that he did not take issue with the landed 
proprietors‘ legal rights to introduce these measures, nor did he oppose the view that 
the ringleaders of the riots ought to be brought to justice for their actions; but he did 
wish to underline that - in his opinion - it was a flawed interpretation of the situation 
the local public officials presented. Gordon was himself clearly concerned about the 
disturbances, and in an official letter sent on the same day he pointed out that: ‘The 
late disagreeable disturbances in Ross-shire, are subsiding - and likely - soon to 
end’, before adding that ‘Thank God - as yet - no Blood has been S p i l t ? ’  
The Ross riot was. however, also indicative of other aspects of local 
e uovernment during the early crisis of 1792. It revealed how little the civil authorities 
were able to do about an insurrection on a larger scale without the backing of 
military forces. At a time with no standing police force, local government 
representatives had very limited means for physical coercion at their disposal, and in 
cases where troops were not readily available, local officials were often unable to 
suppress disturbances effe~tively.’~ Instead, they would either have to adopt delaying 
tactics in an attempt to calm the situation. negotiate with the crowds. or simply give 
in to their demands - at least in the short term. Under such circumstances, much 
could rely on how shrewdly the local magistrate or sheriff assessed the situation. and 
on how calm and collected he remained when under pressure. Not everyone handled 
the new and more aggressive atmosphere of 1792 equally well, and this became 
increasingly clear during the second wave of rioting in the autumn of that year? 
The Edinburgh authorities had noted a potential for renewed radical activities 
and unrest as early as by the end of September, when James Stirling reported to 
Henry Dundas that he had ‘sent Expresses’ to both the Lord Advocate and the 
Solicitor-General in order to arrange a meeting ‘to take under consideration, the 
seditious Publications which continue to peep out here’ .19 Dundas also received 
26 Ibid., ff. 294-95, Lord Adam Gordon to Henry Dundas. Fort George, 19 August 1792. 
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7 30 anonymous correspondence on the ’Dispersion of Seditious letters , and concern 
similar to that expressed by James Stirling was put forward by Allan Macconochie - 
an Edinburgh Advocate who resided in Glasgow - only a few weeks later. 
_Macconochie appears to have been genuinely concerned about the possibility of a 
revolution beginning in Glasgow, and wrote of how: ‘The Success of the French 
Democrats has had a most mischievous Effect’ in that city?’ After widespread unrest 
again broke out in November, nervous members of the local elites sent equally 
apprehensive reports to the authorities in Edinburgh. William Maxwell of Springkell 
in Dumfriesshire, for example, wrote to the Lord Advocate on 19 November about ‘a 
variety of facts’ of an ‘alarming nature’, which had been brought to his attention. 
’Emmisarys of sedition have been at work in this part of the Krngdom, sowing the 
Seeds of discontent, faction & rebellion amongst the lower Classes of the People’, he 
wrote, and by spreading ’the most infamous falsehoods’ and using ‘the most 
insidious artifices’, these evil-minded people had been able to convert many of the 
‘weak & uninformed’ to their cause.” Maxwell was particularly concerned about the 
increased circulation of Thomas Paine’s book Rights of Man. which he believed was 
‘now in the hands of almost every Countryman’, not the least because it was sold at 
‘so low a price as twopence’. In his own opinion the ‘daring & seditious Riot that 
happened lately at Langholm’ was all too likely to have been spurred on by the 
circulation of seditious material such as Paine’s book, and in essence, Maxwell could 
not help but, ‘dreading the consequences that may arise from the present discontents, 
the absurd doctrine of equality. and the spirit of licentiousness which seems every 
where to prevail in the Kingdoms, amongst the lowest Classes of the People’.33 He 
therefore turned to the Lord Advocate for ‘advice & direction how to act’ in the 
present ‘alarming crisis’.34 Maxwell’s was not a lone voice of apprehension. David 
Smyth in Perth was concerned about the impact the activities of political radicals had 
30 Ibid.. f. 344, Anonymous to Henry Dundas, undated. For a similar anonymous letter. see: NAS, 
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on ordinary people, and after the rioting appeared to have subsided in early 
December 1792 he hoped that the recent events would ‘be a lesson to the reformers 
to avoid measures which may stir up such outrages’.’5 Lord Adam Gordon was 
constantly worried about the number of troops stationed north of the border. which in 
his opinion was largely insufficient to ensure peace and quiet, and in November 1792 
it was particularly the situation in Dumfries that caused him concern. In a letter to 
Henry Dundas he argued that ‘if more Troops were to be drawn from that part of 
Scotland, Riots and Disturbances would follow’ ?‘’ A few weeks later he expressed 
similar concerns about ‘the very weak State of His [Majesty’s] Castle of Dumbarton, 
(a Post of much importance if any Disturbances arise in the west of Scotland. or from 
Ireland)‘.’7 Following the outbreak of war in February 1793 it was inevitable that 
Scottish soldiers would be needed for service abroad, but upon the decision to 
remove four Battalions from Scotland for the planned campaign in Holland, Gordon 
urged Dundas to ‘consider the State of this Country ... for till the Fencibles are in 
force we are every where weak and exposed and tho’ the Bad Spirit, of some 
Individuals. be somewhat stifled - it is by no means. extinguished’.’8 A stronger 
military presence was also requested by George Auldjo, the Provost of Aberdeen, 
who was struggling to resolve a conflict with a group of sailors blocking the 
harbour.‘’ He stressed that if a ‘general arrangement could be made’ whereby a 
hundred soldiers were stationed in Aberdeen, ‘this part of the Country would be 
perfectly quiet’.““ The need for more troops to be stationed in Scotland when the 
worst rioting was going on in Dundee and Perth was, however, acknowledged by 
Henry D ~ n d a s . ~ ’  
As a consequence of the widespread agitation by political radicals and the 
popular unrest which materialised over the course of 1792, the atmosphere in 
35 
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Scotland had undoubtedly become very heated by the end of the year. and the 
perhaps most revealing comment in this respect came from John Pringle, the sheriff 
of Edinburgh. In a letter to Henry Dundas, Pringle apologised for having recently 
supplied Dundas with what turned out to be misinformation, but lamented that: ’I am 
somewhat pestered with false or exaggerated Information that I am rather disposed to 
be distrustful [of] but on the present occasion was thrown off my Guard - which I 
promise shall never be the case again? The ruling classes in Scotland had clearly 
been shaken by the sudden upsurge of disturbances, and in the chaos and confusion 
of 1792, many of them were prepared to believe most of the rumours they came 
across. George Home of Wedderburn, for example, feared the possibility of a 
revolution on the French model erupting in Scotland. Writing to his cousin in 
London, he claimed that ‘many People, and some of no mean ability, are determined 
to exert themselves to bring about a Similar Revolution in this Country’. The 
government could not risk being complacent about the situation - despite the 
apparent moderation of some of the reformers - because ‘at present the mob can be 
repressed. in a litte [sic] time they may be able to carry all before them’. Unless firm 
action was taken, Home argued, Scotland risked becoming ‘a mob Governed 
Country’?:’ A few weeks later he also wrote that: ‘The Societies and associations 
here against Government are I beleive [sic] rather upon the Encrease’, and lamented 
that Edinburgh had become -the Paris of Scotland’.34 
Although reports at the beginning of 1793 indicated that the unrest had been 
subdued in most parts of Scotland,55 Robert Dundas was not convinced by the 
apparent quietness of the country. He thought that ‘The Spirit of the people here may 
be at present compared to Gunpowder which is just now in a quiescent state but a 
spark only is necessary to set it ablaze’.‘‘ As it turned out, there would be no further 
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large scale disturbances in Scotland until the Militia riots of 1797, but public officials 
in Scotland none the less remained tense until well after the main political trials had 
been successfully concluded in 1794. An isolated riot in Inverness in the beginning 
of April 1793, for example, prompted the local bailies to comment: ‘God grant that 
neither we nor posterity may again Witness such a Scene?’ while the bankruptcy of 
a few principal mercantile houses in Glasgow early that year, sparked an equally 
strong reaction. The crisis in Glasgow, James Stirling wrote to Henry Dundas, had 
been triggered by the failure of ‘two Capital Houses in London‘ with which the 
Glasgow merchant houses had been ‘deeply connectid’ .4x This, he claimed. 
threatened to plunge the whole of western Scotland into ‘a general Bankruptcy’, with 
the even more daunting possibility of a cumulative effect for the Scottish economy as 
a whole. Stirling made no attempt to conceal his concern about the situation and 
wrote to Henry Dundas: ‘For gods sake Sir let something be done and speedily or the 
consequences cannot be foretold’.4y A few months later it was clear that - although 
the ‘Manufactures and Trade‘ in Glasgow had ‘suffered a dreadful Reverse’ and been 
’plunged into the Depth of Distress’ - the dreaded universal bankruptcy had not yet 
materialised.”’ None the less, James Fraser, the Secretary of the Bank of Scotland, 
found reason to stress that the Edinburgh banks - which were also suffering as a 
consequence of the crisis in Glasgow - were still in need of government aid to 
successfully ride off the storm.” An anonymous letter from Glasgow painted an even 
darker picture of the situation. The author insisted on giving his ‘account of the very 
alarming situation in which Scotland is at this moment’, which he claimed had begun 
with the bankruptcy in Glasgow, but had now ‘spread a universal panick and want of 
confidence over the whole lungdom’.’’ Not only was this panic a threat to ‘every 
man of property‘, but increasingly it was also threatening peace and stability in the 
The riot was ostensibly about a shipment of grain out of Inverness harbour, but the bailies rather 
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country. Due to the financial crisis, sections of ‘the discontented uvuwrs‘ in the city 
had already been ‘discharged’, and with no regular military force available and the 
Fencibles not yet embodied, it was - in the view of the author - ‘impossible to say 
what will be the consequence’. ‘Something must be speedily done’, he urged the 
authorities, ‘or this country will be totally ruined’? 
A particular concern which affected the Edinburgh authorities from 
September 1793 onwards, was the retention within the Tolbooth prison of the city of 
those prominent political radicals who had been convicted of sedition by the Scottish 
High Court. and who were awaiting transportation to Australia. Thomas Elder was 
the first to bring the problem to Henry Dundas’s attention in a letter he sent on 7 
September. Elder wrote to inform Dundas that ‘Muir‘s Sentence has revived the 
frequency of the meetings of the societies calld friends of the people’, and that ’his 
remaining here tends very much to keep up the Spirit of Sedition’. On behalf of the 
magistrates of the city, he therefore urged Dundas to ‘get him removed from this 
Country as soon as possible’.54 Elder‘s request was supported by John Pringle. who 
could provide additional information to the extent that ‘Reports have been circulated 
that his [Muir‘s] Adherents have it in contemplation to rescue him from Jail‘. Pringle 
did not think that such a rescue attempt was very likely to happen - or to succeed if i t  
should take place - but he did think it unfortunate if Muir was to be kept in 
Edinburgh for much longer. since ‘the minds of the lower Class of people will be 
kept in a ferment while he remaines here’.‘‘ No immediate action was taken by the 
government in London, and nearly two months later, Robert Dundas found it 
necessary to reinforce the point himself. ‘The bad consequences of Muir’s remaining 
in Prison here, become every day more apparent’ he wrote to Henry Dundas, and 
stated that ‘I consider his removal to London, as early as convenient to be essential 
for the Peace & Quiet of this City . The request of the Edinburgh authorities was 
eventually complied with, and Muir was moved to one of the prison-ships anchored 
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in the Thames.” The same problem, however, re-emerged after the trials of the 
leading British Convention delegates. On 17 January 1794, Thomas Elder wrote to 
Henry Dundas that: ‘Tho I believe The Lord Advocate has wrote you, to sollicit the 
early removal of Skirving and Margarot from our Jail, yet the anxiety of the 
Magistrates has prompted me also to trouble you on the same Subject.’* Since the 
two radicals had ‘little or nothing else to do’, Elder wrote, they had been ‘constantly 
employed in hatching mischief. writing seditious paragraphs for their Newspaper the 
Edr. Gazetteer, Resolutions for their Societies, hand bills &c’. The best solution 
would therefore be if Dundas could ‘as soon as possible send down a warrant for 
their removal hence’ .” 
By the end of 1794, the tension which had been so marked among public 
officials in 1792 and 1793 seemed to ease, and, gradually, local government regained 
its confidence. Adam Gordon did come close to panic over the Fencible mutinies in 
1794, but his was largely a lone voice of despair by then.60 The main reason for this 
change was that the central government’s response to the challenge created by the 
upsurge of political radicalism and popular unrest was now beginning to have its 
impact. 
As Home Secretary, domestic security was Henry Dundas’s responsibility, and the 
” rovernment campaign which was launched to counter radicalism in 1792 was largely 
masterminded by him!’ Dundas was in London when the first round of disturbances 
broke out in Scotland in the spring of 1792, but travelled north to see the trouble for 
himself as soon as he was able to, and arrived in Edinburgh just before the middle of 
October.” Once in Scotland, Dundas was soon convinced that ‘something effectual’ 
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had to be done to stop the spread of radicalism and radical societies, as well as to 
root out popular disturbances and their causes? Many of the letters he received from 
concerned public officials and other members of the local elites across Scotland 
while there, he forwarded on to Evan Nepean at the Home Office, so that they could 
be inspected by Pitt and G r e n ~ i l l e , ~ ~  and in the last letter he sent before returning to 
London, he also stressed the need for stationing more troops in Dundee!‘ 
Particularly his final letter seems to indicate that he had been convinced of the 
severity of the situation in Scotland, and consequently of the grave threat that faced 
the existing political regime. At no point, however, does Dundas appear to have 
doubted either his own or the government’s ability to handle the crisis and 
successfully face off the challenge, and in this he was representative of all the top 
members of the ruling elite - both in Scotland and in Britain as a whole. Although 
some of the government’s men on the ground had been pushed to the brink of panic, 
and the governing classes as a whole had been rattled by the events of 1792, the 
people at the head of government remained calm and collected.66 There was no 
‘night of the fourth of August’ in Britain.” The British ruling classes did not panic 
and surrender when faced with the radical challenge of the early 1790s, in the way 
that the French aristocrats had done when they stood before the self-confident 
representatives of the Third Estate in 1789. but rather closed their ranks in 
determination to meet the problem. But also in the longer term. it was clear that the 
British governing elite never lost its belief and confidence in either its own ability or 
right to govern the country, and this perhaps marked the greatest contrast with 
France, where the morale of the elite had arguably been broken long before the 
revolution in 1789? Throughout the bleakest war years such as 1797 the morale of 
63 NAS. RH2/4/64, ff. 278-79. Henry Dundas tu Evan Nepean, Edinburgh. 14 October 1792. 
@ Meikle, Scotlund, p. 94. 
65 NAS, RH2/4/65, ff. 94-5, Henry Dundas to Evan Nepean, Edinburgh, 26 November 1792. Dundas 
forwarded another two batches of letters to Nepean from Melville Castle, see: ibid.. ff. 48-53, 24 
November 1792, and ff. 68-70, 25 November 1792. 
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the British elite remained intact, and was bolstered by the fact that the men in charge 
of government - Pitt, Dundas and the other ministers - never themselves wavered, or 
lost their nerve.69 
Frank O’Gorman has argued that the government’s response to the domestic 
challenge - or ‘Pitt’s repressive policy’ as he named it - took on several different 
forms and functioned on different levels.70 Particularly in the early phases of the 
period, 0’ Gorman argued, the government was ‘anxious to utilise existing 
disciplinary mechanisms as strongly as possible’, which in practice meant giving 
instructions to magistrates and other local officials on how they should act in order to 
counter the domestic ~hal lenge.~’  The contents of this policy was set out in the Royal 
Proclamation of 21 May 1792, and later reinforced by a more strongly worded 
second Royal Proclamation issued on 1 December the same year.7’ Increasingly. 
however, the authorities were also prepared to ‘mobilise the legal system’ in order to 
prosecute leading radicals for the political offences of sedition or treason, and from 
1794 onwards, the ‘use of Parliament and parliamentary enactments’ was resorted to, 
mainly for the purpose of clamping down on radical organi~ations.~’ This repressive 
legislation consisted of a series of acts which were either suspending, or restricting 
’liberties’ traditionally secured under the British constitution. In 1794 the 
a Government secured the suspension of the Habeas Corplcs and its Scottish equivalent 
7.74 the ‘Act anent Wrongous Imprisonment , in 1795 Parliament passed the two so- 
Frank O’Gorman has argued that there mas never a ’vacuum of authority’ in Britain, for which the 
main reason was that ‘In Britain, unlike France, the ruling elite did not lose i t  uni ty  either before or 
after 1789’. Frank O‘Gorman, The Long Eighteenth Centiin.: RririJh Poiiticul arid Social Histon. 
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Frank O‘Gorman, ’Pitt and the “Tory” Reaction to the French Revolution 1789-1815’. in Britain 
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called ‘Gagging Acts’, the Treasonable and Seditious Practices Act and the Seditious 
Meetings in 1797 the Unlawful Oaths Act outlawed secret organisations, and 
in 1798, ‘A Newspaper Act established a system of registration which would 
facilitate the prosecution of printers and publishers believed guilty of sedition’ .7h 
Furthermore, the two Combination Acts of 1799 and 1800 aimed to halt the 
emerging organisation of labour, by banning ‘combinations’ of workers.77 
Formidable as this legislation undoubtedly looked on paper, it was a weapon rarely 
used (this was particularly the case with the gagging acts), and in practice, it was the 
policy of giving guidelines and instructions to local government representatives, 
together with the use of the law courts, which made up the two main pillars of central 
government’s strategy. The political trials of the 1790s are dealt with in a separate 
chapter, and the focus of this chapter must therefore be on the first of the 
Dundas’s own strategy for countering the radical threat - of which most was 
implemented - consisted of a combination of reactive and proactive measures, which 
can be summed up in seven main points. Radical societies were to be spied upon, and 
for this purpose the government hired a number of informants to infiltrate and report 
on the activities of the radical societies, subsidies would be provided for mass 
printing of loyalist pamphlets and ‘guidance’ would be given to newspapers. The 
Clergy of the established churches would be placed under pressure to preach loyalty 
to their congregations, some of the most unpopular taxes were to be removed, the 
b oovernment was organise meetings of loyalists in Edinburgh (which would then be 
copied across Scotland, it was believed), and finally the Scottish sheriffs and 
magistrates were ‘to gather evidence on publishers and of those distributing seditious 
writings . Dundas did not attempt to push through all of these measures at once, 
and with respect to some of them - most notably the repeal of taxes and support for 
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loyalist organisations - he did not obtain the immediate support of the cabinet. 
Moreover, it is possible to divide these measures into reactive and proactive policies, 
and we will address the reactive policies first. 
i) Reactive policies - 
A certain degree of caution can be detected in Dundas’s approach immediately after 
the IOng’s birthday riot in Edinburgh in 1792, and before he had been to Scotland to 
inspect the state of the country himself. In a letter to the sheriff of Edinburgh sent in 
mid-June, he emphasised that ‘the Civil power should exert itself to the utmost, and 
that the interference of the military should on all occasions if possible be dispensed 
with’.*’ It was only in cases where the civil authorities on their own would be 
‘absolutely ineffectual’, that military force should be resorted to, and he proceeded to 
outline and stress the importance of the job the civil magistrates were expected to do: 
As I wish to acquire every possible Degree of information of the real 
cause of these unwarrantable commotions as well as of the Mischief 
mediated by the Insurgents I must desire you to be very particular in 
your enquiries, and as soon as it can be done to transmit to me as 
minute and circumstantial an Account thereof as you may be able to 
collect in order that any measures may be taken thereupon which may 
on a consideration of the Subject appear to be expedient! 
The ’measures’ which would be deemed ‘expedient‘ were largely set out in a letter to 
Thomas Elder sent the same day, where Dundas stressed the need for ‘the speedy 
trial and punishment of such of the Ringleaders as are now in custody’, mainly for 
the purpose of acting as an example and deterrent to people, so that similar 
‘tumultuous and unjustifiable proceedings’ as had recently taken place could be 
avoided for the future.81 Although Dundas had recommended caution in the use of 
military force, he also sent a letter to Lord Adam Gordon, underlining the need to 
keep troops on the alert so that ‘ready assistance’ could be provided for the civil 
authorities if that should be required? In just three letters, following shortly after the 
first major riot, Dundas had thus set out all the central guidelines for the policies 
NAS, RH2/4/218. pp. 94-5, Henry Dundas to ‘the Sheriff o f  Edinburgh’. Whitehall. 15 June 1792. 
Zbid., pp. 96-7. Henry Dundas to ‘the Lord Provost’ [Thomas Elder?]. Whitehall, 15 June 1792. 





which were subsequently adhered to with unflinching consistency and confidence 
throughout the 1790s. The local authorities were to seek as much information about 
radicals and the discontented as they could possibly procure, and transmit this to the 
central authorities without delay. This would hopefully make it possible to launch a 
pre-emptive strike where unrest was in the making, but if that failed, the authorities 
were not to attempt large-scale arrests - as this would require the backing of a 
considerable military force - but rather seek out and seize the ringleaders, who 
would consequently be put on trial. 
Dundas continued to stress the importance of apprehending ringleaders also 
during the Ross-shire riots and, in a letter to the Lord Advocate, he underlined the 
good effects that takmg the leaders to trial would produce, since ‘it must serve to 
convince the lower class of people that they will not be suffered to commit such acts 
of violence with impunity’.84 By now, however. he also showed more readiness to 
use troops to quell the disturbances - as his letter to the Lord Advocate on 9 August 
demonstrated - and to ensure that potential trouble spots had a sufficient military 
presence? In a letter to Lord Adam Gordon he expressed his concern about the state 
of Edinburgh, and pointed out that: ‘It may possibly appear to Your Lordship to be 
indiscreet to leave that place entirely destitute of Military protection’. If the 
Commander in Chief should find it necessary. troops from ‘South Britain’ could be 
despatched on ‘the shortest notice’. Dundas assured him.86 The importance of having 
troops ready to be deployed in the event that it should be deemed necessary for 
securing or restoring peace and order was further emphasised in connection with the 
Inverness riot of May 1793. Dundas instructed Gordon to ‘give every possible 
assistance, so far as the force under Your command will admit to the Civil Magistrate 
in the execution of his duty’.87 No further instructions specifically aimed at Scottish 
officials appear to have been sent out during the rioting in the autumn of 1792, but 
the renewed proclamation against seditious writings issued on 1 December did 
underline how ‘the Circulation and Dispersion’ of such writings had ‘lately been 
NAS, RH2/4/218. p. 103, Henry Dundas to the Lord Advocate, Whitehall, 21 August 1792. See 
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renewed with much Activity in different Parts of the bngdom’, and that ‘His 
Majesty’s Magistrates & Civil Officers throughout his POngdom of Great Britain’ 
were expected to ‘make diligent Enquiries respecting all such wicked and seditious 
Writings’ within their respective jurisdictions.8* 
Judging from his correspondence, Dundas seems to have been largely 
satisfied with the conduct of the government’s local representatives in Scotland. In a 
letter to Archibald Fraser of Ross-shire, for example, he wrote that: ‘The immediate 
suppression of these dangerous proceedings can only be attributed to the spirited 
conduct of yourself, and the rest of the Gentlemen of property in that part of the 
Country which certainly has done you considerable Credit’ .*9 Similar praise was 
awarded to the Edinburgh authorities after the King’s birthday riots, when Dundas 
thought that the sheriff of the city had conducted himself with ‘a discretion & 
firmness becoming the important situation which you so properly fill’?” 
Nevertheless? when the government decided to introduce a completely new layer of 
government in Scotland by appointing lords lieutenant and deputies lieutenant on the 
English model in 1794,” part of the reason for doing so may well have been a 
dissatisfaction with how the existing structure of local government had performed 
during the crisis of 1792-93 .” 
Ostensibly the purpose of this new arrangement was the ‘preservation of 
internal tranquillity’, as Henry Dundas wrote in a circular letter to the newly 
appointed Scottish lords lieutenant and high sheriffs on 14 May 1794. but his 
instructions bore all the hallmarks of being an attempt at creating a clearer and more 
efficient structure of command.” The lords lieutenant would be in control of the use 
of those fencible regiments which were in the process of being raised; they would 
lhid.. pp. 112-13, Henry Dundas to *Sir’ [circular letter]. Edinburgh. 1 December 1792. 
lhid.. pp. 104-5, Henry Dundas to Archibald Fraser, Whitehall. 6 September 1792. 
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organise local voluntary defence  force^;'^ appoint depute lieutenants from 
individuals who were ‘known to be attached to His Majesty’s Person and 
Government and to the principles of our happy Constitution’; and decide whether 
they thought it advisable to arm those loyal inhabitants who should step forward to 
assist the civil authorities in the ‘suppression of Riots and ... illegal and tumultuous 
 meeting^'.^^ The lords lieutenant were to be unequivocally in charge of local 
government, and directly answerable to the Home Office, thereby creating a ‘a 
regular and direct link’ between London and the That there was a certain 
degree of urgency about this measure is evident from another circular letter Dundas 
wrote shortly after. This time he stressed that there was: 
much anxiety that the Lieutenants of the Counties should immediately 
enter upon the discharge of the duties to which they are appointed as it 
is certainly essential in the present moment that no want of attention to 
the Peace and Security of the Country be felt in any part of the 
Kingdom. 97 
It seems clear then, that in a situation where the country had gone to war whilst at the 
same time still facing a domestic challenge to the political regime, the old Scottish 
local administration was no longer seen to be sufficient.’x 
William Pitt’s government went through a major overhaul, and received a 
considerable strengthening of its parliamentary position in 1794, when the opposition 
split into two factions with the Portland Whigs crossing the floor and joining the 
administration. A central part of the political deal which was brokered was that the 
Duke of Portland would become Home Secretary at the cost of Dundas losing his 
cabinet post. Dundas was shocked and appalled at this decision by the Prime 
Minister, and threatened to resign from the government, but was eventually 
persuaded to stay on in the newly created office of Secretary for War.99 Dramatic 
For a discussion of the raising of voluntary defence forces, see: chapter 4, sections 111 and IV. 
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though the changeover of the office had been, the implications for the government of 
Scotland were not equally significant. Dundas continued as Scottish manager, 
controlling most government patronage in Scotland and managing Scottish elections, 
without this appearing to have caused friction with Portland. Although Dundas was 
‘critical of Portland’s tenure of the Home Office’, there seems to have been little 
profound disagreement between the two over policy, and they remained friendly. O0 
But while there was no marked change in the overall government strategy, there 
undoubtedly was a change in tone and approach. Portland probably took less of a 
genuine interest in Scotland as Home Secretary than Dundas had done, and continued 
to do, which had the consequence that he was more prepared to hand out instructions 
and orders without consulting anyone in Scotland beforehand, and less inclined to 
adjust government policy according to specific Scottish needs and requests. 
The first major problem of a specifically Scottish nature that Portland faced 
as Home Secretary was the second mutiny in the Breadalbane Fencible Regiment in 
November 1794, and his handling of this incident provides a clear example of the 
new ‘hard-line’ approach he took on Scottish affairs. Writing to the Lord Advocate 
in the beginning of December he stressed the need to take ’prompt and vigorous 
measures . . . for securing the Ringleaders and enforcing obedience from the rest’, and 
pointed out that ‘The Remedy to the Evil in question would be much facilitated by a 
speedy removal of the most objectionable Regiments . . . into some Parts of England 
which, I trust, Circumstances may permit of? Two days later he emphasised the 
need to bring all available military force into Glasgow to defeat the mutiny, and 
expressed his hope that ’a speedy trial and punishment of the principal offenders, 
with the Removal of the Regiment’ would render a complete disbanding of it 
unnecessary. Given the difficulty with which some of the earlier Fencible mutinies 
had been brought to an end, this approach was undoubtedly tough and potentially 
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risky, but Robert Dundas and John Dunlop followed the instructions they had been 
given, and shortly afterwards the majority of the mutineers surrendered. Once 
Portland had received information that the mutiny was in the process of being settled, 
he replied by expressing his satisfaction of the way in which the disagreeable affair 
had been handled, but his approval was stated in very measured terms: ‘The conduct 
which has been pursued on this unpleasant occasion’, he wrote to John Dunlop, 
‘appears to have been in all respects perfectly prudent, and such as is best calculated 
to bring the Offenders to Justice’.’”‘ To Robert Dundas he stressed that ‘There 
cannot be the shadow of a doubt’ that the handling of the mutiny had been conducted 
in an ‘extremely proper’ manner, ‘and such as the necessity of the case strongly 
called for’.’”’ He was also pleased with the policy adopted by the Lord Advocate of 
‘instantaneous Trials of the Mutineers on the Spot, or at Edinburgh’ Portland had 
been in no doubt about the seriousness of the mutiny, which, ‘had it not been timely 
quelled, might have been productive of Serious Evils . Yet, precisely because the 
situation had been so grave, he was not entirely pleased with the speed and efficiency 
whereby information had been brought to his attention. He made this very clear in a 
letter to John Dunlop. where he lamented that, although ‘Very full information of the 
circumstances attending this unpleasant affair has been regularly transmitted to me 
by the Lord Advocate’, it was ‘undoubtedly desirable in all cases. that on the first 
appearance of disturbance. an acct. of it should be sent, without loss of time, from the 
Chief Magistrate of the Place to the Secretary of State’.108 There was, in other words, 
no need to go via the Lord Advocate when providing London with information. In 
t: Diving this instruction as a guideline for the future conduct of affairs, Portland was 
adopting a different line from that which had been adhered to by Henry Dundas 
when he held the office of Home Secretary. Dundas had kept in close touch and 
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frequent correspondence with his nephew Robert Dundas, expecting the Lord 
Advocate to provide him with updated information on Scottish affairs and ready to 
implement the instructions he would transmit from London. The Lord Advocate thus 
took on the role of ‘sub-minister’ for Scotland, leaving him effectively in charge of 
the day-to-day running of the government of Scotland.”’ This was convenient for 
Dundas, who, from 1792 onwards, had to focus the bulk of his energies on 
government business in London, and for that reason was unable to spend as much 
time on Scottish matters as he had done earlier. David Brown has argued that Robert 
Dundas continued to fill this role also after Portland became Home Secretary, acting 
as ‘a major channel of information’ on Scottish affairs, and thus ‘forming the main 
link between the centre and the Scottish localities’. l 1  ’ Yet, Portland’s comments to 
John Dunlop indicates that he was not entirely satisfied with the efficiency of this 
particularly Scottish system, and that he was prepared to alter it according to his own 
preferences. The overall government strategy, however. remained the same for the 
rest of the decade. 
In 1796, for example - following a food riot in Dumfries, where a ‘body of 
People’ had ‘seized a considerable quantity of Oatmeal’ which was due for shipment 
to Liverpool, and sold it at reduced price at the market - Portland found it ‘needless 
to point out to you the evil consequences which must arise from such proceedings’. 
He instructed the local authorities to ‘take the most effectual means for guarding 
against similar outrages’, and to enforce the ‘Act for securing the free circulation of 
Grain’.’ The continued belief that disturbances were caused by radicals sowing 
discontent was demonstrated in Portland’s response when the Dingwall Volunteer 
Corps had been involved in some ‘disorderly and riotous proceedings’ in April 1796. 
The reason was immediately held to be the alarm ‘some few artful and ill intentioned 
Persons’ had created amongst the Volunteers encouraging them to ‘Acts of Outrage’, 
rather than any ‘premeditated malice on the part of the Men . Decisive action was 
to be taken in June 1797 to ‘put an immediate stop to’ the ‘alarming Emigration from 
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the rebellious Counties in the North of Ireland, to Port Patrick’ in Scotland, which 
had been going on for some time by then.’“ The Irish ‘immigrants’ were suspected 
of involvement in clandestine activities, and the Lord Advocate was instructed to 
make sure that all ‘Irishmen as can not give good account of themselves’ were ’sent 
back to Ireland without loss of time’.’ ’‘ By late June, Robert Dundas could assure the 
authorities in London that ‘no person of a suspicious character ... will be permitted 
in future to pass from Ireland into this Country’.’’6 The report of some ‘riotous 
proceedings’ in Edinburgh in May 1800 was met with the by now familiar response 
of making an example of those of the rioters who had been apprehended, as this was 
perceived to be of ‘the utmost importance with a view to prevent a repetition of such 
Outrages’ , I 1 ’  and following ‘some disturbances’ which had taken place in Renfrew, 
Ayr and ‘the City of Glasgow & its neighbourhood’ in November the same year, 
Portland once more found it necessary to outline the key elements of the 
government’s strategy to Robert Dundas (who by then must have been very well 
acquainted with all of t h e m ) ? ‘  The only occasion when Portland re-adapted 
government strategy according to the demands of the situation was when the Militia 
riots erupted in late August 1797. This time he did listen to advice from below, and 
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instructed all the lords lieutenant to implement the policy which had been 
recommended by a few central government officials in Scotland.’ l 9  
ii) Proactive policies 
The government’s strategy for countering the radical challenge through more 
positive means, in essence amounted to an attempt at out-competing the radicals on 
their own turf. By appealing to the loyalty of the people at large, and inviting them to 
support the existing political regime, the authorities hoped to rally the nation behind 
the government and its cause. This proactive policy was largely the same for the 
whole of Great Britain - there were few specifically Scottish initiatives in this 
respect - and it can therefore be outlined more briefly than the reactive policies. 
The Pitt administration’s strategy for rallying the support of the people behind 
the government and the war effort consisted of three main elements. Support for a 
counterpropaganda campaign was to be provided in order to halt the influence of 
seditious literature, attempts were to be made at either encouraging or pressurising 
the clergy of the established churches into preaching loyalty to their congregations 
and support was to be given to loyalist associations.”” The need for the first of these 
elements - a campaign to stem the spread of radical ideas through the dissemination 
of conservative counterpropaganda - became apparent after the issuing of the Royal 
Proclamation against seditious writings in May 1792 had created an unprecedented 
interest in radical literature. and pressing when the second volume of Paine’s Rights 
q f M u n  appeared in a cheap edition in the late summer of 1792, and the book quickly 
sold in large numbers. While it is not known that the government actually hired 
people to produce counterpropaganda, nor that there ever was an ‘over-arching 
b oovernment scheme to orchestrate an ideological campaign’. the authorities certainly 
encouraged its production by subsidising the printing of loyalist literature, thereby 
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making it affordable to the general public.I2’ It may be difficult to determine which 
had the greater impact on people’s minds - radical or loyalist propaganda - but the 
government undoubtedly won the battle of circulation. Although Rights of Man sold 
in huge numbers, it came nowhere near the circulation of Hannah More’s loyalist 
Cheap Repository Tracts - which enjoyed a government subsidy - and in more 
general terms, it is clear that the sheer quantity of conservative propaganda produced 
and circulated from 1792 onwards, went far beyond anything the radical societies 
were able to achieve. Although there were many who offered, not just to write, but 123 
also to print and distribute loyalist propaganda without any kind of remuneration 
from either the government or loyalist associations, it would be unreasonable to think 
that government support and financial subsidies played no role in this success. 133 
The clergy of the established churches - both in Scotland and in England - 
was overwhelmingly conservative and needed little encouragement to support the 
government.”s In the case of Scotland. it was clear that also the Episcopal and 
Roman Catholic churches were supportive of the existing political regime, and it was 
only the Seceding churches which were viewed as somewhat ‘suspect’ by the 
authorities. The support of the clergy was undoubtedly a tremendous asset for the I26 
b government, since the local minister met with the whole congregation once a week to 
b Dive his sermon on the Sabbath, and few if any, public officials had a similar 
”’ H. T. Dickinson. ’Popular Conservatism and Militant Loyalism‘, in Brirairz uric1 the French 
Ke\~olmtion 1789-1815. ed.. H. T. Dickinson (Basingstoke, 1989). p. 120. Some loyalist pamphlets 
were printed entirely at the government’s expense and given away for free. 
”-’ H. T. Dickinson. The Politics ofthe People in Eightee~2th-Cetiriir?, Britain (Basingstoke. 1994), pp. 
272-73, 275. Whereas approximately 200 000 copies are estimated to have been sold of the Rights q f  
Mari, the Cheap Repositon Tracts was sold in more than 3 million copies between 1795 and 1798, 
Dickinson, Politics nf the People, p. 242 [Rights of Mutz]; and Dickinson. ‘Popular Conservatism‘, p. 
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opportunity to address and influence people in his locality. The possibility of using 
the already loyal clergy for government propaganda purposes, by providing them 
with guidelines on which political issues to address in their sermons and what 
precisely to say about them, must have been evident and seemed very tempting to the 
central authorities, because in November 1795, a direct government instruction to the 
clergy was published in the Scottish press. In a letter to the ‘MINISTERS AND 
PREACHERS OF THE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND; AND THE CLERGY OF THE 
EPISCOPAL COMMUNION’, emanating from the Council Office in Whitehall, the 
following instructions were given: 
THE Lords of his Majesty’s Most Honourable Privy Council 
having been pleased in order; That every Minister and Preacher, as 
well of the Established Church, in that part of Great Britain called 
Scotland, as those of the Episcopal communion, ... put up their 
Prayers and Thanksgivings to Almighty God, for his late merciful 
preservation of the IOng’s Majesty, from the daring attempts against 
his Royal Person, as he passed to communicate in such manner that 
due obedience may be paid thereto immediately. lZ7 
The most important aspect of the government‘s proactive policies, however. 
was its approach to popular loyallsm and the forming of loyalist associations, and on 
this issue its attitude was somewhat ambivalent. On the one hand, the authorities 
unquestionably appreciated the support of the general public, and if loyalist 
associations could help to rally the people behind the government’s cause, rather than 
that of the radicals, then they clearly represented an asset to be reckoned with. 
Popular enthusiasm for the existing political establishment was also too positive a 
phenomenon not to be appreciated at a time when the ruling elite believed sedition to 
be lurking in every corner of the country. Nevertheless. the authorities were not too 
insistent on endorsing widespread forming of loyal societies. and particularly not if 
these societies attracted a lower class audience. Behind this apparent contradiction 
lay a careful assessment of the situation. 
It was not onZy because of the political message they were spreading among 
ordinary people, that the members of the ruling elite were so concerned about the 
activities of well-educated radicals in Britain. The very fact that they were educating 
127 Caledonian Mercury, 21 Nov. 1795 [original capitals]. 
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people about political issues in any shape or form, and creating an interest in politics 
among people at large, was bad enough. Ideally, the governing classes of Britain 
would have preferred ordinary people to have stayed away from politics, remained 
deferential to their social superiors, and concentrated their energy on hard work. 
Moreover, if the loyalist associations were able to attract a large membership, they 
might become too self-confident for the liking of the elite, and perhaps begin to 
develop ideas about their own ‘rights’ or importance. Essentially, loyalist 
associations were only desirable as long as they focussed their attention on defeating 
radicalism, and did not become more than moderately successful. ’” 
In the autumn of 1792, however, the government received an increasing 
number of proposals for the forming of loyalist associations. Both William Pitt and 
Henry Dundas were sceptical about the whole concept of supporting popular 
organisations of this sort. and Pitt had even contemplated introducing legislation to 
the effect of preventing all kinds of political meetings, but in the end they both came 
down in favour of supporting one loyalist ass~ciation.”~ This was John Reeves’s 
‘Association for the Preservation of Liberty and Property against Republicans and 
Levellers’ (APLP), founded on 20 November 1792, and also known as the ‘Crown 
and Anchor’ association. from the name of the London tavern in which the inaugural 
meeting had taken place. The actual forming of Reeves’s organisation has been the 
subject of a long-standing debate among historians, where the disputed problem has 
been whether Reeves took the initiative to form the Crown and Anchor association 
independently of the government, or whether it was formed at the instruction and 
behest of Pitt and his Cabinet.’?’ This discussion has recently been brought to a 
1 3 0  
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provisional conclusion through the discoveries made by Michael Duffy. According 
Duffy’s findings, no hard evidence can be produced to support a claim that the 
ministry had either ‘prior knowledge’ of the intended formation of Reeves’s 
association, or that it was in any way involved in the actual instituting of the 
organisation. When Reeves conducted the inaugural meeting on 20 November, he did 
so without the backing of the government. ’’’ Nevertheless, the authorities were 
involved in the subsequent development of the association. Faced with several 
nascent loyalist organisations, the government appears to have concluded that the 
Crown and Anchor society offered the alternative best suited to its preferences, and 
thus decided to throw its weight behind that association at the cost of others. 
Although the movement remained outside of the government’s direct control, it was 
not outside its influence, and the backing Reeves received from the authorities was 
undoubtedly a crucial factor in its rise to become the dominating loyalist association. 
The APLP certainly enjoyed advantages such as government subsidies in the form of 
free advertisement space in government newspapers and free use of the Post Office 
for the distribution of its material.’” The final evidence, however, that the 
government did in the end trust the loyalist associations was the decision to authorise 
the raising of armed volunteer corps in March 1794.’” Those who had showed their 
loyalty were now given the opportunity of, not only organising in support of the 
government, but also of carrying arms in defence of the state. 
IV 
hteractioii behiTeeri c‘eiitral crnd local government 
The government of Scotland in the 1790s was not, however, merely a matter of 
anxiety expressed from below and firm instructions given from above. A certain 
degree of interaction also took place, with examples of local officials taking 
initiatives to solve problems, or refusing to comply with instructions they had been 
given. Initiatives from below were normally appreciated and often integrated in the 
government’s overall strategy. Henry Dundas, for example, had praised the way the 
Duffy, ‘Loyalist Association Movement’, H J ,  39 (1996). 947. 
Ibid., 953-54,957-58. 
Dickinson, ‘Popular Conservatism‘, p. 1 17: and Dickinson, Politics of the People, p. 282. 
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local public officials and proprietors had handled the Ross-shire riot in its earliest 
phases, when they had to act without guidance from the central authorities. Portland 
had expressed his satisfaction with the Lord Advocate’s policy of bringing fencible 
mutineers to trial ‘on the Spot’, and the idea of explaining the Militia Act had been 
adopted as the general policy during the riots of 1797. In some cases, however, the 
central authorities were not as appreciative of the initiatives taken by local officials. 
Occasionally the local authorities quite simply missed the target, and consequently 
received corrections from London. Such an incident occurred in the wake of a 
disturbance in Banff in June 1792, where the crowds involved in the riot had burnt an 
effigy. The local magistrates had proceeded to arrest the maker of the effigy although 
he had not been involved in the actual disturbance. As it turned out a certain ‘Mr. 
Leith’ had been the ‘by far most active person in raising the tumult’, and for that 
reason - Dundas pointed out - ‘it could have been wished that instead of the maker 
of the Effigy, Mr. Leith had been taken into Custody’ and punished ‘in order to deter 
other people from following his example’. Since no other charge could be produced 
against the arrested man than the making of an effigy, Dundas recommended that he 
be released ‘as soon as possible’.”’ In other cases the central authorities thought the 
initiatives presented by local officials unnecessary. During the Ross-shire riot, 
Dundas had declined a request for the issuing arms to the proprietors in the area on 
the grounds that ‘such a discretion is not conceived to be at all necessary’ as long as 
there was a military presence in the area. These episodes were, however, 
concerned with fairly minor disputes, and do not come up among the more serious 
disagreements which arose from time to time. 
1’16 
In January 1793, Robert Dundas asked his uncle’s advice on a suggestion 
which had been put forward by the government spy Robert Watt, concerning the 
correspondence of a certain James Wylie, a merchant in Perth, who Watt claimed to 
be ‘the most Revolutioner in Scotland’. Wylie was believed to be ‘engaged in a 
foreign correspondence with France’, and Watt had thought it a good idea to open all 
his correspondence at the Post office, both letters he had sent and those he was due to 
’” NAS, RH2/4/218, pp. 98-9, Henry Dundas to the Earl o f  Fife. Whitehall, 20 June 1792. 
Ibid., pp. 104-5, Henry Dundas to Archibald Fraser, Whitehall, 6 September 1792. 136 
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receive from a b r ~ a d . ” ~  It is not clear how Dundas responded to this specific request, 
but a similar suggestion from John Orr in Glasgow a month later was met with a 
stem rebuke. Dundas stated that the magistrates were not ‘to take any steps whatever 
with regard to the stoppage of letters at the Post Office’, and indeed, he stressed that 
‘a subject of this kind shall not even be talked o f .  One year later the same issue 
re-surfaced and, by now, Dundas seems to have become more favourably disposed 
towards a policy of intercepting the correspondence of radicals, but it was still not to 
be undertaken without the prior approval of the central authorities. In a letter to John 
Campbell of Greenock, he wrote that: ‘Though I cannot but commend the motives by 
which you have been led to open and transmit to me the Letters in question, yet I feel 
it a matter of public duty to disapprove in the strongest manner of such an 
extraordinary and unjustifiable proceeding’ If Campbell had reason to believe that 
the letters contained any ‘treasonable or seditious matters’. Dundas stressed. the 
appropriate procedure would have been to submit them to the Postmaster General, or 
detain them until further instructions had been given. A somewhat different 
example of local initiatives occurred during the Militia riots of 1797. Many local 
officials were threatened with violence by crowds of angry people when they tried to 
implement the Act, and some 0‘; them were also physically assaulted or had their 
property attacked. Placed under this kind of pressure, several lords lieutenant 
adapted government policy to what they thought best under the circumstances, or 
were quite simply unable to carry through the provisions of the Act. The Duke of 
Hamilton. for example. reported to the Home Secretary that because of the 
opposition to the Militia Act in the County of Lanark, where he was lord lieutenant, 
he had decided to suspend the execution of the Act ‘until additional Instructions are 
7 138 
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given by Government’.’42 Portland did not approve of this initiative, and in his reply 
he stressed that ‘any steps which appear to have a tendency to concession must 
encourage the deluded people to persist in their resistance to this Act’, and it was 
therefore essential that it should be ‘completely & speedily executed’. Sometimes, 
however, local magistrates would simply refuse to comply with government 
instructions if they thought that local interests were being compromised. This was 
occasionally the case in coastal areas when press gangs appeared, since the 
Impressment Service - although authorised by the government - was deeply 
unpopular with most people. In early February 1795, Captain Oliver of the Royal 
Navy sloop HMS Hazard complained about the lack of cooperation he had received 
from the local magistrates of Campeltown, when he had attempted to ‘procure’ some 
‘idle People ... for His Majesty’s Service’. Although Oliver had written to Mr. 
Porter, the provost of the town beforehand - as the regulations required of officers in 
the Impressment Service - Porter had absconded from the town when the Hazard 
arrived, and there was not much help to be had from the other local officials either. 
When Oliver had applied to one of the local bailies to assist him, the bailie had 
instead roused ’a great Mob’ consisting mainly of women. who proceeded to arrest 
the impressment party, and the local authorities had then refused to release the sailors 
until Oliver gave up four men he had managed to secure for service. At first sight 
the magistrates of Campbeltown appeared to be in an indefensible position, but the 
investigation which was subsequently launched into the event did not produce a 
favourable verdict on Captain Oliver. Its conclusion was that Lieutenant Hunt - the 
leader of the impress party - had acted without the necessary civil authority, and that 
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Dundas, who had been in charge of the investigation, concluded that ‘some degree of 
Blame is to be imputed to the Officer and his Party’ from acting ‘without the 
knowledge and assistance of the Civil Magistrates’, and that ‘no farther notice’ 
should ‘therefore be taken of the rnatter’.lJ6 In Greenock, however, the local 
magistrates had no such excuse to rely on when they came under scrutiny in March 
1795. According to a report by ‘Rear Admiral Pringle’, who had visited the town, 
‘the Impress Service is very much crippled and obstructed in the neighbourhood of 
Greenock, in consequence of all countenance and protection being withheld from it, 
by the Magistrates in that quarter’. Upon learning of this, Portland wrote to the local 
lord lieutenant, William McDowell, ‘to request’ of him, that he would: 
immediately and seriously represent to the Magistrates in this 
neighbourhood of Greenock of what importance it is ... that they 
should not decline to give all the assistance which they are by Law 
enabled to do, in aid of the Impress Service, as a necessary measure, 
and which has for its object the safety and welfare of the Publick at 
large’. 147 
Roger Stewart, one of the magistrates, later defended his decision not to sign impress 
warrants on the grounds that he considered ‘such warrants as a dangerous [and] 
inefficient expedient’. and that ‘surely the Magistrates of a Town may be allowed 
certain discretionary latitude as being the best qualified to judge of local 
pre-judices . It would be far better. Stewart argued, if the magistrates could offer 
bounties to volunteers instead. but his views do not appear to have been endorsed by 
the central authorities. The wording of his letter seems to indicate that Stewart was 
aware that his actions had not been entirely legitimate, but in other cases concerning 




Ibid., ff‘. 182-84, Robert Dundas to the Duke of Portland. Edinburgh, 22 June 1795. For his 
investigation, Robert Dundas collected a total of 13 declarations from people who had been involved 
in the incident. See: NAS, RH2/4/78. ff. 186-215. Declarations on HMS Huzurd and Campbeltown. 
‘in the Lord Advocate’s of the 22d of June 1795’. For a more comprehensive discussion of the 
Campbeltown-event, see: Kenneth Logue. Popular Ilistiirbnnces in Scotland, 1780-1815 (Edinburgh. 
1% 
1979), pp. 121-3. 
NAS, RH2/4/219, p. 303, Portland to William McDowell, Whitehall. 23 March 1795. 
NAS, RH2/4/78, ff. 97-8. Roger Stewart to William McDowall Esq. M. P., Greenock, 7 April 




[Stewart’s letter to McDowall was a defence of his actions following criticism from Portland.]. 
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On 23 January 1798, the Duke of Portland had sent out a circular letter to all 
the lords lieutenant of Scotland, informing them that the government had decided to 
limit the service of the volunteer corps to one day a week - as opposed to the two 
days set out in the original provisions for volunteer forces - and that the pay of the 
volunteers was to be reduced accordingly. Portland’s circular letter was met with 
instant and near universal opposition from the lords lieutenant in Scotland. First to 
reply was the Duke of Atholl in Perthshire, who wrote back to the Home Office on 
25 January stating that ‘As His Majesty’s Lieutenant of a large and Populous County 
and well acquainted with the Inhabitants of It’, he would have wished to have been 
consulted about the measure beforehand. ‘j l The attitude among volunteers in 
Perthshire was rather one in favour of extending their service to three days a week, 
Atholl pointed out, which meant that a reduction to one day would have an adverse 
effect on the spirit the men. Some of the volunteer companies were also so fresh that 
they ‘require to be called out more than once in the Week’, in order to reach a proper 
level of training.”’ William McDowall of Renfrew also stressed his concern over the 
adverse effects the reduction of pay could have on the morale of the Volunteers, 
which, in his opinion, had ‘contributed more to check these dangerous principles of 
new fashioned liberty equality & democracy in Scotland than all the acts of 
parliament which have been passed’.“’ The Duke of Montrose, ‘as Commanding 
Officer of the Volunteers in Stirling’, found reason to express his ‘regret’ at the 
recent decision since he feared that it would ‘damp that spirit which has hitherto 
prevailed, & which has been productive of such good consequences, particularly in 
Scotland’. He also thought that it would lead to a reduction in the size of the force 
and ‘be attended with general bad effects‘ if it was to be implemented. The Earl of 
Fife responded by urging ‘His Majesty’s ministers’ to reconsider the measure, which 
he found to be an odd way of repaying the loyalty of the Volunteers, many of whom 
had ‘put themselves to very considerable expence which have never been allowed, by 
Portland’s circular letter does not survive, but the government instructions can be ascertained from I50 
the subsequent correspondence between him and the lords lieutenant. 
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’ 154 Government , while James Brodie, the lord lieutentant of Nairnshire, pointed out 
that the issue of pay was of importance to the Nairnshire Corps, because ‘As most of 
them are tradesmen & small Farmers, the two Shillings a week is [of) some 
consideration to Them’. 15’ Brodie believed that the pay had ‘reconciled Them to their 
new Profession’ and allowed the officers to keep them in ‘subordination & 
Discipline’. Should one day’s pay be taken away, chances were that the Volunteers 
would be ‘little better than a Mob with Arms in their hands’, and, in short: what was 
the purpose of a scheme which would have ‘highly Dispiriting’ consequences, and 
only produce ‘trifling’ savings?lS6 
Portland’s initial response to the reaction from Scotland was a complete 
rejection of the complaints that had been put forward. In a letter to Montrose, he 
wrote that for a measure: ‘which applies without distinction to every Volunteer 
Corps in Great Britain, it is quite unnecessary for me to trouble you upon the 
impolicy or rather impossibility of making any exceptions in favour of particular 
counties or The decision was to be adhered to by all the lords lieutenant in 
Britain, and although the Volunteers would have their pay reduced, there was 
nothing to ‘prevent them from exercising as much and as often as they please’.158 
The dispute did not end with Portland’s renewed instructions. however. James Brodie 
expressed his discontent with the Home Secretary’s reply, and even the Duke of 159 
Buccleuch now aired his concerns. Buccleuch focussed his reply on the good spirit of 
the Volunteers in his county, on how ‘anxious’ they were to have more practice and 
on their readiness ’to keep the peace of the Country, and ... to oppose the foreign 
Enemy’. Given all these favourable circumstances, Buccleuch wondered. ‘Will it . . . 
be worth while for so trifling a Saving to risk raising discontent and ill-humour 
Ibid., f. 65. Fife to the Duke of Portland, Fife House, 27 January 1798. 
Ibid., f. 67. James Brodie, Lieut. Nairnshire to the Duke of Portland, Brodiehouse by Forres, 30 
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among the Volunteers a this Moment?’ 160 Again Portland’s reply was unfavourable. 
Far from being a ‘trifling saving’, he argued, the proposed reduction in pay would 
amount to no less than ‘about S 250 000 annually’, and he could see no reason why a 
measure ‘which has been acquiesced in, with only one Individual exception, in every 
County in South Britain’ should not be implemented in Scotland as well. 1 6 ’  By now, 
however, also Robert Dundas had found it necessary to express his deep concern 
about the and shortly after Portland wrote his letter to Buccleuch, Henry 
Dundas stepped in and gave contrary instructions. In a letter which was probably sent 
to the Lord Advocate, Dundas wrote: 
I believe it will be absolutely necessary for your Grace to write to the 
Lord Lieutenants in Scotland without delay to authorise them, to take 
no further steps for taking the Shilling a week from the volunteers till 
further orders. By letters I have received from different quarters, I 
perceive that they conceive it to be Breach of faith to them; and will 
resign their Commissions [?I. If that should go to any length, We shall 
be left in Scotland for a long time without any Military Defence 
whatever except the few regular Regiments and the Volunteer Corps 
consisting of gentlemen only. which forms a very small proportion 
indeed of our present defence. 163 
Dundas’s intervention appears tc, have secured an exemption for Scotland from the 
order, since no further complaints or instructions were put forward. 
The disagreements which existed over some aspect of government strategy 
notwithstanding, as well as the confusion and anxiety which marked the Scottish 
ruling elite in 1792 and 1793 in particular, and the stresses of war from February 
1793 onwards; the government of Scotland under Henry Dundas’s leadership came 
through the period remarkably unscathed. The perhaps best gauge of this success was 
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addressing the issue of an alleged ‘breach of faith’ or ‘contract’ on behalf of the authorities, see: ibid.. 
ff. 150-51, Lt. Col. Alex Murray to the Duke of Portland, Edinburgh, 12 February 1798; and f. 154, 
‘Memorial for Captain Arthur Gibbon commanding the Battery Company of Aberdeen Volunteers‘, 
Aberdeen, 10 February I798 [presented to Portland by the Duke of Gordon in a letter dated: 12 





the general election of 1796. Before the election Dundas had boasted that if he 
‘exerted’ himself, he ‘might be able to prevent the return of any one member for 
Scotland, hostile to Government’, and his prediction came very near to f~lfilment.’’~ 
When the election results were clear, only two out of the 45 MPs returned for 
Scotland were not government men, and all of the 16 peers came from the bng’s  
list.’65 It was the greatest triumph of Dundas’s career as Scottish manager, and it 
came at one of the most difficult periods of the war, when a French attempt at 
invading the British Isles was looking increasingly likely, and the country was 
suffering from a disastrous harvest failure the year before. Yet, in his early 
biography of Dundas, Holden Furber argued that the 1796 election represented not 
only the greatest triumph of Dundas’s career, but also its peak, and that his political 
‘interest’ in Scotland declined gradually thereafter eventually to become a mere 
‘shadow of its former self‘.’67 Whereas it is uncontested that the 1796 election was 
Dundas’s greatest success in terms of the number of government supporters returned 
for Scotland, more recent research by David Brown has led him to question the 
notion of a subsequent decline of the Dundas interest. In Brown’s view. Dundas’s 
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rest of the decade 
Henry Dundas to Lord 
grip on the management of Scotland remained intact for the 
lh3 Brown, Ph.D., p. 218. Brown‘s source was: NAS. Melville, GD51/17/69 
Hobart, 6 June 1796. 
Ibid., pp. 218-21; Brown. ‘Government of Scotland’, p. 273; Fry, Dundas, pp. 201-3; and Fry, 
Patronage. p. 15. See also: NAS. RH2/4/79, f .  201, ‘State of the Votes at the Election of the Sixteen 
Scots Peers 30 June 1796’. In the Union agreement of 1707, Scotland had been allocated 45 MPs and 
16 ’representative‘ peers in the new ‘British’ parliament at Westminster. The 16 peers were 
‘representative’ in the sense that they were to be elected at the time of a general election, from and by 
those Scottish noblemen who qualified for a seat in the House of Lords. This provision in the Union 
settlement was a novelty as far as the workings of the Westminster Parliament were concerned, since 
it meant that the Scots nobility was allocatedfkver seats in  the Upper House than there were families 
which qualified for one, leaving them in the position of having to compete for a seat every time a 
general election was called. By comparison, the aristocratic families in England all held a seat in the 
Upper House. See: Brown, Ph.D., p. 19; Furber, Dundus, p. 175; Meikle, Scotlund, pp. 12-13; and 
Riley, English Ministers, p. 3 1. David Brown has estimated that the peerage electorate in the 1780s 
consisted of 86 families with Scottish titles as well as about a dozen Scottish peers holding Irish or 
British titles (the latter only had their right to vote confirmed by a ruling in the House of Lord on 23 
May 1793). Brown, Ph.D., pp. 6, 196. With only 45 MPs in the House of Commons Scotland was also 
‘grossly under-represented’ in the lower chamber. Fry. Patronuge and Principle, p. 7. 
Ib6  David Brown has called i t  ‘a triumph for management’. Brown, Ph.D., p. 198. 
16’ Furber, Dmndus, pp. 266, 268. The concept of a political ‘interest’ has been defined by David 
Brown as ‘a group of individuals working together to advance or protect their own influence’. The 
interest was ‘the basic unit for county politics’ and was a word which ‘had a general application 
throughout the eighteenth century British politics’. Brown, Ph.D., pp. 9- 10. 
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supported by the ‘two main buttresses of the Pitt government’s influence in 
Scotland’, the ‘fear of insurrection from within, and of invasion from without . 7 168 
V 
Pitt’s ‘Reign of Terror’? 
The policies pursued by the government in the 1790s have often been referred to as 
‘repressive’, and a debate has been waged among a number of historians of the 
eighteenth century over whether these policies amounted to a Pitt’s ‘Reign of Terror’ 
- if not equal to that of France - at least in clear breach of traditional ‘British 
liberties’ The main positions can be outlined briefly. 
Clive Emsley has been the main proponent for playing down the notion of a 
reign of terror. In his view, the ‘repressive‘ legislation did not amount to the 
appropriation of any ‘new or arbitrary power’ on the behalf of Pitt’s administration, 
nor was it ever the government’s intention to ‘change the rules of the game’. The 
suspension of the Habeas Corpus, for example. was only intended to be a temporary 
measure. aimed at strengthening the authorities’ hand in their attempt to safeguard 
the rule of law and the British constitution from the threat posed by domestic 
Jacobinism.17” Frank 0’ Gorman has also emphasised the temporary nature of the 
legislation which was implemented - the Seditious Meetings Act, for example, was 
passed for a duration of three years only - and has argued that ‘although the 
0 uovernment M’as prepared to take draconian measures to discipline domestic 
radicalism, it was not prepared to endanger the constitution in so doing‘. Pitt 
intended no ‘permanent change’ in the nature of the constitution. Malcolm J .  
Thomis and Peter Holt on the other hand, have stressed that ‘it was the government 
that was chiefly responsible for confusing reform with revolution’, and that the 
consequence of this confusion was ‘the creation of revolutionaries where none had 
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[bid., pp. 4 18- 19. 
The notion that Britain was experiencing a Reign of Terror equivalent to that which marked the 
French Republic from 1792 to 1795 was a contemporary idea, first put forward by Charles James Fox. 
Emsley, ‘Pitt’s “Terror“‘, 155. 
I68 
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Ibid., 17.5. See also: Emsley. British Socie?,, p. 48. 




previously been’. 17’ By branding all reformers as potential revolutionaries who 
aimed at the overthrow of the state, and prosecuting political radicals for the crimes 
of sedition and treason, the government was not only guilty of gross, deliberate and 
unfair exaggeration, but was also driving the reform movement underground and 
thereby forcing many reformers to adopt more extreme policies than they otherwise 
would have done.173 Although some of the measures implemented were justified at a 
time of war, Thomis and Holt admit, the Pitt administration nevertheless sought to 
‘make political capital out of conspiracy scares, not only to intimidate the extra- 
parliamentary opposition but also to split the opposition within parliament’ .”‘ 
Whatever its aims, the government must clearly have faced a dilemma, because, by 
implementing its repressive policies, Pitt’s administration was effectually setting 
aside some of those very principles it claimed to be defending. This course of action 
could be defended on the grounds that it was only an emergency expedient aimed at 
stopping thoss individuals and organisations the authorities believed were conspiring 
for an overturn of the British constitution. The state was fighting for its survival, and 
in the process of doing so, it could legitimately suspend some of those restrictions it 
would normally operate under, in order to defeat those who were working for its 
demise. The validity of such an argument, however, would depend on whether the 
authorities genuimly  believed there to have been a real threat of revolution in Britain 
- that the alleged threat to the constitution was not merely an excuse for clamping 
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down on a noisy, but harmless group of political radicals as Thomis and Holt 
indicated - but it can also be tested by assessing the attitudes the more senior 
politicians held towards the use of such extraordinary measures, as well as the rule of 
law in a more general sense? Whereas it is beyond the scope of this chapter to 
address this issue for Britain as a whole, a few points must be made about the 
Malcolm I. Thomis and Peter Holt, Threats of Revolution in Britain 17891848 (London, 1977). p. 
Ibid., pp. 9,  12. 16-17. 
lhid. ,  p. 16. 
The ‘enemies’ of the British state were, of course, not believed to be adhering to the principles of 
the British constitution. 
17‘ According to Frank O’Gormiln: ’There can be no doubt . . . that Pitt believed that the nation was o r  
could he. endangered if radical groups were left to agitate without hindrance‘. O’Gorman. ’Pitt and the 






situation in Scotland, and more specifically on how the Scottish authorities viewed 
their own policies. 
Central government figures such as Henry and Robert Dundas were aware of 
the importance of retaining the confidence of the public. The authorities had to be 
seen to act in accordance with the rule of law, as well as to be honouring its promises 
and obligations. This latter point was emphasised during the fencible riots in 1794, 
when it was feared that the decision to send troops by sea to England could be 
perceived by the soldiers as a ‘breach of faith’ or a violation of their contract.’77 
Lieutenant Colonel John Woodford of the 6‘h or Northern Regiment of Fencibles, for 
example, urged the authorities to let his Highlanders march to England rather than 
sail, since there was such a ‘strong Aversion & Suspicion’ among the men about 
going on board a ship, and because he feared that ‘an Embarkation would be 
attended, with unpleasant Circumstances, & should any thing unfortunate happen on 
the Voyage, all future Confidence might be lost’.178 The central authorities were not 
oblivious to concerns of the kind Woodford put forward, as was demonstrated so 
adamantly by Dundas’s final instructions to suspend the reduction of pay to 
Volunteer forces in 1798. A similar focus on retaining the government’s confidence 
with the public can be seen in the preparations for political trials. As the head of the 
Crown prosecution in Scotland, it was the Lord Advocate’s responsibility to gather 
evidence and build a case against those who had been arrested for rioting or seditious 
activities, and in most cases, Robert Dundas was concerned to make sure that he had 
what he believed to be a solid case, based on a thorough investigation and sufficient 
evidence to ensure conviction. h June 1793, he wrote to his uncle about a dilemma 
he was facing over whether he should bring to trial a few individuals who had been 
apprehended following a riot in Inverness earlier the same year. Since sufficient 
evidence had been secured to make conviction a strong possibility, it would of course 
be ‘proper’, Robert Dundas wrote, to bring these offenders to trial. The problem was, 
however, that the sheriff and magistrates of Inverness had ‘prevailed on the rioters to 
For a discussion of the riots and their causes, see: chapter 4, pp. 147-53. 
NAS, RH2/4/75, f. 269, Lt. Col. John Woodford of the 6‘h Fencibles to General Lord Adam 
Gordon. Edinburgh Castle, 13 March 1794. A similar point was made by Lt. Col. Cochrane Johnstone 
commanding Col. Fullarton’s regiment of Light Dragoons. NAS, RH2/4/76, ff. 89-90, ‘Copy Letter Lt 




disperse, on an assurance that if they did so, no further notice would be taken of their 
conduct’. Although he disapproved of this decision by the Inverness authorities, 
Robert Dundas doubted the ‘Expediency’ of now bringing these individuals to trial, 
on the grounds that it might subject the magistrates to the ‘imputation of a Breach of 
Faith, which may hurt their usefulness & authority on any future occasion’. He 
therefore recommended that ‘no further notice be taken of these outrages’. 179 
In more extreme cases, however, the leading government men Nw-e prepared 
to make their own political interests and considerations take precedence over the law. 
When - in Robert Dundas’s words - ‘swarms’ of Irishmen were coming across to 
Scotland from Northern Ireland in the summer of 1797, and the authorities were 
deeply concerned about the potential influence these immigrants could have on the 
population of western Scotland, strict rules were set aside in order to deal with the 
problem as effectively as possible. In a letter to John Kng  at the Home Office, the 
Lord Advocate reported that we ‘have sent back as many, indeed more Persons, than 
in strict law we are authorised to do. But we must not stop at trifles’.’*” An analogous 
example can be found in the aftermath of the Tranent riot, the most serious of the 
Militia disturbances in 1797.’” Shortly after the riot, the authorities had considered 
prosecuting those of the dragoons who had been involved in the killing of innocent 
bystanders following the dispersal of the rioting crowd. The responsibility of opening 
a prosecution rested with Robert Dundas as the Lord Advocate of Scotland, and 
initially, he was not favourably disposed towards the idea. On 5 September he made 
the assessment that: ‘The military must do their duty when called upon, and it is 
impossible for them, in such circumstances, to discriminate the innocent from the 
guilty. If innocent blood is shed, it rests on the head of the authors and abettors of 
those lawless outrages’.182 Later in the year, Robert Dundas admitted that some of 
those who had been attacked by the dragoons well outside of Tranent had been 
NAS, RH2/4/7 1, ff. 349-50, Robert Dundas to Henry Dundas, Edinburgh. 25 July 1793. Similarly, 
before the trails of Skirving, Margarot, Gerrald, Callander and Scott, Robert Dundas ensured his uncle 
that ‘we have complete Evidence’ against the accused. National Library of Scotland [NLS], M e l ~ 4 l e  
Papers, MS 105 1 , ff. 68-7 1 ,  Robert Dundas to ‘My Dear Sir’ [Henry Dundas?], Edinburgh. 15 
December 1793. 
NAS, RH2/4/80. ff. 130-31, Robert Dundas to John King Esq.. Edinburgh, 14 July 1797. John 
King took over from Evan Nepean as Undersecretary of War in 1794, see: Brown, Ph.D., p. 349. 
For a discussion of the riot at Tranent, see: chapter 4, pp. 178-80. 





‘entirely innocent’ and had ‘lost their lives most unjustifiably’, and he appears to 
have given serious consideration to the possibility of raising charges of murder 
against at least a few of the responsible soldiers.’” In the end, however, the 
unfortunate political implications of prosecuting military men who had been 
involved in the quelling of a serious riot took priority, and no legal action was 
taken. 184 
The ‘repressive’ policies, however, also consisted of a more informal element 
than the suspension of traditional liberties through acts of parliament, or the 
application of the law courts to prosecute political radicals. The use of intimidation 
and even crude harassment of political radicals and reformers was another element of 
the government’s strategy for rooting out the domestic challenge to the regime, and 
one which was not spoken of as forthrightly or advertised as unequivocally as the 
emphasis on apprehending and punishing the ringleaders of disturbances or seditious 
activities. This policy of intimidation could take the form of agent provocateurs 
mixing with loyalist crowds in order to stir them up against radical arrangements or 
to attack the property of leading radicals; of deliberate attempts at obstructing the 
professional careers of prominent reformers; 186 of economic sanctions levied by the 
ruling elite against reform groups or individual political radicals; and of different 
185 
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NAS. RH2/4/82. ff. 267-70. R. Dundas to the Duke of Portland. Edinburgh. 26 December 1797. 
For a detailed discussion of the aftermath of the Tranent riot, see: Kenneth J .  Logue. ‘The Tranent 
Militia Riot of 1797‘. Transactions qf the Eust Lothian Aritiymrian rind Field Naturcilists ’ Societ]., 14 
( 1974). 5 1-6 I : and Sandy Mullay. The Trunent Massacre (East Lothian. 1997). pp. 52-61. 
This was probably more common in England than in Scotland, since there were no ‘Church and 
King‘ mobs north of the border and hardly any loyalist demonstrations that turned violent. Indeed, 
John Brims has argued that ’intimidation was more subtle in Scotland than in England‘, John Brims, 
The Scottish Democratic Mnvenient in the Age qf the French Retvlution. unpublished Ph.D. thesis 
(University of Edinburgh, 1983), p. 373. See also: Thomis and Holt. Threuts qf Re\dution, p. 23; and 
Emma Vincent Macleod, ‘The Influence of the French Revolution in Scotland’. in The Auld Alliance: 
Frurzce and Scotland over 700 Years, ed., James Laidlaw (Edinburgh, 1999), p. 13 1. 
The practice of obstructing the careers of those who showed support for reform or reform societies 
was particularly common in the Scottish legal profession. Henry Erskine’s dismissal as Dean of  
Faculty in 1796 was only the most prominent of a number of‘ such cases. Meikle, Scotland, pp. 1%- 
60; and Thomis and Holt. Threats o f  Revolution. p. 13. In 1797. Charles Hope, the Dean of the 
Faculty of Advocates, presented a motion to ‘expel from that Body Mr. John Morthlund, on account 
of his being Editor of a Scotch Paper, the tendency of which is  to alienate the affections o f  his 
Ma-jesty’s subjects from his person and government’. The Times. 27 Sept 1797 [original italics]. 
This kind of intimidation would often take the form of blacklisting of people who supported reform 
societies. The consequence could be that they had their credit stopped at the bank, or - if they were 
shopkeepers - that the elite would boycott their establishment and encourage everyone else to do 
likewise. On one occasion in  early March 1793, the sister of Lord Braxfield - the Lord Justice Clerk - 
had discovered a parliamentary reform petition lying open for subscription in  a shop she entered, 
whereupon she warned the shopkeeper that ‘if he continued to take in subscriptions she would 
1 R ?  





kmds of pressure being placed upon the publishers of radical newspapers or other 
material deemed ‘seditious . Since any involvement in such activities on the part 
of the government would have been illegal - strictly speaking - it was conducted as 
covertly as possible. Unequivocal evidence of government involvement in such 
activities is therefore not abundant, but a few examples survive. 
7 188 
Early in December 1792, the Provost of Glasgow, Gilbert Hamilton, had 
exerted pressure on ‘the Printer of the Gazetteer or New Daily Advertiser’ to 
‘immediately contradict’ an article he had published about a conversation Hamilton 
was alleged to have had with Henry Dundas in Glasgow. The article, ‘every part of 
which was falsehood’, could not be verified as Dundas had not actually been in 
Glasgow for years. The same printer was already under surveillance for publishing 
pro-French material in his ne~spaper . ’~’  Later the same month, David Smyth in 
Edinburgh transmitted two letters containing resolutions from Perth to Henry Dundas 
at the behest of the Lord Advocate. The wording of these resolutions struck Smyth 
‘as libellous and Seditious‘ and he added that ‘the Resolutions will probably be in the 
newspapers of this evening though I shall endeavour to prevent them’.’”’ 
189 
By and large. however, the government tried to defeat radicalism openly and 
through legal means, and in this, prosecutions for sedition and treason played a 
dominant role. In the next chapter we will address the role played by the Scottish law 
courts in the political trials of the 1790s. 
withdraw her own employment and that of her friends and acquaintances‘. Brims, Ph.D., p. 382. See 
also: Meikle, Scotland, pp. 155-56; and Bewley, Muir, pp. 49-50. 
Sec: Brims, Ph.D., pp. 372-89; Brown. Ph.D., pp. 171-73; Dickinson, Politics o f  the  People. p. 
281; Meikle, Scotlund. pp. 153-60; and Thomis and Holt, Threats of ReL8olittion. pp. 14, 23. 
NAS, RH2/4/66. f .  214, Gilbert Hamilton [Lord Provost of Glasgow] to ’the Publisher of the Star’, 
Glasgow. 5 December 1792 [Hamilton asked the printer to contradict the false story in his 
publication]. 
1 x x  
1x9 
Ibid., f. 21 2, Gilbert Hamilton to Henry Dundas, Glasgow. 3 December 1792. 






The second main element in the government’s strategy for defeating the challenge 
posed by radicalism in the 1790s was the use of the legal apparatus for what were 
essentially political ends. Prosecutions for political offences were not new in 
Scotland at this point, but there had been very few trials of the sort since the Act of 
1 
Union, and in many respects Scots Law had not been significantly ripened by 
practice in this area of jurisprudence and jurisdiction over the last century. When the 
government decided to bring those it perceived to be domestic enemies of the state 
before the law courts, charged with political crimes, it was therefore entering largely 
uncharted territory, and the political trials would - to an extent - prove to be a 
double-edged sword for the authorities. 
This chapter aims to discuss the content of those trials which took place in 
Scotland, how they were conducted, and how effective they were as a political 
weapon for the government; first by summarising the proceedings in the most 
important cases. and then by discussing their implications. A comparison will also be 
made to the political trials that were conducted in England in this period. 
I 
.Trialsfor Sedition and Treason it1 Scotluizd, 1793-94 
The first of the major trials for sedition to be held in Scotland during the 1790s was 
that against the advocate Thomas Muir, held on 30 and 31 August 1793.’ Muir had 
played a central role in the setting up of the Association of the Friends of the People 
in Edinburgh in 1792, and he had also helped to form similar societies elsewhere. 
Although Muir claimed to be in favour of moderate political reform and change by 
’ The other main element was to give instructions to local government representatives, see: chapter 2, 
’ By ‘major’ trial in  this context, the meaning is a trial in which the defendant was a leading radical, 
that attracted considerable public attention, was of importance for the development of the 
government’s argument on political crimes, and where the defendant - i f  he was found guilty - was 
sentenced to a severe punishment. Six ‘minor’ sedition trials had already taken place in  1793 by the 
time Muir stood before the bench. For a complete list of all the political trials conducted in Scotland 
from 1792 until 1802. see: Appendix: B. 
pp. 58-60. 
a7 
constitutional and peaceful means only, he had emerged as one of the more radical 
leaders at the first general convention of the Scottish Friends of the People, primarily 
because of his insistence on reading out an address from the United Irishmen? This 
was probably crucial in influencing the government’s decision to view him as a 
dangerous radical ringleader and put him on trial. 
The trial took place at the High Court of Justiciary in Edinburgh, and Robert 
Dundas, the Lord Advocate, led the prosecution. Five judges made up the Scottish 
‘bench’, of whom Robert Macqueen - Lord Braxfield - held the position of Lord 
Justice Clerk, the presiding judge on the bench. In addition, Braxfield was by far the 
most dominant personality among the judges. Muir had decided to defend himself, 
despite having been offered the counsel of the excellent advocate Henry Erskine. 
This was an unusual decision, one that was generally not recommended, and many 
commentators have seen this as an error of judgement on Muir’s part.‘ The 
indictment for sedition contained four main charges: Muir was accused of ‘exciting 
disaffection by seditious speeches’ and advising the purchase and reading of 
‘seditious and wicked publications’, of ‘circulating various seditious papers’ such as 
Paine’s Rights of  Man, and of ‘reading a seditious and inflammatory writing in 
public, viz. the United Irishmen’s address’ .’ Again rather unusually, Muir did not 
challenge the relevancy of any of these charges. The normal procedure in a Scottish 
trial was for the defence to present a claim that the acts cited in the indictment - even 
if they had been committed - did not constitute the crime charged. This was known 
as ’challenging the relevancy of the indictment’, and normally took up a considerable 
amount of the court’s time at the opening of a trial.6 If the charge was found to be 
‘irrelevant’ the trial would have to be abandoned, and it must have seemed strange, 
to say the least, that a trained advocate such as Muir should have missed this 
7 
3 
- See: chapter 1 ,  p. 17. 
See, for example: Christina Bewley. Muir cfHiintershil1 (Oxford University Press, 198 1 ). pp. 67. 70. 
’ Bewley, Muir, pp. 68-9. 
According to Lord Cockburn, the influential nineteenth-century ad\,ocate and judge, it  had become 
customary to challenge the relevancy of almost any indictment by the 1790s. to an extent where the 
objection, in some cases was an accepted, but empty, ceremony. Lord Cockburn, An Examination of’ 
the Trials for  Sedition which have hitherto occurred in Scotland ( 2  vols.; Edinburgh. 1888; New 
York, 1970), i, 96-7. 
6 
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opportunity to have the case d i~missed .~  The next stage of the trial was the selection 
of the jury. Under Scottish law the appointment of the jury for the High Court was in 
the hands of the judges, although based on a list of 135 names provided by the 
sheriffs of the three Lothian-counties, who each submitted 45 names. From this list, 
the Justiciary Clerk - who was appointed by the Lord Justice Clerk - chose 45, and 
out of this number the court then proceeded to pick 15 to sit as the jury. The defence 
had no right of a peremptory challenge, and the jurors could only be challenged on 
the basis of ‘insanity, outlawry, deafness. or dumbness’.8 In the trial of Muir, the 
bench chose only men from the list who were members of the loyalist Goldsmith’s 
Hall Association. This was a more than an ordinary partial choice since the 
Association had not only struck Muir’s name off its records, but also offered a 
reward for evidence of anyone circulating Thomas Paine’s works. Muir therefore 
objected to the selected jury on the grounds that, as members of the Goldsmith’s Hall 
Association, they had to be presumed to have prejudged him. The court made no 
attempt to counter Muir’s assertion, and simply ignored it. One of the jurors, 
however, a naval officer by the name of Captain John Inglis, asked to be removed 
from the jury because, as a ‘servant of the government’ he did not think it proper that 
he should try a man accused of crimes against the government.’ The bench dismissed 
his plea, on the grounds that there was no impropriety in sitting on the jury, despite 
being in the service of the government, and he was compelled to serve.’” The 
prosecution called a total of thirteen witnesses, the majority of whom did not provide 
much information to substantiate the prosecution’s case, presented information that 
reflected rather favourably upon Muir, or were just not very reliable. One of the 
witnesses. Alexander Johnston, a bleacher from Campsie - who had attended a 
meeting of weavers at which Muir had also been present - stated that Muir had called 
for order and regularity at the meeting and recommended the reading of political 
Whether this was a deliberate tactic, or merely a matter of foolishness on the part of Muir, is an issue 
we will return to below. 
Bewley, Muir, p. 70. See also: Henry W. Meikle, Scotland and thci French Revolution (Glasgow, 
19 12). pp. 130-33. At the time, the three Lothian Sheriffs were all appointed by Henry Dundas. 
William Cobbett, A Complete Collection ($’State Trials and Proceedings jbr  High Treason and other 
Crimes and Misdemeanours .from the Earliest Period ( I  I631 to the Present Time ( 18201, [hereafter: 
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pamphlets in general, not just radical ones. Robert Weddell, another prosecution 
witness and one of the weavers at the meeting, pointed out that - when asked to give 
his opinion about Paine’s work - Muir had said ‘that it was foreign to their purpose’. 
Weddell’s point was corroborated by Henry Freeland, a weaver from krkintilloch, 
who stated that, with respect to Paine’s work, Muir had replied: ‘it had rather a 
tendency to mislead the weak minds’.” Weddell also thought that Muir had 
mentioned Flower’s book on the Constitution, just after the weavers’ meeting, and 
since this was a book held to be seditious by the authorities, the Lord Advocate 
immediately seized upon this opportunity to ask him if Muir had recommended it. To 
this, Muir objected, as the book had not been cited in the indictment, but Braxfield 
ruled the question perfectly legitimate as ‘it had a tendency to establish the charge of 
sedition’.” With most of the other witnesses providing little or no useful 
information, the prosecution’s case rested mainly on the testimony of Annie Fisher, a 
former scullery maid in the Muir household. Fisher had not attended any meeting, 
nor had she been a member of any society, and she could therefore not say anything 
about Muir’s public activities. Instead, she was brought in to answer questions about 
the recommendations of seditious books he had made in private - within his own 
family. Some of the evidence she gave was probably true, some of it was clearly 
not and was later contradicted by other witnesses, but it was the way in which she 
presented it that has attracted the most interest.14 Fisher stated that Muir frequently 
read French law books - the titles of which she could cite correctly for the court - 
and when referring to these works she used precise and scholarly terms and phrases. 
In addition to this she knew the exact titles of all the pamphlets Muir was accused of 
having circulated. This testimony was more than just a little suspicious coming from 
a scullery maid of little education; indicating that she was probably coached in her 
evidence, and may even have been bribed by the prosecution. 
13 
1s 
ST, 23, Johnston: cc. 136-38, and Weddell: cc. 138-39, Freeland: c. 142. Muir objected to Johnston 
as a witness because, before the trial, he had allegedly told people that he would do everything in  his 
power to get Muir hanged. 
l 7  Cited in: Bewley, Muir, pp. 71-2. ST, 23, cc. 139-41. 
I 1  
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Bewley, Muir, p. 73. 
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Muir did not cross-examine Fisher - possibly because much of what she said 
was true - but her evidence was not corroborated by any of the other witnesses. 
Instead Muir enquired of the Lord Advocate why he had not called Alexander Muir - 
the defendant’s uncle - who had also been cited as a prosecution witness. Robert 
Dundas replied that his feelings would not let him examine an uncle against his 
nephew, but Muir dismissed this explanation and claimed that it was really because 
he would have contradicted Fisher’s evidence. l 6  The prosecution proceeded to 
augment its direct evidence with indirect or circumstantial information, making 
references to occasions when Muir had talked favourably about French military 
successes or claimed that economic progress in Revolutionary France was surpassing 
that of Britain. The Lord Advocate barely made any effort to cross-examine Muir’s 
witnesses and instead concentrated on addressing the jury and reiterating the message 
that Muir’s intention had been to create similar anarchy and bloodshed in Britain, as 
at the present moment existed in France. 17 
Towards the end of a trial, both the prosecution and the defence were meant 
to give a closing speech before the jury, and since Muir had opted to defend himself, 
it fell upon him to speak in his own defence. Rather than giving a traditional 
summing up of his case, however, Muir proceeded with a three-hour long political 
oration in favour of political reform. This was entirely unsuitable as a legal defence, 
and has led some commentators to speculate whether he did this because he saw 
conviction as inevitable. It has been claimed that Muir suspected the authorities of 
merely aiming to constitute his trial as an example, but that he hoped to turn the trial 
to his advantage none the less, by presenting himself as champion of reform, thereby 
becoming a political martyr if convicted.18 Perhaps Muir thought that he would 
receive only a few months imprisonment - such as had been awarded in the previous 
sedition trials - and that this would have been a bearable price to pay for applying 
Bewley, Muir ,  p. 73-4. 
Ibid., pp. 75-7. The Lord Advocate addressing the jury: ST. 23, cc. 179-186. While addressing the 
jury, Robert Dundas made references to Fisher’s testimony and admitted that: ‘It may be said. that the 
evidence of this girl Fisher is, in a trifling instance, contradicted by the elder, Barclay; but you should 
recollect the salvo which that old gentleman chose to introduce when he took the oath: - That did not 
look well’. ST, 23, c. 184. 
Bewley, Muir, p. 77. See also: Brim D’Osborne. BRAXFZELD: rhe hanging judge? Justice-Clerk 





the trial as a lever in support of reform.” Muir may, in other words, have been trying 
to counter the authorities by their own means. Since the government had decided to 
apply the courts of law as a political weapon, the radicals could attempt to do the 
same. !f this was his plan, then the sentence he received certainly showed that he had 
taken more than a calculated risk. 
Following Muir’s speech, Braxfield commenced his summing up of the trial. 
In what was as political a speech as that given by Muir just before, Braxfield voiced 
the current conservative views, and made allusions to the state of France and the 
recent unrest in Scotland as aggravations of Muir’s crime. He also took for granted 
several points which had not actually been proved and when the jury returned a 
unanimous verdict of guilty as charged, he congratulated them on their decision - a 
most unusual conduct for any judge.”’ Braxfield then threw it open to his fellow 
judges to suggest an appropriate punishment, as the law did not define a set penalty, 
and an agreement was reached on fourteen years transportation to Botany Bay in 
Australia.” The jury - and probably everyone else in the courtroom - was shocked 
by the severity of the sentence, and resolved to prepare a petition to the court.” The 
day after, however, one of the iury members - a Mr. Innes of Stow - produced a 
letter threatening him with assassination for concurring in the verdict of guilty. at 
which point the jury found it ‘impossible for them to interfere’.’’ Since there was no 
opportunity to .appeal against a ruling by the High Court of Justiciary, the sentence 
could not now be reversed. Muir’s trial set a precedent, which was to be closely 
followed in the subsequent trials, and the first of these was against a clergyman by 
the name of Thomas Fyshe Palmer. 
Palmer’s trial was held before the Circuit Court of Justiciary at Perth, on 12. 
and 13 September 1793, which meant that neither Lord Braxfield nor the Lord 
Advocate took part, but the two judges on the bench - Lord Abercromby and Lord 
Bewley, Muir, p. 52; and John D. Brims, ’The Scottish Democratic Movement in the Age of the 
Cited in: Bewley, Mriir, pp. 79-80. See also: ST, 23. cc. 239-32. 
In the six sedition-trials preceding that of Muir, the harshest sentence imposed was nine months 
imprisonment. See: ST, 23. No.: 588. Trial of  John Morton. James Anderson and Malcolm Craig; and 
Cockburn, Examination, i ,  95- 108. ’’ Ibid., 182. 
I9 
French Revolution, unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of Edinburgh, 1983). pp. 428-3 1 ,  444, 338. 
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Eskgrove - had both sat on the bench in Muir’s trial. The indictment charged Palmer 
with ‘seditious practices’, and it referred specifically to an allegedly seditious 
handbill which Palmer supposedly had ‘written or printed’ and then ‘circulated’ in 
Dundee.24 Unlike Muir, Palmer used his opportunity to challenge the relevancy of 
the indictment. He first stated an objection to the indictment because of a technical 
mistake in the text. His counsel, Mr Haggart, argued that the person cited in the libel 
- one ‘Thomas Fische Palmer’ - clearly could not be him, as his name was ‘Thomas 
Fyshe Palmer’, and that the case therefore had to be abandoned. After a lengthy 
debate, the judges eventually dismissed the objection. Once it was evident that the 
trial would not be given up due to a spelling mistake in the indictment, the defence 
presented its other objections to the relevancy of the libel, but none of these were 
sustained.” Following the examination of witnesses for the crown, the chief 
prosecutor, Mr Burnett, proceeded to mount the crown’s case against the defendant, 
spending considerable time outlining the ‘seditious and inflammatory tendency’ of 
the handbill Palmer had printed and distributed? The pamphlet itself had been 
drafted at a meeting in the Dundee Berean Meeting-house - where Palmer had been a 
leading figure - but the original author was one George Mealmaker, a Dundee 
weaver. Palmer had certainly been involved in the shaping of the final text, giving 
advice on alterations and terminology. but he had himself discouraged its circulation 
on the grounds that - at the present time - it might bring the members of the meeting 
into trouble with the authorities. At this he was outvoted by the meeting, and he 
subsequently acquiesced in the task of having the address printed and distributed.” 
On the point of printing and distributing the handbill, the evidence was thus quite 
clear. Palmer could be shown to have done both. In terms of the handbill’s content, 
ST. 23. cc. 237-38. For the complete indictment, see: Ibid., cc. 237-42. 24 
2.i Ibid.. 255 [my italics]. Palmer’s counsel tried to show that the indictment had not been properly and 
accurately ‘laid’, and that Palmer’s activities did not amount t o  the crime charged. to which Mr 
Maconochie for the prosecution argued that: ‘the whole drift of Mr. Haggart’s speech goes to attack 
the major proposition in  the indictment. as not containing sound law’. Ibid., 282. 
I6  Ibid., 334-36, Burnett argued that: 
The whole paper, from beginning to end, breathes the language of sedition, and o f  opposition 
to the established government; it is written in a style which marks the school from whence i t  
came; it  is violent, hyperbolical, and declamatory; it calls upon the people to rise up and 
vindicate their just rights; i t  speaks of a just and necessary war. as being undertaken “by a 
wicked ministry, to forge chains for a free people. and to rivet those chains upon ourselves”. 
Ibid., 335. 
See Cockburn, Exaniination, i ,  194-95. 1-7 
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the prosecution also had a strong case to make? The problem was to prove that 
Palmer had acted with seditious intention, and this the prosecution found more 
difficult. No direct evidence of this could be produced, but an argument was 
developed, whereby it was held that to promote universal suffrage - such as the 
handbill did - in itself showed seditious intention, since introducing such a measure 
would necessarily imply the overthrow of the existing form of government. By 
printing and publishing the handbill, Palmer had therefore betrayed his real 
intentions? His guilt was then further aggravated, the judges argued, by the timing 
of his activities - he had attempted to stir up discontent against the government just 
as the unrest of the winter of 1792 had subsided - and also by the fact that he was a 
cZergyman.30 The defence disagreed with the claim that campaigning for universal 
suffrage - in itself - was seditious, but mounted its main counter-argument to the 
prosecution on displaying how a language similar to Palmer’s had been used by ‘men 
of unquestionable wisdom and public virtue on other occasions’.” Referring to the 
Prime Minister William Pitt’s reform programme of 1784, Mr. John Clerk, the 
counsel for the defence, pointed out that: ‘Mr. Pitt and the Duke of Richmond were 
guilty of no sedition, and the same law that applied to their case does now protect 
Mr. Palmer. Gentlemen, there :s no change in the law, but there has been a very 
considerable change in the views of the disapprovers of reform’?’ The summing up - 
which was conducted by Lord Abercromby - as well as the closing remarks made by 
both the two judges following the sentence of guilty, were as politically biased as 
anything Braxfield had stated at the end of Muir’s trial and, although there was some 
discussion on the range of apprcpriate penalties, the judges again landed on 
transportation, this time for seven years. 
After the trial of Palmer had been closed, no major trial for sedition took 
place in Scotland for almost half a year, until early in January 1794. In the meantime 
Even Lord Cockburn, who was generally not very favourably disposed towards the prosecution in 
his discussion of the trials, admitted that ‘there was sedition in the paper‘. Ibid., 190. 
ST, 23, cc. 284, 294, 368. For a further discussion of the prosecution’s argument on universal 
suffrage. see below, pp. 130-3 1 .  
’O Lord Abercromby held it to  be the ‘peculiar duty’ and ’province’ of a man of his  profession. ‘to 
instruct citizens in their duty to God and to man, and not become an exciter to crimes of the most 
dangerous nature’. ST. 23, c. 372. 
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the British Convention had sat in Edinburgh, and the next political trials to be staged 
in Scotland were against delegates at that convention. Two of the seven men who 
were to be tried - Scott and Callander - failed to appear in court, and a third, 
Browne, was never brought to trial, but the remaining four were tried.” William 
Skirving was the first to stand before the bench at the High Court of Justiciary in 
Edinburgh, on 6 and 7 January. 
The complete minutes for both the first Edinburgh Convention and the British 
Convention are included in State TriaZs at the opening of the account of Skirving’s 
trial, but it is not stated explicitly whether they were actually read out to the court, or 
just presented as evidence; or if they were read out, when exactly that occurred.’4 It 
does seem likely that they were presented orally to the court at the very beginning of 
the trial, however, since the prosecution made repeated references to them 
throughout the whole of the proceedings. Assuming that familiarising itself with the 
minutes came first on the court’s agenda, the next stage in the process was for the 
Solicitor General - Mr. Blair - to present the prosecution’s case. This he did while at 
the same time making extensive comments on the proceedings of the convention,3F 
and it should be stressed in this context that, although the indictments for all the four 
delegates who were tried - Skirving. Maurice Margarot, Charles Sinclair and Joseph 
Gerrald - differed slightly. the charge was essentially the same in the four trials. 
They were all accused of having met under the ‘pretence’ of advocating the reform 
of parliament, but that their real intention had been to ‘subvert’ the constitution.36 In 
Skirving’s trial the Solicitor-General held the ‘particular acts of sedition’ - of which 
the prosecution intended to prove Skirving guilty - to consist of two branches. First, 
he was charged with having circulated and distributed a seditious libel, or more 
precisely, the handbill that Thomas Palmer had already been convicted of printing 
2 3  
- -  See: John Ban-ell, Imagining the King’s Death: Figurative Treason, Fantasies of Regicide 1793- 
1796 (Oxford, ZOOO), p. 157. In addition to being a member of the Convention, Alexander Scott wits 
the printer of the Edinburgh Gazetteer, and was charged with having published the proceedings of  the 
convention in his newspaper. Cockburn, Examiization, i ,  221. 
ST, 23, c. 391-442 [minutes], and cc. 443-71 [accounts of the proceedings of the convention 
published in the Edinburgh Gazetteer]. The editor of ST only stated that: ‘These minutes were 
received as evidence on this and on the following trials, and I here insert them at full length’. c. 391. 
Cockburn has argued that the Solicitor-General’s opening speech, ‘though professed to be only 
intended to explain the charges, was powerfully calculated to make the jury believe them’. Cockburn, 
Examination, i ,  270 [original italics]. 
34 
35 
Barrell, Imagining, p. 158. 36 
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and distributing, and this had occurred before the convention was convened. The 
second branch of the charge related to the proceedings of the British Convention, in 
which Skirving was charged with having taken ‘a very principal part’.37 Skirving - 
who had opted to defend himself - presented three main objections to the relevancy 
of the indictment, of which the first two took the form of questions. His initial 
inquiry was whether he was to be tried for the single crime of sedition, as was stated 
in the major proposition, or for the ‘crimes specified’ as was outlined in the minor 
p r o p ~ s i t i o n . ~ ~  His second objection was concerned with the trial of Palmer. where 
Skirving had been cited as a prosecution witness. It was his view that this 
disqualified him from now being tried, because ‘nothing I might then reveal, 
supposing I had been criminally concerned, could ever come against myself?’”$ 
Finally, Skirving objected to the way in which the British Convention had been 
presented in the indictment, and the fact that it was used in a trial against him as an 
individual. Partly, he argued, he could not be held responsible for everything that had 
been said and done by the delegates at the convention, when he had been indicted 
before the court as an individual; and partly, the prosecution had wrongfully assumed 
the British Convention to be a seditious meeting.“) 
The judges simply dismissed the first and third point without spending much 
time explaining why, but Lord Braxfield did inquire about the second objection. He 
wished to know if Skiving had - not only been on the list of witnesses - but actually 
been called to give his testimony, since that would have prevented him from being 
called upon again by a criminal prosecution. The Lord Advocate could confirm that 
Skirving had not testified at the trial of Palmer, and the objection was consequently 
over-ruled and the indictment found relevant? Next came the selection of the jury. 
ST, 23. c. 485. 
ST, 23, c. 491 [my italics]. In Scottish criminal law the terms ‘minor-’ and ‘major proposition‘ 
referred to the libel or indictment for the trial. The major proposition stated which crime was charged, 
and the minor proposition outlined the act or acts allegedly committed by the defendant and why these 
acts amounted to the crime that had been charged. The description of the acts and why they amounted 
to a specific crime could be very long and detailed, and i t  was normal for the court to debate the 
‘relevancy’ of the minor proposition for quite some time at the beginning of a trial. This is what was 
referred to as the discussion of the ’relevancy of the indictment’ above. 
3 1  
ST, 23, c. 492. 
Skirving argued: ‘That the British convention, however, is a seditious and unconstitutional meeting, 
remains to be proved, and cannot be proved, t i l l  the legislature declare them such; or until they shall 
be cited, tried, and condemned according to law’. ST. 23, c. 497. 
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Skirving objected to those of the chosen jurors who were members of the 
Goldsmith’s Hall Association, on the same grounds as Muir had done earlier, but to 
no effect. Since a similar objection had been rejected by the court in Muir’s trial, the 
judges could now rest their case on precedent with no need to discuss the matter any 
further. Skirving, however, also objected to ‘all those who hold places under 
government; because it is a prosecution by government against me’. Anyone holding 
office under the government, Skirving argued, would not have the necessary 
impartiality to judge fairly in a trial where ‘they are materially parties’. To this 
objection Lord Eskgrove replied that: 
This gentleman’s objection is, that his jury ought to consist of the 
convention of the Friends of the People; that every person wishing to 
support government is incapable of passing upon his assize. And by 
making this objection, the panel is avowing. that it was their purpose 
to overturn the government.32 
Eskgrove thus appeared to take the point of view that the country was divided into 
two camps, the friends and the enemies of the constitution, and that it was impossible 
to hold a neutral position. By objecting to those the prosecution saw as the ”friends’ 
of the government, Skirving was necessarily requesting to be tried hy its ‘enemies’. 
and that was untenable. The required fifteen jurors were consequently chosen 
without any heed being taken to Skirving’s objections. His argument that they were 
prejudiced against him was turned around by the Lord Advocate, who, when 
addressing the newly constituted jury, praised them as ‘prejzrdiced in favour of the 
British constitution’ .43 
A total of sixteen witnesses were called by the prosecution, two of them 
testifying on the circulation of the Dundee address, and the remaining fourteen on 
various aspects of Skirving’s activities in connection with the convention.u The 
choice of witnesses reflected the prosecution’s priorities, since, during the rest of the 
trial, the prosecutors focused mainly on the proceedings of the convention. 
Emphasis was placed on the decision to form secret committees. and particularly on 
the committee of emergency and its purpose (it was questioned whether it had been 
“ ST. 23, c. 5 13. 
ST, 23, c. 538 [original italics]. 




established with the intention of resisting or supporting a French invasion)? The 
Lord Advocate and the Lord Justice Clerk also made much out of the fact that 
Skirving had been the secretary to the convention, and that this put him in a 
particularly responsible position with respect to the decisions reached by the 
assembly.46 In his summing up of the trial the Lord Justice Clerk argued that the 
crime of sedition consisted of ‘violating the peace and order of society’, and that 
when it ‘has a tendency to overturn the constitution of this country, it borders upon 
high treason’. Since ‘a very little more’ than what was contained in the indictment, 
would have made it high treason, the jury was to view this case as sedition highly 
aggra~ated.~’  A verdict of guilty as charged was returned by the jurors. and a 
sentence of fourteen years transportation imposed, since the judges could not, 
Braxfield argued, ‘consistent with the justice of the country, pronounce a less 
sentence upon this panel. than we did upon Mr. Muir’? Skirving only made one 
remark to the sentence, which was that: ‘my Lords, I know that what has been done 
these two days will be rejudged; - that is my comfort and all my hope’.‘’ 
The trial of Maurice Margarot took place on 13 January 1794. and the 
indictment held out a charge very similar to that under which Skirving had been 
tried. Margarot was principally charged with having been a leading member of the 
convention. This amounted to the crime of sedition, the indictment stated, because 
the activities of the assembly had already been proved to be seditious in the trial of 
Skirving.”’ Of all the sedition trials held in Scotland in the 1790s. the trial of Maurice 
Margarot was probably the most confrontational and the one where tempers ran the 
highest. This was in no little degree due to the approach adopted by Margarot, who 
had also chosen to defend himself. At the opening of the trial. he objected to the 
absence of the Lord Justice GeneraZ in the court, which he believed prevented any 
proceedings from taking place, and pointed out to the judges that as the Scottish trials 
soon ‘will undergo a revision in both Houses of Parliament in England. You already 
“ S T ,  23, c.  555. 
Cockburn, Exuminution, i .  285. For example, the Lord Advocate: ST, 23, c. 533. 
47 ST. 23, c. 588 .  
ST, 23, c.  601. 
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know that there is an impeachment hanging over your heads’.’’ Margarot also put 
forward a demand whereby he appeared to present himself as the representative of 
the ‘new’, liberal and modern Britain at an old ‘feudal’ Scottish Court, an attitude 
which must have irritated Braxfield considerably.s2 He argued that: 
I need lord justice clerk and lord Henderland’s testimonies, as 
exculpatory evidences: I wanted to bring them upon their oaths to the 
bar, but though it is the privilege of an Englishman - of a Briton I 
mean, for I wish the name of Englishman to be annihilated in that of 
Briton - it is a privilege granted to us by that constitution which is so 
loudly trumpeted up upon every occasion, that a panel at the bar, shall 
have the same compulsory method of bringing his witnesses that his 
prosecutor has, that has been denied me? 
The prosecution and the judges were not inclined to let the defendant get away with 
this attempt at seizing the moral high ground and the fact that he was an Englishman 
was repeatedly used against him. At the very end of the trial, for example, almost all 
the judges made a mention of Margarot’s nationality, and the Lord Justice Clerk, 
who spoke last. stated quite dryly that: 
If this country suffers any grievances. I am sure he felt none of them: 
he lives not in Scotland: has no property there: and, as a stranger, he 
comes into this country a man with a great deal of abilities and great 
elocution, - he comes here for the express purpose of disseminating 
sedition among the lower order of people in this country. I cannot 
consider it as any thing but sedition highly aggravated.” 
Mxgarot’s objection was rejected, and neither of the two judges agreed to give 
testimony later in the trial. 
The indictment was concerned - almost exclusively - with Margarot’s 
activities at the British Convention, but it also mentioned that he had been the chosen 
representative at the convention of ’an association of seditious people, calling 
5 1  - ST, 23, c. 606. Although the High Court was ‘nominally under the direction of the Lord Justice- 
General’. this office had become a sinecure by the mid-eighteenth century, and it was not required for 
the person who held it  to be present in court. ‘In reality. the High Court was presided over by the Lord 
Justice-clerk’. D’Osborne. BRAXFZELD. pp. 15.73 [quotes]. 
Braxfield, Brim D’Osborne has argued: ‘stood out ... for old ways and the old tongue of speech 
and manners’. He was proud of his Scottish, or ’doric’ accent, as well as of the Scottish legal system, 
and was clearly annoyed by the arrogant and condescending attitude Margarot displayed i n  court. 
D’Osborne. BRAXFZELD. pp. 27. 43. See also: Brims, Ph.D., pp. 533-35. 
i i  ST,  23, c. 607. 
” S T .  23, c. 776. 
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themselves the Corresponding Society of London’. He was charged with having 
supported the motion for a reconvening of the convention in the event of the 
introduction in Britain of a Convention Bill - similar to that which had been passed 
in Ireland - and with presenting a plan for a ‘general union and corporation’ between 
radicals in England and Scotland. The purpose of the ‘union’ was allegedly that of 
‘exciting our subjects in England, in contempt of legal authority, to adopt the same 
unconstitutional conduct, which the said Maurice Margarot and his associates had 
presumed to follow’ .” 
In Margarot’s view there was no need to discuss the relevancy of the 
indictment, since it was not appropriate for the trial to go ahead without the Lord 
Justice General, but when Braxfield refused to comply with this and stated that the 
defendant had only one chance of challenging the relevancy, Margarot presented two 
objections none the less. The first was aimed at the concept and law of ‘sedition’ in 
more general terms, and the second concerned three minor misspellings in the text of 
the libel, in themselves sufficient, he claimed, to have the trial abandoned. The latter 
objection was unlikely to have any impact, since a similar objection from Palmer had 
been repelled in his trial. The first objection, however. was more serious. Margarot 
challenged the judges ‘to point Dut the law which makes sedition a crime, and also, 
that which shows the punishment that is due to it? A lengthy discussion of the 
crime of sedition ensued, but the judges disagreed with Margarot’s view, and the 
indictment was eventually 
Margarot demanded to have 
found relevant.” Next came the list of witnesses. 
the Duke of Richmond, Henry Dundas and the Prime 
Minister William Pitt brought up from England to give testimony, since, as the 
leaders of the government, he held them to be material witnesses in his case. This 
was refused by the bench, which claimed that calling up witnesses from England lay 
outside its jurisdiction.“ 
j i  Indictment: ST. 23. cc. 608-14. 
ST, 23, c. 616. 
More or less extensive debates on the law of sedition took place in all  the trials, and a discussion o f  
these debates can be found in section I11 of this chapter. 
ST, 23, cc. 627-630. When the judges refused his demand, Margarot found this inconsistent since: 
‘it seems you overlook some things and pry very closely into others - it seems you are not competent 
to enforce the attendance of a witness from England. but it  appears, by the libel. that you are 
competent to try offences committed in  England’. ST. 23, cc. 627-628. The bench was, however, 




The prosecution presented many of the same arguments against Margarot, as 
it had done against Skirving in the previous trial, focussing on the proceedings of the 
convention, on the forming of secret committees and on the plans for calling an 
emergency convention, in the event of the present assembly being broken up by the 
authorities (as indeed it was). Margarot, however - who was making speeches as 
politically loaded as those Muir had delivered in his trial - provided more resistance 
to the prosecution’s case than Skirving had done before him. He challenged the 
prosecution’s attempt at portraying it as seditious to assemble a number of people to 
discuss reform,59 and towards the end of the trial - in his closing speech - he accused 
the prosecutor of having ‘found means to blend trials, crimes, criminals, various 
persons and various articles of accusation altogether’ with the intention of proving ‘a 
mountain of guilt, where in fact, there is not even a molehill of imprudence’.“O The 
Lord Justice Clerk retorted by twice stating that Margarot’s defence speech, which 
had taken up four hours of the court’s time, ‘was all sedition from beginning to 
Just as he had concluded his examination of the Sheriff and the Provost as 
part of the evidence for the defence, Margarot introduced an objection, which - had 
it been presented at the appropriate time during the discussion of the relevancy - 
could have made it difficult for the prosecution and the court to go ahead with the 
trial. The objection was concerned with some remarks Lord Braxfield had made at a 
dinner party hosted by one Mr. Rochead at Inverleith about a week before the triaL6‘ 
Margarot enquired of his Lordship whether it was true that - in conversation - the 
Lord had made comments about the defendant, and had asked the lady he was 
conversing with: ‘What should you think of giving him a hundred lashes, together 
with Botany Bay; or words to that effect’; and when the lady had replied, ‘the mob 
would not allow you to whip him’, he had said that ‘the mob would be the better for 
losing a little If it was true that Lord Braxfield had made these comments - 
which it probably was - then he had clearly prejudged the trial, and that was good 
enough reason for having him disqualified from the bench on this particular 
59  ST. 23, CC. 621-22. 
6o ST, 23, c. 71 1. 
ST, 23, cc. 763, 767. 
Mr. Rochead frequently held dinner-parties for his friends, and both the Lord Advocate and Lord 
61 
Justice Clerk were ’established guests’. Cockburn, Examination. i i ,  32. 
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occasion. When Margarot decided to examine him on this issue, Braxfield was 
therefore in a potentially very awkward position, and resorted to asking his fellow 
judges if they thought it appropriate of him to answer the questions. In reality, 
however, he was on fairly safe ground because of Margarot’s timing. If he had 
brought his point forward at the outset of the trial, Margarot could have presented it 
as an objection to the fitness of Braxfield to sit as a judge. By delaying it to this later 
stage, however, he had allowed the Lord Justice Clerk to preside unopposed, and 
thereby implicitly and indirectly accepted his presence on the bench. In the middle of 
the defence’s examination of witnesses was not the appropriate stage of a trial’s 
proceedings to make this kind of objection, and it was consequently over-ruled, on 
the grounds that it was irrelevant ‘as a defence fo r  the prisoner? Margarot was 
found guilty, and sentenced to the same fourteen years of transportation as his fellow 
delegate Shrving had received. 
The relatively short trial of the third British Convention-member to be tried, 
Charles Sinclair, took place over no fewer than four separate occasions, on 17 and 24 
February and 10 and 14 March 1794. Sinclair was charged with sedition and, with 
the exception of a speech which he had delivered at the convention, the details and 
facts stated in the indictment corresponded closely with those used against Skirving 
and Margarot .h5 Unlike his two fellow convention-members, however, Sinclair had 
not opted to defend himself, and had instead employed the counsel of Henry Erskine 
and Archibald Fletcher. These two well-qualified defence lawyers were able to 
criticise the indictment far more effectively than either Skirving or Margarot had 
done, and the whole first session of the trial was consequently spent debating the 
relevancy of the charge. Their objections were mainly concerned with the 
presentation of the crime of sedition in the indictment. The libel was ‘vague and 
uncertain’ Fletcher argued, ‘inasmuch as it had not informed the panel whether he 
was to be tried by the statute law, or by the common law of the land’, nor did it state 
if it was ‘real’ or ‘verbal’ sedition which was meant to be charged. In addition to this, 
the indictment was also uncertain with respect to the kind of punishment that could 
6-1 Cockburn, Examination, ii ,  28-32, [original italics]. See also: D’Osborne, RRAXFIELD, pp. 195-97. 
The speech was concerned with the recently passed Convention Bill in Ireland and called for the 
admission of ‘all or any of the patriotic members of the society of united Irishmen of Dublin’, to be 
‘admitted to speak and vote in this convention’. ST, 23, c .  780. 
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be inflicted if the panel was found guilty."6 Whereas the objections in the previous 
trials had been more or less founded on political arguments, these were objections of 
a purely legal nature, and presented by people who knew the law. It is therefore 
possible that the prosecution was taken a little by surprise at this point, and the 
Solicitor-General appeared to be - at least initially - struggling to provide a coherent 
and persuasive reply. Answering Fletcher's observations he argued that: 'To give a 
precise definition of sedition would be difficult, perhaps impossible; but I have no 
hesitation in giving this definition of it, - that the act charged must be unauthorized 
by law, and must be done with an intention to disturb the peace of the community'.67 
The debate continued for some time, but the indictment was eventually found 
relevant. Instead of proceeding with the trial the court was now adjourned and the 
case continued until the 24'h of the same month, only to be postponed another two 
times until 14 March, when it was abandoned. Precisely why it was decided to give 
up the case has been the cause of some discussion. The traditional view has been that 
Sinclair had struck a secret deal with the prosecution, and had agreed to become a 
e oovernment spy. More recent research, however, has unveiled a different possible 
explanation. John Barrell has discovered a statement made by Sinclair to one Amelia 
Anderson, who was well informed about radical politics in London. In a conversation 
with Anderson. Sinclair is supposed to have said that 'he was saved from conviction 
by the influence of his family'. In the absence of any hard evidence of Sinclair 
spying for the government. this seems to be the more likely explanation.68 
The last of the major sedition trials was held on 3, 10, 13 and 14 March 1794 
against the fourth convention-delegate, Joseph Gerrald? At the opening of the trial - 
before the indictment had been read - Gerrald stated the same objection to 
Braxfield's presence on the bench as Margarot had done in his trial. In Gerrald's 
"" ST. 23, cc. 784-85. 
ST, 23, c. 786. 
Barrell, Znzagining. p. 157, footnote 37. Both Cockburn and Meikle supported the theory of Sinclair 
becoming a government spy. Meikle's source was one of Sinclair's counsels, Archibald Fletcher. See: 
Meikle, Scotland, p. 142; and Cockburn, E.r-amiiiatiotz, ii, 40. 
Of al l  the political trials held in Scotland in the 1790s the case of Gerrald was probably that which 
made the greatest impact on public opinion at the time, not least because of Gerrald's poor health, 
which meant that the punishment of transportation was as good as a death sentence. Gerrald's counsel, 
Mr. Laing presented this as a separate point in his main speech in the trial: 'From the state of his 
health, I must add, that a sentence of transportation is to him, in all human probability, a sentence of' 





opinion, Braxfield had disqualified himself from judging in this particular case, 
because at the dinner party he had ‘prejudged the cause of every person who had 
been a member of that assembly calling itself the British Convention’, by exclaiming 
that ‘the members of the British Convention deserved transportation for fourteen 
years, and even public whipping’ .70 Unlike Margarot, however, Gerrald presented his 
objection at the correct stage of the trial, which meant that it could not be dismissed 
offhand as it had been in the earlier trial. The judges, however, rallied to the defence 
of Braxfield and Lord Eskgrove tried to argue that since Gerrald’s name had not been 
mentioned in the conversation, the comments could not be held to have been directed 
against him personally. Moreover, he argued. the Lord Justice Clerk’s remarks had 
constituted ‘nothing more than a general opinion given upon the nature of the 
offence’. He then attempted to shift the focus over to Gerrald, claiming that the only 
motives the defendant could possibly have had for presenting this objection were 
‘malevolence and desperation’. Gerrald protested that he had not come to trial to be 
abused in this way, but was reprimanded by Lord Henderland, who replied that he 
had better behave, as his lordship would ‘not suffer this court to be insulted’. 
Eskgrove, however. withdrew his statement, and offered an apology to G e ~ ~ a l d . ~ !  
The debate was closed by Lord Henderland, who commented that: ‘this respectable 
judge. by what is here alleged, is to be rendered incapable of sitting in this chair - to 
be degraded from his office, and held unfit to judge in the most important trials in 
this country: where his abilities, steadiness, and knowledge in the law, are most 
req~ired‘.~’ To remove Braxfield from the bench was clearly not acceptable in his 
lordship’s view, and the objection was overruled. 
The indictment was in all major respects the same as in the trials of Skirving 
and Margarot, but also included references to three speeches which Gerrald had 
ST, 23, c. 808. 
ST, 23, c. 81 1. 
ST. 23, c. 814. Lord Cockburn found this remark completely unacceptable. arguing that Gerrald’s 
objection had nothing to do with Braxfield’s general fitness to sit on the bench. as Lord Henderland’s 
comment seemed to imply: ‘The plea of the prisoner only went to exclude the justice from acting in 
this particular rrial; and a judge may disqualify himself, by accidental rashness, from interfering in a 
single case, or in a single class of cases, without incurring any general disability’. Cockburn. 





given, two during the proceedings of the convention and one when it was dispersed? 
All combined, this was ample proof of a seditious intention, or so the prosecution 
argued. The relevancy of the indictment was challenged by Mr. Gilles, one of 
Gerrald’s counsels, in a long speech to the court. Gilles criticised the lack of a clear 
definition of ‘sedition’ in the indictment - whether it was real or verbal sedition that 
was meant to be charged - questioned whether it was seditious to campaign for 
universal suffrage and annual parliaments, and attacked the prosecution’s use of 
circumstantial evidence, such as the fact that the country was currently at war, as an 
aggravation of the crime. He also repeated the argument of Pitt’s previous reformist 
agenda, which had been presented first in the trial of Thomas Palmer, and questioned 
the legality of transportation under Scottish law.73 All his objections were, however, 
rejected by the judges. The next stage of the trial was the selection of the jury, and 
Gerrald himself objected to two of the jurors, one Mr. Rankin and Mr. Creech. The 
objection to Rankin - that he was a tailor to the king, and therefore biased - was not 
persuasive, but the objection to Creech was more forceful. According to Gerrald, 
Creech ‘had repeatedly declared in private conversations that he would condemn any 
member of the British Convention, if he should be called to pass on their assize’, 
which indicated that he had prejudged the defendant. To this Lord Henderland 
replied that it would only have served to disqualify Creech, if he had said that he 
would condemn them ‘whether they were guilty or not’.’’ Both objections were 
consequently over-ruled. 
The prosecution’s presentation of its case followed much the same pattern as 
in the two preceding trials, and once it had finished, Gerrald gave a long speech in 
his own defence, before the Lord Justice Clerk commenced with his summing up of 
the trial. Braxfield was mainly concerned with the activities of the convention, but he 
also made direct attacks on Gerrald, at one point holding him to be ‘a very dangerous 
member of society’, because he had ‘eloquence enough to persuade the people to rise 
in arms’. This sparked Gerrald to protest that this was ‘a very improper way of 
Ibid. In the first speech, Gerrald had argued that the current political system in Britain, no more 
resembled the Revolution-settlement of 1689, ‘than a dead putrid carcase does a living body’. ST, 23, 
c. 817. For the other two speeches, see: ST, 23, cc. 820, 823. 
ST, 23, cc. 828-53; and Cockburn, Examination, i i ,  60. 






addressing a jury’, and ‘descending to personal abuse’, to which comment a fierce 
response from Braxfield might have been expected. Instead he retreated a little, and 
came close to apologising when stating that ‘I do not say that you did so, but that you 
had abilities to do i t 7 ‘  In Gerrald’s trial it was also used against him that was 
English, and that he had come up to Scotland, allegedly with the intention of 
spreading sedition. He was found guilty and sentenced to the same fourteen years 
transportation as his fellow accused.77 
In addition to the sedition trials, two trials for high treason were also staged in 
Scotland in the 1790s, and the accused were Robert Watt and David Downie; the two 
key organisers of the ‘Pike Plot’. Since the law of treason was set down by statute, 
these trials were not marked by the kind of legal ambiguity which was such a 
dominant feature in the earlier sedition trials, and they were therefore surrounded by 
less controversy and appear in a somewhat different light. The English treason law 
had been extended to Scotland in 1709 and this had opened for the possibility of 
trying treason by the politically appointed special commission of ‘Oyer and 
Terminer’. rather than before the High Court in Edinb~rgh.~* After the conduct 
displayed by Lord Braxfield in the sedition trials earlier in the year, both Henry 
Dundas and his nephew the Lord Advocate were determined to make sure that the 
treason trials were not presided over by ‘that violent and intemperate gentleman who 
sits in the justiciary’, as Robert Dundas phrased it. Although they had both defended 
the Edinburgh trials in Parliament, their private view was now that his behaviour had 
been s~andalous.’~ By applying the option of Oyer and Terminer, it was possible to 
circumvent Braxfield and instead place the more reliable and predictable Lord 
President Ilay Campbell in charge of the court (Braxfield still sat on the bench, but 
7 h  ST, 23, c. 1002. 
77 Of the subsequent sedition trials staged in Scotland in the 179Os, the most important was that 
against George Mealmaker of Dundee. who was brought before the law courts because of his 
involvement in the forming of the United Scotsmen in 1797. Mealmaker was prosecuted under the so- 
called ‘Gagging Acts‘ of 1795, convicted and sentenced to fourteen years transportation. See: ST, 26, 
no: 627, cc. 1 135-60; Cockburn. Esanziriation, i i ,  150-55; and Meikle, Scotland, pp. 187-88. 
79 Meikle. Scorlarzd, pp. 150-5 1 ; and Michael Fry, The Ditrzdas Desporisrii (Edinburgh, 1992). p. 17 1. 
Later, in 1798, when the ‘Convicts now under Sentence of Transportation’ were finally to be sent off 
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Justice Clerk certainly was too violent & hasty in pronouncing the Sentence’. NAS, RH2/4/83, ff .  
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now only as an ordinary judge). The two trials took place on 3 and 5 September 1794 
for Watt and Downie respectively, and the trial of Downie mirrored that of Watt in 
all major respects. Initially in Watt’s trial, Ilay Campbell presented some 
observations on the state of the kingdom, before reading out two out of the seven 
paragraphs in the treason law, under which the defendant was to be tried. The first of 
these two paragraphs stated that it is treason: ‘When a man doth compass or imagine 
the death of our lord the king, or of our lady his queen, or of their eldest son and 
heir’, and the second: ‘Or if a man levy war against our lord the king in his realm. or 
be adherent to the king’s enemies in his realm, giving to them aid and comfort in the 
realm, or elsewhere, and thereof be proveably [sic] attained of open deed by the 
people of their condition’.”’ The indictment - which was the same in the two trials - 
was divided into eighteen ‘overt acts’ of treason. Numbers one to four were 
concerned with the defendants’ connections with the British Convention, which was 
now described as having been ‘held for the purpose of assuming to themselves the 
powers of government and legislation, and of deposing the king’. Overt acts five to 
seven and nine related to the king, and the crimes allegedly committed against him. It 
was for example stated in number six ‘that he conspired to raise and make 
insurrection and rebellion against our lord the king‘. Number eight referred to the 
plan for ‘seizing the castle of Edinburgh’, numbers ten and fifteen to eighteen were 
concerned with the production of arms and plans for arming those who would take 
part in the planned insurrection, numbers eleven and fourteen with the raising of 
money. and finally numbers twelve and thirteen with the composing, printing, 
publishing and dispersing of ‘certain malicious, wicked and treasonable papers and 
addresses’. All combined this amounted to a compendious charge, but perhaps the 
most interesting aspect of it was that the activities of the British Convention were 
now included in a charge of treason, whereas previously they had been deemed 
‘only’ seditious.8’ 
The disclosure of the pike heads and the evidence linking the production of 
them to Watt and Downie, together with the fact that both of them could be shown to 
be members of the secret sub-committee referred to as the ‘Committee of Ways and 
8o ST. 23, c. 1175. 
ST, 23, CC. 1186-88. 81  
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Means’ formed at the British Convention, all meant that the prosecution rested its 
case on relatively solid ground as far as hard evidence was concerned. It seemed 
evident that the Committee of Ways and Means, with Watt at its head, had been 
planning some sort of conspiracy or insurrection, most likely with the intention of 
seizing Edinburgh Castle. Not even the defence lawyers denied this. For the main 
part of the trial the prosecutors were therefore preoccupied with proving how Watt’s 
seemingly wild plot could be seen as a serious threat to the state, and thereby as an 
act of treason. To constitute the crime of treason, an act had to fulfil the demands of 
at least one of the seven paragraphs in the statute law. They were all concerned with 
the person of the king, and it therefore had to be demonstrated - in some way or 
other - that the acts of the defendant posed a threat to the king’s life. Since the Pike 
Plot had been discovered before the planned attack on Edinburgh castle had taken 
place, the prosecution could not provide direct evidence that a war had been levied 
against the king, but attempted to argue that the conspiracy was - on its own - an act 
of treason. Mr. Anstruther for the prosecution, quoting from a work by the learned 
lord chief justice Hale, stated that if a ’conspiracy be of levying a war, which if 
levied, has a direct tendency to destroy the life of his majesty, there is no doubt such 
a conspiracy is an overt act of high treason*.82 There was in other words no need for 
the conspiracy to have been set in motion, as long as it could be demonstrated that if 
it had been. it would have threatened the king’s person. The problem was how an 
attack on Edinburgh Castle could be seen as an attack on the king. The defence tried 
to argue that the Pike Plot could not be held to have threatened the king’s life, as it 
did not contain any actual plan to march down south and confront his Majesty. but 
this was held to be unnecessary by the prosecution.83 It was enough to show, the 
crown lawyers argued, that the planned attack on Edinburgh Castle necessarily 
implied an intention of overthrowing the government, since - as the king was an 
inherent part of the government - it  also had to be an attempt at removing the 
monarch from his throne? That the plot to seize the castle was in fact aimed at 
overthrowing the government, was held to be proved by its connection with the 
ST, 2 3 ,  c. 1196. 
Barrell, Znzugining, p. 276. 




British Convention - the proceedings of which had by now been stated as treasonable 
- through the Committee of Ways and Means. This argument, however, required an 
explanation of why an attempt to overthrow the government put the king’s life under 
threat. The required explanation was developed by Anstruther, and has been coined 
the ‘Coronation Oath argument’ by John Barrell.“ According to Barrell: 
The Coronation Oath binds the king to resist any attempt to put 
pressure on him and his parliament, by force of arms, to change the 
law of the kingdom or to redress a real or imaginary public grievance. 
In effect, argues Anstruther, anyone who conspires to levy war for 
such purposes must be regarded as imagining the king’s death, for he 
must foresee that the king is obliged to oppose him ‘at the hazard of his 
life itself, and he must foresee that in the ensuing struggle the king’s 
life must be put at risk.86 
Since an attack on Edinburgh Castle was also an attempt on the king‘s life, it 
constituted an act of treason, Anstruther concluded. The defence in both trials - 
Hamilton in the trial of Watt, and Cullen as the counsel for Downie - made one last 
attempt to counter the prosecution’s line of argument, by claiming that the Pike Plot 
was not to be taken seriously. Hamilton stated that the conspiracy hatched by Watt 
and his accomplices was nothing but a ‘ridiculous absurdity’. How believable could 
it be, he argued, for ‘seven men to seize one of the strongest castles in the 
kingdom! ’ x 7  Mr. Anstruther for the prosecution in Downie‘s trial. however, retorted 
that .the wildness and extravagance of the scheme does not prove the scheme did not 
exist‘. This was the view adopted by the jury as well, and both the two prisoners 88 
were found guilty and sentenced to death. Watt was subsequently hanged and 
beheaded, and Downie was meant to suffer the same punishment, but the jury 
decided that ’upon account of certain circumstances, we desire to recommend the 
prisoner to mercy’.89 It was not specified what these ‘circumstances’ were, but 
Barrell. Imngirzing, pp. 277-8 1 .  
Ibid., p. 278. Barrell cited Anstruther: ST, 23, c. 1205 [Barrell’s italics]. 
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Downie was pardoned ‘on condition that he transport himself from the United 
kngdom’ .90 
I1 
Was there a Law of Sedition in Scotland? 
It was mentioned above that the crime of treason was marked by less legal ambiguity 
than that of sedition, since, for treason, there were several statutes pinning down the 
exact content of the law, whereas no such statutory legislation appeared to exist for 
the crime of sedition. The precise meaning of ‘sedition’ under Scots law was 
consequently debated at great length in several of the sedition trials - those of 
Sinclair and Gerrald have been alluded to above - and was also of crucial importance 
for the treason trials. We will return to this discussion in more detail below. but first 
it is necessary to establish the nature and content of Scottish law on political crimes. 
Scottish law, as it existed before the union, does not seem to have contained 
any substantial amount of statute law on sedition. There certainly were acts passed 
which concerned aspects of what might come in under the later definitions of the 
crime, but no comprehensive statute, specifically designed to outline the nature of 
sedition, existed within Scottish law before the Union of 1707. Scots law, however, 
operated with a crime denoted as leasing-making. The exact nature of the 
relationship between this crime and sedition had not been clarified, and was one of 
the most important issues of contention during the political trials of the 1790s. 
Although no statute existed for sedition, an act concerning leasing-making had been 
passed by the Scottish Parliament in Edinburgh as recently as 1703. It stated that: 
‘Leesing makers’ and ‘Authors of Slanderous Speaches or Writs’ who, for their 
crime, had up till then been liable for capital punishment, could no longer sentenced 
to death. Instead. those convicted of the crime were to suffer a punishment which: 
‘shall for hereafter only be arbitrary according to the demerit of the transgression 
That is by fineing imprisonment or banishment, or if the party offender be poor and 
not able to pay a fine, then to be punished in his body (life and limb always 
9o Barrell, Imagining, p. 257. William James Anderson has argued that Downie was saved by the 
intervention of the (Catholic) Bishop Hay. William James Anderson, ’David Downie and the “Friends 
of the People’”, The lnnes Rei-iekt.: Scottish Catholic Historical Stirdies, 16 ( 1965), 175-76. 
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preser~ed)’.~’ The situation with respect to case law on sedition was not notably 
different from that of statute law. There had been a number of trials for treason and 
leasing-making before the union, but in no trial had the indictment stated that the 
crime committed was sedition. When the trials began in 1793, the judges therefore 
‘had actually no precedent whatever to guide them’.92 With little or no statute law, 
and hardly any case law, a definition of sedition - if indeed it was to be accepted as a 
crime under Scots law - had to be sought in authoritative writings on the law of 
S CO t 1 and. 93 
A number of scholars wrote treatises aiming to explain Scottish law, but the 
most important in our context are John Erskine, and Baron David Hume. Hume first 
published his Commentaries on the Law of Scotland in 1797,94 which was after the 
main political trials had taken place in Scotland, while Erskine had published his 
work in 1773, and was the acknowledged authority referred to by both sides in the 
1790s, although mostly by the prosecution.95 In a comprehensive work, Erskine dealt 
with sedition in a relatively short section denoted: ‘Sedition and leasing-making’. 
According to Erskine’s interpretation, sedition consisted of two separate crimes, 
‘real’ and ‘verbal’ sedition, where the latter was referred to as leasing-making in the 
statutes, while the forrner did not appear to be covered by a statute. and this seems to 
have been the accepted definition of sedition by the 1790s.”‘ 
Some of the apparent confusion in the trials may have been due to flaws in 
Erskine’s interpretation. Baron Hume certainly claimed that the distinction between 
real and verbal sedition was at best of little use, and at worst only served to confound 
the far more important distinction between what he saw as the three separate crimes 
9 ’  The Acts of the Parliaments of Scotlcrrzd, xi, 1702- 1707 (London, 1824): 16 September 1703. no. 4. 
‘Act anent Leesing Makers and Slanderers‘. p. 104. By ‘arbitrary’ punishment what was meant was 
any punishment sanctioned in  Scottish law. less than death. the ultimate penalty. 
Cockburn, Examination, i ,  3 [original italics]. 
This was the normal practise when there was no statute or case law to rely on. Alternatively, a 
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be right and wrong. John W. Cairns. ‘Historical Introduction’, in A Histov of Scots Pri\ate Larr,. 1 :  
ZnrrodiJction and Proper8 ( 2  vols.; Oxford, 3000), 168-69, 176-84. 
Pirnishment of Crimes ( 2  vols.: Edinbureh, I797 1. 
92 
93 
Baron David Hume, Conzrnenraries on the  La\\* qf Scotland resprcting the Description arid 94 
John Erskine, An Institute qf the Lart. ofScotland (2  vols.; Edinburgh, 1773, reprint 1989). 
Erskine, Institute, ii, 1 186- 1 188. 
95 
96 
1 1 1  
of leasing-making, sedition and treason.97 Initially, Hume addressed the crime of 
leasing-making by referring to an act of the Scottish parliament, which stated that: 
‘Leasing-makers are characterised ... in the statute 1424, c. 43, as inventors and 
tellers of rumours “whilk may ingender discorde betwixt the k n g  and his people . 
He then went on to outline the nature of leasing-making as: ‘a verbal injury levelled 
against the Kng’  and a crime which ‘is construed in the law to be done out of malice 
and evil disposition, entertained against him’.99 The offence was in other words 
directed against the king’s person, with the intention of presenting him in an 
unfavourable light; ‘to do him prejudice as a person’. ‘Oo Leasing-making could take 
the form of inventing false stories about the monarch, describing him as a common 
liar, uttering words or speeches containing reproach or contempt for the king or 
charging him with deeds such as adultery. It was therefore a crime whose ‘peculiar 
character’ was one of being ‘a high and aggravated form of slander’ upon the king. 
Hume proceeded to interpret and clarify the nature of leasing-making by contrasting 
it to the related crime of sedition. Whereas leasing-making was directed against the 
king as a person, sedition consisted in ‘projects’. which were ’levelled against the 
whole system, and are not moved out of a special grudge to the Prince upon the 
throne‘. Rather, an act of sedition was aimed at ‘the new modelling of the State 
without the authority of law’.’o’ Sedition was a crime committed by ‘deed, word. or 
writing’, which had been expressed ’for the purpose of producing public trouble or 
commotion, and moving his Majesty‘s subjects to the dislike, resistance, or 
subversion. of the established government and laws, or settled frame and order of 
things’.’()’ Similarly to Erskine, Hume did not make any references to acts 
9 7 ,  98 
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specifically concerned with sedition, or using exactly that word, but he did state why 
it necessarily had to be a crime under Scots law. In his opinion: ‘sedition is a crime, 
whereof the notion is coeval in all countries with the institution of regular 
government’, and this would still have to be the case, ‘even if our statute-book were 
silent on the subject, and no instance had occurred in past times of punishment 
inflicted on transgressors in this kind . The absence of statute law and of precedent , 103 
to guide future trials was in other words not a sufficient, nor a legitimate reason for 
stating that sedition was not a crime under Scottish law. 
Hume also disagreed with Erskine’s distinction between real and verbal 
sedition, or more precisely, he disagreed with Erskine’s understanding of real and 
verbal sedition. Erslune had claimed that verbal sedition was the same as leasing- 
making and that real sedition entailed some sort of convocation of people. This, 
Hume argued, was to confound real sedition ‘with the crime of riot or convocation of 
the lieges’, and in his explanation of the difference between the two, he moved on to 
treason, and gave a remarkably clear definition of the distinction between this crime, 
and that of sedition: 
For the characteristic of sedition lies in the forwarding, preparing, and 
producing such a state of things as may naturally issue in public 
trouble and commotion: and it is opposed to the guilt of those who are 
actively engaged in the tumult or rising. if any ensue. Farther, riot and 
sedition differ in their scope and object. The crime of sedition is a 
State crime: which is levelled against the Government, structure of 
laws, or political order of the land . . .  in regard to which, if any liostile 
rising ensue. the offender shall be guilty of no lower crime than 
treason. 103 
Hume did admit that there was a certain degree of overlap between sedition and 
leasing-making, in the sense that some acts might qualify for both charges, and that - 
in some cases - verbal sedition did indeed equal leasing-making; but he also 
maintained that not all leasing-making was sedition and vice versa. They were not 
controvertible terms. On the basis of this clarification, Hume also questioned the 
usefulness of the distinction between verbal and real sedition. In his opinion, it was 
‘03 Ibid., 487. 
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of little importance whether 'the mischief is conveyed, as by words and speeches, or 
by other proceedings', as long as it could be proved to be seditious.'" 
What emerges from Hume's investigation then, is that the important 
distinction does not lie between real and verbal sedition, but between leasing-making 
and sedition, and that this distinction is one of the intention held by the perpetrator of 
the deed. If the act took the form of disrespectful things being said or written about 
the k n g  - or even about the government - but without there being any purpose of 
this beyond expressing a personal grudge against the monarch or the authorities, then 
it was an act of leasing-making. If, on the other hand, it emerged that there was a 
malicious intention of encouraging the toppling or subversion of the British state, 
underlying the perpetrator's decision to make his statements, then it was an act of 
sedition. It was this underlying intention - and not the medium through which the 
attitudes were expressed - which decided whether or not an act constituted the crime 
of sedition. Rioting, therefore, if it was not spurred on by an intention of 
overthrowing the government, was not seditious. Finally, sedition could be 
distinguished from the more grievous crime of treason. by looking at whether or not 
the encouragement of overturning the government had in fact been followed by an 
actual physical attempt to do so. If such an attempt had not taken place, no worse 
crime than sedition had been committed, but if it had, then the instigator or 
instigators of the attempt were guilty of treason. even if they had not themselves 
taken part in the use of force. 
The relationship between sedition and treason was equally important for the 
trials of the 1790s, as was that between sedition and leasing-making, or rioting. As 
far as treason was concerned, an essential development had occurred on 1 July 1709 
when the English treason law was introduced in Scotland, thereby abolishing the old 
Scottish law on this particular crime. The main practical effects of the new 106 
legislation for Scottish law was to reduce the number of treasonable offences, 
thereby limiting the scope of capital punishment, and to introduce the possibility of 
' 05  Ibid., 495. 
21. 'An Act for improving the Union of the Two Kingdoms - [ 1" J u l ~  17091'. 
Statutes at Large, 4, 10 William I11 to 12 Q Anne, 1699-1713 (London, 1763), 7 Anne, Chapter. I06 
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trying treason before a politically appointed Commission of Oyer and Terminer. lo7 
One such Commission was appointed for the trials of Robert Watt and David Downie 
in 1794. 
A final legal issue which needs to be addressed in relation to the political 
trials of 1793-94, is the question of punishment. Many historians have commented 
upon the alleged harshness and illegality of the sentences inflicted upon the radicals 
tried for sedition in Scotland, beginning with Thomas Muir in 1793, and this was 
also an issue with which many contemporaries concerned themselves. lo8 The debate 
then, and later, focused on the use of transportation as a punishment, and on whether 
this was a reasonable or even a legal punishment for sedition. Again there was 
clearly a problem due to the lack of statutes using the concept or term ‘sedition’, but 
Hume addressed the issue, and his focus was on the distinction between the 
punishments of transportation and banishment. In his opinion it was banishment - 
and not transportation - which was the concept known and used in Scottish law, and 
he argued that ‘the terms transport and transportation are not native or proper terms 
of the law of Scotland, but a new and foreign style, which has of late years been 
borrowed from the English practice . In terms of pure terminology, transportation 
would thus not appear to be a valid punishment under Scottish law. But did this 
difference in terminology necessarily entail a difference in the semantic meaning of 
the words? Hume was of the decided opinion that it did not, and went to great lengths 
* 109 
On the implications of the act for the Scottish law of treason, see: Erskine. Institute, i i ,  1181-82; 
and Hume, Coi?imentaries, i. 553-55. It was still possible to conduct a Scottish treason trial before the 
Justice Court, and the appointment o f  a Commission of Oyer and Terminer was therefore only an 
alternatirie for the government. 
‘O*  The trials and the sentences passed were debated at the highest political level in the country. On 
several occasions, the issue was raised in Parliament. For example, on 31 January 1794. the Earl of 
Stanhope moved for the execution of  the sentence against Muir to be delayed until  the House of Lords 
would have had time to inquire into the case, and on 24 February 1794, Richard Sheridan presented a 
petition to the House of Commons. describing the sentence passed on Palmer as ’illegal, unjust, 
oppressive, and unconstitutional’. Parliamentan* Histon, 30, 1449, cited in:  Cockburn, E.xuminarion, 
i i ,  136. The MP Mr. Adam presented a motion in the House of Commons in March 1794 appealing for 
the house to postpone the execution of Muir‘s and Palmer’s sentences until an inquiry had been held 
into the trials. He found i t  absurd that an offence which was punished with one years imprisonment in  
England should be given an penalty of fourteen years transportation in Scotland, and according to The 
Times: ‘He thought it  would be a proper subject of enquiry in a Committee. whether there really did 
exist such a crime as Sedition, which he thought extremely problematical‘. The Times, 26 March 
1794. For a general discussion of the proceedings in Parliament on this issue, see: Cockburn. 
Examination, ii, ‘Proceedings in Parliament’, 133-50; and D’ Osborne. BRAXFIELD, pp. 190-9 1. 
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to prove his point. Referring to a number of trials, mainly from the seventeenth 
century, he displayed how a sentence of banishment very often - in practice - had 
meant that the defendant was transported out of Scotland. He also showed that the 
word 'transport' kept recurring in these sentences of banishment.'" Yet, even if we 
accept transportation as a mode of banishment, another problem arises in relation to 
whether sedition qualified for banishment. Leasing-making clearly did, but, 
according to Hume's argument, there was a relatively clear divide between the two 
crimes, and the political trials of the 1790s had not been concerned with leasing- 
making (as indeed the prosecution repeatedly pointed out). " ' Hume did not address 
this problem directly, but seems to have held the view that sedition as a common law 
crime qualified for any arbitrary punishment less than death."' The Lord Justice 
Clerk may therefore well have been within the parameters of the law when he 
suggested fourteen years transportation as an appropriate penalty for sedition. He 
was probably well outside the parameters of what contemporaries saw as a 
reasonable punishment, but this did not necessarily mean that the sentences were 
illegal. ' ' ' 
Hume. Commentarics (1797), i ,  119. A. Roger Ekirch has demonstrated that, up until 1775, the 
Scottish law courts made extensive use of transportation as a punishment, although for other crimes 
than sedition. A. Roger Ekirch. 'The Transportation o f  Scottish Criminals to America during the 
Eighteenth Century'. Journal o f  British Studics. 24 ( 1985 1. 366-74. 
In  December 1793. the Earl of Lauderdale. together with Grey and Sheridan had addressed Henry 
Dundas over the legality of the sentences passed on Muir and Palmer, whom they beliexd to have 
been convicted of leasing-making. Dundas referred the whole matter back to the Lord Justice Clerk. 
who reported that the cases of Muir and Palmer had nothing to do with leasing-making. See: 
D'Osborne, BRAXFZELD, pp. 191-94: and Meikle, Scorlcrizd. p. 136. For the correspondence between 
Dundas and Braxfield, see: NAS, RH2/4/73. ff. 285, 303-5, 3 13. 
Hume, Conzmentaries. i ,  487-88. Cockburn disagreed with Hume and held that transportation 'was 
warranted by nothing that ought to be considered as a precedent'. Cockburn, Exanzinati~m, i i .  125-26. 
Henry Meikle has argued that the punishments could not be defended relative to the law, because: 
'the Act relating to the removal of offenders from Britain expired in 1788, and when i t  was renewed, 
Scotland was omitted'. If Meikle's point is correct - his source of information was the Diu?. of Lord 
Colchester - then the case would seem to have been closed firmly against the legality of the sentences. 
on the basis of this technicality. Nevertheless, i t  does seem a little odd that this piece of legislation 
should have missed the attention of everyone else who has looked at the trials. including learned 
scholars such as Hume. Meikle, Scotland, p. 136. footnote 1 .  Meikle did not state when the Act was 
renewed, whether i t  occurred in the same year as i t  expired or later, but from looking at Sturutes ut 
Large and Scots Statures Revised for 1788 I have not been able to find any indication that such an act 
was passed the same year. See: Statutes ut Large, 15, 26 Geo. I11 to 29 Geo. 111, 1786-1789: and Scots 







The Courtroom debate on sedition 
Although the nature of sedition was debated very briefly in the trials of Palmer and 
Skirving, it was not until Margarot challenged the whole notion of sedition as a crime 
under Scots law in his trial that a thorough discussion of the concept was initiated. In 
Margarot’s trial, the Solicitor-General was driven into a corner by the defendant’s 
demand for a clarification of the law by which sedition was made a crime, and the 
range of punishments affixed to it. In response Mr Blair claimed that: ‘My answer to 
that is, that sedition was made a crime not by any statute, but by the common law of 
Scotland’, and as such, it qualified for ‘an arbitrary punishment’. ’ Margarot had, 
however, also demanded to see a proper definition of sedition, and this, the Solicitor- 
General found it more difficult to provide. He argued that sedition consisted of 
crimes of such a ‘complex and vague nature, that it is hardly possible to give a 
general definition to comprehend them all’, but nevertheless proceeded to refer to 
Erskine’s distinction between verbal and real sedition. and to quote his definition of 
real sedition. The implication of choosing Erskine as authority was, however, one 
of accepting verbal sedition as equal to leasing-making, and this was a notion which 
would be challenged by the prosecution in later trials. Blair‘s view of sedition as a 
crime under common law was endorsed by Braxfield at the end of Margarot’s trial, 
when - in his summing up of the trial - the Lord Justice Clerk stressed that sedition 
was not a crime founded upon any statute law. but was ‘very well known in the 
common law of Scotland’.l16 So far, it had thus been concluded that sedition was a 
crime under the common law of Scotland. 
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No effort appears to have been made, however, to clarify any of this in the 
indictment for the next trial. Mr. Fletcher - Sinclair’s junior counsel - immediately 
challenged the prosecution on what he saw as the lack of clarity and precision on a 
ST, 23, cc. 6 16- 18. Cnnznzori L U H . ,  with respect to Scotland. can he loosely defined as: ‘everything 
concerning the law of Scotland. which was not part of the statutes‘. For a discussion of the 
development of Scots common law, see: Cairns, ‘Historical Introduction’, pp. 13-1 83. 
Blair’s reason for choosing Erskine as his authority was probably that the calling and forming of 
the British Convention fitted well with Erskine‘s ’convocation of a number of people, without lawful 
authority, tending to obstruct or trouble the peace of the community’. Erskine, fn.stitLm, i i .  1 186. 
114 
115 
ST, 23, c. 763. 116 
117 
number of accounts in the charge. Was the panel to be tried under statute or common 
law, and what exactly was meant by the phrase ‘sedition is a crime’ in the 
indictment, Fletcher enquired. Moreover, was the crime which had allegedly been 
committed real or verbal sedition? Fletcher himself was perhaps not entirely up to 
date, in that he claimed the punishment for real sedition to be the same as for treason, 
i.e. death, but this may also have been a tactical move to ensure that his client was 
charged with verbal, and not real sedition, since he defined the verbal form to equal 
leasing-making. Being once again forced to clarify the crime of sedition, the 
Solicitor-General emphasised that ‘the charge here made is not leasing making, nor 
laid upon any of the acts but as sedition, and sedition and leasing making are by no 
means synonymous terms’. He reinforced his point with reference to the trial at hand, 
stating that: ‘the facts do not amount to leasing-making, but to a great deal more’. 
Blair had thus placed sedition firmly in common law and leasing-making in statute 
law, and, as a consequence of Fletcher’s challenge, he had been forced to move away 
from Erskine’s position of seeing leasing-making as one kind of sedition, and 
towards Hume’s more clearly defined demarcation between the two crimes. At the 
very end of proceedings - just before the trial was abandoned - the Lord Justice 
Clerk endorsed this view. 
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Lord Henderland developed the distinction between sedition and leasing- 
making even further in the trial of Gerrald, where he took it beyond the position 
Hume would later adopt. Henderland claimed that seditious acts of a verbal kind 
were as criminal and as dangerous as ‘real’ acts of sedition. If a man was to ‘run into 
the streets’ urging people to rise against the government, that was no less dangerous 
than an attempt at organising a convocation of people, and clearly this had to be 
crime completely different from leasing-making. Faced with the repeated 
challenges of the defence, the prosecution had consequently developed its view from 
one of seeing sedition and leasing-making as related crimes - in co-ordinance with 
Erskine’s definitions - to seeing them as completely different offences. This had all 
119 
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taken place in an attempt to fend off the efforts made by the defence to turn the 
charge from sedition into leasing-making, but why was this so important? 
With little or no statute law on sedition, it would probably have been easier to 
outline a charge for leasing-making, and certainly, with the act of 1703, there was no 
doubt that leasing-making qualified for banishment as a penalty. Sedition did not 
qualify for capital punishment after 1709, so there was not the possibility of 
inflicting a harsher punishment with a conviction for sedition either. In addition to 
this, leasing-making might have been easier to prove. With no requirement for a 
seditious intention, it should have been necessary only to collect, and present, 
information that something abusive had been said or written about the king or his 
government to ensure conviction. When this path was not chosen it was perhaps 
precisely because a conviction for leasing-making said nothing about the intention of 
the perpetrator. Convictions for leasing-making would therefore be of little use if the 
prosecution were to successfully portray the radicals as intending to overthrow the 
British constitution and government. As a consequence, the Crown lawyers were left 
with the more difficult task of proving the somewhat ill-defined crime of sedition. It 
was, however, the distinction between sedition and treason, which took the most 
prominent place in the debates on the law in the sedition trials of the 1790s. 
For a set of trials where the charge always was on some or other aspect of the 
crime of sedition, it is remarkable how often references or allusions were made to 
treason. John Barrell has pointed out how: ’The word “treason” is broadcast across 
the reports of these trials like seed across a field. in the hope, no doubt, that it would 
germinate and grow in the minds of the jurors’.120 Barrell here seems to suggest that 
the prosecution and the bench were trying to make the jury think about treason in 
trials where the accused was in fuct charged with sedition, with the intention of 
making sedition appear a more sinister crime in the eyes of the jurors. Treason was 
alluded to in a number of ways. The first to make a reference to the offence was Lord 
Swinton in Muir’s trial, who, when commenting on the verdict, thought that sedition 
was ‘a crime of the most heinous kind, and there was scarcely a distinction between 
it and high treason , although he later moderated his view to: ‘The crime here, , 121 
Barrell, lnzugining, pp. 164-65. I70 
’” ST, 33, c. 233. 
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though very near to treason, does not amount to it’?’ The argument that sedition 
was very nearly treason - that the two crimes were so closely related that it was only 
just possible to distinguish between them - was returned to repeatedly in the trials. It 
was argued that sedition was ‘upon the verge of high treason’, that ‘it approaches to 
high treason’ and that ‘it borders ... upon the crime of high treason . Seemingly, 
every effort was made to blur the distinction as much as possible, and in the trial of 
Margarot, the Lord Advocate Robert Dundas stated about the procedures of the 
British Convention that: ‘while their guilt still remains with a feature of sedition 
marked upon it’, it was none the less ‘verging upon treason, with such a trifling 
distinction, that it is almost impossible for a lawyer to find the If, 
however, the distinction was so negligible, and many of the particulars included in 
the minor proposition did indeed qualify for treason, then why was sedition and not 
treason the crime stated in the major The Lord Advocate’s conclusion 
to the above point provides an indication: ‘Sure I am, but for the act of the 7‘h of 
queen Anne, that the gentlemen were far within the case of Scotch treasons; and in 
that case, Mr. Margarot would have stood at your bar tried for his life’. 176 
7 123 
Similar arguments were presented in other trials. Lord Eskgrove, when 
commenting on the sedition5 nature of Palmer’s handbill, could not resist the 
temptation of pointing out that: ‘by the old law of this country it was more, for 
sedition, and raising commotions among the people. was considered as a species of 
treason’. In the trial of Skirving. Lord Abercromby argued that: ‘before the alteration 
of the law of Scotland with regard to treason, I think that the facts charged in this 
indictment, might have been laid as treason’. Lord Eskgrove returned to the issue 
again at the beginning of Gerrald’s trial claiming, that if only those who had so far 
been convicted had been ‘brought to trial before the alteration of the treason law by 
the union’ they would have been charged with treason. After the major sedition 127 
’” ST, 23, e. 235. 
‘13 ST. 23, cc. 600, 623, 764 [my italics]. 
‘” ST, 23, U. 701. 
During the discussion of the relevancy of the libel, Lord Dunsinnan argued that he had only one 
doubt about the indictment, and that was: ‘whether in some of  these particulars it is any thing short of 
the crime of high treason‘. ST, 23, c. 626. 
‘X ST, 23, c. 701. 
ST, 23, cc. 29 1 ,  5 12, 809. 
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trials were over, and the Scottish prosecution was concerning itself with charges of 
treason in the trials against Watt and Downie, the issue re-emerged. In the opening of 
Downie's trial, the Lord Advocate came close to lamenting that the act of 1709 had 
ever been passed, when he stated that: 
Gentlemen, I shall not stop to inquire, whether we, in Scotland, gained, 
or may be supposed to have gained, or to have lost, by the introduction 
of the English law of treason ... but this I can state ... that the Scots 
laws of treason, previous to the union, were much more strict, and 
much more severe, than those which were established in England, 
under the protection of which we now live; and that some persons, 
who are now suffering under the common law of Scotland, arbitrary 
punishments, for offences committed against it,  would, if the Scots 
laws of treason had existed at the present moment, have been tried for 
their lives, under that law, and would have suffered the capital 
punishment which that law inflicted. 
Two options seem to present themselves from the above quotations. Either, the 
prosecution had made a grave mistake in charging the accused with sedition and, as 
the lawyers and judges came to realise this, they did everything they could to make 
the charge of sedition uppeur as treason; or - being well aware that the activities of 
the radicals did not in fact amount to treason - they did whatever they could to 
aggravate the charge of sedition. Lord Cockburn is the most prominent advocate of 
the first of these two explanations. In Cockburn's opinion. the wrong crime had been 
chosen. This, he believed was primarily due to ignorance on the part of the 129 
prosecution - particularly in the case of the Lord Advocate - who had not quite been 
able to grasp the distinction between the two crimes. Cockburn's view has, however, 
been challenged by John Barrell. who has argued that, quite to the contrary, the 
prosecution knew exactly what it was doing: 'The speeches of the prosecutors and 
the judges repeatedly reveal that they have thought hard about whether the charges 
amount to high treason, and have decided, with great reluctance. that they do not?' 
Barrell's argument seems to be reinforced by the third way in which the prosecution 
addressed the issue of the distinction between sedition and treason. 
ST, 24, cc. 6-7. See also a comment by Braxfield in the trial of Skirving. ST. 33. c. 5 13. 
Cockburn. Exaniitzariori. i ,  245-46. With reference to the trial against Skirving. for example. 
Cockburn argued that: 'If i t  was a case of treason. or ought t o  have been considered as such, the whole 
proceedings were wrong from the first to the last ' .  lhid., i .  246. 
I28 
I79 
Barrell, Imagining, p. 167. 130 
121 
Frequent mention was made in almost all the trials of the consequences it 
would have had, if the seditious activities had been followed by risings and 
commotions. Lord Abercromby claimed that Palmer was a fortunate man, because if 
his writings had led some deluded men to produce the 'slightest insurrection', he 
would have been charged with high treason?' The same applied to the actions of the 
British Convention, according to the Solicitor-General, because 'had it been 
accompanied with the rising up of the people it would have ceased to be sedition, and 
would instantly have become high treason', and a number of similar statements were 
made in the other trials."? The prosecution was painfully aware, of course, that no 
riot or insurrection had followed upon either the activities of the British Convention, 
or Muir's handing out of the Rights of Man, nor had anyone been stirred into 
attempting the overthrow of the government as a consequence of reading Palmer's 
handbill. All these references to insurrections which had not taken place were 
therefore irrelevant to the charge and the trial at hand. It seems unlikely that the 
prosecution would have failed to comprehend this point in trial after trial, and more 
plausible that - by making references to what the activities of the radicals could have 
led to - the crown lawyers tried to make the radicals appear more sinister and to 
aggravate their crimes in the minds of the jurors. 
By the time Gerrald had been convicted, and the sedition trials of 1793-94 
were over, the Scottish courts had thus clearly been able to distinguish sedition from 
both treason and leasing-making. but had they managed to clarify the precise 
meaning and content of the crime? I t  has been argued by several historians who have 
written on the Scottish sedition trials of the 1790s that a major problem facing the 
law courts was the unclear nature of the law itself and, certainly, the absence of 
statute law on sedition undoubtedly made it more difficult to define than treason and 
leasing-making. Yet, it can be argued that it was the lack of precedent, not the 133 
supposedly unclear nature of the concept of sedition, which was the cause of the 
discussions in the trials. Since the Scottish courts of the early 1790s had little or no 
case law to rely on, they had to interpret meaning of sedition under Scots law. and 
'" ST, 23. c. 373. 
ST, 23, c. 787. 
John Barrel1 is the latest historian to have presented this argument: Imagirzirzg, p. 157. 133 
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this was precisely what they proceeded to do. In the end, the greatest problem facing 
the courts was therefore not how to define the nature of sedition as a crime, but how 
to prove that an act of sedition had been committed. The absence of a requirement 
for some kind of substantial physical action, set in motion with the purpose of 
overthrowing the government (such as Watt’s production of pikes), meant that the 
prosecution relied upon proving seditious intention on behalf of the defendant. This 
demanded a substantial amount of direct and solid evidence, and, as has been argued 
by many commentators, in these trials such evidence was not abundant. 
The legality of transportation as a punishment for sedition was mainly 
debated upon on two occasions, first in the trial of Margarot. and then when Gilles 
presented his objections to the relevancy of the indictment in Gerrald’s trial. 
Margarot had challenged the judges to specify the legal backing for transportation as 
a penalty for sedition, and Lord Henderland resorted to references to common law. In 
his opinion the court had the power to punish sedition ‘by the highest arbitrary 
punishment’.’’‘ Gilles, however, challenged this argument. In his opinion, 
transportation was a concept entirely unknown to Scottish jurisprudence, and if ‘  
sedition could be punished with banishment, it would thus be wrong to conclude that 
this also allowed for a sentence of transportation. Moreover, he held the prosecution 
and judges to be entirely misguided in their dismissal of traditional banishment to 
England on the grounds that the prisoners could then commit the same offences 
there. If this was so, Gilles wondered. then why was this punishment regularly 
imposed upon Scottish ‘thieves and pickpockets’, who would then be ’at liberty to go 
to England. where, as people’s pockets are generally better filled than they are here, 
persons of this description will be enabled to exercise their profession with much 
greater advantage and success?’ The prosecution. however, persisted with its view 
of transportation as ‘a particular mode of banishment’. which was ‘known to the 
common law of Scotland’ and ‘was a power exercised by the court of session without 
a statute, and exercised by all the criminal courts in Scotland’.’36 
ST. 23, c. 772. 
‘ j5 ST. 23, c. 85 I .  
ST, 23, c. 866. The judges agreed with the prosecutors and Gilles’ objection was overruled. Lord 





The Prosecution ’s Argument 
The purpose of the political trials of the 1790s, as seen from the government’s point 
of view, was to convict those leading radicals the authorities perceived to be a threat 
to the state, and thereby to neutralise the danger they posed. For the prosecution, the 
task at hand was consequently to prove sedition, and while it is outside the scope of 
this chapter to discuss whether the evidence the crown lawyers presented was 
sufficient in strict legal terms, it is essential to look at the arguments they employed 
for this end. 
With the possible exception of Palmer’s trial, the prosecution could produce 
relatively little in terms of direct evidence of sedition in any of the major trials of 
1793-94, and its argument therefore rested mainly on indirect and circumstantial 
evidence. While this has led some historians to argue that the prosecution had a very 
weak case, the reliance on circumstances and indirect evidence should, none the less, 
be seen as going beyond that of merely compensating for the lack of direct 
evidence. We will address the issue of circumstantial evidence first. I37 
In the opinion of the prosecution, the circumstances in which the allegedly 
seditious activities had taken place were essential in proving malicious intention - 
independently of direct evidence - and the crucial circumstance was the timing of the 
activities now charged as constituting sedition. It was argued that, when the radicals 
decided to promote their political agenda of parliamentary reform precisely at a time 
when the country was marked by internal turmoil. it demonstrated a deeper and more 
sinister intention. Since a conviction for sedition was a matter of proving an intention 
of encouraging the overthrow of the political system, merely producing a handbill 
promoting substantial reform in court, or alluding to a convocation of people styling 
itself the ‘British Convention’, did not provide adequate evidence of sedition. But 
when this material was distributed, or the convention was held, at a time when all 
In the case of Muir, for example, Christina Bewley has argued that the prosecution based its case 
’entirely on circumstantial evidence’, of which she was critical, while John Barrel] has claimed that 
the trials following the British Convention have become renowned for ’the defects in the prosecution 
evidence’. Bewley, Muir, p. 70; and Barrel], Imagining, p. 157. Henry Meikle took a similar view of 
Muir‘s trial. Meikle, Scotland, p. 133. 
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well-meaning and well-educated men ought to have realised that a potential threat to 
the state existed and that their activities served to aggravate that threat, then that was 
proof of seditious intention. Throughout the trials, the prosecution adhered 
persistently to the view that claims of ignorance of such a threat were not to be 
accepted or believed, and in this, it was supported by the judges. At his summing up 
of the trial against Muir, Lord Braxfield urged the jury to attend to ‘the state of this 
country during last winter’, when ‘there was a spirit of sedition and revolt going 
abroad which made every good citizen seriously uneasy’, and he invited the jury to 
consider: 
whether it was perfectly innocent or not in Mr. Muir, at such a time, to 
go about among ignorant country people, and among the lower classes 
of the people, making them leave off their work, and inducing them to 
believe that a reform was absolutely necessary to preserve their safety 
and their liberty, which had it not been for him, they never would have 
suspected to have been in danger. I38 
Braxfield’s argument was developed further by the Lord Advocate in Margarot’s 
trial. Addressing the jury,  Robert Dundas asked: 
Is it not an aggravation of this man’s offence, that with superior 
education. intellect. and information, he encouraged a set of low, 
ignorant, mechanics in their criminal courses, and urged them, by his 
inflammatory discourses, to lengths, the danger and extent of which it 
is probable were to them unknown. 139 
Precisely because they could not know the danger, or quite grasp the possible 
consequences of challenges to the state at a time of crisis, ordinary people with little 
education were not to be blamed if they got carried away by the rhetoric of the 
radicals. Conversely, precisely because they ought to know the possible 
consequences of such activities at the present time, the well-educated radicals were 
to blame, according to Dundas and Braxfield. By their statements the Lord Advocate 
and Lord Justice Clerk had thus moved into the somewhat awkward argument of 
saying that, anyone with a comparable background and education to them, 
necessarily had to hold the same perceptions as they did with regard to what sort of 
ST, 23, c. 229. 
I3’ST, 23, c. 694. 
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activities were likely to produce challenges to the authority of the state at any given 
time and in any given circumstance. Since their view of what constituted seditious 
actions also had to be the universally accepted view of this, anyone involved in such 
activities had necessarily shown seditious intention. Other circumstances were also 
held to be of relevance. In the trial of Margarot, Dundas went on to argue that, if it 
was true - as it had come to his attention - that the defendant was an attorney, then 
that was also an aggravation of his crime, since he had thereby ‘made an ill use of his 
profession’. 1 4 ’  A similar accusation was levelled against Palmer. Mr Burnett for the 
prosecution held it to be a circumstance working against Palmer that he was a 
clergyman, before he quickly pointed out that ‘he does not however stand at your bar 
for his religious principles’. 1 4 ’  
A more careful explanation of how timing could prove seditious intention 
was, however, presented by the Solicitor-General in the trial of Skirving, and 
concerned the question of whether a meeting which had allegedly been staged by the 
committee of secrecy was seditious or not. Although initially boasting that he should 
have found no difficulty in proving it seditious even if the meeting had taken place 
five years ago when the country was quiet and peaceful - as ‘the law is always the 
same’ - he proceeded to argue that for a crime of this nuture it should be observed 
that: ‘the circumstances of the time must operate very strongly’. If, for example, a 
few individuals had walked up to Edinburgh Castle and fired a shot or two some five 
or six years ago, Blair argued, it was unlikely that anyone would have thought of that 
as high treason at the time. But if the same thing had occurred in the year 1745, those 
people would probably have been tried for, and found guilty of, high treason. Thus, 
Blair concluded: 
the complexion of the times speaks the intention of the parties, and if 
ever there was a period when a man was called upon to abstain from 
seditious practices, it is the present ... I say, if at these times men are 
so perversely obstinate as to assemble such a meeting, it denotes a 
ST, 23, C. 696-97. 140 
141 ST, 23, c. 333. Cockburn was particularly scornful about this remark by Burnett. In his view i t  was 
completely irrelevant. If Palmer was not on trial for his religious principles: ‘Why then introduce 
them?‘ Cockburn, Exuminuiion, i ,  196. Burnett‘s point was later repeated by Lord Abercromby in his 
comment on the verdict, see: ST, 23, c. 372. 
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criminal intention much greater, than if the same things had happened 
at another period. 14’ 
The particular circumstance which made it seditious to campaign for political reform 
in the 1790s was the perceived threat from Revolutionary France. The radicals ought 
to have realised, the crown lawyers argued, that when the French National 
Convention decided to issue the Edict of Fraternity in November 1792 - whereby it 
offered French assistance to the peoples of neighbouring nations if they decided to 
rise in an attempt to overthrow the existing political regimes of their own countries - 
the situation had changed dramatically. Campaigns for reform in Britain could now 
be taken as an invitation to intervene by the French revolutionaries, and when the 
well-educated and well-informed radicals persisted with their agitation for reform 
when they knew that this was the case, they had also revealed their seditious 
intentions. The outbreak of war between Britain and France in February the next year 
only made this point even more pre~sing.’‘~ I t was held to be particularly dangerous 
to campaign for a reform of the political system, and thereby to question the 
legitimacy of the government, at a time when the country was ‘engaged in a bloody 
war with a neighbouring nation’.’‘‘ It was legitimate for the state to demand a greater 
degree of loyalty from its sub-lects when there was an external threat to the country. 
than would be required in peacetime, the prosecution argued, and promoting reform 
was therefore a far more dangerous activity at this point in time. than it would have 
been only five years earlier. 
Extensive references were also made to the state of France in order to 
demonstrate that the reform-measures presented by the radicals were not as innocent 
as they claimed them to be. In his comment of the verdict in Muir’s trial, Lord 
Swinton argued that Muir’s seditious activities constituted ‘a crime of the most 
~ ~~ 
ST. 23, c. 489. Margarot thought the whole argument on timing ludicrous. While in 1782, he 
argued, it had seemed a ‘very laudable and a very constitutional thing to assemble, to meet to consider 
of grievances, and to plan a method by which they were to be redressed’, by 1794 this had, by some 
way or another, become a criminal act of sedition: ‘How ridiculous for a crown lawyer to attempt to 
impose upon a court of justice; or for any man to support such imposition, that what was 
constitutional in  1782. should be criminal in 1794’. ST, 23, cc. 621-22. 
Referring to the activities of the radical ‘corresponding societies’ in particular, Mr. Maconochie 
argued in the trial of Thomas Palmer that: ’if  there had not been those infamous connexions with 
France . . . there would have been no war’. ST, 23. p. 286. 
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ST, 23, c. 589 [Lord Braxfield when summing up the trial of Skirving.]. 144 
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heinous kind’, because they could lead to the ‘dissolution of the social compact’ and 
thereby to ‘every sort of crime, murder, robbery, rapine, fire-raising, in short, every 
species of wrong, public and private’. And this was ‘no theoretical reasoning’, 
Swinton insisted, ‘for we had it exemplified before our eyes, in the present state of 
France, where, under the pretence of asserting liberty, the worst sort of tyranny was 
established, and all the legal and moral ties which bind mankind were broken’.14s 
The Lord Advocate adopted a similar line in Slurving’s trial, where he argued that 
the ‘sole purpose and intention’ of the British Convention had not been reform, but 
the subversion of parliament, and this was to be done by 
a determined and systematic plan and resolution to subvert the limited 
monarchy and free constitution of Britain, and substitute in its place, 
by intimidation, force, and violence, a republic or a democracy, as 
wild, as cruel, as despotic, and as abominable as that which at this 
moment desolates France. 146 
The argument then finally re-emerged at the end of Downie’s trial when the Lord 
President insinuated that the real purpose of the Pike-Plot had been ’to bring this 
country into the miserable situation of France‘.’4’ On this account. and with respect 
to the activities of the British Convention. the prosecution could also produce 
iizdirect evidence to support its charge. 
The allegation was that the delegates at the convention had been copying and 
imitating so-called ‘French forms’. It was outlined in Chapter 1 above how the 
delegates at the third convention in Edinburgh adopted a terminology taken from the 
French National Convention by calling each other ’citizens’. naming the meetings of 
the convention ‘sitting’ and dating their proceedings in the first year of the British 
Conventions. Some of them also wore a dress and hairstyle similar to the leading 
French revolutionaries, and the very name of the assembly - the ‘British Convention’ 
- bore a striking similarity to the name of the French national assembly. This was 
anything but an innocent play with words in the prosecution’s opinion. The choice of 
French forms ‘carries sedition upon the face of it’ argued the Solicitor-General in the 
opening of the trial against Skirving. Moreover, the minutes of the assembly showed 
ST, 23, CC. 233-34. 145 
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ST, 23, c. 544. Robert Dundas presented a similar argument in the tr ial of Margarot, c. 709. 
ST, 24, c. 187. 
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the delegates ‘constantly departing from the language of this country, and adopting 
[a] foreign language; which, I am not a little surprised that any person in this country 
could have thought of‘. The ‘foreign language’ was that of the French 
Revolutionaries, and Blair found it more than conspicuous that the delegates at the 
Convention should have chosen to apply precisely that phraseology: ‘which laid the 
foundation of those scenes of anarchy, - those scenes of rapine, - those scenes of 
bloodshed, of cruelty and barbarity hitherto unknown in the world, which have 
desolated that unhappy country, and disgraced it among the nations of the earth’.’4* 
Blair’s point was supported by Robert Dundas in the trial of Margarot, but while the 
Solicitor-General had only hinted at a connection between the delegates’ use of 
French forms and the violence of revolutionary France, the Lord Advocate made an 
explicit link. He questioned the credibility of the claim that the delegates had 
intended to pursue their aim of parliamentary reform through legal channels, on basis 
of their adoption of ‘measures of a very different tendency’. Quite to the contrary - 
Robert Dundas argued - the delegates present at the British Convention had never 
intended to conduct their business in a peaceful manner, but: ‘by aping and imitating 
the example, the language, and the forms of a French convention, a country with 
whom we are involved in war. they demonstrate their intention of following its 
footsteps in revolution and in blood’ 
150 A similar point was made with respect to the name of the convention. 
According to the prosecution the chosen title showed seditious intention, and on two 
different levels. First, it was held that by arrogating to themselves ‘the name of the 
British Convention of the People’, the delegates were trying to present themselves as 
‘the representatives of the inhabitants of Great Britain’. Since the British people were 
already ‘represented in parliament‘, Mr. Blair argued in the trial of Skirving, this 
could only mean that the delegates intended to erect an anti-parliament or to replace 
the existing one. In Gerrald’s trial, he returned to the same point and argued that IS1 
ST, 23. c. 487. 
ST, 23. c. 681. See also: Lord Eskgrove and Lord Braxfield in the trial of  Gerrald. Braxfield stated 
in unequivocal terms that the imitation of French forms demonstrated that the real objective o f  the 
convention was ‘to overturn the established constitution’. ST, 23, cc. 894-95, 999. 
The full title was: ‘the British Convention of the People, associated to obtain Universal Suffrage 
and Annual Parliaments’. See for example: ST, c. 486. 





the name of the convention demonstrated that the delegates had aspired to be ‘the 
representatives of the great body of the people at large’, which was ‘seditious’ and 
‘illegal . The other reason why the title revealed seditious intention on the part of 
the delegates was that the very aims it presented - ‘to obtain Universal Suffrage and 
Annual Parliaments’ - in themselves were seditious. This was held to be true, since 
either of the two were incompatible with the British political system, as it existed at 
the present moment. Lord Braxfield stressed the incompatibility of universal suffrage 
and the British form of government in his summing up of Skirving’s trial, where he 
argued that it was ‘certainly a very lawful thing to apply to parliament’, but not for a 
measure which would entail the fall of parliament itself: ‘It was impossible they 
could ever obtain from parliament universal suffrage, and for a very good reason, it 
is a thing that cannot exist; a nation could not subsist under such a government’.’“‘ 
Lord Swinton addressed the same issue in Gerrald’s trial, arguing that universal 
suffrage would be ‘not only inconsistent with the British constitution, but 
inconsistent with every constitution or government that ever did exist, or ever can 
exist’, though he was not able to specify exactly why this was so. 
9 152 
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The same argument was resorted to at other times as well. when it  was 
claimed that universal suffrage had only ever been tried in one country - 
Revolutionary France - and that it should be evident to everyone the disastrous 
consequences this dangerous experiment had produced there. The prosecution also 
attacked the notion that universal suffrage had somehow been a part of the settlement 
emerging from the Glorious Revolution, as some radicals claimed. In the trial of 
Skirving. the Solicitor-General decided to ‘take it upon me to affirm, that universal 
suffrage is an idea that never entered the head of those who framed the constitution’, 
before returning to the point in Gerrald’s trial by asking: ‘was universal suffrage any 
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ST, 23, c. 387 [Solicitor-General in the trial o f  Skirving]. A similar argument was presented by Mr. 
Burnett in relation to Palmer’s handbill, which contained a passage on universal suffrage, and Lord 
Abercromby held it  be seditious to tell people that they have a right to vote, since introducing 
universal suffrage ‘would unquestionably be tantamount t o  a total subversion of  this constitution’. ST, 




part of the constitution established at the revolution?’ The answer to the question was 
an unequivocal no, Blair insisted, in which he was undoubtedly correct.lS6 
V 
A fair trial? 
The Scottish Sedition trials of 1793-94 have not received a very favourable 
assessment by the majority of those commentators and historians who have studied 
them, and they have consequently earned a poor reputation. The main focus of this 
criticism has been the supposed ‘irregularities’ of the proceedings in and 
this has tended to overshadow the question of whether the defendants had in fact 
committed sedition according to Scots law (although it can, of course, be argued that 
it is difficult to assess the verdicts in the trials relative to the law, when the 
proceedings in court were held to be largely inadequate). Since the prevailing view 
has been that the appropriate procedures were not adhered to in the trials, it followed 
that those radicals who stood before the Scottish bench in 1793-94 were not given a 
fair trial, and that. in this, the Scottish law courts became little more than an 
extension of the government’s apparatus of repression. While much of this 
criticism is justified, it will be argued here that it has tended to be a little too general 
and broad-sweeping, and that some elements of it consequently need to be qualified. 
This is particularly the case with respect to the role of the prosecution, as distinct 
from the judges. 
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Once in court, it was the prosecution’s job to argue in favour of conviction. 
Whereas it is legitimate to criticise the government’s politicul decision of bringing 
several leading radicals before the law courts on a charge of sedition, or to point out 
weaknesses in the arguments presented by the prosecution in the trials, this should be 
ST, 23, c. 937. I56 
15: Christina Bewley, for example, has argued that Thomas Muir‘s trial ‘bristled with ... 
irregularities’. Bewley, Muir, p. 72. 
The tradition of criticising the procedural aspects o f  the trials was initiated in the nineteenth 
century by Henry Cockburn, who pointed to numerous examples o f  ‘injustice’ being committed by the 
court in all  the Scottish sedition trials of 1793 to 1801, and was continued in the early twentieth 
century by Henry Meikle. More recent historians such as Christina Bewley, John Brims, Michael Fry, 
and John Barrell have also argued that the procedures at the Scottish law courts left much to be 
desired. See. Cockburn, Exnmirzutiorz. i, 144 [example from Muir’s trial]; Meikle, Scorland, pp. 133- 
36. 144-46, Bewley. Muir,  pp. 68-84; Brims. Ph.D., pp. 425-67, 523-59 [especially pp. 450. 525-261; 
Fry, Dundus, pp. 170-7 1 ; and Barrell, pp. 157-69. 
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kept distinct from the appropriate judicial role of the crown lawyers. It was their task 
to present the defendant in as unfavourable a light as possible, and to win the case for 
the government. Some of the criticism which has been levelled against Robert 
Dundas in particular - it has been argued that the Lord Advocate exaggerated every 
point he used against the prisoners beyond anything reasonable, that he harassed both 
witnesses and juries, and that he tried to compensate for his lack of skills as a lawyer 
by applying a fierce language in court - therefore appears somewhat misguided. 
Robert Dundas staged a poor performance in court as a prosecutor, then, that should 
only have worked to the prosecution’s disadvantage. When it did not, it was because 
of the approach taken by the judges and the juries, rather than the crown lawyers. 
159 If 
Whereas the task of the prosecution and defence was to argue either side of 
the case before the court, the judges were meant to hold a neutral ground between the 
two and concern themselves with the due procedures and protocols of the court, as 
well as matters of the law. In the political trials of the 1790s, however, this was far 
from being the case. Indeed, a striking feature of the trials against the four British 
Convention-delegates, John Barrel1 has argued, was: ‘the often virtually 
indistinguishable arguments of the prosecution ... and the bench ... about the aims 
and procedures of the British Con~ent ion’ . ’~~)  This was not limited to the trials 
against the convention delegates, however. In Muir’s and Palmer’s trials i t  was also 
clear that the bench had sided unequivocally with the government and the 
prosecution, possibly even before the trials had begun. and in general, the judges 
agreed with and approved of every single argument presented by the 
Equally consistently, the judges dismissed all the objections presented by the defence 
in the trials, whether they were well founded in the letter of the law or not. Gerrald’s 
objection to Braxfield’s presence on the bench in his trial is perhaps the best example 
of this. On that occasion, the judges appeared to be far more concerned with 
protecting their fellow judge - attacking Gerrald for harbouring personal and 
malicious motives towards the Lord Justice Clerk - than with addressing the legal 
implications of the objection. Taken together, this evidence seems to point in the 
See: Cockburn, Examination, i ,  91; Bewley, Muir, pp. 68. 75-7; and Holden Furber. H c n n  
Barrel], Inuzgiriing, p. 157. 
Braxfield’s comments at Mr. Rochead’s dinner party is one example, see above. pp. 1 0 1 ,  103-3. 
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Dnndas: First Viscoirrit Melville 1742- 1 N I  1 (Oxford. 193 1 ), pp. 1 14- 15. 
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direction of an underhand agreement having been reached between the government 
and the judges before the trials begun, whereby a carefully choreographed and 
coached performance could be staged, merely for the purpose of constituting an 
example of the most bothersome of the radicals. 
To date, however, no evidence of such a 'fix' has been discovered, and it is 
unlikely that the government would have wished to stage trials that risked being 
viewed as illegitimate by many people. The courts were in any case not under 
government control. Moreover, it was mentioned above in the discussion of the trials 
of Watt and Downie, that one major reason for adopting the Commission of Oyer and 
Terminer was the possibility it provided of removing Braxfield from his position as 
the presiding judge on the bench. Braxfield's behaviour in the preceding sedition 
trials - although on his part probably intended to serve the case of the prosecution - 
had gone beyond what the Dundases and the cabinet wanted, and become an 
embarrassment. This seems to suggest that there had been no prior agreement 
between the judges and the authorities, and that the bench was acting entirely on its 
own accord."' To some extent, the Scottish judges could be regarded as having 
become a bit of a loose cannon, and one which fired a much heavier shell than was 
necessary or even advisable. The conduct of the trials was therefore not so much a 
matter of proceedings staged by the government in advance, as of the government's 
supporters - in this case the conservative judges on the Scottish bench - becoming 
over-eager in their desire to display their unwavering loyalty to and support for the 
British state. In doing so, however, they ran into a number of self-contradictions and 
displayed a staggering degree of inconsistency, which cannot have made these trials 
less of an embarrasbment for the government. 
In the trial of Muir, for example, it was held to be an aggravating factor that 
he had gone about stirring up sedition, at a time when there was considerable unrest 
in the country, with mobs going on the rampage in the major Scottish towns and 
cities, while in the trial of Palmer, the argument was turned around. Now it  was an 
aggravating factor that Palmer had been attempting to stir up sedition when 
everything was peace and quiet. As Cockburn argued: 'Muir suffers because the 
See above p. 104. 
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people were in a state of excitement; Palmer because they were not’.’6’ Another 
example is how Lord Eskgrove dismissed Gerrald’s objection to Braxfield’ s presence 
on the bench, on the grounds that his lordship’s remarks had been made in private, 
whereas in Muir’s trial, it was deemed perfectly legitimate to use remarks he had 
made in private as evidence against him (see: Annie Fisher’s t e ~ t i m o n y ) . ’ ~ ~  More 
serious, perhaps, was the tendency to adapt the legal ramifications of a crime 
according to the specific circumstances of the trial at hand. While the activities of the 
British Convention were held to be only ‘seditious’ in the trials against the four 
convention delegates, they had become ‘treasonable’ by the time Watt and Downie 
were tried. The judges were. however, consistent in always making sure to interpret 
the law to the disadvantage of the defendant?’ 
In a Scottish trial it was not the judges, however, who passed the verdict, but 
the jury and, although the bench decided on the sentence if the jury returned a verdict 
of ‘guilty as charged’, the judges had no direct influence on the question of guilt. As 
a consequence, John Brims has argued: ‘The fairness of the trial depended, in large 
measure, upon the impartiality and independence of the jury . In this respect, the 
system of selection was clearly biased in favour of the prosecution. since the original 
list of candidates was drawn up by local government officials, but the judges 
nevertheless had the last word in terms of who would actually sit on the jury. Thus, 
while the judges could not control the -jury once it had been appointed. they had 
considerable influence upon its composition. and thereby indirectly on the verdict it 
would reach at the end of the trial. Moreover, in the sedition trials of 1793-94, it can 
hardly be argued that great efforts were made to ensure the selection of an impartial 
jury, although there was strictly speaking nothing ‘irregular’ about the manner in 
which the juries for the different trials had been selected. 
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When considering the issue of fairness, the Scottish trials do not compare too 
well in certain respects with those that were conducted before the English law courts 
in this period either. Mistakes in the libel concerning technical details. of the kind 
that had been dismissed in the Scottish courts, led to the abandoning of trials south of 
Cockburn, Examination. i. 2 12. 
On Braxfield: ST, 23, c. 672. 
See, for example: ST, 23,  cc. 5 13, 628, 672. 





the border on several occasions. The trial against Richard Patmore and Christopher 
Payne held in Essex in July 1793, for example, was given up because the indictment 
described Payne’s offence as having been committed ‘in Colchester’, when it should 
have read ‘in the borough of Colchester’.167 In more general terms it was difficult for 
the prosecution in England to go ahead with a trial unless it had a good case and solid 
evidence to support it. Clive Emsley has argued that ‘if there was the slightest chance 
of the man being acquitted the advice was against prosecution . Sentences for 
those who were convicted of sedition also appear to have been far more lenient in 
England. Of the nearly 200 prosecutions for sedition and treason which were 
conducted before English law courts over the course of the 1790s, the harshest 
punishment imposed for sedition appears to iave been three years imprisonment and 
five years’ security for good behaviour. 11 most trials, the punishment consisted 
merely of a fine. On the other hand, it is also clear that the ‘packing’ of juries was 
not a phenomenon confined to Scotland alone, as Lord Cockburn argued.17” The 
English system provided the choice of trying a case either before a ‘common’ jury or 
to call for a ‘special’ jury if the case at hand was particularly complex. Both options 
were used, and, according to Emsley: ‘several juries during the 1790s, whether 
special or common. were clearly packed’ .I7’ With respect to ‘major’ trials against 
leading radicals, however, the Scottish law courts broke new ground. and provided 
an example which the authorities hoped to replicate in England. 
7 168 
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John Barrell has developed a comprehensive and persuasive argument that the 
Scottish trials - mainly the two treason trials, but also those for sedition - served as a 
testing ground for the development of the prosecution’s main argument in the later 
English treason trials. Aspects of this argument have been alluded to in the 
summary of Watt and Downie’s trials above, but more needs to be said. In the two 
Scottish treason trials, the prosecution had focused on developing an argument 
I72 
Clive Emsley. ‘An aspect of Pitt’s “Terror“: prosecutions for sedition during the 1790s’. Sociiil 167 
Hisfo?.. 6 ( 1982), 169. 
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whereby it could apply the ancient English law of treason to prosecute leading 
radicals for offences which were defined as ‘modem treason’, the ‘treason of the 
day’, ‘democratic treason’ or ‘French treason’.173 This was far from easy since the 
old English law - dating back to the reign of Edward I11 in the fourteenth century - 
had been designed to deal with the traditional aristocratic regicidal plot. In the days 
of Edward 111, the main internal threat to the state had been perceived to be 
conspiracies and attempts to lull the king, set in motion by members of the nobility, 
and the law had been framed accordingly. By the 1790s, however, the government’s 
view of treason had changed significantly, and in the Scottish political trials of that 
decade, the prosecution gradually stretched the meaning of the medieval law to 
comprehend any form of organised activity outside of Parliament, which had as its 
aim to reform or change aspects of the British system of government. To campaign 
for political reform in Britain had become treasonable, or as John Barrell has argued: 
‘what was not treason in Scotland at the beginning of 1794 would certainly be 
treason in England by the end of the year’.174 This re-interpretation of the treason law 
was achieved by long arguments on what it meant to ’irnagine’ the king’s death, 
which - together with the Coronation Oath argument - provided the government 
with the necessary ammunition for prosecuting and hopefully convicting the leading 
English radicals - or so it was believed.’75 The only problem was that in terms of 
law, England and Scotland had remained separate countries following the union and, 
although the law of treason was now the same on both sides of the border, most other 
aspects of the legal system were not. All the subsequent English treason trials - bar 
one - therefore failed, and most notably, the prosecution was unable to secure a 
verdict of guilty against the three leading English radicals, Thomas Hardy, John 
Home Tooke and John The l~a l l . ’~ ‘  The Scottish example had clearly failed to make 
an impact in England. 
See: Barrell, lmugining, pp. 275, 283. 
Ibid., p. 167. 
The implications of ‘imagining‘ the king’s death is the main theme of  John Barrell‘s book, and a 
summary o f  most of his work would be required for a proper presentation of  the argument. This i s  
beyond the scope of this chapter, and has therefore been omitted. For the Coronation Oath argument, 
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In conclusion, the Scottish system - overall - appeared more ruthless than the 
English in terms of convicting those who were charged with political offences. Not 
only were the radicals convicted of sedition by Scottish courts given far more severe 
sentences than in England - for what was essentially the same crime - but the 
Scottish courts also produced two convictions of treason, before the prosecution had 
properly developed its argument. The completed argument then failed spectacularly 
to produce convictions for similar offences in England, and even after the 
government’s failure in the English courts, the Scottish courts continued to deliver 
the results the government ~ a n t e d . ” ~  It was therefore the Scottish courts, not the 
English, which proved to be the more useful weapon for the government and the 
British state in the 1790s. Yet. in some respects the efficiency of the Scottish legal 
system could clearly be a double-edged sword. The popular outrage following Muir’s 
trial, for example, was probably bad news seen from a propaganda point of view, 
while the acquittals of the leading English radicals may have had a positive 
propaganda effect for the government in the long run, since these trials seemed to 
demonstrate that Hardy, Tooke and Thelwall were protected by those constitutional 
liberties they claimed to have been denied.”8 Nevertheless, the government would 
undoubtedly have preferred conviction, and this the Scottish courts produced. 
While the political trials was the single-most important instrument in the 
government‘s defeat of the domestic challenge of radicalism, the main issues 
concerning the Scottish government with respect to the war-effort were the 
recruitment of men for armed service and the financing of the war. These issues will 
be addressed in the following two chapters. 
See: Appendix: B.  177 
’78 See: Robert R. Dozier, For King, Constitution, and Countn: The English Loyalists and the French 
Revolution (Lexington, KY, 1983), pp. 168-69. 
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Chapter 4 
Military Recrui trnent 
Britain’s entry into the war on 1 February 1793 presented the British government 
with the usual eighteenth-century problem of having rapidly to augment its armed 
forces from their low peacetime numbers, since - in peacetime - Britain maintained 
a very small military establishment by the standards of most contemporary European 
powers.’ In 1792 the strength of the British army was in the region of 45,000 men, 
and there were fewer than 3 1,000 militiamen in England and Wales. No militia force 
existed in Scotland, and the Irish militia had been allowed to lapse.’ The Royal Navy 
was in better shape, having enjoyed substantial spending on ships-of-the-line by the 
Pitt government following the American War of Independence and, although the 
majority of battle-ships were not in commission, the navy could be mobilised to full 
strength at relatively short notice. In addition to all the usual rigours of bringing the 
armed forces up to strength, however, the outbreak of war in 1793 also presented the 
British state with the new phenomenon of mass-arming and a mass army, in the form 
of the introduction of conscription in France in the late summer of 1792, and the 
subsequent leve‘e erz nzasse in the autumn of the same year. Supposedly consisting of 
soldiers fighting for themselves and in their own interest, the new French mass 
armies which repulsed the allied counter-offensive in November 1792, opened up a 
whole new scenario of warfare where the old professional and relatively small armies 
of the eighteenth century would soon be rendered obsolete. The response of the 
British government was eventually to create - or at least to attempt to create - what 
J .  E. Cookson has labelled an ‘armed nation’, in which the whole population would 
be drawn upon for defensive purposes. 3 
See: John Brewer. The SirzeM9s o j  Power: War, Mane!, arid the English Stcite, 1688-1783 (London, 
1989). pp. 31-42; and Andrew Mackillop, ‘More Fruitful than the Soil’: Arrii>~, Empire, and the 
Scottish Highlands, 1715- 1815 (East Lothian, 2000), p. 66. 
’ Clive Emsley, British Soc ieh  and the French Wars 1793-1815 (London. 1979), pp. 11-12; and J .  R. 
Western, ‘The Recruitment of the Land Forces in Great Britain 1793-99’. unpublished Ph.D. thesis 
(University of Edinburgh 1953), p. 8. 
.’ J .  E. Cookson, The British Armed Nation 1793-1815 (Oxford, 1997). In 1798. when the prospect of a 
French invasion was at its most unnerving, Henry Dundas and William Windham had agreed that 
‘becoming an armed nation was necessary for national survival’. Ibid.. p. 2. This strategy was not, 
however, without its risks. As Linda Colley has argued: ‘to beat the French, the British had been 
1 
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This emphasis on a ‘national defence’ was, however, also linked to another 
serious, though not so novel aspect of the French Revolutionary Wars - the threat of 
a French invasion of the British Isles. With repeated French attempts at landing 
forces in Ireland, plans for an invasion of Scotland and the assembling of the ‘Army 
of England’ on the French Channel coast in 1798, the menace of invasion posed a 
grave, persistent and long-lasting threat to the British state.4 Over the course of the 
decade, and as the war progressed, the necessity of building up an extensive defence 
against invasion therefore became increasingly pressing, and nowhere was this more 
apparent than in Scotland, where the absence of a militia force seemed to create an 
alarming gap in the line of defence. The focus of this chapter is on the issues of 
recruitment in Scotland for the regular armed forces and for the internal defence 
forces. Emphasis has been placed on the build-up of the defence forces, since this 
was the more complex problem for the government of Scotland in this period. 
I 
The recruitment qf regulars 
The British government did not pursue a consistent recruitment policy throughout the 
whole of the 179Os, but changed its priorities in accordance with the developing 
nature of the war. In the early stages of the conflict. from 1793 until 1795, emphasis 
was placed on bringing up the strength of the regular army, and the number of 
soldiers in the line was more than doubled - all of them recruited by ordinary 
enlistment.’ Then. in 1795. following several serious set-backs and failed campaigns 
on the Continent, the government revised its policy away from offensive campaigns 
in Europe and towards a focus on raising forces for invasion defence, since the 
assumption now was that Britain would have to fight a defensive war, and would 
probably also have to face a French invasion attempt at some point in the near 
required to imitate the French, and the challenge this presented to its old order was potentially 
corrosive’. Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (London, 1996). p. 336. 
’ According to 3.  R. Western’s estimates, the British Army stood at 130,000 men in the spring o f  
1795, which represented the ’peak of endeavour’ in recruiting terms so far in  the war. This figure, 
however, also included fencible regiments, Western. Ph.D., p. 7. See also: Andrew Mackillop, ‘More 
Fruirful than the Soil I: Army, Empire and the Scottish Highlands, 1715-1815 (East Lothian, 2000), p. 
113. 
For a discussion of the French plan to invade Scotland, see: chapter 1 ,  pp. 38-9. 3 
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future? As a consequence of this shift in policy, recruitment for the regular army was 
given a lower priority and the army establishment was allowed to contract slightly, 
while the forces for internal defence were built up.7 Once the most immediate threat 
of invasion had subsided by the summer of 1798, however, and Nelson’s spectacular 
victory at the mouth of the Nile in August had opened up the possibility of a renewed 
offensive from the allies, the government changed its policy again, and shifted its 
focus back to building up the regular forces. This time the augmentation of the line 
regiments was intended to be based largely on voluntary enlistment from the ranks of 
the defence forces, the Fencibles, Volunteers and Militia.’ 
i )  The Army 
The first phase of recruitment for the line followed much of the same pattern as it 
had done in previous wars. The raising of new, and the augmenting of old, regiments 
was left largely to their commanders and to recruiting parties, which meant that the 
whole enterprise of enlisting the men rested in private hands, with no overall 
L 2  oovernmental policy for recruitment. As Clive Emsley has argued, ‘there was no 
inspector-general for recruiting when war commenced, nor for some time after’, and 
‘no satisfactory method of examining the fitness of recruits’ had been developed 
either. Recruitment parties often competed for recruits in the same areas, and many 
recruiters did not come from established regiments, but were professional agents - 
so-called ‘crimps’ - who tended to use methods on the very borderline of the law to 
obtain the men they sought. Viewed as corrupt and dishonest, the recruiting service 
was as unpopular with the public at large, as was service in the army itself? During 
the first half year of the war, the policy for expanding the army remained tentative 
and cautious. Recruitment was limited to augmenting already existing regiments, or 
Although offensive operations in Europe were suspended, the government continued to launch 
colonial attacks in the West Indies. See. for example: Ian R. Christie, Wurs and Revolutions: Britain 
1760-1815 (London, 1982), pp. 229-34. 
J. R. Western has estimated that the strength of the regular army had been reduced to about 100.000 
men by 1797-98 (this figure also included fencibles). Western, Ph.D.. p. 7. 
6 
7 
* Ibid., pp. 5-12. 
Emsley, British Sociehs, p. 36. As a consequence of the disorganised and unprofessional mode or 
recruiting. many of the troops raised were very far from prime soldier material. Part of the Duke of 
York‘s British force in the Flanders campaign of 1793-95, for example, was described as ‘totally unfit 
for service’. Christie, Wars and Revolutions, p. 230. For a more extensive discussion of the negative 
aspects of the recruitment system. see: Western. Ph.D., pp. 1, 93- 102. 
9 
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to raising new independent companies, which were then meant to be absorbed by 
these regiments. From September 1793, however, the raising of entirely new 
regiments was commissioned and enlistment began to gather pace. The Scots took a 
full part in this early recruitment drive and, in Scotland, the government’s recruiting 
efforts in this period retained a strong and persistent focus on the Highlands. 
10 
The government’s particular interest in the Highlands for recruiting purposes 
dated back to the defeat of the Jacobite rebellion of 1745-46. Andrew Mackillop has 
demonstrated that one of the main effects of the rebellion was to prove to the 
authorities the martial qualities of the Highlanders, and to convince them that the 
best way of defusing the rebellious tendencies of the region was to enlist large 
numbers of young clansmen for military service in the British army - thereby 
physically removing them from the area.” The martial qualities of the Highlanders 
were soon demonstrated in the regular army, and gradually, the military 
establishment came to take a particular interest in the Highlands as prime recruiting 
ground for the armed forces.’’ This view was shared by central figures in the 
e aovernment such as Henry Dundas. who was particularly intent on keeping the 
region over-populated and thereby able to provide a steady supply of recruits. As 
Andrew Mackillop has argued, the Highland policy Henry Dundas set out amounted 
to ‘using the region as a nursery for the army’. and in this he was in line with most 
13 
Western. Ph.D., pp. 5-6. Andrew Mackillop has argued that this was a period when ’unprecedented 
numbers of regiments were in the process of formation’. Mackillop. ‘More Fri4itful than the Soil ’, p. 
113. 
lbid., pp. 12. 44. 57-8. 75. 237. Mackillop has argued that the ‘assault on clanship after 1746’ was 
’intense but short-lived’, and that in the longer run the authorities took a more calculating and 
pragmatic approach to the traditions of the Highlands, seeing the proven martial spirit of the 
Highlanders as a resource which could be channelled in a direction favourable for the Hanoverian 
regime. Andrew Mackillop, ’Military Recruiting in the Scottish Highlands, 1739- 18 15’: unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis (University of Glasgow, 1995), p. 364. The Border region. by comparison - which had 
many similarities with the Highlands in terms of economy and climate - ‘lacked what the Highlands 
did not - clear and recent evidence of militarism in the form of the 1745 uprising’. Ibid., p. 5 1 .  See 
also: Mackillop, ‘More Fruitful than the Soil ’, pp. 41, 50-1, 58. 75. 
This interest was only strengthened by the by the relative ease with which soldiers could be raised 
within the clan framework, as well as the general perception of the Highlands among contemporaries, 
which was that the region was lagging behind the rest of Scotland in economic development. and that, 
unlike other parts of Scotland, men could be removed from there without inflicting any particular 
damage to its economy. Mackillop, ‘More Fruitful than the Soil’. pp. 216-17; and Stanley Dean 
MacDonald Carpenter, ‘Patterns of Recruitment of the Highland Regiments of the British Army, 1756 
to 18 15’, unpublished MLitt thesis (University of St. Andrews, 1977), p. 1. 
He gave this intention a clear demonstration as early as in 1775, when he secured a temporary ban 
on emigration from the Highlands. Mackillop, ‘More Fruitful than the Soi l ’ .  pp. 180, 193, 195. The 






contemporary military planners, who tended to see the region as ‘something akin to a 
recruiting reservation . 9 14 
The favourable qualities of the Highlands - as seen from the government’s 
point of view - were even more conspicuous at the beginning of the 1790s than they 
had been before. Populated mainly by predominantly Gaelic-spealung clansmen, who 
were still used to a life within a social structure were the authority of the chief was 
not questioned, the Highlands was believed to be far less likely to become infected 
with radicalism than most other parts of Scotland. The advantages this held for 
military recruitment was not lost on the authorities and, when radicalism seemed to 
be spiralling out of control in the Lowlands in the spring of 1792, Henry Dundas was 
determined to prevent it from spreading north. If the region could be kept as isolated 
as possible from the Lowlands, then, not only would the government retain its source 
of first-rate recruits, but it would also be able to draw upon soldiers which could be 
safely deployed to suppress popular disturbances elsewhere. l S  h the event, the 
Highlands did remain largely unaffected by radicalism, and this only made Dundas 
even more convinced of their value as a recruiting resource.“ To the very end of the 
1790s, he retained the view that the Highlands were ‘an underutilized resource of 
men and the Highlander superior soldier material, especially in comparison with 
townsmen’.I7 The latter point may well have been true, but the first was certainly not, 
since the government’s recruitment drive in the Highlands was in fact a remarkable 
success. Stanley Carpenter has estimated that as many as 70,000 Highlanders may 
have served in the British army between 1793 and 1808, which amounted to 
approximately fourteen per cent of the total male population in the region. 
Although more conservative estimates have later reduced this number to fewer than 
50,000, it is none the less clear that the Highlands provided a higher proportion of 
18 
Mackillop Ph.D.. pp. 127. 227; and Mackillop, ‘More Fritifful than the Soil’. p. 236 [second quote]. 
Cookson, Armed Nution, p. 35. 
See, for example: Western, Ph.D., p. 252. The one notable popular disturbance that occurred in the 
Highlands in the 1790s - the Ross-shire riot of 1792 - had, as we have seen, little to do with radical 
influences, see: chapter 2, pp. 47-50. 
Cookson, Armed Nation, p. 137. 
Carpenter, MLitt, pp. 75-6. 
13 





men for arrned service than any other part of Great Britain.19 Indeed, so efficient was 
the recruitment of Highland soldiers in the period 1793 to 95, that the supply of men 
soon showed signs of being exhausted. In the second half of the decade the over- 
recruitment of the region could be seen most clearly in the diminishing number of 
Highlanders serving with the Highland regiments, which were increasingly coming 
to rely on Lowland recruits to replace their rank-and-file. By the end of the war, a 
number of these regiments had such a high proportion of non-Highlanders serving 
with them, that they were ordered out of the kilt and lost their identity as Highland 
regiments - at least for a period of time.” Another indication of the depletion of 
manpower resources was the low return of eligible men on the militia-lists submitted 
from the Highland counties in 1797, and the consequently small quotas set for these 
counties, when compared to those for the Lowlands.” None the less, the Highlands 
retained the attention of the government, and gradually also became symbolic of both 
the increasingly admired martial qualities of the Scots and of Scotland’s specific 
contribution to the war effort of the British state.’? The region was. however, not 
alone in Scotland in providing large numbers of men for armed service. Although the 
Highlands may have contributed more men than any other part of Scotland - when 
measured against the proportion of the total Scottish population living there - in 
ribsolute terms, the lion’s share of troops was in fact increasingly being raised 
elsewhere. J .  E. Cookson has argued that by the time of the Napoleonic wars, 
Scottish regiments had become ’predominantly lowland in substance, if not in spirit’, 
and even if the Lowlanders may have hoped to appropriate the Highland image for 
themselves in this period, their readiness to do armed service was as much a 
consequence of a general Scottish phenomenon as of any new-found admiration for 
Highland traditions. ” 
According to Andrew Mackillop’s estimates, the number of Highlanders doing armed service in the 
period 1793 to 1815 was in  the region of 37,000 to 48.000, while the total population of the region 
was approximately 250,000 to 300,000. Mackillop. ‘More Fruitfill thun the Soil ’, p. 236. 
Carpenter, MLitt, pp. 81, 91, 100-5; and Cookson, Armed Nation. pp. 129-30. The regiments that 
lost their Highland title were the 71”. 72”d. 73“. 74‘h, 75‘”, 91’‘ and 94lh. See also: Western. Ph.D., p. 9. 
l’ Carpenter, MLitt, p. 42. The militia quotas are included in Appendix: C. 
-- The Highland soldier’s status as the very symbol of Scotland’s contribution to the war effort was 
given its clearest demonstration when the Black Watch was paraded through London to cheering 
crowds on its return from the Egyptian campaign of 1801 - a campaign i n  which the Highland 
regiments had played such a prominent part. Cookson, Armed Nation, pp. 149-50. 





Since Scotland was a poorer country than England, both in absolute and 
relative terms, and the Scots therefore were - OR average - less wealthy than their 
southern neighbours, military service had always presented itself as a more attractive 
career prospect, or means of livelihood, to Scots, than it did to most Englishmen. 
This was particularly the case for the Scottish gentry and aristocracy, who ever since 
the union of 1707 had grasped eagerly for commissions in the army, but it was also 
the case that a greater proportion of ordinary people in Scotland than in England had 
served with the armed forces - and this trend continued into the 1790s.’‘ Figures 
calculated by J. E. Cookson indicate that Scotland was ‘grossly over-represented, in 
the officer corps and to some extent also in the army’s rank and file during the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. With about 15 per cent of the British population 
living in Scotland, Scots held about a quarter of all commissions, and one-sixth of 
the regular soldiers were Scottish.” Whether seen as a career opportunity for 
impoverished Scotsmen, or as a disproportionate burden carried by the Scots, it is 
clear that Scotland provided men for service in the army out of proportion to her 
share of the total British population. 
The Scottish contribution was, however, steadily declining over the course of 
the decade, and this was no doubt to some extent due to the high early outtake of 
recruits. which left fewer men to be enlisted at a later stage. It certainly appears to 
have been the case that the Scottish contribution was proportionately lower during 
the second round of recruitment for the line regiments - when emphasis was placed 
on ‘voluntary’ enlistment from the ranks of the defence forces - than in the early 
phase of the war. Some success was had in making Scottish fencible forces and 
volunteers enlist for extended service in the regular army,’6 but enlistment from the 
Scottish militia was given up on the grounds that the men were ‘too raw to make it 
worth while and the force ... so small that a further reduction would cause it to 
For a detailed discussion of the disproportionate Scottish involvement in both the armed forces and 
the imperial service, see: Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707- 1837 (London. 1992 ). 
chapter 3: ‘Peripheries’, particularly pp. 122-40. See also: Carpenter, MLitt, p. 16. 
25 Cookson, Armed Nation, pp. 126-27. 
was not a success at this point. See section I1 below. 
24 
Extension of service was first attempted with the Scottish fencible regiments as early as in 1794, but 26 
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di~integrate’.’~ Voluntary enlistment into the line was begun in 1798,’’ when the 
Scottish militia force was only in the process of being raised, and the returns for it 
were also significantly smaller than the government had anti~ipated.’~ This meant 
that those men who had been balloted would have to remain in the force if there was 
to be a militia establishment of any sort in Scotland. 
ii) The Royal Navy 
Recruitment for the navy was less systematic than for the army, and rested primarily 
on the use of ‘impressments’ and on the issuing of bounties to volunteers. The first of 
these two recruiting techniques was organised by the Impressment Service, which 
issued warrants to so-called ‘press gangs’ - groups of sailors under the command of 
an officer, who had authorisation to seize ‘idle persons’ for service in the Royal 
Navy. Operating from smaller warships, press gangs would normally be landed in 
ports or towns and villages on the coast, where they would attempt to force or 
‘impress’ local able-bodied men - preferably seamen - into naval service. The 
impressment system was hugely unpopular with people at large, and the inhabitants 
of the towns or ports where press gangs appeared would often do their best to 
obstruct these attempts at enlisting local men. In doing so, they occasionally received 
more or less open assistance from local government officials who either sympathised 
with their opposition to impressments, or wished to avoid antagonising the local 
population. For the Impressment Service, this was an enduring problem since, before 
a press gang could act legally. it needed to have its warrants countersigned by the 
local authorities in the town or port where it had landed.”’ When this was not 
forthcoming, the situation could easily deteriorate into an open conflict between the 
Western, Ph.D., p. 319. Almost all volunteer corps agreed to extend their service after they had been 
embodied for some time, and in 1799, the decision was made that Fencible regiments would either 
have to agree to serve at least in Ireland, or be disbanded. lhid., pp. 286. 292. For Western’s general 
discussion o f  extension of service. see: ihid., chapter 10 and 1 1. 
The Act authorising the line regiments to enlist men from the militia was passed in January 1798. 
lhid., p. 3 13. 
See section V below. 






sailors on the one hand, and the local residents and magistrates on the other, of which 
the famous incident from Campbeltown in 1795 is a particularly poignant example?’ 
As an alternative to impressments, the issuing of bounties to volunteers for 
navy-service was therefore the preferred means of recruitment among local 
magistrates and the people in general. In the 1790s, many Scots took the 
consequence of this view and contributed money out of their own pockets to 
subscription campaigns aimed at raising funds for bounties, in the hope that this 
might prevent the necessity of issuing press warrants in their localities. Although the 
central government does not appear to have devised any national policy on the 
issuing of navy-bounties out of public funds, local authorities were increasingly 
offering bounties themselves and, in Scotland, the initiative in this respect was taken 
by the Edinburgh Town Council and the Lord Provost, Thomas Elder, who issued a 
bounty already in late December 1792? By 1795, however, the dual system of press 
gangs and local bounty-offers had evidently become insufficient in terms raising the 
necessary number of men for naval service, as the government now decided to 
introduce a coordinated and nation-wide policy for naval recruitment. 
Passed by Parliament as three separate Navy Acts in March and April 1795, 
the new scheme set up a system of quotas. specific to each locality, and due to be 
administered by the local authorities. Enlistment for service was voluntary, but the 
set quota had to be filled none the less. and the responsibility of raising the necessary 
funds to pay for bounties rested with the local government officials. In the case of the 
first two acts, which concerned the English counties and the ports in the whole of 
Britain respectively, special commissioners were to be appointed for this task, while 
the third act, which related to the counties, stewartries, royal burghs and towns of 
Scotland, stated that ‘the Clerks of the Peace’ were to administer the enlistment of 
navy recruits in conjunction with the local justices of the peace. The final lists of 3 3  
For further detail on the Campbeltown incident, see the discussion on interaction between local and 
central government in chapter 2, pp. 75-6. 
- -  A discussion of the practice of awarding bounties to volunteers for armed service. in  the navy or  
land forces. can be found in chapter 6, pp. 281 -89. 
Statutes at Large. xvii ,  35 George I11 - 38 George 111, 1795 - 1798 (London, 1798). Chapter 5, ‘An 
Act for raising a certain Number of Men, in the several Counties in England. for the Service of his 
Majesty’s Navy. - [SIh March 1795.1’; Ibid., Chapter 1 1, ’An Act for procuring a Supply of Men from 
the several Ports of this Kingdom, for the Service of his Majesty’s Navy - [ 161h March 1795.1’; and 





quotas had been completed by the time the acts were passed by Parliament, and they 
were consequently included with the main text of the legislation. For the two acts 
which applied to Scotland, it emerges that 31 Scottish ports were due to raise a total 
of 2627 men, while 1 10 places listed under the third and last act were to raise 18 14 
 recruit^.'^ Compared to the numbers raised for land service, these figures cannot be 
said to have been very significant, but the local authorities whose task it was to fill 
the quotas, nevertheless had to give out very large bounties in order to attract the 
necessary number of volunteers.3s 
I1 
The Fencihle Regiments 
Although the augmentation of the regular armed forces was emphasised in the early 
part of the war and the main focus was on military action abroad, the threat of a 
French invasion was also realised and taken seriously from the very beginning of the 
conflict. In Scotland. the invasion defences were in a particularly poor state - mainly 
because of the absence of a militia force there - and this meant that a build-up the 
defensive forces north of the border was emphasised from the outset. Initially, Henry 
Dundas and the government had wished to set up a Scottish militia force, similar to 
that which already existed in England, but when this failed, they proceeded to 
strengthen the traditional Scottish defence force, the fencibles, instead? 
Royal Burghs. and Towns, in that Part o f  Great Britairz called Srotlund, for the Service o f  His 
Majesty’s Navy. [2gth April 1795.1‘. 
The complete lists of places and quotas are included in Appendix: D. 
- -  Bounties as high as 26 pounds were offered to able-bodied seamen, see: chapter 6. p. 286. 
Fencible units were first instituted in Scotland in 1759 as a compensation for the refusal t o  grant a 
militia force to Scotland, and four regiments were raised on condition that they would not be moved 
out of the country, unless in the event of an actual invasion of England, and that the soldiers were not 
to be drafted into the regular army. The most distinct aspect of the fencible regiments, therefbre, was 
that they were intended for home service only, but otherwise they were not entirely dissimilar to the 
regular army. Raised by the more prominent and wealthy Scottish noblemen, the fencibles were 
embodied full-time and in permanent pay, unlike the militia, which was not always i n  pay, and which 
was raised by government officials through compulsion and a ballot-system. The fencibles were none 
the less classified as ‘militia’, and up until the 1790s they effectively served as a Scottish militia force, 
being further augmented with new regiments in 1778. When the need to upgrade the Scottish invasion 
defences re-emerged with the outbreak of war in February 1793, the raising of new fencible corps 
therefore presented itself as the most straight-forward option for the government. John Robertson, Thc 
Scottish Enlightennient and the Militia Issue (Edinburgh, 1985). p. 136; Mary Margaret Lodge, ‘The 
Militia Issue: The Case of the Buccleuch Fencibles. 1778- 1783’, unpublished MLitt thesis (University 
of Edinburgh, 1985), pp. 56-9, 65-80; and Western, Ph.D., p. 3. 
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The initial plan was for six regiments of eight companies each to be ra i~ed ,~ '  
but eventually a total of nine battalions, divided into seven regiments were 
commissioned and embodied over the course of that same year. A further sixteen 
regiments were raised the following year, together with a few units of fencible 
cavalry, and over the period 1793 to 95, Scotland enlisted no fewer than 15,000 men 
in fencible regiments.'* Another nine fencible corps were raised over the course of 
1798 and 99, at the same time as the militia was in the process of being embodied, 
and these corps held a strength of about 600 men each? Together with the roughly 
5500 men raised for the Scottish militia, this amounted to a defensive force, 
proportionately no smaller than the English supplementary militia of 1796-97."" The 
raising of fencible units on such a scale undoubtedly contributed to the exhaustion of 
manpower reserves north of the border, and therefore also to Scotland's 
disproportionate supply of men for armed service." 
Although the first nine battalions which were commissioned in 1793 had been 
raised quickly and successfully, these units soon created serious difficulties for the 
authorities in Scotland." The root of the problem lay with the government's decision 
to alter the fencibles' conditions of service, only shortly after they had been 
embodied, and without consulting the soldiers first. The nine battalions raised in 
1793 had been enlisted on the same terms as earlier fencible troops. which meant that 
they could o d ~  be ordered to serve outside Scotland, in case of an invasion 
elsewhere on the British Isles. In 1794, however, there was a short-lived invasion 
scare in England, and the government decided to move Scottish troops south, in order 
-'7 The Times, 13 Feb. 1793; and Ediizhitrgh Ad\iertiser, 15-19 Feb. 1793. During the debates in the 
House of Commons, Henry Dundas was asked by Major Maitland MP i f  the raising of fencible 
regiments meant that he had given up the idea of a Scottish militia. At this point Dundas replied in the 
negative. Ibid. 
Cookson, Armed Narion, p. 28; and J .  R. Western. 'The Formation of the Scottish Militia in  1797'. 
Scottish Historical Retviert-, 34 (1955). 7. 
Although the new fencible regiments of the 1790s were also raised and commanded by prominent 
Scottish noblemen, the quick embodiment of these units must have been - in some degree - due to the 
voluntary offers of troops made by several counties. For a discussion of the voluntary offers, see: 
chapter 6, pp. 281-89. 
Cookson, Armed Nation. p. 127. and note. 7;  and J. R. Western, The English Militia in the 
Eighteenth Celltug*: The Stons of u Political Issue 1660- 1802 (London, 1965 ), pp. 2 19-22. 
The raising of so many troops for service in fencible regiments may explain why the later returns 
for the Scottish Militia were so meagre. 
The regiment raised by the Earl of Breadalbane. for example, was completed as early as in April. 







to strengthen the defences against invasion there. When the soldiers in the Scottish 
fencible regiments were asked to ‘volunteer’ for this service, many of them mutinied 
against an order they held to be in breach of their contract? 
There were two ways in which the fencible soldiers saw their contract as 
having been broken. The more obvious reason was that no actual invasion had yet 
taken place in England and it was therefore not legitimate to remove any soldiers 
from Scotland. Such concerns appear to have been the cause of the mutiny in the lst 
or Strathspey Fencibles stationed at Linlithgow. Their commander reported to Lord 
Adam Gordon that upon being briefed about the scheme of going to England, a party 
of soldiers in his regiment who refused to comply had run off and seized Linlithgow 
Palace. When an officer had been sent over to negotiate with them, he had received 
the reply that they ‘would not depart from the place they were in, till they had a 
Letter under my hand, that such a proposition should never be again made to them 
unless in case of Actual Invasion’.44 A similar point about the absence of an ‘actual 
invasion’ was stressed by a number of the soldiers in the 4‘h Regiment when they 
were presented with the plans,4s and it was also mentioned by those in the Earl of 
Hopetoun’s regiment who opposed being sent to England a few days before the 
mutiny at Linlithgow? The other, and perhaps more important reason, was 
concerned with the small print of the contracts signed by the fencibles, and at first 
sight appears far more obscure. 
When Lord Adam Gordon had been requested by the government to mobilise 
a detachment of Scottish fencible forces for the defence of England, he had decided 
that - in order to save time - half of the troops should be sent by ship rather than 
Logue. Popular Disturbances, p. 77. Lord Adam Cordon devised the final plan, whereby four 
Regiments were to provide 500 men each for the expeditionary force, NAS, RH2/4/75. f. 192, Adam 
Cordon to Henry Dundas. Edinburgh, 2 March 1794. Initially, however, all seven regiments were 
’consulted by their officers ... as to their willingness to submit to this service’. To make the offer 
more tempting, every volunteer was to receive a bounty of one guinea. Western. Ph.D., p. 289. 
NAS, RH2/4/75, ff. 329-30, Copy Colonel Sir James Grant to Lord Adam Cordon. Linlithgow. 21 
March 1794. 
Ibid, f. 345, Copy Letter Lieut. Col. Macdonal (2d Batt. 4h Fencible Regt.) to Lord Adam Cordon, 
Musslburgh [sic], 24 March 1794. 
In the case of Hopetoun‘s regiment, however, the absence of invasion was not the main reason for 
opposition. and in this regiment the problem was resolved very quickly anyway. Ibid, f .  295, Copy 






march all the way down to England.47 Transportation by sea would also have the 
additional benefit of saving the troops from 'a long and tedious march', Gordon 
thought.48 Although probably well-meant, this decision was an invitation to trouble, 
as the Duke of Gordon - who commanded the 6'h or Northern Fencible Regiment - 
found reason to warn his uncle: 
I don't much like the Idea of Detachments going from the Fencibles, 
and I wish the Men may not think so too; I am also certain, if my 
Regiment, or 500 of them ... had been asked to March into England 
they would readyly go, but whether they will Boat, is more than I can 
answer for .49 
Gordon's view was supported by the Earl of Hopetoun - commander of the 7'h or 
South Regiment of Fencibles stationed at Banff - who argued that for the soldiers to 
embark on a ship 'does not fall within our Agreement'.s0 Subsequent events showed 
that the two commanders were justified in their apprehension, and in expressing 
these warnings. Most of the reports on the mutinies that followed stressed the men's 
opposition to transportation by sea, and pointed out that in many cases, those who 
had staged the mutiny were perfectly happy to march south into England. Lieutenant 
Colonel Donaldson of the 3"' Regiment. for example, wrote of the mutineers in his 
unit, 'that they would never Embark, that they would March to any part of England, 
but Embark they would not?' 
There are two main explanations for this hostility against going onboard a 
ship. The majority of the fencible troops which had been raised in 1793 were 
Highlanders, and the contemporary perception was that Highlanders had 'a natural 
aversion to the sea'. as well as being 'extremely jealous of any infringement on what 
NAS, RH2/4/75, f .  192; and John Prebble, Mutin!: Highland Kegirrients in Reivolt 1743-1804 
(London, 1977). p. 277. 
NAS, RH2/4/75, f. 300, Draft to Lord Adam Gordon. Whitehall, 18 March 1794 [this letter was 
probably written by Henry Dundas, and makes references t o  earlier statements by Gordon]. 
"Zbid., f. 273, The Duke of Gordon to Lord Adam Gordon, Fort George. 8 March 1794 [original 
italics]. 
Hopetoun also pointed out that the absence of a scheme to provide for the families of those 
Fencibles who would be sent down south could become a 'chief Obstacle' to the whole operation, but 
there is little evidence that this particular concern materialised. Ibid., f. 27 1, the Earl of Hopetoun to 
Lord Adam Gordon, Banff, 9 March 1794. 
Ibid., ff.285-6, Copy Letter Lt. Colo. Donaldson of the 3d. Fencible Regiment to  Lord Adam 






they consider their rights’.” If their ‘Agreement’, as the Earl of Hopetoun had 
phrased it, stated that the soldiers could not be sent by sea, then the authorities were 
now breaking their promises, and tossing the ‘rights’ of the soldiers aside. Perhaps 
more convincing is an alternative explanation which has been developed by John 
Prebble, based on his studies of the British government’s earlier deployment of 
Scottish fencible forces. In Prebbles view, ‘past breaches of faith’ by the government 
- when fencible soldiers had been lured onboard ships under false pretences and 
shipped off to the West Indies only to die of tropical fevers or be disbanded there - 
were still vivid in the memories of Highlanders, and made them wary and suspicious 
of going onboard any ship? Moreover, when England had not yet been invaded, and 
there were perfectly good roads to march on, what other aim but to ‘betray’ the 
fencibles could the government have for insisting on transportation by sea?s4 These 
past experiences of previous Highland units do not, however, explain why soldiers in 
the two Lowland regiments were hostile to going onboard a ship, but reports on the 
West Lowlanders may provide some explanation. The mutineers in the 3‘d Regiment, 
Donaldson wrote, ‘have it amongst them that they are Sold. that the greatest number 
of the Officers have either Sold or given up their Commissions, & all we can say to 
the contrary will not conkince them’? Although he did not state so directly, 
Donaldson’ s observation seems to indicate that the fencibles feared being drafted 
into line regiments. Another report offers a different explanation. The government 
suspected the involvement of the Friends of the People or other political radicals in 
the mutinies, and in the case of the West Lowland Regiment at Inverness, this 
suspicion may well have been justified. The Lord Provost of Inverness wrote that: 
‘We fear it is not without cause that the Soldiers blame of the Inhabitants for having 
misled them by artful misrepresentations of the intentions of Government & of their 
This statement about Highlanders was made by Pryse Lockhart Gordon. an officer in the 6‘h or 
Northern Fencibles [commanded by the Duke of Gordon], Prebble. Mutirrj., p. 276. [Unfortunately. 
John Prebble did not provide a reference for the original source he consulted.] 
j3 Prebble, Murinj*, pp. 277-8 [see chapters 1 and 2 for Prebble‘s account of  earlier Fenciblc 
Regiments]. See also: Logue, Popular Disturbances, p. 77. 
j5 NAS, RH2/4/75, ff. 285-6. Similar views appear to have been held by the Gordon Fencibles. 
Western, Ph.D., p. 290. 
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Officers, which occasiond their reluctance at first to embark'.'' A final possibility is 
that all of these factors played a role. The commander of the Strathspey regiment 
certainly seemed to have thought so, when he summed up the mutiny by stating: 
The Idea of going by Sea, the exaggerated accounts they had got of the 
Conduct of other Fencible Regiments, which was industriously spread 
amongst them by evil minded people, & there being no actual Invasion 
at the Time, first sat them wrong, & gave rise to a number of false 
imaginations which they seem now ashamd of.'7 
Although the mutinies represented a very serious breakdown of order and 
discipline within the armed forces," there are few signs that the grievances held by 
the soldiers went much beyond the actual breach of contract. or that they were 
prepared to side with the political radicals and place themselves in more long-term 
opposition to the government. One factor pointing in this direction was the relatively 
brief duration of the 'proper' mutinies - those in which the soldiers not only refused 
to volunteer. but also resorted to violence. The first violent mutiny had broken out in 
the West Lowland Fencibles at Inverness on 12 March, and was quickly followed by 
the other Lowland regiment at Banff two days later. But the mutineers in the Banff 
Fencibles seem to have changed their mind the same day.59 and by 19 March the 
West Lowlanders had 'come quite around', acknowledged the 'badness' of their 
behaviour and were now 'willing to Embark'.'" Of the five Highland regiments, only 
the Strathspey Fencibles reacted violently to the request for volunteers, and after nine 
days of insurrection they also changed their minds and were prepared to march 
NAS, RH2/4/75, ff. 339-40, William Mackintosh Provost (and Bailies: William Inglis. James Shaus 
[?I, Alexander Mackintosh, Thomas Young and John Mackintosh. and Gen. Sir Hector Munro of 
Novar KB, MP) to Henry Dundas, Inverness, 27 March 1794. In the same letter, Mackintosh had 
already described the problems with radical influences that he was experiencing in his town. See 
chapter 1 ,  p. 42. 
Ibid., f. 357, Copy James Grant, Col. 1 St Fencible Regiment to Lord Adam Gordon, 28 March 1794. 
The most serious mutiny was probably that of the Strathspey Fencibles who had not only seiLed the 
derelict Linlithgow Palace, but also broken into the ammunition store and carried away sizable 
supplies with them, Prebble, Mutin?., p. 307. Also the West Lowland Fencibles had, however, taken 
hold of ammunition. and upon hearing of this, the officers of Hopetoun's regiment decided t o  throw 
their ammunition into the sea as a precaution, only to recover some of i t  afterwards. NAS. RH2/4/75, 
f. 295. 
Upon being assured that 'we only desired Volunteers for England . . .  181 Rank & File' stood 
forward to sail, and another 150 agreed to march. NAS. RH2/4/75, f. 295. 
Ibid., f. 333, Copy Colonel Montgomrie to Lord Adam Gordon, dated: Inverness 19 March 1794. 
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south.6' The Gordon Fencibles had been the first regiment to be presented with the 
plan, on 8 March, and had remained in a state of passive resistance, with no man 
stepping forward to offer his services until 19 March. On that day, however, the 
Duke of Gordon could report that his men were ready to go to England 'either by Sea 
or Land' .62 In the remaining three Highland regiments - the Sutherlands, 
Breadalbanes and Argylls - no volunteers came forward, and none of these regiments 
provided any soldiers for the defence of England in the short term, although they 
demonstrated their opposition by the same kind of passive resistance as the 
Gordond3 Thus, by the end of March, the fencible revolt had largely faded out?' 
After 1795, no further problems were encountered with either the existing 
fencible corps, or with the new ones raised in 1798-99, and the extension of service 
in that period appears to have gone ahead smoothly. The most immediate 
consequence of the fencible revolt of March 1794 was that all new fencible corps 
now had to accept to 'serve in any part of Great Britain', not just in Scotland.65 
Serious though the fencible mutinies had been, they were short-lived, and did not 
present the Scottish authorities with as grave a threat to the government of Scotland - 
or to the stability and order of Scottish society - as the popular opposition to the 
Scottish Militia Act was tc) do three years later. In the meantime, however. the 
emphasis on invasion defence in Scotland came to focus on the forming of Volunteer 
units. 
The mutiny began on 18 March and ended on the 27, mhen the commander James Grant could 
report that his regiment was ' in  perfect Order 8r tranquillity', ibid. f .  357. Copy Letter from James 
Grant, Col. 1" Fencible Regiment to Lord Adam Gordon, Edinburgh. 28 March 1794 
'" Zhid.. f. 317, Duke of Gordon to Lord Adam Gordon, Edinburgh Castle. 19 March 1794. 
The Argylls 'changed their mind later in the year' and volunteered for England, Western, Ph.D.. p. 
290. John Prebble has argued that in March 1794, the Breadalbanes 'did not carry their sullen refusal 
to volunteer into open mutiny', Prebble, Micrin!., p. 322. 
6-1 Another mutiny occurred in the Breadalbane Regiment later the same year. and one was staged by 
the Strathspey Fencibles in  June 1795, but both concerned disciplinary problems within the regiments, 
not the shipment of troops to England. See: NAS, RH2/4/77, ff. 316-7, Copy Letter John Dunlop, 
Provost of Glasgow to Lord Advocate, Glasgow, 1 December 1794; Edirihitrgh E \ ~ n i n g  Courant, 18, 
22, 27 Dec. 1794; The Times 17, 22 Dec. 1794, 13 Jan. 1795; and Prebble. Mcrriiij,, pp. 319-46, 359- 
391. 
NAS. RH2/4/2 18, pp. 18 1-83, Portland to Lieut. Col. Humberstone MacKenzie, Whitehall, 19 
September 1794; and NAS. RH2/4/2 19, pp. 195-96, Portland to Lt. Col. Humb. MacKenLie, 






The Volunteer Corps 
Unlike the fencibles or the militia, the paramilitary force which came to be known as 
the ‘Volunteer Corps’ consisted of men who were essentially civilians, enlisted to be 
trained in the use of arms in their spare time and embodied part-time only, or when 
there was an actual need for them? They had - as the name indicated - volunteered 
to do this kind of service and they could withdraw from their respective corps 
whenever they wished to do so. In most cases, the operational area of a volunteer 
corps was also restricted to its immediate locality - usually the county in which it 
had been raised - and throughout the period when volunteer corps were embodied, 
they remained outside the direct control of the army.67 The background for the 
introduction of this kind of defence force was an idea that Henry Dundas had put 
forward in February 1793. On the basis of an initiative originating in a few coastal 
communities, where the inhabitants had offered to be trained in the use of arms, 
Dundas proposed the setting up of voluntary artillery companies. which would man 
coastal gun-batteries, and be raised under the supervision of the local lords 
lieutenant. He also opened for the possibility of raising an inland volunteer force, for 
policing purposes. but at this point that was of secondary consideration.“ I t  took 
some time for this idea to be developed into a concerted plan, however, and it was 
not until March the next year, that Pitt‘s government had devised a comprehensive 
scheme to utilise civilian resources for defensive purposes.69 The Prime Minister’s 
intention was to invite the British public to volunteer for home defence, as well as to 
contribute financially to the raising of this volunteer force. and the government’s 
Western, Ph.D.. p. 3. 
Cookson, Armed Nation, p. 77;  and Western, Ph.D., p. 273. As was the case with much military 
terminology i n  the eighteenth century, also the term ‘volunteer‘ was used with more than one 
meaning. (We have already seen how the fencibles were occasionally referred to as ’militia’. although 
they constituted a different kind of force from the English militia). Before 1794, for example. i t  was 
commonplace for government officials to refer to ’anyone who offered his services to government in 
any capacity’ as a ‘volunteer’, and this included enlistees in the army o r  the navy. In this section, 
however, focus is on the volunteer ‘corps’ as they emerged after March 1794. See: Robert R .  DoLier. 
For King, Constitution, and Couritns: the English Loyalists arid the French Rei-olution (Lexington. 
6 0 
67 
KY, 1983). pp. 139-40. 
Western, Ph.D., p. 236. 
The draft for the plan was, however, presented by the Duke of Richmond on 8 February 1793. John 
68 
69 
Ehrman, The Younger Yitt: ii. the Reluctant Transition (London, 1983), 261. 
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work eventually materialised as the ‘Plan for Providing more completely for the 
Security of the Country’ passed by Parliament on 14 March 1794,70 or the ‘Plan for 
an augmentation of the Forces for Internal Defence’, which was the term adopted by 
the g~vernment .~’  The programme was divided into five sections, where the first set 
aut that the English militia should be augmented by ‘volunteer companies, as was 
practised in the last war’, while the second provided guidelines for the setting up of 
artillery companies along the coast - in accordance with Dundas’s earlier proposal - 
and the third presented the opportunity of raising ‘volunteer troops of fencible 
cavalry’. The fourth section concerned the force which would most often be referred 
as the ‘volunteer corps’ afterwards, although in the text defined as ‘other bodies of 
cavalry’, due to consist of ‘gentlemen and yeomanry’,7’ while the fifth and last 
section provided for the establishment of pioneer units7’ A later Act of Parliament 
presented a more careful outline of the terms of service which applied for volunteer 
Accompanying the circular to the lords lieutenant was also a suggestion to 
open general subscriptions to fund part of the expenses involved in embodying the 
new corps, since the government had only committed itself to provide ‘arms, 
accoutrements, and uniforms’ as well as two days‘ pay a week for the cavalry units. 
Horses, saddles and bridles, the volunteers would have to provide themselves, and 
this was how Pitt envisaged the public giving an additional - and voluntary - 
financial contribution to the war effort.75 
’() Purliumenrun~ Histoy.  xxxi (London. 18 18). cc. 89-9 1. 
NAS, Rattray of Craighall Muniments, GD385/20, no. 1 ,  Henry Dundas to the Lord Advocate of 
Scotland. Whitehall, 28 March 1794: and /hid.. no. 23. Circular entitled ‘WHITEHALL’ including the 
provisions of the ’Plan for an augmentation’. An abbreviated version of the same document can be 
found in:  NAS. RH2/4/76, f. 38. Robert DoLier has referred to the same plan as the ‘General Orders 
for the Security of the Country’. Dozier. King, Constitlition arid Countv ,  pp. 140-41. See also: 
Cookson, Armed Nution. p. 25; and Western. Ph.D., p. 236. A few Volunteer Corps had been formed 
already in 1793. on basis of local initiatives, and prior to the general invitation to arm. J. R. Western. 
’The Volunteer Movement as an Anti-Revolutionary Force, 1793- 1801 ’, English Hisrorical Re\iim‘. 
71 (1956), 605; and Cookson, Armed Nution. p. 26. 
Since some of these units subsequently came to consist of predominantly yeoman farmers, they 
were occasionally referred to as ’yeomanry’ corps, rather than ‘volunteer’ corps, but for consistency. 
we will adopt ‘volunteer corps’ throughout in this discussion. 
l3 Parliameritun* Histor]?, xxxi, cc. 89-9 1. 
NAS, RH2/4/76, ff. -37-8. 34 Geo. 111. Cap. 31, ’An Act for encouraging and disciplining such 
Corps or Companies of Men, as shall voluntarily inroll themselves for the Defence of their Counties, 
Towns, or Coasts, or for the General Defence of the Kingdom, during the present War. [ 171h April 
1794.1’. More informal instructions were also provided for those infantry units which were raised for 
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To some extent, the defence plan of 1794 was an attempt at channelling the 
resources of the loyalist association movement into a format more directly useful for 
the government, and in this sense, the volunteer corps were intended to serve a dual 
purpose. The loyal societies - which had already given ample demonstration of their 
zeal and attachment to the administration over the two years they had been embodied 
- were seen to be near ideally suited to the task of defending the state, not only 
against its external enemies, but also against those who threatened the status quo 
from within.76 In addition to providing a means of invasion defence, the volunteer 
corps were thus intended to act as a local police force, suppressing radicalism and 
popular disturbances; and for this latter purpose, the members of the loyalist 
associations were perceived to be particularly well suited.” The forming of volunteer 
corps was not, however, in any way restricted to loyalist associations, and the 
offering of this lund of service was open to people beyond the ranks of these 
societies. Robert Dozier has identified four different types of meetings which were 
held to start subscription campaigns following the invitation to arm - the first step in 
the forming of a volunteer corps - and, of these, by far the largest group was made 
up by county meetings, called by the Lord Lieutenant and attended by the principal 
inhabitants in the county. Not quite as numerous were city or town meetings, or 
meetings held by private individuals who were opening subscriptions on their own 
initiative, whereas established loyalist societies converting themselves en rncisse into 
volunteer corps formed the smallest group.” This may serve to indicate that the 
public did not respond quite in the way that the government had anticipated or even 
hoped for, and certainly, volunteering - once the invitation had been given - was to 
remain unpredictable and difficult for the government to control. 
The initial response in 1794 was somewhat mixed. For Britain, as a whole, 
the scheme cannot be said to have met with overwhelming enthusiasm, and this was 
particularly the case with the loyalist associations. Whereas nearly 2000 loyalist 
associations had been set up in the two-year period from 1792 to 1794, there were 
only about 160 volunteer corps formed in England and Wales over the course of 
For a further discussion of the loyalist societies, see: chapter 6, section 11. 
Ibid.. p. 139; Western, ‘The Volunteer Movement‘, EHR, 7 1 (1956). 607; and Austin Mitchell, ’The 
Dozier. King, Couritq‘, and Constitution, p. 148. 
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1794-96. Only a small part of the loyalist societies in this part of Britain thus 
converted themselves into volunteer corps and, by 1796, the number of volunteer 
infantry in England was still below 10,000 men. Most of the offers to raise corps 
came from the more exposed parts of the coast, such as the south coast from 
Cornwall to Kent, and the north-eastem from Yorkshire to Scotland, but this was 
perhaps to be expected given the emphasis that had been placed on raising artillery 
companies for coastal defen~e . ’~  To a degree, however, this lukewarm response was 
perhaps more of an English than a generally British phenomenon, and may largely 
reflect the continuing lack of enthusiasm for armed service in England - which was 
part of the reason for the disproportionate Scottish and Irish contributions to the 
armed forces in this period.80 Certainly, in terms of volunteering, Scotland stood out 
clearly in this context, and provided a sharp contrast to the lack-lustre response in 
England. The service proved very popular north of the border, and a proportionately 
much larger number of volunteer corps was raised in Scotland in quick succession, 
following the government’s invitation to arm. Edinburgh, Glasgow and the central 
Lowlands led the way in 1794, but were soon followed by the smaller towns on the 
east coast from Dunbar to Thurso. By 1796 there were over sixty volunteer 
companies along the coast, as opposed to just under fifty in the Lowlands,” and no 
fewer than one in three infantry volunteers in Britain belonged to a Scottish corps at 
this point.” Nor was there an absence of men willing to join the newly established 
volunteer units either. Indeed, as J. E. Cookson has remarked, ‘the other outstanding 
feature of Scottish volunteering was the numbers that came forward’.83 A steady 
stream of volunteers meant that the Scottish volunteer establishment remained 
proportionately much larger than the English and, by the end of 1797, the Scottish 
Cookson, Armed Nation. pp. 24-7;  and Clive Emsley, Britain cirid thc French Kcvolution (Harlow, 
J. E. Cookson has estimated that as much as half of the strength of  the British army was Scots-Irish 
in 1793-94. Ibid.. p. 28. 
Ibid., p. 140. 
” Ibid.. p. 28. 
Ibid., pp. 140-41. Linda Colley has suggested that the same conditions which seemed t o  make 
service in the armed forces more popular i n  Scotland than In England - the relative poverty of 
Scotland, the greater control wielded by Scottish landowners over their tenants and the supposed 
‘martial qualities‘ of society in some parts of the country - also served to facilitate the early and rapid 
expansion of the volunteer force. Colley, Britons, pp. 3 10- 1 1 .  
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volunteer infantry made up a good 44 per cent of the British totaLx4 The 
concentration of volunteer corps in Scotland came to remain in the central Lowlands 
and along the east coast throughout the rest of the war, but a sample of volunteer 
offers taken from the Caledonian Mercury in 1794 shows that also people outside of 
these two areas stood forward to arm in defence of the state. Over a period of only 
about one month, from the end of July until the end of August that year, offers to 
raise forces for 'internal defence' were made in places as far apart as Inverness, 
Berwickshire, Ross, Argyllshire, knross-shire, Wigtonshire, Cromarty, 
Roxburghshire and Selkirk?' 
One reason for the success of the volunteer programme in Scotland may have 
been the enthusiasm with which the local gentry and the Scottish lords lieutenant 
embraced the scheme. The volunteer corps tended to be controlled by that same 
faction of the gentry which had supported the government's plans to start with, and 
the lords lieutenant - who had no militia to deal with until 1797 - often went beyond 
their official task of organising the companies and took an active part in the corps 
themselves.8h It is not clear whether this gave them a vested interest in the 
volunteers, which made them liable to defend this particular type of military force 
regardless of its performance. or whether they gerzuinelj. held it  to be useful, but 
there is little doubt that the Scottish lords lieutenant - together with the central 
b Oovernment officials in Scotland such as Robert Dundas - persisted in their defence 
of the volunteer corps, even when the central government seemed to be losing its 
confidence in them. The clearest example of this is the negative response the 
government drew from the Scottish lords lieutenant in 1798, when it presented its 
proposal to reduce the pay of volunteers to one day per week."' 
Although Scottish enthusiasm for volunteering must have provided a 
welcome contrast to the half-hearted response in England, the central government 
soon grew wary of the volunteer movement as it emerged after 1794. For a start, the 
Cookson's estimates were 18.1 24 volunteer infantry in Scotland, out of a total of 41 .A65 for the 
whole o f  Britain. Ibid., p. 69. On the continued popularity of the volunteer corps in Scotland, see: 
National Library of Scotland [NLS], MS 7, Mel\.ille Papers, ff. 154-57, A. Dirom to Lord Ad\wcate, 
Edinburgh, 27 March 1797. 
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volunteer project did - of course - carry with it the same dilemma for the 
government as the forming of the first loyalist association societies had done two 
years previously. Support for the government was all very well, but by encouraging 
active popular involvement in loyalist organisations the authorities also ran the risk 
of making people more politically conscious in general. What if this made them think 
new ideas of their own, or made them sufficiently confident of their own position to 
start presenting demands for a more formalised influence in politics and political 
decision-making? The fact that they now also had arms which could be used to back 
up such political demands can hardly have been reassuring for those who were 
already prone to worry.88 Thus, in this sense, the moderate English response was 
perhaps to be preferred above Scottish enthusiasm. Of greater and more immediate 
concern to the central authorities, however, was the intense localism of the volunteer 
corps, and the fact that it remained difficult to bring them under proper army control. 
The invasion-defence strategy of the government's military planners rested 
upon the ability to move quickly large numbers of defence forces to the place of a 
French landing, in order to 'hem in' the invasion force, while the Royal Navy cut its 
supply lines.*' Since the French troops were expected to be of superior quality to the 
regular British army, the strategy was to use large numbers of defence forces to 
contain them within one area until they became demoralised and could be safely 
attacked. British numbers and perseverance were thus to defeat French mobility and 
fighting prowess."' Given this scenario it was obviously not convenient that the 
volunteer corps tended to insist on serving only within their own county, and the 
localism of the volunteers therefore came to be increasingly resented by the 
government. Added to this were the problems of inadequate discipline and training 
for the main body of the force, too few and poorly trained officers - men who were 
often drawn from the lesser local gentry - and the fact that the volunteer corps 
remained small, locally controlled units; all of which stood in the way of effective 
army control. Paradoxically, it was precisely their local foundation that made the 
See: Western, 'The Volunteer Movement', EHR. 71 (1956). 610. 
I t  was not viewed as realistic for the navy t o  be able to stop a landing from taking place. Dozier. 
Cookson, Armed Nation, pp. 42-7. For a discussion of the British defence strategy throughout the 
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volunteers so popular with the people at large in Scotland and, following the French 
expedition to Bantry Bay in December 1796, there was a renewed interest in and 
moderate expansion of the volunteer forces - independently of any government 
initiative.” 
By 1796 the authorities had become convinced that a further augmentation of 
the volunteer corps would not enhance the country’s defence against invasion, and 
when the government instead embarked on its programme to improve these defences 
by augmenting the compulsory militia force, attempts were therefore made to halt the 
forming of further volunteer corps - particularly in Scotland. In a letter to the Lord 
Lieutenant of Inverness, Sir James Grant, on 30 March 1796, the Home Secretary 
wrote in reply to a proposal of forming yet another two volunteer companies that: 
‘His Majesty does not, at present judge it expedient to make any addition to the 
Volunteer Corps, raised for the internal defence of the Kingdom’.” The reason for 
this decision was set out more clearly in a similar reply to William MacDowall in 
Renfrew a few days later. This time the Duke of Portland wrote that ‘considering the 
number of Volunteer Corps, which have been already accepted by His Majesty, he 
does not, at present, think it proper to accede to any further Proposals, for raising 
Corps or Companies of that Description’ ?’ The government clearly believed that 
sufficient volunteer corps had been raised for the time being, and a further 
application from Perth was declined on the same grounds later in the summer?‘ By 
October. however. the government seemed to have suddenly changed its mind, or to 
have become more uncertain, since in another letter to James Grant in Inverness. 
Portland wrote that ‘His Majesty’s intention ... is now meant only to extend to 
Fencible Regiments. & not to Volunteer Corps’. The cabinet would thus be pleased 
to accept the offer of an additional volunteer company in Inverness, provided that i t  
was formed ‘upon the same terms that have been granted to the other Volunteer 
Companies in that County’ .95 Another eight requests to raise additional companies, 
coming from other places in Scotland, were accepted within the next four weeks, and 
Ihid.. pp. 67-9. 77, 9 1-2; and MackiIlop. ‘More Fruitfill than the Soil ‘. pp. 23 1-32. 
‘” NAS, RH2/4/220. p. 48. Portland to J .  Grant Bt, Whitehall. 30 March 1796. 
Ibid., p. 49, Portland to Wm. MacDowall, Esq., Whitehall. 2 April 1796. 
Ibid., pp. 64-5, Portland to His Grace the Duke of Atholl, Whitehall, 12 August 1796. 






more tentative enquiries were also given an encouraging response.” In a letter to the 
Lord Advocate, Portland referred to a letter from Major Mayne of the Stirling 
Volunteer Corps, who had requested ‘to know the wishes of Government with 
respect to the augmentation of that Corps’, and wrote that if any such proposal 
should be made, ‘I have no doubt but, it would be acceded to by His Majesty’.97 A 
similar point was made in a letter to Humberston Mackenzie, Lord Lieutenant of 
Ross-shire, concerning the Dingwall Volunteers.98 These approvals were, however, 
issued at around the same time as the raising of a Scottish militia force was becoming 
a serious possibility, and the next response given to a volunteer offer showed that 
Whitehall had again swung in the opposite direction. In reply to another proposal 
from Peterhead, Portland wrote to the Duke of Gordon that: ‘I should apprize your 
Grace of the expediency of deferring the proposed Augmentation. until the measures 
for increasing the internal strength of the IOngdom, which are now under the 
consideration of Parliament, shall be decided upon, and if adopted, carried into 
effect’.99 Similar responses were sent to Thomas Elder in Edinburgh and to the Earl 
of Caithness. before Portland found reason to express himself in even more 
unequivocal terms in a letter to Earl Gower. In reply to yet another offer to raise a 
company of volunteers ‘for the District of Strathnaver in the County of Sutherland’, 
Portland emphasised that: ‘It is His Majesty’s wish that all further Proposals for 
raising Volunteer Corps, or for augmenting those already raised, should be 
suspended for the present, with a view to facilitate the execution of the Acts lately 
passed for the internal defence of the IOngdorn’.lOo The same, or similar, responses 
were given to a number of offers from other places in Scotland, and the government 
(bid., p. 73. [Attachment to above, containing short notices with acceptance of similar proposals 
from:] Principal inhabitants of Peterhead. signed by the Duke of Gordon, Inhabitants of Perth, Duke 
of Athole, Inhabitants of Strathnaver. Earl Gower, County of’ Caithness, Earl o f  Caithness, Magistrates 
and Town Council of Montrose, Lord Douglas and Major McKenell, Commandant of the Paisley 
Volunteers, Wm McDowall; ibid., pp. 77-8, Portland to Wm McDowall, Whitehall 14 October 1796 
[Refrewshire Volunteers]; and ibid., pp. 82-3, Portland to the Rt. Honble Lord Douglas. Whitehall. 1 
November 1796 [Burgh of Montrose]. 
O8 Ibid., pp. 79-80, Portland to J. H. Mackenzie Esq., Castle Brechan Ross-shire, Whitehall, 24 
October 1796. 
loo Ibid., p. 88, Portland to Earl Gower, Whitehall, 21 November 1796. See also: NAS, RH2/4/212, f. 
261, Circular to ‘The Lieutenants of Counties in Scotland’. 
96 
Ibid.. p. 73. Portland to the Lord Advocate, Whitehall, 10 October 1796. 97 
Ibid., pp. 83-3, Portland to the Duke of Gordon, Whitehall. 8 November 1796. 99 
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now seems to have put its foot down firmly against any further extension of the 
volunteer force - at least for the time being. 101 
As it turned out, this was not for very long, since, already by the middle of 
February 1797, an offer to raise an entirely new volunteer corps in St. Andrews was 
accepted."' Offers to augment the Royal Glasgow Volunteer Corps, and the corps at 
Linlithgow were approved on the same day and, a week later, the Dundee Volunteers 
also received permission to extend their unit."' Oddly enough, offers to raise a new 
corps in Aberdeen, Edinburgh, Dalkeith, and Mussleburgh - similar to that of St. 
Andrews - were declined only a month later on the grounds that the forming of any 
further volunteer corps had been suspended. awaiting the implementation of the new 
'Plan for the general defence of Scotland'; the same argument that had been put 
forward in November the year before.'04 If this seemed an inconsistent and possibly 
even confused approach by the Home Office, another letter from Portland to 
Buccleuch may provide some explanation. Writing about the possibility of raising 
another volunteer corps in Edinburgh, Portland stressed that: 
From a consideration . . .  of the importance which must be attached to 
the Safety and Tranquillity of the Metropolis of Scotland, it is judged 
expedient, that the suspending of the formation of further Volunteer 
Corps for the present . . . should not be construed to extend to the above 
1 OS corps. 
The indication provided by this passage is that rather than being inconsistent, the 
government was in fact being selective in its decisions on whether or not to approve 
of and accept a given application. Only offers from places where it was perceived to 
See: NAS, RH2/4/220. pp. 89-91, Portland to Sir J .  Grant Bt, Whitehall. 24 November 1796 
[Inverness]; ibid., p. 93. Portland to J .  H. Mackenzie, Whitehall 5 December 1796 [County of Ross]. 
and Portland to Sir James Grant Bart, Whitehall 12 December 1796 [Inverness, again]; ibid., pp. 98-9, 
Portland to Sir James Grant Bart. Whitehall, 24 December 1796 [North Uist Volunteers]; and ibid., p. 
101, Portland to the Earl of Fife, Whitehall, 5 January 1797 [County of Banffj. 
lo2 Ibid., p. 123. Portland to the Earl of Crawford. Whitehall, 14 February 1797. 
Ibid., pp. 124-25. Portland to His Grace the Duke of Hamilton, Whitehall, 14 February 1797 
[Glasgow]; ibid., pp. 126-27, Portland to the Earl of Hopetoun, Whitehall, 14 February 1797 
[Linlithgow]; and ibid.. p. 130, Portland to Lord Douglas, Whitehall, 23 February 1797 [Dundee]. 
Ibid., pp. 142-43, Portland to the Duke of  Cordon, Whitehall, 24 March 1797 [Aberdeen]; and 
ibid., pp. 144-45, Portland to His Grace the Duke of Buccleuch, Whitehall, 24 March 1797 [City of 
Edinburgh, and Towns of Dalkeith and Mussleburgh]. 





be useful to augment the volunteer forces were accepted. Io6 Further indications that 
this may have been the case came in a letter to the Earl of Fife on 29 May 1797, 
when Portland declined several proposals because the king did not ‘think it necessary 
to accept of any further offer for raising Volunteer Corps except in such parts of the 
Coast, & in such Cities or large Towns, as appear to require an additional Force’.107 
Increasingly, the government came to place new demands on any additional 
or new volunteer units that were to be formed. On 24 April 1797, the Earl of 
Caithness was duly informed that the inhabitants of the parishes of Dunnell and Olrig 
in the county of Caithness would have to ‘agree to march in the event of an lnvasion 
or the appearance of Invasion ... to any part of the three contiguous and adjacent 
Counties at least’, if their offer was to be accepted.lU8 The same demand was placed 
on the burgh of Kmghorn,lO’ and the offer to raise a volunteer company in Fifeshire 
was approved ‘with the additional Condition that the Company will be ready to 
march to any part of Great Britain in case of Invasion’.”’ This was the first hint of 
what was to become a changed government policy on volunteers. Although the 
authorities had not entirely discarded the idea of a further strengthening the volunteer 
force, the corps were now having to accept new government guidelines and 
directions. 
Although the British defence forces were predominantly made up of militia 
and fencibles units by the end of 1797 - there were a total of 130,000 men enlisted in 
militia or fencible regiments, as opposed to 51,000 volunteers and yeomanry - the 
programme for extending and augmenting the compulsory part of the defence forces 
was viewed as a partial success only. The supplementary militia and provisional 1 1 1  
cavalry in England had been raised without too much difficulty, but the quotas set by 
‘Oh Robert Dundas had himself, on basis of recommendations given by Lt. Col. Alexander Dirom, 
written a letter to Henry Dundas, in which he expressed his wish that the ’Corps established in the 
City of Edinburgh & its vicinity should be immediately & without farther Delay. accepted o f .  It is 
likely that this intervention was of importance for the decision to accept the offer. NLS. MS 7, ff. 1 SO- 
53, Robert Dundas to Henry Dundas, Arniston. 29 March 1797. 
NAS. RH2/4/220, pp. 2 18-19, Portland to the Earl of Fife. Whitehall, 29 May 1797. 
Ibid., pp. 174-75, Portland to the Earl of Caithness. Whitehall, 24 April 1797. 
Ibid., pp. 225-226, Portland to J. H. Mackenzie, Whitehall, 31 May 1797. 




‘ I ’  These figures are J. E. Cookson’s estimates, see: Cookson, Armed Nutinn, p. 68, and note 5. Cf. 
Clive Emsley’s estimate of 54,600 volunteers by April 1798. Emsley, Brituin and the French 
Re\vlutiori, p. 45. 
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the government had not been filled, leaving the two forces at a lower strength than 
estimated.”’ The Scottish militia - by comparison - was met, not only with 
widespread rioting, but the number of men due to be raised also had to be scaled 
down because of low returns for the ballot, and only half of the force was embodied 
in its first year.”’ Furthermore, as the war was now developing in an increasingly 
unfavourable direction for Britain, even the original estimates for the defence forces 
were becoming insufficient. With Napoleon’s ‘Army of England’ in the process of 
being assembled on the French Atlantic coast, the British government swung back to 
volunteering as the best, or even the only, way of rapidly augmenting the forces for 
invasion defence. Nevertheless, lessons had been learned from the first invitation to 
arm in 1794, and the government now made significant efforts to avoid a repetition 
of the chaotic situation of 1794-95. This was done by setting out provisions for a 
volunteer force under more firm government control, and one that would be more 
useful for the government’s purposes (as opposed to suiting local interests). All new 
and existing corps were now given incentives to extend their service outside of their 
own military districts - such as pay for training and a clothing allowance if they 
agreed to do so - and the corps were increasingly being converted to ‘the idea of 
national defence’, so that ’by early 1799, there were few corps left restricted to local 
service . A clearer distinction was drawn between volunteer units embodied for 
defence purposes and those intended to function as a police force, and the social 
composition and internal organisation of the corps were also given more specific 
government guidelines. This time the public response was enthusiastic across the 
whole of Britain - probably because of the by now very serious threat of invasion - 
and in just four months, from April into July 1798, the volunteer establishment more 
than doubled in strength from 51,000 to 116,000 men.116 With a better response in 
England this time than in 1794, the Scottish component of the newly formed corps 
was naturally proportionately lower than had been the case up till then, and some of 
9 114 
1 IS 
Western, English Militia, pp. 2 19-24. 
See section V below: and Cookson, Armed Nation, p. 70. 
Ibid., p. 73. Although service outside of their military district was voluntary. after 1798, all  
volunteers had to agree to serve throughout that district, not just their county. and later - in August 
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the more isolated parts of the Highlands, such as Inverness-shire and Bute were now 
more reluctant to volunteer, but this may only reflect on the exhaustion of manpower 
in those areas at this point.l17 The volunteer force continued to grow, even after 
Napoleon’s army on the Channel coast had been dispersed,’ l 8  and, by 1801, it stood 
at approximately 300,000 men.119 A total of 228 volunteer corps had by then been 
raised in Scotland.’”) 
IV 
The Auxiliary forces 
The Defence of the Realm Act of April 1798 - which set out the new provisions for 
the volunteer force - was, however, not limited to volunteer corps only. It also 
included a plan for a vastly extended use of civilian auxiliaries, which had been 
devised and written by Henry Dundas earlier that year.’” Entitled ‘Proposals for 
rendering the Body of the People Instrumental to the General Defence, in case of 
Invasion’, the plan set out a comprehensive strategy for civilian involvement in what 
amounted to both a limited ‘scorched earth’ tactic, and a scheme for civilian 
assistance to the armed forces in the case of a French invasion.”’ The first line of the 
introduction to the d0cumer.t stated that: ‘IF an Enemy should land upon our Shores, 
every possible exertion should be made immediately to deprive him of the means of 
Collev. Britons. pp. 309- 12. 
Cookson. Artned Nation, p.  73. 
See. for example: Frank O’Gorman. The Long Eighteenth Ccritui?.: British Political and Social  
Cookson. Arnitci Nation. p. 140. 
Ibid., p. 34; and Western, Ph.D., pp. 26-31. Although the final version of‘ the plan bore the 
signature of Henry Dundas, the initiative and idea behind it, as well as most of its detail. oriyinated 
with Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Dirom, a high-ranking army officer in Scotland. In May 1797 he 
published a work under the title of ’Plans for the Defence of Great Britain and Ireland’. which he had 
devised and written with the assistance of the Duke of Buccleuch and, in his pamphlet. Dirom 
launched a scathing attack on the long-standing British policy of’ letting the armed forces shrink to a 
minimum in peace-time, thereby necessitating frantic and ad-hoc recruitment upon the advent of war 
(which was precisely how the Pitt government had conducted its defence policy in the early 1790s). In 
its place, Dirom proposed the instituting of a permanent, comprehensive and concerted defence 
system and, not only was the general principle of this plan taken up by the government, but many of 
Dirom’s detailed proposals and suggestions were adopted in the Defence of the Realm Act. See: 
National Library of Scotland [NLS], Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Dirom, Plans f o r  the Dcferzce o f  
Great Britain and Ireland (Edinburgh. 1797). NF.784.c.3(5). 
I?’ The complete provisions of the ‘Proposals’ have survived in the Buccleuch papers held by the 
National Archives of Scotland. NAS, GD224/628/3/20, ‘PROPOSALS. For rendering the Body of the 
People Instrumental to the General Defence, in case of Invasion’. 
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subsistence’. This would be done by ‘driving away the live stock, and consuming, or, 
in case of absolute necessity, destroying all other means of subsistence’, in those 
parts of the country which the enemy either had, or was expected to gain, control of. 
Anyone who sustained losses because of this strategy was to be compensated through 
a system of ‘indemnification from the Community at large’.”‘ The intention of the 
plan was thus to bring more or less the whole population into the defensive effort, in 
what might be seen as a ‘total’ defence strategy, or a system where every possible 
resource was utilised for defensive purposes. The actual detail of the plan itself was 
divided into eight separate ‘heads’. addressing the various elements of the scheme. 
The first head, entitled ‘Driving the Country within Fifteen Miles of the 
Coast’, dealt with the practicalities of making sure that the French invasion force 
would not get its hands on any useful resources, as it made its advance. Particular 
emphasis was placed on ‘the immediate removal of the horses and draft cattle; the 
former of which would be useful in mounting the Enemy’s Cavalry. the latter in 
dragging his Artillery, Ammunition, Stores, &c’. but also sheep ‘or other live stock‘ 
were to be removed, and *a certain number of the Inhabitants’ were to be ‘set apart to 
superintend the removal and march of the different descriptions of stock? The 
second head, which was entitled ‘ Beuriiig Arms uizd eizguging to assemhlcl M * I ~ C I I  uti 
Enemy has lmded’ , essentially provided for an additional volunteer force, due to 
consist of ‘those who voluntarily agree to appear in Arms for the defence of their 
Country, Families. and Property. wlzeiz an Iii\mio?i hus uctuul!\~ tcdwz pluce’ ,  
whereas the third and fourth heads set out the forming of pioneer companies and 
t wide corps. The pioneers were to be equipped with axes, shovels and bill-hooks. 
while the guides were to be mounted on horseback, armed and consist of people with 
detailed knowledge of the local geography and communications. The fifth head gave 
instructions to the county nobility. gentry and yeomanry on how they should go 
173 Ibid. 
Ibid. [original italics]. The work of charting the ’live stock’ in Scotland had already begun the year 
before, when a circular to the lords lieutenant instructed them to ‘exert your Influence i n  causing to bc 
made out and transmitted to Lord Adam Gordon . . .  an account of the live and dead Stock. in  such 
Parishes ... as are within ten or twelve Miles o f  the Sea‘. The purpose was to make sure that these 
resources could be moved out of the reach of’ a French invasion force as rapidly as possible. NAS. 
RH2/4/80, ff. 21-2, Draft of Circular to the Lords Lieutenants of certain Maritime Counties in 
Scotland, Whitehall February 1797. 
174 
166 
about cataloguing the number of ‘wagons and carts’ in their district - the idea being 
that they should be made available for the army - while the sixth and seventh heads 
addressed the organising of ‘millers’ and ‘bakers’, ‘engaging to aid the Supplies of 
the Army, if required’. Finally, the eighth head set out the furnishing of ‘Barges or 
Boats upon Navigable Rivers or Canals’ for the ‘Conveyance of Troops or Stores’ .125 
The plan was then further refined by nine ‘schedules’, which provided even more 
detail on the organisation of the different heads.’?‘ The Defence Act. moreover, also 
provided for ‘a census of all fit men between fifteen and sixty’ to be conducted for 
the purpose of mapping out all available manpower resources. and specifically to 
find out how many of these would be able, and willing to join volunteer ~ o r p s . ~ ”  The 
returns for the Edinburgh district - which have survived in the Buccleuch papers - 
reveal that a total of 10,779 men fell within the eligible category, 119 were classified 
as ‘Infirm or incapable of active Service’, 1462 were already ‘Serving in Volunteer 
Corps or Armed Associations’, 17 were ‘Aliens’, 6 were Quakers and 22,202 were 
categorised as ‘Persons who from age Infancy Infirmity or other cause may be 
incapable of removing’ 
By drafting and passing the Defence Act of 1798. the government had 
therefore set out a comprehensive and well thought-through programme, whereby it  
hoped to put Britain in the best possible state to meet a French inusion. Not only did 
this stand in contrast to the somewhat hesitant and haphazard efforts of the early part 
of the war. but it probably also amounted to the best that could be achieved in the 
circumstances of 1797-98. The government had avoided handing out an open 
invitation similar to that of 1794. and instead set out a detailed plan of exactly what 
was needed. Indeed, as Linda Colley has stressed, the purpose of the Defence Act 
was not to gain ‘blanket assurances’ of support for the state, but detailed information 
of actual defence capability. The central government sought ‘accuracy not 
I” NAS, GD224/628/3/20, ‘PROPOSALS‘ [all original italics]. 
The ’Proposals‘ were re-issued in 1803 and 1805. and on the last occasions. a ‘Plan for establishing 
a system of communication throughout each county’ was added to the original scheme, see: NLS. 
5.217.g.1(7). See also: Colley, Britons. pp. 304-5. 
176 
Western, Ph.D., p. 238. 
NAS. GD224/628/3/18. ‘Internuf Defence /798, General Abstract of’ the Number o f  Men between 
the age of  15 and 60 - Infirm - Serving in Volunteer Corps - Aliens - Quakers - Persons Incapable of 
removing themselves, and of the live and dead Stock in  the different Parishes of the County of 
Edinburgh, Edinburgh 5 July 1798‘. The returns are included i n  Appendix: E. 
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129 reassurance’. The implementation of the Defence Act does not seem to have met 
any serious difficulties, and as far as military recruitment was concerned, it was the 
raising of a Scottish Militia which was to create the greatest challenges for the 
authorities in Scotland. 
V 
The Scottish Militiu 
By the beginning of the 1790s, campaigns to secure a Scottish militia already had a 
history going back nearly half a century to 1757, when the revival of the English 
militia had not been accompanied by a similar renewal of the old pre-union Scottish 
militia force. Parliament’s main reason for denying the Scots a militia had been the 130 
fear that the raising of a force of this kind in Scotland would be ‘tantamount to  
rearming the Jacobites’, and the Jacobite rebellion of 1745 had been one of the main 
reasons for reviving the force in England. Many leading Scots did not take kindly 
to this decision at the time - partly as it seemed to indicate that Scots were not to be 
relied on to arm in their own defence, but also because i t  was held to be in breach of 
the principle of equality within the Union of Great Britain - and English reluctance 
to grant Scotland a militia was to remain a sore point in Anglo-Scottish relations for 
the rest of the century. Repeated campaigns to secure a Scottish militia came to  137 
nothing. and. by 1790, the hope of instituting such a force north of the border, bore 
all the hallmarks of a thoroughly lost cause. 133 
Late in 1792. however, when it seemed increasingly likely that Britain would 
be drawn into the war on the continent in the near future, the government decided 
that it was time to update the Scottish home defence by introducing a Scottish militia 
Colley, Britons, p. 306. 
See: John Robertson, The Scottish Enlightcnnient and the Militirt I S S W  (Edinburgh. 19X5), pp. 5-6; 
Logue, Popular Disturbances, p. 76. See also: Western, English Militia. p. 167. 
Janet Adam Smith, ‘Some Eighteenth-Century Ideas of Scotland‘, in Scotluncl in the Agc of 
Improvemrnt, eds.. N. T. Phillipson and Rosalind Mitchison (Edinburgh, 19701, pp. 109- 10; and 
Robertson, Militia Issue, pp. 116- 17, 119, 134. 145. 
There had in fact been very little, if any, agitation since 1782. when the last campaign failed to 
achieve its aim. Ibid., pp. 98, 1 19; and Western, English Militia, pp. 206-9, 2 17- 18. To compensate 
for the absence of a militia force, a few fencible troops had been raised in Scotland in 1760 and a 
much larger force of almost 4500 men from 1778. Ibid. pp. 164-5. 209. An account of one of the 
fencible regiments raised in 1778 - the Buccleuch Fcncibles - can be found in :  Lodge, ’Militia Issue‘. 
I79 
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force similar to that which already existed in England. Henry Dundas was one of the 
strongest proponents of this policy, and on 1 January he notified the House of 
Commons that he would 'soon bring forward some proposition to the defence of the 
Northern part of the kingdom', before presenting a Scots Militia Bill a few days 
later.'34 During the debates on the bill, Dundas picked up many of the points made by 
previous Scottish militia campaigners, and stressed that, 'he never was able to 
discover any good ground for this distinction between the two great divisions of the 
kingdom; for as the establishment was useful in the one, it must be equally so in the 
other'.13' The Caledonian Mercury reported that the bill was 'expected to meet with 
little or no opposition, although all former attempts have proved ineffectual'. ' '' 
Questions were, however, raised as to why it was necessary to institute a Scottish 
militia when Fencibles were already being raised, but overall. the bill does not appear 
to have run into significant resistance in Parliament.''' In Scotland, on the other 
hand, grave concerns were raised concerning the possibility of popular resistance to 
such a military levy, and it was due to the perceived difficulties of actually 
implementing the Act north of the border that Dundas and the government eventually 
decided to drop the bill."' Instead renewed emphasis was placed on continuing the 
raising of Fencible regiments, and on encouraging the forming of Volunteer corps. 
K" Tlic Times. 3 Jan. 1793. 
Edinburgh E\*c)tiitig Coururit. 7 Jan. 1793. An anonymous pamphlet entitled: i l n  Address t o  the 
People qf' Scotlund on the necessih* c f  an iriitnc>diate Application to Parliument j i)r  a Scots Militici was 
published in  Edinburgh in 1792, and i t  seems likely that Dundas drew inspiration from this text for his 
speech in Parliament, since his arguments were closely aligned to those set out in the pamphlet. See: 
NLS, 1938.19(28). On support for a Scottish militia. see also: NAS, GD224/31/6. ff. 18-19. Sir 
William MaxweIl to the Duke of Buccleuch, Springkell, 17 December 1792. 
'I7 The Times. 13 Feb. 1793; Edinburgh Ah1ertisc.r. 15 to 19 Feb. 1793; and J. R. Western. 'The 
Formation of the Scottish Militia in 1797', Scottish Historical Revic~rr~, 34 (April 19SS), 9. 
138 
1 3 5  
Culedonian Mrrcun', 7 Jan. 1193. 136 
John Dunlop, the Lord Provost of Glasgow, wrote to Henry Dundas that: 
I am fully convinced that i t  would be highly improper to trust arms in the hands of the lower 
classes of people here & in Paisley. I wish you think seriously of this matter. The "friends of 
the people" are I know very fond of the Idea. which is at least a presumption against the 
propriety of the Measure. 
NAS. RH2/4/69, ff. 177-78. John Dunlop to 'Sir' [Henry Dundas'?], Glasgow, 16 January 1793. See 
also: David J .  Brown, 'Henry Dundas and the Government of Scotland', unpublished Ph.D. thesis 
(University of Edinburgh. 1989). p. 171; and Western, 'Scottish Militia', SHK, 34 (1955). 1. 
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i) The Militia Act of 1797 
This policy was not successful from a defence point of view. The fencible mutinies 
in 1794-5 very soon raised serious doubts about the reliability of the fencible system, 
and the volunteers were of questionable military value - partly because of their 
limited military training and partly due to their inflexibility. Indeed, the fencible 
mutinies in 1794 had convinced the Earl of Hopetoun that only a Scottish militia 
would ensure sufficient protection for Scotland. As he commented in the beginning 
of April that year: 'The whole convinces me more & more That a regular established 
Militia as in England is the only sure & efficient National Defence for Scotland & to 
put both parts of the United POngdom on the same footing'.''' When the threat of 
invasion became more serious in late 1796, it was therefore evident that the gap left 
in Britain's defences by the absence of a militia in Scotland would have to be 
filled.'" By now the government machinery at the local level had also been prepared 
through the appointment of Scottish lords lieutenant in 1794.151 Moreover, it was 
hoped that the volunteer forces that had been raised under county auspices since 
1794 would have prepared the counties to carry a heavier military burden of a 
compulsory kind, such as the Militia. '" A convenient opportunity for forwarding the 
case of a Scottish militia arose with the government programme for augmenting the 
English force in late 1796, and early in November that year, the Lord Advocate 
introduced a bill for the raising of a 'Scotch Supplementary Militia' similar to that 
which was planned for England.'" Nothing more came of this bill, but Robert 
Dundas remained optimistic about the prospects of raising a Scottish militia, and 
early in 1797 he wrote to the Duke of Portland stating that it was up to 'His Majestys 
Ministers alone, to say, to what Extent they wish either a Militia or the Establishment 
of Volunteer C ~ r p s ' . ' ~ '  Later he became more pessimistic, and in May he pointed out 
to John POng at the Home Office that: 'The Militia Bill is likely to be so much 
NAS, RH2/4/385/21/2, Earl of Hopetoun t o  James Clerk, Cullen House. 7 April 1794. 
It had already been brought to Henry Dundas's attention that the French viewed Scotland as an 
attractive place to land an invasion force. precisely because o f  the lack of a militia force. NAS, 
RH2/4/208. ff. 678-80, George Young to Henry Dundas, Girvan. ['?I 15 February 1794. 
Cookson, Armed Nation, pp. 133-34. 
'" Western, 'Scottish Militia', SHR, 34 ( 1955). 8-9. 
The Times, 5 Nov. 1796. A detailed discussion of the provisions for the English Supplementary 
Militia can be found in: Western, Ph. D., pp. 135-43; and Western. English Militiu. pp. 21 8-24. 





opposed, and is now so late of bringing forward, that His Grace need hardly confide 
to it this Summer as any part of our Defence'.'45 Henry Dundas, on the other hand, 
had been sceptical about the prospects of raising a Scottish militia as late as in 
November 1796, but, by the early summer of 1797, he appears to have been 
convinced that the measure could be carried to a successfully completion, and on 2 
June 1797 he introduced a 'Bill to raise and embody a Militia in that part of Great 
Britain called Scotland' 
I46 
which was subsequently passed on 19 July. 
The Act followed closely on the earlier provisions for a Scottish militia force 
- as they had first been set out in 1759 - which meant that it provided for 6000 men 
to be raised by ballot.'" Enlistment was for the duration of the war plus one month 
only, and those eligible to be drawn were all able-bodied men between the ages of 
nineteen and twenty-three, inclusive. 150 The Act allowed for the possibility that those 
who had been balloted could avoid service by providing a suitable, unmarried 
substitute, or alternatively pay a fine of E10, which would then be used to hire a 
substitute. The responsibility of setting up the lists of those men who were liable to 
serve was given to the parish schoolmasters. who would submit them to District 
NAS. RH2/3/2.12, ff. 288-89. R. Dundas to John King Esq.. Edinburgh. 19 May 1797. The reason 
for Robert Dundas's pessimism at this point may well have been a letter he received f rom Lt. Col. 
Alexander Dirom in late March 1797. In his letter. Dirom reported from a series of meetings held in 
Edinburgh 2nd at the Duke of Buccleuch's estate at Dalkeith t o  debate the issue. Prominent 
cc wvernment men in Scotland, such as Lord Adam Gordon. Lt. Col. Alexander Dirom and the Duke of 
Bucclcuch had been present. and the conclusion they had reached was t o  recommend that the plans for  
a Scots militia should be postponed until 'the approach of  Peace'. Instead of a militia. Dirom earnestly 
requehted 'that encouragement should he given to the forming Volunteer Corps in all the principal 
Tonrns in Scotland'. NLS. MS 7. ff. 154-57, A. Dirom to Lord Advocate. Edinburgh. 27 March 1797. 
Robert Dundas appears to have been convinced by this. See: ibid.. ff .  150-53. 
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Western. Ph.D.. p. 165. 
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37 Geo. 111, c. 103. 'An Act to raise and embody a Militia Force in that Part of the Kingdom of 
Great Brituin called Scotland. - [ 19'h July 1797.1'. The complete provisions of the Bill - 65 sections in 
a l l  - were published in the Scottish press one month before the Act was passed by Parliament. see for 
example: Cnlerloriiciri Mercury. 15 June 1797; and Glcisgoir. Coicri~r. 15 June 1797. The opening 
section of the Act described the inadequacies of the existing defence arrangements in Scotland in 
scathing terms. thus emphasising the absolute necessity of instituting a Militia force. I t  was held that 
'the Laws now in being for the Regulation of  the Fencible Men, o r  Militia. in  Scotland, are defective 
and ineffectual'. lhid., s. 1 [original italics]. 
For the Bill of 1759 and later militia proposals. see: Robertson, Militici Issiie, pp. 98, 119; Western, 
English Militia, pp. 206-9, 217- 18; and Eric J .  Graham. A Mcrritinic) H i s t o n .  of' Scotlnrid, 1650-1 790 
(East Lothian, 2002), pp. 205-7. 
The Act provided for exemptions from militia service for married men with two or more children. 
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meetings where they were to be checked and revised by the deputies lieutenant. All 
lists were to be posted on the local church door on the Sunday preceding the date set 
for the District meeting, and any grievances or objections from those whose names 
appeared on the lists could be raised at these meetings. The finalised lists were then 
to be forwarded onto a general meeting for the whole county, and from there to the 
Privy Council. which would set the quota of men to be raised by each county. The 
last step in the proceedings was for the deputies lieutenant of each district to conduct 
the actual ballot, and raise the number of men required by their quota.”’ Crucially, 
following the fencible mutinies of 1794-95, one section of the Act stressed: ‘That 
neither the Whole, or any Part of the Militia ... shall on any Account be carried or 
ordered to go out of that Part of Great Britain called The authorities had 
clearly learned from the problems encountered with the fencible regiments, and 
appeared intent on avoiding any confusion or misunderstandings on this occasion. 
Thus, with seemingly every caution having been taken to accommodate 
potential concerns and no effort spared to make the Act as palatable as possible, the 
authorities hoped to establish a Scottish militia without a repetition of the 
disturbances which had marred the implementation of the Supplementary Militia in 
England the previous year.”’ Indeed, one of the main differences between the 
provisions for the Supplementary Force in England and the new Scottish Militia - the 
narrower age-band for the Scottish force - was intended as a conciliatory measure. 154 
A concise summary of the whole provisions of the Act can be found i n :  Logue. Yopiilur- 151 
Distr irbanc~~,  p. 78. See also: Meikle, Scotland, p. 179. ’” 37 Geo. 111. c. 103, s .  55 [original italics]. 
Western. Ph.D., p. 172. 
Under the English Act, all f i t  men aged eighteen to forty-five were liable for service. unless exempt 
according to the provisions of the Act. Western, Ph.D.. p. 136. The conciliatory intentions the 
government had in setting such a narrow age-band was stressed by the Duke of  Buccleuch, sec: NAS. 
GD224/423/7, [Duke of Buccleuch, Military Papers, 1762- 18 121, ‘Address to  the Inhabitants o f  the 
County of Mid-Lothian by His Grace THE DUKE OF BUCCLEUCH, Lord Lieutenant of the county 
of MID-LOTHIAN’. undated; and NAS. RH2/4/81, f. 3 [the same address]. See also: Western, 
‘Scottish Militia’, SHR,  33 (1955), 3-4. Parliament later raised the upper age-limit to 30, which was i n  
accordance with the plan Henry Dundas had outlined in a letter to the Lord Advocate on 7 .March 
1797. Meikle, S c o t l a d .  Appendix C, Henry Dundas to Lord Advocate, Somerset Place, 7 March 
1797. The Act of Parliament was: 39 Geo. 111. c. 62 [21 June. 17991. cited in: Western. ’Scottish 




ii) The Militia Riots 
All these good intentions notwithstanding, the first indication that the 
implementation of the Act might not be carried through without resistance appeared 
already on 27 July, when a farmer in the parish of Campsie went to his local church 
and tore out those pages of the parish register on which his son’s name was listed - 
presumably with the intention of preventing him from being balloted.155 A few weeks 
later, on 16 August, ‘the young men7 of Strathaven held a meeting for the purpose of 
taking ‘the Militia Act into consideration’ , at which they demonstrated their 
unequivocal opposition to the measure. These two incidents were, however, only 
reported to the authorities at the very end of August, and the first news of serious 
opposition to the Act to reach a senior official in Edinburgh, was a report sent by the 
Earl of Home to Lord Adam Gordon on 17 August, concerning recent disturbances in 
Berwickshire. The unrest had taken place at Eccles church, where - it was later 
reported in the press - a crowd of between six or seven hundred people, many of 
them women, and some of whom had been pressurised into joining, had successfully 
disrupted a meeting of the local deputies Amidst cries of ‘No Militia! 
No Militia!’ the gentlemen assembled at the meeting had been forced to sign a paper, 
whereby they pledged themselves ‘to do every thing in their power to delay the 
execution of the Militia Act. and to use all their influence to get it repealed’. The 
crowd had acted in a violent manner. the men being armed with sticks and the 
women ‘having their aprons filled with stones‘, and during the foray, one of the 
deputies lieutenant - a Mr. Waite - had twice been knocked down. Lord Home 
also warned of the possibility of further unrest, referring to information he had 
obtained that ‘similar disturbances will occur at Lauder on Saturday next’ . l h O  Once 




I” NAS. RH2/4/80. ff. 2 16- 19, Revd. Mr James Lapslie to R. Dundas, 28 August 1797. 
lbid., ff .  202-207, Declaration by William Aiton, Writer in Strathaven, Hamilton, 27 August 1797. 
Ibid., f. 162, Earl of Home to Lord Adam Gordon, Dunse, 17 August 1797. 
It was reported that a group of people had gone to ‘the houses of most of the farmers in the vicinity 
of Eccles, insisting that their servants should instantly join them. and proceed to Eccles, in order to 
express their hatred of the militia act’. Many of the servants had readily joined the crowd, but many 
had also resisted, only to be violently coerced into following the group. Glasgokt. Courier, 26 Aug. 
1797; and The Times. 29 Aug. 1797 [The Times based its coverage on the reports in  the Scottish 
press.]. 
159 Ibid. On the riot at Eccles, see also: the Culednniun Mercliy. 26 Aug. 1797. 




the paper, the unrest in Eccles appears to have died down, but, when the authorities 
tried to hold an investigation into the riot a few days later, 'a large body of people' 
attempted to interrupt the meeting which sat in nearby Orwinslane. On this occasion 
the crowd was easily dispersed by a detachment of the Cinque Port Cavalry, which 
had been ordered in from Greenlaw,16' and shortly after, the commander of the 
cavalry unit reported that the county of Berwickshire would 'very soon' be 'perfectly 
quiet'. 
Although the riot at Eccles was more violent than most of those that were to 
follow, it none the less set a pattern for the subsequent unrest in other places. People 
sought either to destroy the lists of those liable to be balloted, to force the magistrates 
or deputies lieutenant to sign documents whereby they pledged to take no further part 
in the execution of the Act (thus preventing any new lists from being drawn up), or to 
stop the local officials from carrying out the proceedings of augmenting and 
finalising the militia lists, if necessary by the use of violence. This, some of the 
rioters evidently thought, would prevent the Militia from being raised. Following 
the disturbances at Eccles there was a brief interlude of a few days. when the country 
was generally quiet, before further outbreaks of unrest were reported from the Border 
towns of Selkirk and Jedburgh. Several hundred people assembled in Selkirk on 21 
August where they proceeded to disrupt the District meeting, c and attack one of the 
deputies. In Jedburgh on 22 August, a 'body of two hundred rioters' was reported 
to have gathered, only to be dispersed by the local Yeomanry Cava1ry.l"' On the 
same day as this potentially serious situation in Jedburgh was defused by the 
164 
intervention of the military, a crowd at New Galloway in the Stewartry of 
krkcudbright. further west in the Borders region, L- successfully disrupted the local 
District meeting, by rushing into the Court House where the meeting was being held 
Glrnsgmi, Courier, 29 Aug. 1797. I 6 1 
l h 7  NAS, RH2/4/80, f. 168, Major Robert Dundas Saunders of the Cinque Port Fencible Cavalry to 
Lord Adam Gordon, Dunse 23 August 1797. The disturbances in Eccles were believed to have 
'originated in a few Parishes round Greenlaw'. Ihid. 
L o p e ,  Popular Disturbances. pp. 102-3. 
Ibid., p. 79. 
Culedorzian Merccq., 26 Aug. 1797. The relative ease with which the Jedburgh riot was dispersed. 
may have been due to a rather half-hearted involvement by many of the rioters. The G l a s g o ~ *  Courier 
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and tearing up the militia lists which were under consideration. On this occasion, no 
military force was at hand to stop the rioters from menacing the judges in the Court 
House. 66 
The Borders were not alone in being affected by unrest at this point. Several 
parishes in the western Lowlands experienced outbreaks of disturbances 
simultaneous with those taking place further to the south and south-east. At Cadder 
Church in Lanarkshire, on 22 August, the authorities had been ‘obliged to postpone 
the business’ of carrying the Militia Act into effect, when a number of people had 
successfully obstructed the proceedings that were under way, and similar 
disturbances were reported to have taken place in the parishes of Campsie and 
Balfron in Stirlingshire on the same day.167 Both at Cadder and Balfron, the crowds 
had not been content merely with tearing up the militia lists, but had also ‘chased to 
their homes the Deputy Lieutenants and Magistrates’.’”’ Some sort of riot had also 
taken place at Falkirk,lb9 and there were further disturbances in Lanarkshire two days 
later, when the District meeting at Strathaven church was interrupted by a noisy and 
boisterous, but largely good-natured crowd. ‘70 
Disturbances continued to erupt in the western part of the Lowlands in the 
following days. On 25 August a stone-throwing crowd attacked the local 
schoolmaster’s house at New IOlpatrick in Dunbartonshire, forcing him and his 
family to flee. and the meeting of the deputies lieutenant for the district of Easter .I 7 1 
and Wester IOlpatricks was ‘forcibly obstructed by a body of about 300 people’. The 
deputies had only just been able to escape ‘from the hands of the rioters’, by 
adjourning the meeting and riding off to the Lord President’s house at Garscube, but 
there the crowd had re-assembled, now ‘armed with sticks and bludgeons’, and it 
took the determined intervention of the Royal Glasgow Volunteers - both infantry 
and cavalry - to stop them. Ten of the rioters were subsequently arrested, and six of 
Logue, Popular Disturbances, pp. 79-80. 
Glasgow Courier, 23 Aug. 1797; and Cctledonian Merciirj., 26, 28 Aug. 1797. See also: Logue, 
Popular Distirrhances. p. 8 1 .  
The Times. 3 0  Aug. 1797. 
NAS, RH2/4/80, f. 166v. Major James Mayne to the Duke of Montrose. Stirling, 23 August 1797. 
The Glasgm? Courier, for example, only commented that ‘some trivial opposition has manifested 
itself in the parishes of Strathaven, Kirkintulloch, &c.’.  Cla.sg,‘oLt* Courier, 29 Aug. 1797; and Logue. 
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them committed to pr i~on.’~’  Similar incidents took place at Carstairs and Lanark the 
next week - on 28 and 29 August respectively - and in both cases, the authorities 
were compelled to give up the lists that had been compiled.’” By now, Ayrshire had 
also become affected. On 26 August a group of about sixty people had marched from 
Beith to Dalry, where the sight of them caused the deputies lieutenant to make a 
hasty retreat, apparently in fear of their lives, although the crowd only proceeded to 
carry a ‘Tree of Liberty’ in procession through the town, before eventually planting it 
in the town-centre. Further south, the District meeting at Galston was interrupted 
by a ‘numerous Body of People’, who demanded of the deputies lieutenant that they 
inform the Lord Advocate of ‘how disagreeable the Act was to them’, and ‘that the 
measure of raising a Militia is contrary to the wishes of the people in the parish of 
Galstoun’. This, the deputies promised to do - and did - and the crowd then 
More serious dispersed, although only after planting a Tree of Liberty. 
disturbances followed at Ochiltree and New Cumnock on 30 August. where - in the 
latter place - the crowd seized the local schoolmaster at his house, dragged him to 
the river and ducked him there until he nearly drowned. These were. however. the 




There were yet more riots in the south-west. now primarily in Dumfriesshire. 
where a disturbance in Kirkpatrick Fleming on 25 August followed the standard 
pattern of the rioters disrupting the District meeting. destroying the militia lists and 
forcing the deputies to sign a bond whereby they promised to take no further action 
to implement the Militia Act. Disturbances continued in and around Dumfries for 
several days. The town itself was targeted on 28 August,’” there was a riot at 
Dunscore on the same day. and another at Boreland of Dryse three days later, 178 
The Times, 30 Aug. 1797 [Thc Times verified its source as the Glasgorz- Ad\-erti.\c)r]. See also: 
Logue. Yoprilur Distiirharzces. p. 82. 
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1797; Logue, Popiilnr Distiirhance,~, p. 83; and Western, ’Scottish Militia’. SHK. 34 (1955), p. 4.  
NAS, RH2/4/80, f. 67 William Cunninghame. Thomas Waltoun. and William Hamilton. Dep. Lts. 
to Lord Advocate. Waterside o f  Galston, 2 September 1797. See also: Logue, P o p l a r  Distirrbcinces. 
p. 84; and Meikle, Scntlnnd, p. 182. 
Scots Chronicle, 12 September 1797, cited in:  Logue. Populcir Disturburiccs. pp. 84-5; and Sandy 
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while a meeting at Moffat turned particularly ugly when one of the deputies 
lieutenant - guarded by a party of dragoons - was attacked by 'a Riotous Mob and a 
good deal of Blood was drawn'.'79 No lives were lost, however, and in most of the 
other Dumfriesshire parishes that were affected by riots, it was the schoolmasters 
rather than the District meetings that were the target of the crowds' anger?' Further 
to the west, at Wigtown on 27 August, the deputies had to postpone their business, 
even though troops were at hand, because the crowd - which had already seized the 
militia lists - was able to blockade the meeting place and thereby prevented them 
from signalling to the military. By now, however, the focus of rioting and the 
attention of the authorities had already turned to the eastern parts of the Lowlands. 
181 
At the same time as riots were taking place in Strathaven, opposition to the 
militia had also manifested itself in nearby West Lothian, where, on 24 August, a 
large crowd had assembled on Bathgate Muir to protest against the Militia Act.''? 
The Times reported that a meeting, consisting of 'between two and three thousand 
people' coming from the parishes of Whitburn, Livingstone, Bathgate. Torphichen 
and Uphall, had requested and obtained a 'bond' from the deputies lieutenant 
whereby they agreed to take no further part in the execution of the Act." The day 
before the Bathgate disturbance, the Earl of Hopetoun had asked Lord Adam Gordon 
to despatch regular troops to Kirkliston where a District meeting was to be held the 
next day. because .the County People are so much set against it,  & threaten to 
assemble three or four hundred to obstruct it, which the Yeomanry could not 
repress . Gordon acquiesced in the request, although he was not convinced by its 
necessity. Later comments made by Robert Dundas seem to indicate that 
181 
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NAS, RH2/4/81, f. 53, Extract of a letter from David Haig. Esq.. Deputb Lieutenant. Blair, 5 
Western, Ph.D.. pp. 178-79. 
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'some thousands' were given for the Kilpatrick riots. and I t  seems likely that - in  the heat of the 
moment - some of  the observers on the ground were disposed to give inflated estimates of  the crowd\ 
they were facing. None the less, these estimates are still clear indications that significant numbers of 
people were involved. 
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opposition to the militia was widespread and lasting in West Lothian and that 
Hopetoun may have been right in doubting the usefulness of the Yeomanry in 
suppressing these disturbances. ‘In West Lothian’, he wrote ‘I suspect the Yeomanry 
have been ... intimidated through the threats of burning their Houses & Barns’, a 
type of threat to which this kind of local force was particularly vulnerable. I86 
The unrest in West Lothian was quickly followed by disturbances in East 
Lothian, and it was there that the most serious of all the militia riots was to take 
place. Rioting was first reported to have occurred in the parish of Gifford on 27 
August,18’ and again two days later when a crowd of 700 people was claimed to have 
been involved,Igg but these incidents were little more than light skirmishes when 
compared with the riot that took place at Tranent, half-way between Edinburgh and 
Haddington, on 29 August. The Tranent riot has been well-researched and 
documented, and only a brief account of the events will be given here. I89 
Trouble had been brewing in the area for some time before the 29‘h. The 
Times, for example, later reported that ‘The affair at Tranent, it appears, had been for 
several days in agitation’, and there were rumours circulating in the area just before 
the riot that messages had been passed from parish to parish, encouraging people to 
turn up at Tranent on the day appointed for the District meeting. The local deputies 
took no chances, and wrote to the commander of the Cinque Port Light Dragoons 
then stationed at Haddington, requesting military assistance for the day of the 
meeting. By the time the deputies arrived under military escort on the morning of 
29 August, many people - mainly women - had already assembled in the main street 
of Tranent, and there they proceeded to threaten and abuse the public officials and 
soldiers as they made their way to the public house where the meeting was to take 
190 
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place. Once inside the house and well underway with the business of the day, the 
deputies were presented with a petition which had been drawn up in Prestonpans 
earlier the same day, expressing disapproval of the Militia Act and threatening 
violence against anyone attempting to implement its provisions. 97 The deputies at 
the meeting, however, quickly dismissed the Prestonpans letter as highly seditious. 
Whether due to a pre-concerted plan in case the petition was not accepted, or due to 
spontaneous anger when the letter was rejected, the crowd now turned increasingly 
hostile and began throwing stones at the house and at the guard outside. As the 
attack intensified with volleys of stones thrown at the house, many of them of 
smashing through windows, the deputies were forced to break off the meeting and 
retreat to a back room. Reinforcements in the shape of a detachment of the 
Pembrokeshire cavalry were brought in to break the siege, but at this point the crowd 
held the upper hand - partly because the cavalry found it difficult to operate 
effectively in the narrow streets, and partly because some of the rioters had climbed 
up on the rooftops. which gave them a good vantage point to pelt the troops with 
bricks. During the general melee that ensued, one of the deputies, John Caddel. made 
an attempt to read the Riot Act, but his voice was drowned by the noise from the 
crowd and. as he tried to step out of the house. he was met by a volley of stones. 
Angered by this, he began to shout abuse at the crowd, and shortly thereafter the 
soldiers opened fire. It has never been established who gave the order to fire - if 
indeed such an order was given - but the consequences were obvious enough.'94 
Initially, the firing does not seem to have made any significant impact on the crowd, 
which may have thought that it was meant as a warning and would soon stop, but as 
191 
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the first dead fell in the street, including two women, and those of the rioters who 
were positioned on the rooftops were being specifically targeted and gradually forced 
down, the crowd began to disperse. Events now took a rapid turn for the worse. 
Seeing the crowd in the process of losing the advantage it had held so far, many of 
the troops - who had been abused and attacked for over an hour - ran out of control 
and charged at the dispersing crowd. As some villagers fled out of the town, they 
were pursued by troops, who proceeded to assault, not only some of the rioters, but 
also a number of people outside of Tranent, who had not been involved in the riot 
and were either working in the fields or on their way to the town. Some of the 
officers made attempts to stop the soldiers, chasing after them and giving out the 
trumpet signals for ‘cease fire’, but, by the time the troops had been brought under 
control, eleven people had been killed and possibly as many as twenty wounded. One 
of the wounded later died. bringing the total dead up to twelve.”’ This marked the 
end of the Tranent riot, but in its aftermath a total of thirty-six rioters were tried for 
mobbing and rioting. All those who appeared before the court were acquitted, while 
none of the soldiers who had been involved in the unauthorised pursuit and killing of 
civilians was ever brought to trial.’” 
The militia riots were not over with the bloody affair at Tranent, however. 
Opposition to the militia had already been manifested further north in Fife and 
Kinross. There was a disturbance at Leuchars on 26 August and another in the parish 
of Markinch three days later, were it was reported that a crowd of a thousand people 
had forced the deputies lieutenant to surrender the parish list.’” On 24 August. there 
had been unrest north of the Tay at Newtyle and Monfieth in Angus. where the 
schoolmasters had been forced to give up the lists, and similar incidents took place 
30 August in the parish of Dysart and in Linktown.lY8 From Tayside, opposition to 
the Militia Act moved gradually into Perthshire. The Duke of Atholl, who was the 
Lord Lieutenant of the county, reported on 29 August that the schoolmasters in and 
around Perth were refusing to act because they feared maltreatment at the hands of 
Glnsgo~*  Courier. 3 1 Aug. 1797; and Logue. Popular Distiirhutices. pp. 89-94 
Ibid., pp. 94, 101 ; and Logue, ‘Tranent Militia Riot’, pp. 5 1-6. 
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the pe0p1e.l~~ Two days later a crowd at Alyth seized the militia list there, before 
marching on to Rattray where they successfully forced the local schoolmaster to tear 
up his list himself, and at the District meeting in Blairgowrie the next day, a large 
crowd - which probably consisted mainly of people from Alyth and Rattray - 
successfully disrupted the business of the deputies lieutenant. Similar incidents 
followed further to the north and west at Balnakeilly, Faskally, Weem and Blair 
Atholl on 2 and 3 September, before a disturbance at Foss in the parish of Dull 
marked the beginning of a long spell of organised unrest in Strathtay. Two well- 
known radicals - Angus Cameron and James Menzies - took charge of the crowd 
which had assembled in Foss and led them to Castle Menzies, the meeting place of 
the deputies lieutenant for the county, where they forced the owner of the house, Sir 
John Menzies, to sign a bond promising not to take any further part in the execution 
of the Militia Act. From there the crowd continued along the north bank of the Tay, 
extracting similar bonds from deputies in the parishes of Balfracks, Ballechin and 
Pitnacree, before arriving in Balnakeilly on the morning of 5 September. At 
Balnakeilly they were unable to extract a bond from the local official, John Stewart, 
who refused to be intimidated by threats to burn his house, and - having had their 
bluff called by Stewart - the crowd moved on towards Blair Atholl. The duke, 
however, had already experienced trouble in his area. and therefore met them well 
prepared, having mobilised four hundred of his servants to defend him. Faced with 
this kind of opposition, the crowd gave up and dispersed. Cameron then travelled 
around the area, trying to stir people up to join him at an anti-militia meeting at 
Fortingal on 11 September, but, with very few people turning up, the meeting was an 
anti-climax, and three days later both Cameron and Menzies were arrested.'"'' 
The fiasco of the Fortingal meeting was but one example of the disturbances 
fizzling out and, on 9 September, Robert Dundas wrote to the Duke of Portland, 
assuring him that 'in Fifeshire, all serious resistance is at an End'. The same 
appeared to be the case in Perthshire and, across most of the previously troubled 
Borders region, the deputies were now reported to be in the process of implementing 
NAS, RH2/4/80. ff. 240-4 1, Duke of Atholl to  Lord Advocate. Blair. 29 August 1797. 
The account of the disturbances north of the Tay i s  largely based upon Kenneth Logue's work, see: 
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the Act.”’ Four days later, Robert Dundas wrote to the Home Office again stating 
that, ‘the threatened Rebellion vanishes away rapidly’, and he expressed his 
satisfaction that ‘our Magistrates begin to recover from the trepidation into which I 
was hurt & alarmed to see that they had fallen’.’0’ Lord Adam Gordon could confirm 
that ‘things are getting better’ in a letter he wrote to the Home Secretary on 8 
September, but he was nevertheless deeply concerned about the possibility of a fresh 
burst of rioting in ‘the Highland, and Islands of North Britain’. In his assessment. the 
authorities could well be facing ‘almost insuperable difficulties’ in carrying the Act 
into execution there.”’ At first sight, Robert Dundas’s assurances may appear 
slightly premature and Adam Gordon’s concerns justified, since, three days before 
Dundas wrote his letter to Portland. he had himself received a warning from the Earl 
of Aboyne about the possibility of riots in the Aberdeen area.’()‘ Aboyne wrote that 
’the people‘s minds in the upper parts of Aberdeenshire are in such ferment that we 
the deputy lieutenants are extremely difficulted how to act in carrying the Militia Act 
into effect‘, and, although he went on to assure Robert Dundas that. ‘I, for one am 
not easily alarmed’, he nevertheless thought it best to ask the advice of the Lord 
Advocate as to how they ought to proceed in the matter. Would it be better, Aboyne 
wondered. to ’gain something by delay‘, or should they simply press ahead with the 
implementation of the Act? The District meeting had been scheduled for 16 
September. and Aboyne expected there to be every chance of disturbances on the 
day? Similar concerns were also expressed by Alexander Moir. the Sheriff-Deputy 
for the a r e a ? ’  and. as forecast by the Earl, a sizable crowd of some ’five or six 
Hundred’ made their appearance on the day.”” The deputies lieutenant acted quickly. 
however, and had already postponed the meeting by the time the crowd arrived ‘in 
order to give time for the Circulation of certain printed papers, explanatory of the 
Act’. Having been thus ‘disappointed in their object’, Aboyne wrote, the rioters 
‘” NAS. RH2/4/8 1 .  ff .  93-4. R. Dundas to the Duke of Portland. Arniston. 9 September 1797. 
’02 lhid.. f. 131, R. Dundas to John King, Esq., Arniston. 13 September 1797. 
’()‘ Ibid., ff. 80-1, Lord Adam Cordon to the Duke of  Portland. Abbey Edinburgh. 8 September 1797. 
lhid.. ff .  95-6. Earl of  Aboyne to the Lord Advocate. Aboyne Castle, 6 September 1797. 204 
7 0 5  Ibid. 
’06 Ibid., f. 129. Alex Moir to R. Dundas, Aberdeen, 9 September 1797. 
”? NAS, RH2/4/82.. f f .  177.78, Duke o f  Aboyne to Lord Advocate. Aboyne Castle. 17 September 
1797. 
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proceeded to maltreat one of the deputies so badly that he barely escaped with his 
life, and the schoolmaster was then forced to give up his list.’()* Three days later, the 
same unfortunate Deputy Lieutenant - Gordon of Abergeldie - was again ‘maltreated 
exceedingly’ at a meeting at Pannanich, but this was also the last reported militia riot 
in 1797.’09 On the same day, the normally pessimistic Lord Adam Gordon gave an 
unusually upbeat assessment of the situation in a letter to Portland, stating that ‘upon 
the whole, I think appearances are favourable - and that Tranquillity will be 
restored’.”’ Robert Dundas was of a similar opinion. Despite the reports he had 
received from Aboyne, he insisted on taking a positive view of the situation. and 
wrote to Portland that: ‘I nevertheless remain of opinion, that the Resistance to the 
Militia Act will soon be entirely at an End’. His reason for being optimistic was 
primarily correspondence he had received from Mackenzie of Seaforth, the Lord 
Lieutenant of Ross-shire, who had assured him that ‘every thing has been & will 
continue quiet’ in the north-west.”’ Seaforth’s view was justified, since the 
Highlands and Islands remained quiet throughout the period of rioting over the 
Militia Act elsewhere in It was not until 3 October, however, that Robert 
Dundas could finally confirm to Portland that ‘all Disturbance therefore, we may 
with certainty conclude. is over‘ . ? 1 3  
Widespread though the riots were, it is worth pointing out that not everyone 
who disapproved of the Militia Act, necessarily approved of the violence that 
accompanied so many of the protests. The inhabitants of Crieff and Madderty in 
Perthshire, for example. organised meetings with the intention of petitioning the king 
against the Act. while at the same time expressing their disgust at ‘the maltreatment 
of poor Schoolmasters, who had no vote in making the said Act more than those who 
are affected by it..”” It is also clear that many people were pressurised into joining 
the crowds of rioters. and therefore took part in the disturbances only very 
’()‘ Ibid.. f. 179, Alexander Moir to Lord Advocate, Aberdeen, 18 September 1797. 
’O‘’ Ibid. 
‘ I o  NAS, RH2/4/81. ff. 158-59. Lord Adam Gordon to the Duke of  Portland. Abbey Edinburgh. 18 
September 1797 [orisinal italics]. 
’ I 1  NAS, RH2/4/82, ff. 175-76, R. Dundas to the Duke of Portland. Edinburgh, 20 September 1797. 
?“Western, Ph.D., pp. 183-84; and Western, ‘Scottish Militia‘. SHR. 34 (1955), 12-1 3. 
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NAS, RH2/4/82, f f .  199-202, Robert Dundas t o  the Duke o f  Portland, Edinburgh, 3 Octobcr 1797 
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reluctantly. Before the riot at Campsie on 23 August, for example, it was reported 
that many farmers and ‘country people’ had been compelled into attending the anti- 
militia meetings under threats of ‘having mischief done to their property’, and this 
was by no means an isolated incident.’l‘ At the same time as rioting was spreading 
across much of southern Scotland, however, there were also a number of places that 
were conspicuous, not only for their acceptance of the Militia Act, but for their 
wholehearted support for the measure. 
iii) Peaceful responses to the Militia Act 
The first report of peaceful militia proceedings came from Stirling, in a letter written 
by the Duke of Montrose. Expecting an outbreak of disturbances in the town. 
Montrose had decided to be present for the District meeting, but upon arriving in the 
town he found that ‘I met with no obstruction ... & held the General Meeting 
proscribed by the Act’. and in general ‘found every thing quiet at Stirling’.’*‘’ On 28 
August, the Caledonian Mercum reported that the Militia Act had been given a 
peaceful reception in the parishes of Rutherglen and Cambuslang. just south of 
Glasgow. At Rutherglen, it was reported that the inhabitants had ‘lately met. and in 
the most harmonious manner made up their list in terms of the Militia Act’, which. i t  
was claimed. was ‘highly creditable to that ancient burgh, which has on every 
occasion been remarkable for its unshaken loyalty and attachment to the K n g  and 
Constitution’, while the inhabitants at Cambuslang were held to have followed ‘a 
similar line of conduct’.”’ Further reports of peaceful proceedings were sent from 
the parish of Newburgh in Fife on the same day, where the schoolmaster had been 
able to set up the list and post it on to the church door ’without the smallest 
appearance of discontent on the part of the inhabitants’.’’’ One week later it was 
reported that the deputies at Kirkcaldy - also in Fifeshire - had gone through the 
‘militia business with the greatest ease . and the same had been the case at Ferry 7 ’19 
‘I5 NAS, RH2/3/80, ff. 216-19, Re1.d. Mr Lapslie, minister of Campsie to Lord Advocate. 28 August 
1797 [quote from f. 218v.I. 
‘ I h  NAS, RH2/4/80, ff. 172-73. Montrose t o  Portland, Edinburgh, 25 August 1797. 
Caledonian Merain. .  2 8  Aug. 1797. The same report was also printed in: The Times. 1 Sept. 1797. 
Glasgow Coltrier. 9 Sept. 1797 [Report on Newburgh. dated: 28 August]. 
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Port on Tay in the same part of the country.’” At Dundee, the Militia Act had - 
according to The Times - been ‘most cordially acquiesced in’,’’’ and some parts of 
Perthshire also stayed perfectly quiet, most notably Perth itself, where the meeting 
for the Perth District had been held on 8 September ‘without the least appearance of 
disturbance’. The Carse District in the County of Perth had held its meeting two days 
earlier, when there was a similar absence of trouble,’” and, on 13 September, the 
Dunblane District meeting went through its business without any problems 
occurring.”” Over in the western part of the country, the District meetings at Mearns 
and Neilston in the county of Renfrew, held on 15 and 16 September respectively, 
were conducted ‘with good order, regularity, and much to the satisfaction of the 
persons who attended on the occasion’. The same was the case for the meeting in the 
parish of Eaglesham held a few days later,224 and overall, Renfrewshire remained 
remarkably quiet and untroubled throughout the period of rioting in the nearby 
counties of Lanarkshire and Ayrshire? About the same time as the District 
meetings in Renfrewshire were conducted under so favourable circumstances, the 
Sheriff-Deputy of Stonehaven wrote to Lord Adam Gordon to inform him that ‘the 
People in our County, have with regard to the Militia Act, behaved in a most 
examplary [sic] manner’ .’26 The business of the District meetings had been ‘carried 
on with Harmony, and good Humour‘ and, although several objections had been put 
forward at these meetings, by people who for legitimate reasons should not have 
been on the lists, ’not one Murinur was uttered against the act in general’. On the 
basis of this success, Burnett hoped that he would be able to implement the 
provisions of the Act equally smoothly in ‘Fettercairn & some of the neighbouring 
Parishes’.’’’ 
”o/hid.. 16 Sept. 1797. 
--- Ibid.. 9 Sept. 1797. 
’‘j Glasgovt~ Courier, 19 Sept. 1797. ’” IDici. ”’ The absence of disturbances in Renfrewshire was in  no mean degree due to the relentless efforts 
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Just how interspersed some of the more troubled areas were with places that 
saw little or no unrest at all, is evident from the experience of East Lothian. On the 
same day as the Tranent riot took place, the nearby town of Haddington - as well as 
the coastal town of Dunbar somewhat further away - both escaped any violence or 
disturbances at their District meetings. The ‘greatest quietness and order’ was 
reported to have prevailed during the proceedings there? Most remarkable, 
however, of all the places that attracted attention for their wholehearted support for 
the Militia Act and its provisions, was Mid Lothian, where the complete absence of 
any unrest in the whole of the county did not fail to be noticed and commented upon 
by contemporaries. Indeed, the fact that such a large and populous county could 
remain loyal and quiet, while there were violent disturbances in the two neighbouring 
counties of East and West Lothian, made it even more conspicuous than the absence 
of opposition to the Act in the turbulent industrial county of Renfrewshire. Among 
the first to remark on the cordiality of proceedings in Mid Lothian was the Lord 
Lieutenant of the county, the Duke of Buccleuch. In a letter to the Home Secretary he 
wrote that ‘my Deputy Lieutenants finished their business in this District regularly 
and quietly’, and he was now only waiting to learn how matters had progressed in 
‘the other District West of Edinr.’’29 Buccleuch’s assessment was confirmed the next 
day by the Caledoizian Mercun, which reported, ‘it is with much satisfaction we 
discover the due submission to the Militia law manifested in the quiet peaceful 
deportment of the inhabitants of this city, and neighbourhood’.”” In addition to the 
city of Edinburgh. the District meetings at Dalkeith and Canonmills were reported to 
have been ’conducted with the utmost regularity’. which was all the more notable 
since they were in ‘that quarter of Scotland which is most populous’.’” A meeting 
held by the Admiral and Magistrates of Leith on 11  September, ‘to hear any person 
that thought himself aggrieved, by being included in the list’ was also conducted to 
the greatest satisfaction of the authorities, and it was reported that, ‘no military 
attended, nor was there so much as a sentinel at the stair-foot, every person being 
~ 
’x Glasgm* Coiirier, 2 Sept. 1797. 
729 NAS, RH2/4/81, f. 89, Duke of Buccleuph to the Duke of‘ Portland, Dalkeith House, 8 September 
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allowed to be present that choosed, and not the least disturbance, or inclination to 
riot, was shewn the whole day’.232 Later reports on peaceful proceedings in the 
parishes of Corstophine and Currie near Edinburgh, in Edinburgh itself (Bruntsfield 
Links), in Mid- and West Calder and in the parish of St. Cuthbert’s was further proof 
that tranquillity as the prevailing mood in Mid Lothian; and a resolution issued by 
the colliers of the Craighall and Cowpits coalsworks in the same county pointed in 
the same direction.”’ Expressing their abhorrence of ‘the riotous and disorderly 
resistance which has taken place in some neighbouring counties’, the colliers 
professed themselves ‘WILLING and READY to come forward as MILITIA MEN, 
in the service of our country, if the Lot falls upon us, or to FIND SUFFICIENT 
SUBSTITUTES’.”“ Furthermore, in one of the very few letters that survives relating 
to the Highlands, the Duke of Portland replied to James Brodie, the Lord Lieutenant 
of Nairnshire, expressing his ‘satisfaction’ at the ‘meritorious & exemplary conduct 
of the Inhabitants of Nairnshire in carrying the Militia Act into effect’?‘ The very 
last reports of peacefully conducted militia proceedings came from Ayrshire - one of 
those counties that had earlier been so troubled with rioting. On 25 September. the 
second District meeting for the parishes of Ayr. Newton, St. Quivox and Monkton 
was reported to have been carried out ’with the greatest harmony and good humour’, 
which led the Glasgo\tv Courier to conclude that ‘the unjustifiable opposition to this 
patriotic and necessary measure is now rapidly subsiding’ .’j0 
Popular reactions to the Militia Act were not, however. merely a matter of 
blind refusal and resistance, or unquestioning and uncritical acceptance. Many 
people also responded in a more pragmatic and constructive manner, attempting to 
make the best of the situation. The crucial aspect of the Militia Act - which people 
felt a need to hedge against - was the unpredictability of the ballot. Since balloting 
was a random system of selection, there was no way in which those who would have 
great difficulty in serving could make sure to avoid service, before the actual ballot 
G l a s g o ~ .  Coitricr. 13 Sept. [Leith, 1 1  September]. 2-32 
’33 Caledoiiinir Merciin-. 14. 16 and 25 Sept. 1797; and Glasgobt, Coiil-ier. 26 Sept. 1797. 
734 Ibid.. 7 Sept. 1797. ’MEETING and RESOLUTIONS of the COLLIERS and OTHERS at the 
CRAIGHALL and COWPITS COALWORKS‘ [original capitals]. ’“ NAS, RH2/4/221, p. 325. Portland to James Brodie Esq., His Majesty‘s Lieutenant for Nairnshire. 
Whitehall. 25 September 1797. 
Caledonian Mercun‘, 28 Sept. 1797. 2 16 
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had been drawn. Once selected, it was possible to avoid service by to providing a 
substitute or paying a fine, but this was of little help for those who were either unable 
to pay the fine or to find a substitute (who would have to be paid anyway). The 
problem was quickly realised by most people and, in an attempt to address it 
effectively, subscription campaigns were opened up across the country for the 
purpose of raising funds whereby substitutes could be hired. The parish of 
Rutherglen seems to have been the first place to start a subscription, but the example 
was quickly imitated elsewhere.”’ By 29 August the Glasgow Courier could report 
that subscription campaigns had been opened ‘in several of the parishes around this 
city’, and a few days later the Caledonian Mercury printed a similar statement, 
summarising what was now quickly becoming the standard for such campaigns: 
in several parishes subscriptions have been entered into by the 
inhabitants to raise a fund for providing substitutes, in case the ballot 
should fall upon those who may find it inconvenient to serve 
personally, or to procure a substitute; and in some cases to give bounty 
to those who may be desirous of serving personally.‘38 
In the parish of Callander in Stirlingshire, the inhabitants had come to an agreement 
with the Lord Lieutenant to use a subscription for substitutes as a way of avoiding 
the necessity of conduc:ing a ballot altogether, and the initiative of opening 
subscription campaigns was quickly seized upon as a commendable way of 
displaying loyalty and selflessness. One example of this attitude was the actions of 
one officer in the Dalkeith Volunteer Corps, who offered to provide a substitute, ’not 
wishing to take advantage of his exemption as a Volunteer’ as he was within the age- 
bracket for the militia.’” A slightly different example came from the Barony parish 
of Glasgow, where ‘a number of Gentlemen’ had decided to raise a fund on their 
own accord for the purpose of procuring substitutes ‘for those declining to act as 
Militia-men’. and to present a bounty to any volunteer within the parish.2J0 In East 
Kdbride. the heritors of the parish held a meeting on 11 September where ‘a liberal 
Ibid.. 28  Aug. 1797; and GlasgoM. Courier, 29 Aug. 1797. 237 
138 Caledonian Mercuq. 2 Sept. 1797. 
239 Ibid. 
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subscription was opened for providing substitutes’ and where ‘several young men, 
who are liable to be balloted for, attended and subscribed One Guinea each’,’‘’ and 
at the Blantyre Cotton Works, the masters and workmen had contributed nearly 
twenty pounds to the subscription for the parish of Blantyre.”’ Subscriptions were 
also started in a few of the places where there had previously been disturbances, such 
as the parish of Cadder, Dumfries and the Stewartry of IOrkcudbright,’‘3 and in total, 
there appears to have been nearly thirty individual subscription campaigns set in 
train.244 
Despite the fact that many people tried to hedge against the arbitrary nature of 
the ballot by raising funds through subscriptions. it was clear that the unpopularity of 
the militia, the random character of the selection procedure and the possibility of 
avoiding service if drawn in the ballot by paying a substantial fine, also combined to 
create the prefect basis for an insurance system. This was realised by a few 
entrepreneurial-minded individuals in Edinburgh, who proceeded to set up a ‘Militia 
Insurance’ in the middle of September, whereby those Scots who knew they were 
eligible to be selected for service, could pay a premium of three guineas to be 
‘insured from serving’. An advertisement for the programme first appeared in the 
Ccrledorzian Mercui33 on 14 September, and it was re-issued a further 16 times in 
subsequent issues of the same year? A rival scheme was later set up by two 
insurance brokers in Aberdeen - Messrs. Fraser and Mole - who offered an 
insurance against, not only the first ballot, but also ‘all subsequent ballots that may 
take place under the authority of the present act of Parliament’. For this they charged 
a lower premium of ‘two guineas and a half‘, and even promised the return of two 
c guineas ‘in case a Peace shall render it unnecessary to carry the act into 
Glasgorir Courier., 14 Sept. 1 797. ’4 I 
’” Ibid., 16 Sept. 1797. 
’“ Ibid., 9 Sept. 1797. 
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e~ecution’.’‘~ Those who entered the insurance scheme were not to be so fortunate as 
to have most of the premium they had paid returned to them, however, as no peace 
was to materialise for the next four and a half years, and the militia programme was 
carried through, although not without modifications or according to the original time- 
frame. The geographical location of the different places mentioned in the above 
discussion of responses to the Militia Act can be seen on Map 1 .247 
iv) The Government’s response 
As had been the case with the earlier riots of the decade, it was the government’s 
men on the spot who first had to face the problem and, for many local public officials 
in Scotland, this renewed outbreak of rioting undoubtedly reminded them of the 
previous waves of disturbances in 1792-94. Perhaps for that reason, many of them 
suspected radical involvement in the unrest, and some came close to panicking when 
faced with angry anti-Militia crowds.’“ Robert Dundas was himself far from pleased 
with the conduct of many of his officers, as he found it necessary to point out in a 
letter to the Home Secretary on 30 August. The magistrates. deputies lieutenant and 
justices of the peace in the counties of Dumfries, Kirkcudbright, Wigton and West 
Lothian. he complained, ‘have been completely subdued & I am sorry to find many 
of them as effectually intimidated from doing their Duty . The ’duty’ of the local 
officials, as Dundas saw it. was to complete the first stage of implementing the Act 
by setting up the militia lists and conducting the District meetings as prescribed by 
the Act. and this several local officials failed to do in the early stages of the riots. 
, 2-19 
246 Zhid.. 9 Oct. 1797. 
See: p. 191.Some places have been omitted due to their proximity to either Glasgow or Edinburgh. 
The county-boundaries on the map were based on a map of the Scottish constituencies in:  The Histon 
of Parliament, The House of Commons, I6 15- 17 15 (Cambridge, 2002), p. 824. 
The Duke of Atholl, for example, reported that, ‘in Perth the Constables refuse t o  act. not from any 
disaffection to Government, But from dread of threats being carried into execution of maltreatment‘. 
NAS, RH2/4/80, ff. 240-31. David Haig, a Deputy Lieutenant in Dumfries. stated similarly that ’the 
opposition to the Militia Bill seems General through Scotland. Cllr no where more so than in  this part of 
the Country. There is not one of your Graces Deputies who has not been threatened with certain 
destruction‘. NAS. RH2/4/8 1. f. 5 3 .  Extract of a letter from David Haig, Esq., Deputy Lieutenant, 
Dumfries, I September 1797. 




Map 1. Responses to the Militia Act in Scotland. 
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The Duke of Montrose was the first senior official to raise doubts about the 
propriety of carrying out the provisions of the Militia Act in the prevailing climate of 
fierce popular resistance, and to suggest that it would be better to postpone its 
execution. In a letter he sent to the Home Secretary on 23 August, Montrose 
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infomed the Duke of Portland that he had told the clerk and deputies lieutenant at 
Stirling ‘to adjourn the Meeting, for a month, that I might receive instructions how to 
act, & that force may be sent into this Country, if the act is to be carried into 
effect’.’”’ Two days later he wrote that the meeting at Stirling had in fact gone ahead 
according to plan, and without any disturbances occurring, but he still believed that, 
in the circumstances, the authorities ought to tread carefully when implementing the 
Act: ‘I think some law proceedings must take place, for the purpose of punishing 
those violent acts’, he argued, ‘before the Militia can be carried into effect’.’‘’ It was 
in other words paramount to restore order before implementing the provisions of the 
Act. The Duke of Hamilton in Lanarkshire had come to the same conclusion. On the 
basis of the Strathaven riot in particular, but also because of the general sentiment of 
the people in his county, he concluded: 
I am sorry to say, that I find the minds of almost every person. even 
those the least affected to Government, of the middle and Lower Ranks 
of the County (nay the generality of the Country) so perfectly 
repugnant and resolved to oppose the Execution of the Act, that I have 
judged it requisite for the quiet of the country, and the good of His 
Majesty‘s Service to direct that no further procedure be had on the Act 
in the County of Lanark until additional Instructions are given by 
Government. 
Some of the schoolmasters in the area had been ‘deterred from taking up the List by 
the threats of Violence against their persons and properties’, and similar threats had 
been levied against a number of deputies lieutenant. Moreover, Hamilton had 
previously asked for a reinforcement of the military forces stationed in the county 
and, since this request had not been followed up. he now deemed it ‘prudent’ to 
suspend the execution of the Militia Act, as the military force available was ‘not 
sufficient’ to guarantee the safety of his officers.’” David Staig, the Provost of 
Dumfries, and William Lockhart of Cleghorn, both made similar points.253 
250 Ibid.. ff. 114-77. 
”’ Ibid., ff. 172-73. ’” Ibid., ff. 230-31. Duke of Hamilton and Brandon to the Duke of Portland, Hamilton House, 29 
August 1797. 
”’ Ibid., ff. 236-38, David Staig, Provost of Dumfries to the Lord Advocate, Dumfries. 29 August 
1797; and Ibid., f. 234, W. Lockhart to ‘My Lord’ [Lord Advocate’?], Cleghorn, 29 August 1797. Staig 
argued that if a militia was to be successfully instituted in Scotland, *a new act of parliament will be 
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These local initiatives were, however, not met with much understanding at 
either the intermediate level of government in Edinburgh, or from the central 
authorities in London. Immediately upon returning from his trip to the north 
Highlands, on 27 August, Robert Dundas wrote to the Home Secretary, asking for his 
backing on two accounts. First, he requested ‘that His Majesty’s Ministers may lose 
no time in immediately sending to this Country such additional force as may be 
necessary for ensuring obedience to the Law’ - thus forwarding the plea of many 
local officials - and second, he expressed his disapproval of the Duke of Montrose’s 
suggestion of postponing the execution of the Act, asking for Portland’s support in 
this as well. ‘We are not at all agreed’, he wrote with reference to Montrose, and 
continued: 
To me the consequences of yielding to so daring and unreasonable a 
resistance to an Act, objectionable only on account of its moderation & 
limited nature, appear so destructive and alarming, that after full 
consideration, I cannot for one moment hesitate in offering my most 
decided Opinion that the Act must be enforced at all hazards.754 
By the time Robert Dundas’s letter arrived in London, however, the Duke of Portland 
had already reached the x m e  conclusion, and in a reply to Montrose’s earlier letters, 
Portland set out the central tenets of the government’s policy in five main points? It 
was of primary importance to suppress the current disturbances and to continue with 
the implementation of the Act without delay, because: 
There can be no doubt that if in this stage of the business, the 
execution of the law was to be suspended the protection of Scotland by 
means of the constitutional force provided by this Act would not only 
be given up for the present, but very little expectation could be 
entertained of its ever being established, under any circumstances, and 
what cannot but be looked to, with greater apprehension and horror, 
are the effects of such an example which would but too probably 
45. or 50’ ,  while Lockhart, who had himself suffered the harassment of a crowd which broke into his 
house, put his case in rather more blunt terms in a letter written on 29 August: ‘in the present 
disposition of this part of the country’ he wrote, ‘I believe no proceedings can take place without 
military aid’. 
254 Ibid., ff. 190-93, R. Dundas to the Duke of Portland, Edinburgh, 27 August 1797. 
”’ A comment Portland made at the very end of this letter reveals that he cannot have been informed 
of the Lord Advocate’s opinion before writing to Montrose. He wrote: ‘I will transmit a copy of this 
letter to the Lord Advocate, who I imagine will be by this time returned to Edinburgh’. Ibid.. ff. 212- 
14, Portland to Duke of Montrose, Whitehall 28 August 1797; and NAS, RH2/4/221, pp. 283-87 
[same letter]. 
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endanger the general system & submission and obedience to the laws, 
upon the maintenance of which the existence of our Constitution and 
National Power entirely depend? 
Suspending the implementation of the Militia Act was thus clearly not the answer. 
In the opinion of both the local authorities in Scotland and the central 
government in London, resistance to the militia was believed to have originated 
solely with misrepresentations of the Militia Act. Those who opposed the 
introduction of a militia force in Scotland did so because evil-minded and designing 
men had been going about in the parishes misconstruing the true contents of the Act, 
as well as using this as an opportunity for sowing discontent and sedition in the 
minds of the unwary in a more general sense.’“ Although the government was not 
justified in seeing misrepresentations as the only cause of the riots, there is some 
evidence to suggest that misinformation about the Militia Act was being spread? 
The colliers of Craighall and Cowpits, for example, opened their address in support 
of the militia by stating: ‘it is evident, from the riotous and disorderly resistance ... 
to the execution of the Militia Act, that the most infamous misrepresentations have 
been used to mislead people, and to prejudice them against that measure’.”9 
Information collected by the government’s own officials pointed in the same 
direction. The Duke of Roxburgh and his deputies lieutenant drew up an address at a 
meeting held shortly after the Eccles riot, in which it was suggested that the ‘arts of 
designing men’ might have been involved in stirring up opposition to the Act, and 
”’ NAS, RH2/4/80, ff. 212-14, Portland to Duke of Montrose, Whitehall, 28 August 1797 [quote: ff. 
2 12-1 2v). 
One reason why the government was apt to see wilful misrepresentations of the Militia Act as the 
primary cause of the disturbances may have been the role played by such rumours in the English riots 
over the Supplementary Militia the year before. There were confirmed cases from, for example 
Warwickshire. of people being told that they were due to be sent off to the East Indies. Western, 
Ph.D., p. 176. 
For a discussion of the other causes of the riots, see: L o p e ,  Popular Disturbances. pp. 102-15. 
The narrower age-band set for the Scottish force - 19 to 23 years, as opposed to 19 to 45 for the 
English militia - has often been seen as a main cause of the riots. In addition, however, i t  should be 
noted that the militia, as a compulsory military levy, was very unpopular in England as well, and that 
nearly every time a ballot had been drawn to raise new recruits since the new militia system was 
introduced in 1757, riots had ensued. See: Western, English Militia, pp. 290-91, 295, 297-99. 
2s9 MEETING and RESOLUTIONS of the COLLIERS and OTHERS at the CRAIGHALL and 
COWPITS COALWORKS, Caledonian Mercuq., 7 Sept. 1797. 
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that they had ‘reason to think endeavours have been used to misrepresent’.”’ Similar 
views were presented by Major James Mayne in Stirling on 23 August,’61 and Lord 
Adam Gordon argued that, ‘our Noblemen and gentlemen’ as well as other ‘ill- 
disposed people’ had been endeavouring ‘to persuade the lower classes of men & 
women - that all, whose names are returned, as with the age & description, of 
Militia-men - are to be /as they chuse to term it / made  slave^'.'^' Gordon’s point 
was supported by the Duke of Montrose, who reported that protestors had declared 
‘they will not be slaves, as they think the Act makes them, by forcing them out’, and 
that ‘the Temper of the People ... is irritated beyond measure, & I must humbly 
conceive be encouraged, if not led, by Men acting on system’.’“‘ On the basis of this 
information from Roxburgh, Montrose and Adam Gordon, as well as his own 
assessment of ‘the Symptoms of Resistance appearing at Places considerably remote 
from each other’, Henry Dundas drew the conclusion that ‘there cannot be a doubt 
that it is the operation of Jacobin Emissaries employed for the Purpose’, which had 
caused the rioting.”‘ 
Since misrepresentations of the Act thus became the main explanatory factor 
in the opinion of the government, and it had to be expected that further attempts to 
‘deceive the people’ would take place. Portland ‘earnestly’ recommended Montrose 
to: 
give immediate directions to your Deputy Lieutenants to prepare and 
issue printed notices by way of caution to be stuck up on the doors of 
all the Parish Churches and in such other conspicuous situations as 
may be judged proper, in which such of the provisions of the Act as 
have been misrepresented or misunderstood, may be stated and fully 
explained. 
”* NLS, MS 13366, Minto - Local affairs, f. 2. MEETING of the LORD LIEUTENANT and 
DEPUTY LIEUTENANTS of the County of ROXBURGH. held at Jedburgh the 2 1 of August. 1797. 
See also: Caledonian Mercun., 26 Aug. 1797. 
NAS, RH2/4/80, f. 166v, Major James Mayne to the Duke of Montrose, Stirling, 23 August 1797. 
26’ Ibid., ff. 156-57, Lord Adam Gordon to the Duke of Portland, Abbey Edinburgh, 23 August 1797 
[original italics]. 
’” Ibid., ff. 152. Duke of Montrose to ‘My Lord’ [Portland], Edinburgh, 23 August 1797. In another 
letter sent the same day, Montrose exclaimed that ‘the state of temper of the People is such as I never 
experienced’. Ibid., ff. 174-77, Montrose to Portland, Edinburgh, 23 August 1797. 
Ibid., ff. 186-87, Henry Dundas to ‘My Dear Lord’ [Robert Dundas], Walmer Castle, 27 August 
1797. See also: NAS, RH2/4/80, ff. 2 16- 19, Revd Mr Lapslie, minister of Campsie to Lord Advocate, 
28 August 1797; Caledonian Mercuy,  28 Aug. 1797, or Glasgow Courier, 26 Aug. 1797 [same 
report]; and The Times, 29 Aug. 1797. 
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These notices should then be accompanied by ‘the most firm and positive declaration 
of your resolution to carry the Act into immediate effect, and to punish in the most 
exemplary manner all those who shall obstruct its execution’ .7-6s Portland further 
encouraged Montrose to make good use of the volunteer corps he had at his disposal, 
‘for Your Grace will recollect that that species of Force is most expressly applicable 
[for] this purpose’, and he stressed that all meetings should be: 
attended by as respectable a number of the principal persons of the 
Neighbourhood as can possibly be prevailed upon to be present, in 
order that by their influence and authority the people may be brought 
to listen to the detection of the falsehoods which have been imposed 
upon them and may be made sensible of the fatal consequences of 
resisting the law of the Land. 
Finally, in case ‘a Mob’ should arise, every effort ought be made to arrest the 
ringleaders.’66 
To some extent, the government’s response to the riots of 1797 therefore 
resembled its reaction to the earlier disturbances of the decade. The emphasis on 
restoring order - with the use of military force if necessary - on making sure that the 
authorities were not seen to hesitate in the face of popular resistance. and on seeking 
out and arresting the ringleaders who were presumed to be 
followed the lines set out during the first outbreak of rioting 
firm instructions given to vacillating local officials also bore 
behind the rioting, all 
five years earlier. The 
a striking similarity to 
Henry Dundas’s approach in 1792. Where the response of 1797 differed from that of 
earlier disturbances was in the closer cooperation between central and local 
authorities. and in the emphasis on using both carrot and stick to subdue the unrest. 
Although Portland’s response to Montrose might give the impression of a crisis 
where the central government took firm control of affairs after the local authorities 
had acted feebly, a closer investigation reveals that the only new aspect of the policy 
”’ This recommendation would also be sent ‘to the Lords Lieutenants of every other County where 
any symptoms of indisposition to this Act may appear or be suspected‘. NAS, RH2/4/80, f .  21 3. 
lhid., ff. 214-14v. The Duke of Hamilton received a largely similar letter a few days later, in which 
Portland expressed his concern ’that any steps which appear to have a tendency to concession‘ - such 
as postponing district meetings - ‘must encourage the deluded people to persist in their resistance to 
this Act’, NAS, RH2/4/221, pp. 300-3, Portland to the Duke of Hamilton, Bulstrode, Sunday 3 
September 1797. See also the letter to the Duke of Queensberry. lhid., pp. 312-14. 
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he set out - the instruction to put up printed notices explaining the Act - originated 
with initiatives taken by local government officials in Scotland, and not with the 
central government. 
It can be said with some confidence that the idea belonged to the Duke of 
Roxburgh and his deputies lieutenant. Their poster - which was the result of a 
meeting held at Jedburgh on 21 August for the purpose of discussing the recent 
disturbances in the county of Roxburgh - is the earliest dated notice that has 
survived, and the two undated notices both refer to later riots.767 The Roxburgh 
poster focused most of its attention on lamenting the poor spirit of those who had let 
themselves be duped by the ‘arts of designing’ men, on how Scots had previously 
seen it as a grievance that they had no militia and on how small a force it was the 
Scots had been asked to raise. Little space was given to any actual explanation of the 
provisions of the Militia Act, apart from its 55‘h clause, which was both cited and 
highlighted in the document. This was the section of the Act which determined that 
the Militia was not to be ordered out of Scotland on any occasion, and the decision to 
stress this aspect of the Militia Act indicates that the rioters in Roxburghshire must 
have been particularly concerned with the danger of being moved out of Scotland on 
military service. The other notices and posters that were produced were equally 
original in their set-up and wording. Montrose’ s poster for Stirlingshire stressed 
many of the same points as Roxburgh’s. but dealt with them more at length and also 
dwelt at the good pay offered to militiamen.76s The Duke of Buccleuch took a more 
systematic and broad approach in his address, explaining the central provisions of the 
Militia Act in ten separate points, but then his reference was to ‘the riotous and 
disorderly resistance which has taken place in some of the neighbouring counties’, 
not to any specific misunderstandings of the Act in his county, which had remained 
quiet. Another original aspect of Buccleuch’s poster was his emphasis on making 
comparisons with England. His first point underlined that, whereas Scotland was due 
767 NLS. MS 13366, f. 2; and Caledonian Mercuq-, 26 Aug. 1797. The undated notices were issued by 
the Duke of Buccleuch and by the Sheriff-Deputy of West Lothian, see: NAS, GD224/423/7, Duke of 
Buccleuch Papers, or Caledoniari Mercun., 31 Aug. 1797, or NAS, RH2/4/81, f. 3; and ibid.. ff  4-5, 
‘TO THE INHABITANTS of THE COUNTY OF WEST LOTHIAN’. 
268 NAS, RH2/4/80, f. 229, Militia poster signed: MONTROSE, and Buchanan, 29 August 1797 [The 
date of this poster indicates that Montrose must have written it hefore he received Portland’s 
instructions.]. 
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to raise six thousand men only, ‘England has at present nearly 50,000 militia actually 
embodied, and 60,000 supplementary or additional militia, who have been trained, 
and are ready to be called out at a moment’s warning’. The intention here was 
probably to create a striking contrast of crude figures, but anyone wishing to 
calculate percentages would have found that the Scottish force made up no more than 
5.5 per cent of the total English force (including the Supplementary Militia). 
Buccleuch also addressed issues connected with the narrow age-band, the 55‘h clause 
of the Act, and on this last point, he stressed that the Scottish Act gave the same 
opportunity of raising funds to provide substitutes through subscriptions, as was 
generally done in most English parishes. The Sheriff-Deputy of West Lothian was 
the most junior government officer to issue his own notice, but his was none the less 
one of the more influential. Adopting much the same broad outline as Buccleuch’s 
address, the West Lothian poster stated its points more concisely and in simpler and 
clearer language. The third paragraph was the most original, and revealed what must 
have been the prevailing misunderstanding in the county. It read: ‘It is NOT TRUE that 
every man is to serve, whose name is set down in the Parish-Lists. It is only a 
proportion of them that are to serve, and probably not more than ten of those who are 
set down, if so many’. It then went on to stress that only six thousand men were to be 
raised in Scotland, and after a total of seven points with direct reference to the Militia 
Act, the Sheriff-Deputy added the comment, ‘England has at this moment NINETY 
THOUSAND Militia armed and fit for duty. Shall it be told that Scotland is unwilling 
to furnish even Six Thousand towards the common cause?’269 At least another two 
notices were issued. The one by Lord Douglas, the Lord Lieutenant for Forfarshire. 
followed much the same set-up as B u c c l e ~ c h ~ s , ~ ~ ~ )  while that by the Duke of 
Hamilton was in the form of a letter to the people of his co~nty . ’~’  
It has sometimes been claimed that the government reacted only slowly and 
hesitantly to the problem of misrepresentations, and that its response came too late to 
have any notable effect. Kenneth Logue has argued that, ‘very little was done to 
769 NAS, RH2/4/81, ff. 4-4v. 
”O EXPLANATION of the MILITIA ACT FOR SCOTLAND, by DOUGLAS, Lieutenant, County of 
Forfar. BOTHWEL CASTLE, August 1797. Caledonian Mercuqs, 4 Sept. 1797. 
171 NAS, RH2/4/81. f. 77, ‘MILITIA ACT. BY his Grace the DUKE of HAMILTON & BRANDON, 
Lord Lieutenant and High Sher f l c f the  Cow& ($Lanark’, Hamilton House, 4 September 1797. 
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counter such rumours; nothing was done by the authorities to explain the Act to 
people until the beginning of September, by which time most of the disturbances 
were over’ .272 This statement needs to be qualified. There was certainly little 
hesitation on the part of the major government figures in Edinburgh as far as the 
requesting of military reinforcements in Scotland was concerned,”’ and the meeting 
held by the Duke of Roxburgh and his deputies on 21 August demonstrated an ability 
to take constructive action very quickly indeed.”‘ Furthermore, the central 
government also responded rapidly. By 26 August Portland had already been 
informed about the first riots by the Duke of Roxburgh, and on that day he wrote a 
reply, expressing his approval of the initiative to post up notices, as well as setting 
out the gist of those points he would outline to Montrose two days later.27‘ Henry 
Dundas expressed his dismay over the ‘silence’ in all the letters he was receiving 
over ‘what Steps have been taken to explain to the Populace the gross illusion under 
which they labour’, and he urged all lords lieutenant to issue proclamations 
explaining the while Robert Dundas found the address issued by the Sheriff- 
Deputy of West Lothian particularly useful, and sent copies of it to all the sheriffs in 
the  highland^.'^^ Moreover, the government’s agents could not immediately know 
that the riots would become so widespread and violent, and that suppressing them 
would require such a forceful and concerted effort on their behalf. In the 
circumstances, the authorities must therefore be said to have responded as quickly as 
eighteenth-century communications allowed them to do. 
v)  The raising, - of the Scottish Militia 
Once the rioting had subsided and the last lists of eligible men had finally been 
drawn up and sent down to London, the next stage in the procedure was for the 
King’s Order in Council to determine the exact quotas of men due to be raised by 
Logue, Popular Disturbances. p. 114. 272 
273 Lord Adam Gordon requested military reinforcements for the first time on 23 August. NAS, 
This was the same day as the riot took place at Selkirk and the day before the riot in Jedburgh 
RH2/4/80, ff. 156-57. 
214 
where the meeting was held. 
275 NAS, RH2/4/221, pp. 276-78, Portland to the Duke of Roxburgh, Whitehall, 26 August 1797. 
276 NAS, RH2/4/80, ff. 186-87, Henry Dundas to ’My Dear Lord’, Walmer Castle, 27 August 1797. 
September.]. 
Western, ‘Scottish Militia’, SHR, 34 (1955), 1 1  [Robert Dundas did this in the beginning of 277 
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‘the several County, Stewartries, Cities and Places’ in Scotland.”* This list of quotas 
was finalised by the Privy Council in January 1798 and provided for a reduced 
number of 5,485 militiamen to be raised from a total of 23,059 eligible men - or 23.8 
per cent of the Precisely why the central government had decided to raise a 
smaller force than that which had been cited in the Militia Act does not transpire 
from the Order in Council, but a clear indication is given by a separate and undated 
document. Entitled: ‘Scotch Militia’, the document contains two separate schemes 
for the Militia force, one for twelve battalions totalling 6000 men, and the other for 
ten battalions amounting to 5485 men. In the second scheme - which appears to be 
the one adopted by the government - the quotas for the ‘Counties of Dumfries, 
Clackmannan and Orkney’, as well as ‘the Islands belonging to Inverness shire’ had 
been removed, since they had provided ‘no Returns’.”’ The key government men in 
Edinburgh, however, thought that even this reduced number of men was too large to 
be implemented, at least to begin with. A letter written by Robert Dundas on 6 
January 1798 concerning the organisation of the various regiments of the militia 
indicated that only a smaller force should be raised at the outset: ‘The D. of 
Buccleuch & Montrose, who are just now here’, he wrote, ‘authorize me to state that 
in full consideration we all approve of the number being 3000, and being divided into 
ten Battallions. as suggested by Major Dundas’ A later letter by Alexander Dirom. 
however, provides more detail on the precise problems the Scottish authorities were 
confronting in the wake of the militia riots, and it therefore needs to be quoted at 
length: 
Considering the numbers returned from the Counties, in all 24,663, it 
appears to me of the greatest consequence to the Peace of the Country 
that not more than 3000 should be balloted for. as a vast many of the 
young men, included in the Lists, will not be forthcoming at the Ballot. 
- Many from the Southern counties have gone into England, & a great 
many have every where entered into the Fencible Corps. the Army & 
the Navy, where they get a understandable Bounty, in order to avoid 
being compelled to serve in the Militia, where they would get no 
27x NAS, RH2/4/83, f .  55, ‘At the Court at St James’s the January 1798. Present The King’s Most 
Excellent Majesty in Council’. 
Ibid., f. 57, included in Appendix: C. 
Including the ‘supposed’ numbers of eligible men from these three counties, the total would have 
Ibid., ff. 8-13, R. Dundas to Henry Dundas, Dalkeith House, 6 January 1798. 
779 
2x0 
been 24.659. NAS, RH2/4/83, f. 20, ‘Scotch Militia’. 
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Bounty. - In short, it seems probably that there will not be above 
18,000 to ballot from, which, were it 3000, will be taking every sixth 
man; whereas in England it does not, I believe, come in general to 
above one in forty or fifty in the List. 
This unequal state of affairs, Dirom held, was ‘in some measure, evident from the 
difference in the rate of Insurance for funding Substitutes, which, in England seldom 
exceeds half a guinea, & here cannot be done for less than three Guineas’.*’’ Armed 
with this information from Dirom, and having made a few calculations of his own, 
Robert Dundas wrote to the Home Secretary: 
The numbers of men returned amounting only to about one half of 
what was originally supposed, it occurred to several persons here that 
to call out the whole 6000 at once, which would be a levy of one man 
out of four might be felt severely by the Country, and perhaps produce 
fresh disturbances. 
Instead, Robert Dundas proposed, that only half the force ought to be raised at the 
moment, leaving the other half to be ‘embodied at some subsequent period if the 
continuance of the war should render it necessary’.’83 This proposal was accepted in 
London, and the Scottish Militia regiments were consequently only brought up to 
half strength in their first year.”‘ 
The next, and obvious, question to ask about the Scottish Militia project, is 
how the actual enlistment of the force proceeded, and in order to provide a complete 
and exhaustive answer to this, it would have been necessary to investigate the papers 
for all the militia regiments which were raised. Unfortunately such papers do not 
seem to have survived for most or nearly all of these regiments, but a laudable 
exception exists in the richness of the Duke of Buccleuch archive, which holds the 
full records of the loth or Edinburgh Regiment of North British Militia, and we shall 
focus on this as a case study? 
’” Ibid., ff. 85-87, Alex Dirom to the Lord Advocate, Edinburgh, 4 February 1797 [original italics]. 
Ibid., ff. 75-9, R. Dundas to the Duke of Portland, Edinburgh, 7 February 1798. 
This statement is based on evidence from the loth or Edinburgh regiment commanded by the Duke 




NAS, GD224/423,426,429,433-39, Duke of Buccleuch papers. 
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vi) The case of the Edinburgh Militia. 
According to the Order in Council, the quota for the loth Regiment was set at 650 
men, which was apportioned to, and due to be raised by the city and county of 
Edinburgh, and the shires of Linlithgow, Haddington and A total of 685 
private men were enlisted over the period 1798 to 1802,’*’ of which the additional 
thirty-five were replacements for those who had either deserted, died or been 
discharged at some point over the period. Fortunately for this inquiry, the Enrolment 
Book for the Edinburgh Militia provides important information on every single 
recruit enlisted over the four-year period that the Regiment was in existence, and this 
has made it possible to calculate statistics on several central aspects of the Scottish 
Militia - such as how quickly it was brought up to strength, the proportion of 
principals to substitutes serving with the force, and the relative sizes of the different 
age groups.’” Addressing these issues in that order, it emerges that 354 or 54.5 per 
cent of the total 650 men due to be raised were enlisted in the first year, indicating 
that the raising of the force went according to plan, while another 266 or 41 per cent 
were embodied in 1799.’89 This brought the force up to 620 men or 95.4 per cent of 
the total within only two years, and the enlistments for the following three years 
therefore consisted mainly of replacements.”0 As far as the bare numbers of enlisted 
recruits are concerned, The impression is thus one of a regiment raised with little 
difficulty or opposition, but the figures for principals versus substitutes point in a 
rather different direction. No fewer than 494 or 72.1 per cent of the total 685 men 
were listed as substitutes, while merely 179 or 26.1 per cent were noted down as 
principals (1 1 recruits bore no indication of being either one or the other). If the force 
was raised according to plafi, and seemingly without any major problems, then this 
high rate of substitutes may provide some of the explanation; many of those who did 
not wish to serve had clearly been able to use the escape-route provided by the 
386 NAS, GD224/429/1, Index, and General Abstract of the Men to be furnished by the several 
Counties &c, to the loth or Edinburgh Regiment of North British Militia. 
”’ The Regiment was disbanded by Royal Warrant in April 1802, along with the other Scottish Militia 
units, see: GD224/423/11, Copy Warrant for disbanding the Militia of the City of Edinburgh, Court of 
St. James’s, 17 April 1802. 
The Enrolment Book is included in:  Appendix: F. 
If calculated against the total figure of 685, the percentages would naturally be lower - 5 1.7 and 28Y 
38.8 per cent respectively. 
’90 46 men were enlisted in 1800, 14 in 1801 and 5 in 1802. 
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system of providing a ~ubs t i tu te .~~’  Since the Militia Act stated that substitutes could 
Age: No.: 
12 1 
be of any age, the issue of age groups should be seen in the light of the high number 
of substitutes.292 The relative distribution of recruits on the different ages represented 
Age: No.: Age: No.: 
24 27 35 1 
in the Edinburgh Regiment are presented in Table l., and the most striking aspect of 
16 
17 
this information is perhaps the large number of 17 and 18 year-olds who had been 
24 26 18 38 1 
56 27 14 39 2 
enlisted, making up no less than 18.2 per cent of the total number of recruits in the 
regiment. Although the high proportion of substitutes meant that the original age- 
band of nineteen to twenty-three was of limited importance and relevance for the 
raising of the regiment, the figures in Table 1 demonstrate that the bulk of recruits 
were none the less in the intended age range. Some 385 or 56.2 per cent of those 
enlisted were within the original age-bracket, and if the new age-band of nineteen to 
thirty - as introduced by Parliament in 1799 - is applied, then the figures are 491 and 
7 1 .7 per cent.”‘ 
Table 1. Age groups in the Edinburgh Militia. 
20 
21 44 
1 22 I 691 32 1 41 45 I 21 
I 23 I 391 34 I 51 46 I 21 
The Enrolment Book also included the professions, or ‘trade’, of those who were 
enlisted, and these can be seen in Table 2. On the basis of the figures contained in 
this table, it emerges that the group denominated as ‘Labourers’ made up by far the 
largest single profession at 33.6 per cent of the total, followed by ‘Weavers’ at 16.9 
per cent and ‘Shoemakers’ at 10.1 per cent. ‘Taylors’ were also well above average 
The high proportion of substitutes in the Edinburgh regiment appears to have been in  accordance 
with the general British picture. As J. E. Cookson has argued. the system of raising funds to provide 
substitutes was so efficient that ‘personal service became a rarity’. Cookson, Armed Nation, p. 103. 
293_ See: 37 Geo. 111, c. 103, ‘An Act to embody a Militia Force in that Part of the Kingdom of Great 
Britain called Scotland - [ 19 July  17971. paragraph XX. 
293 See, 39 Geo. 111, c. 62, ‘An Act to amend an Act made in the thirty-seventh Year of the Reign of  
His present Majesty, and two Act made in the last Session of Parliament, for raising a Militia Force in 
that Part of the Kingdom of Great Brirnin called Scotland. - [21” June 17991’. 
19 1 
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at 6.4 per cent, followed by ‘Joiners’ at 3.8 per cent, ‘Masons’ at 2.3 per cent, 
‘Gardeners’ at 2.2 per cent and as the last group which ran into double figures were 
Blacksmiths at 1.4 per cent. Overall, it is therefore clear that those who served with 
the Edinburgh Militia were either labourers, craftsmen or artisans by profession, and 
that not a single person of middle or upper class background was ever enlisted in the 
force.”‘ It was in other words precisely those ordinary people, who were most likely 
to dislike militia service, that ended up serving and this immediately poses the 
question of how loyal and reliable the established force turned out to be. 
Table 2. Professions in the Edinburgh Militia. 
Part of the answer can be found in the number of men that needed to be 
replaced. Some 35 out of 650 makes up only 5.4 per cent, which can hardly be said 
Although they could avoid service more easily than the poor, J. E. Cookson has argued that the 
wealthy came to resent militia levies, because i t  was they who had to make ‘the largest contributions 
to parochial subscription, and might also have to buy their servants and dependants out of service. To 
them the militia was a “tax”, second only to the property tax as an onerous burden of war’. Cookson, 
Armed Nation, p. 103. 
293 
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to have been a large proportion - by any standards - for a regiment embodied over 
four years, and certainly not for an eighteenth-century force that was unpopular from 
the outset. Furthermore, of those men who had to be replaced a mere five had 
deserted, and ten had died, which left eighteen under the category of discharged (two 
were unaccounted for). The reasons behind the decisions to discharge these men 
were not stated, but is most likely to have been that they were unfit for service, and 
in any case, 18 out of 650 was undoubtedly low by eighteenth-century standards. The 
Buccleuch papers, however, also include a list of all the courts-martial held during 
the period the regiment was embodied, and this list reveals that the majority of 
offences were either related to drunkenness, or concerned ‘disorderly behaviour’. Far 
fewer cases gave any clear indications of disloyalty to the force.29s Moreover, the 
total number of cases tried was not higher than 57 - of which 11 were against NCOs 
- leaving only 46 incidents of privates committing offences, sufficiently severe to 
justify a court-martial. Of the total number of men enlisted in the force, this was 
merely 6.7 per cent. The Edinburgh Militia thus bore all the hallmarks of a well- 
disciplined and loyal regiment,”6 and if it was representative of the Scottish force as 
a whole, then the political decision to raise a Scottish Militia must be seen as having 
ultimately been crowned with success as well.297 
While the recruitment of men for armed service was thus largely a great 
success in Scotland in the 1790s, the Scottish contribution to the other crucial 
element in the war effort of the British state - thefinancing of both British and allied 
military operations - was not equally impressive. The next chapter addresses the 
issue of the relative contribution Scotland made to the revenues of the British state 
within this period. 
295 NAS, GD224/437/2. ‘10. OR. EDINBURGH REGIMENT. OF. NORTH. BRITISH. MILITIA. 
Courts-martial’, included in: Appendix: G. 
Further evidence of this can be found in a letter enclosed with the Royal Warrant disbanding the 
regiment in 1802, in which the King’s satisfaction with the ‘Zeal and Loyalty’ manifested by the 
officers, NCOs and private men of the Regiment was underlined. GD224/423/3 1. Hobart to 
Buccleuch. Downing Street, 17 April 1802. Two days later, the War Office issued a circular letter on 
behalf of the King, stressing ‘the very great Satisfaction he has received from the exemplary and 
meritorious Services of the said Regiment’. GD224/436, Vol. l . ,  pp. 37-9, Circular, signed C. Yorke. 
War Office, 19 April 1802. 
297 Those who had been drawn in the first ballot for the Edinburgh Militia were ordered to report for 
service in a newspaper advertisement in late December 1798, and the same was the case for the 





The preceding chapter focused on the different policies the government employed for 
the purpose of augmenting the armed forces, both the regular army and navy, and the 
forces for home defence. Wars, however, also needed to be financed, and the 
financial arrangements whereby the war-effort was sustained, had been as important, 
for the long string of British successes in all the previous wars of the eighteenth 
century, as the military efforts of the British state. The British financial system, as it 
was developed over the course of the eighteenth century, rested on the two main 
pillars of state borrowing and taxation, where newly issued taxes were earmarked to 
pay off the debt accumulated through borrowing.’ The main focus of this chapter is 
therefore on the relative Scottish contribution to these two, but in addition we will 
also look at Scottish attitudes to taxation in the 1790s. 
I 
State Bo v o w  in g 
The government’s raising of loans in wartime is not an issue which s n d s  itse very 
easily to a comparative study. Borrowing was conducted by the central authorities, 
who focused on raising the necessary funds wherever they could be found and at the 
best terms available. The City of London, as the unrivalled commercial centre of 
Britain, could be expected to dominate in any set of statistics produced on where, and 
from whom, the state obtained its funding, not merely in relation to Scotland, but 
also to the rest of England. Moreover, it is not immediately obvious how the Scottish 
‘share’ of government borrowing could be measured. This issue has, however, been 
addressed by Alan Gunning in his thesis on war-related finances in Scotland, and 
Gunning suggested that, since new loans raised by the government were added to the 
already existing national debt, a possible starting point and approach for an attempt 
On the British financial system, and its development over the course of the eighteenth century, see: 
John Brewer, The SineH-s of Power: War Monej* and the English Stute 1688-1 783 (London, 1989); 
and Peter Mathias and Patrick O’Brien. ‘Taxation in Britain and France, 17 15- 18 10: A Comparison of 
the Social and Economic Incidence of Taxes Collected for the Central Governments’, Journal of  
European Economic Histo?, 5 (1 976), 633-40. 
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at measuring the Scottish involvement in government borrowing would be to try to 
3 estimate the share of this debt held by Scots.’ 
Unfortunately, there is relatively little evidence that provides the geographical 
break-down of shares in the national debt, necessary for this kind of comparison, but 
Gunning has suggested that a reasonably good indication can be achieved by using 
property tax figures. This is because it is possible to single out dividend and annuity 
payments made by the exchequer - that is, to calculate all income derived from 
government stock - from the general assessments to the property tax. Or posed 
differently: all the money paid out by the Treasury to people holding shares in the 
national debt. Figures for this are only available for two separate years after 1800, 
and therefore represent a very restricted source of information, but what they 
demonstrate is that the Scottish proportion was 2.6 per cent in 1803 and 3.1 per cent 
in 1805? This evidence is too limited chronologically to provide more than an 
indication of the Scottish share over time and, in any case, does not necessarily 
reveal much about the situation in the previous decade, but another, and more 
comprehensive set of statistics can be calculated by narrowing the scope and using 
Bank of England records. By looking at that section under the national debt referred 
to as ‘3% consols‘ - and this was a substantial part of the debt - Gunning calculated 
that the Scottish proportion increased from a mere 0.34 per cent as an average for the 
period 1776 - 1782, to 1.72 per cent on average for 18 12 - 18 18? Both in the case of 
assessments to the property tax. and 3% consols, the Scottish share thus appears to 
have been relatively small, and well below Scotland’s proportion of the total British 
population of about 15 per cent.’ 
Part of the reason for this modest involvement in government borrowing by 
individual Scots may have been that there was less surplus wealth available to be 
invested in government stock in Scotland. than there was in England - even when 
measured per capita - but it is also possible that many Scots found it more tempting 
to place their funds in one of the thriving Scottish banks, than in the national debt. 
’ Alan Gunning, ‘War, the Central Government and the Scottish Economy 1750- 1830’. unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis (University of Strathclyde, 1984), pp. 224-25. 
Ibid., p. 228 
Ibid., p. 230. 




One study from the mid-nineteenth century certainly concluded that ‘the surplus 
wealth of England has been invested in the national debt - and that of Scotland in 
their Banks’? If this assessment was correct for the late eighteenth century as well, 
then, there is scope to argue that many Scots in fact made significant indirect 
investments in the national debt, since the Scottish banking sector viewed 
government stock as an increasingly interesting object of investment over the course 
of the 1790s. The Royal Bank of Scotland, for example, increased its holdings of 
government stock substantially in this period. Calculated as a proportion of the 
bank’s total assets. the share made up by ‘government obligations’ had risen from 5.4 
per cent in September 1794 to no less than 22.4 per cent in August 1802.7 Although 
the government obligations held by this bank - together with similar investments 
made by other Scottish banks - may not have represented a very significant part of 
the total number of such obligations issued in London, they undoubtedly represented 
a very substantial part of the bank’s own assets by 1802. Moreover, when the bank 
also decided to increase its holdings of government stock over the period, 
investments in the national debt must have seemed an appealing option also to Scots 
bankers. 
Thus, while the direct investment in the national debt conducted by individual 
Scots in all likelihood was relatively small. their indirect investment in the debt - 
through first depositing their funds with the Scottish banks - may have been more 
significant. Considered in a nationwide context, however, what evidence there is 
indicates that Scotland contributed proportionately less to government borrowing 
requirements, than did England in general, and London in particular. Taxation, 
however - as the true backbone of the British financial system - is a topic far better 
suited to a comparative study. 
William John Lawson, His top  c f  Banking in Scotland, embracing rz brief view cf the revemes o f  
Scotland, Mith a copy of the act of the Scottish parliament establishing the Bank of Scotland (London, 
1845), p. 38. cited in: Gunning, ’War’, p. 227. 
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Most contemporaries who commented on taxation focussed on the issue of ‘fairness’, 
and were interested in whether the Scots paid their ‘fair’ share of the tax-revenue 
collected from the whole of Great Britain. By ‘fair’ in this context, what they 
normally meant was proportionate, and this is a crucial concept for any comparative 
study. Scotland ought to carry a part of the total tax-burden levied on Britain, they 
argued, which corresponded directly to the size of her population, in such a manner 
that the Scots - on average - paid the same amount in taxes as the other inhabitants 
of Britain. The comparison which attracted the greatest interest was between 
Scotland and England as two entities, and a ‘fair’ distribution of taxes was thus held 
to be one where the Scots and the English paid an equal amount in taxes, when 
measured per capita. Less attention was given to the internal tax distribution of the 
two main constituting parts of Great Britain, or to the relative amount of taxable 
wealth that could be found there. The prevailing view was that Scotland did not pay a 
proportionate amount of taxes, and that the Scots were therefore carrying less than 
their fair share of the tax burden.’ Was this true? In the following section we will 
investigate this claim in relation to the absolute Scottish tax contribution, but also 
attempt to establish whether the Scots were paying a proportionate share of taxes, 
when measured against the relative taxable wealth of Scotland. 
Although the evidence on tax returns in the late eighteenth century is far from 
extensive, those tax records which have survived present a few alternatives for 
measuring the Scottish tax contribution. Alan Gunning suggested that three different 
statistics on Scottish tax revenue were of relevance in this context. They were: ‘gross 
tax revenue’, ‘net tax revenue’ and ‘London remittances’, all of which require a brief 
definition.9 Figures for Scottish gross tax revenue would refer to the total amount of 
taxes collected in Scotland within a given time period, normally a year. This sum 
represented all the money which government tax collectors had received from the 
various tax payers throughout the country, and is therefore a natural starting point for 
- 
’ For a further discussion of  the debate on fairness, see: ibid., pp. 159-61. 
Ibid., p. 158. 9 
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any calculations on tax revenue. Indeed, by presenting the total amount of taxes paid 
by the Scots, the gross tax revenue figure also demonstrates the overall tax burden. 
By subtracting from gross tax revenue the expenses involved in collecting the taxes, 
we arrive at the figure known as net tax revenue. Certainly, the officers employed to 
do the actual job of collecting the money - such as excisemen and customs officials - 
needed to be paid, as did the rest of the bureaucracy involved, and it is only after 
these costs have been subtracted from the figure for gross tax revenue, that we arrive 
at the sum of money which stood at the government's disposal for its expenditure. 
Immediately, these two figures may appear sufficient to determine the tax revenue 
raised in Scotland, but for the purposes of a comparison with Britain as a whole, a 
third figure needs to be calculated. The reason for this is that not all of the net tax 
revenue was submitted to London. Some of it was spent directly on government 
expenditure in Scotland, and if this amount is subtracted from the net figure, we end 
up with the sum that was eventually sent down to the Treasury in London, and thus 
constituted the Scottish tax contribution. Gunning defined this as 'London 
remittances . 7 I0 
For the period 1793- 18 15, Gunning calculated that Scottish tax remittances to 
London made up about 4.2 per cent of total British tax revenues, a figure which was 
clearly well below the population indicator of 15 per cent, and probably also by a 
sufficiently large margin to compensate for any distortions there may have been in 
the statistics on tax returns. The Scots thus appear to have carried markedly less 
than their proportionate share of the British tax burden, at least when measured in 
absolute terms. The tax records, however, also reveal that the Scottish proportion of 
British tax revenue had been increasing steadily since the 1750s when it was no 
more than 0.7 per cent, a significantly lower share." Furthermore, the most 
pronounced increase had taken place after the outbreak of war in 1793, when the tax 
burden was rising in the whole of Britain. This meant that - although the Scottish 
11 
Ibid. In addition to being the arguably best representation of the Scottish tax contribution, applying 
London remittances for the calculation, also make it possible to avoid the problems connected with 
contemporary criticism, which tended to state that no matter how large Scottish revenue looked on 
paper - i.e. gross tax revenue - i t  'contributed little to general British finances'. ibid. 
Ibid.. p. 161. Table on: 'Scottish Tax Remittances to London as a proportion of "British" Tax 
Revenue 1750- 1 830'. 
ibid. 
10 
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contribution to British tax revenue was clearly below the population indicator 
throughout the period under investigation here - Scottish tax returns were not only 
going up in absolute terms, they were also increasing at a faster rate than in England. 
A slightly different set of statistics, more directly related to war expenditure, seems 
to reinforce this point. In his table on ‘Scottish Payments into the British Exchequer 
as a proportion of British Exchequer Payments 1797- 1 8 10’ , Alan Gunning calculated 
that the Scottish proportion of the British total increased from 4.8 per cent in 1797 to 
6.3 per cent 1802.” Again, the impression is one of a modest, yet increasing Scottish 
contribution. 
It was mentioned above, however, that absolute figures such as those 
presented here, take no account of, nor do they compensate for, the relative amounts 
of taxable wealth in the different parts of Britain. Since it can be demonstrated with a 
great degree of certainty that Scotland was a poorer country than England in the late 
eighteenth century - also when measured in relative terms - it would appear that 
both total wealth creation and per capita income was lower in Scotland than it was in 
England. There was less taxable wealth north of the border. or, posed differently, 
Scotland had a lower taxable capacity than England. Seen in this light, the relatively 
small contribution Scotland made in absolute terms is unlikely to have been equally 
modest when measured against the taxable wealth of the country, and it may well 
have been the case that, paradoxically, the Scots paid less in taxes than the English. 
but - relative to their lower income - still contributed more than their proportionate. 
or ‘fair‘ share. To be certain about this we would first need to compare average 
income in Scotland with the actual taxes the Scots paid, so as to established how 
large a proportion of their income they paid in taxes. and then a similar exercise 
would have to be conducted for England, before any conclusions could be drawn. In 
the absence of any national income estimates or records from the 179Os, it is difficult 
to see how an entirely convincing calculation of this sort could be achieved, but Alan 
Gunning has none the less suggested that assessments to the property tax may give 
some indication.I4 The implication here is that the government’s assessments to the 
property tax - i.e. which social and occupational groups should pay, and at which 
l 3  Ibid., p. 163. 
Gunning, ‘War’, p. 168 14 
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rate - presents the best available data for determining Scotland’s taxable wealth and 
therefore the Scot’s ability to pay. l 5  Unfortunately, the records on assessments to 
property tax are restricted to the MOOS, which makes it difficult to make any 
conclusive comments about the situation in the 1790s, but for want of more reliable 
information we will use this material from a later period, although with some 
caution. The calculations Gunning conducted demonstrated that between 1803- 18 10, 
the Scottish share of the gross assessments to property tax for the whole of Britain, 
ranged from 7.0 per cent to 9.4 per cent, exhibiting a more or less consistent increase 
over this period! If these figures can be taken to have some validity for the 
preceding decade, then two broad and tentative conclusions may be attempted. First, 
they seem to underline that Scotland was a poorer country than England, also when 
measured per capita, and second that Scotland was probably not taxed according to 
her taxable capacity, although the discrepancy is not as marked as the comparison 
between the Scottish proportion of tax returns and the population indicator would 
suggest. Indeed, the margin between the figures for the Scottish tax contribution, and 
the earliest figure for assessments to property tax - 4.2 to 6.3 per cent and 7.0 per 
cent respectively - is sufficiently slim to demand every degree of caution when 
drawing conclusions.” An alternative set of statistics on tax returns has, however, 
survived in a source which Gunning did not consult, and relate to two of the most 
important taxes in our period, those of Customs and Excise duties. The evidence in 
question consists of two tables on the Customs and Excise revenues collected in the 
period 1791 till 1797, one listing the returns from England, and the other the 
equivalent for Scotland.18 
Since the prevailing political orthodoxy was one of at least attempting to distribute the tax burden 
according to the relative wealth of the taxpayers - i.e. taxation according to ability - efforts were 






Gunning, ‘War’, p. 169. 
See: ibid., p. 247. 
The tables in question were included as an appendix to a report produced by the State Paper Office 
in 1798. See: John Bruce, ‘REPORT, On the Events and Circumstances which produced the Union of 
the Kingdoms of England and Scotland’. Unpublished (State Paper Office, 1798). National Library of 
Scotland [NLS], A.112.c 1-2, [The volume held by NLS was given to the Dean of the Faculty of 
Advocates in Edinburgh, by the Duke of Portland in February 1799.1 A copy o f  the original tables is 
included in: Appendix: H. 
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Since the figures that were compiled under the heading of ‘England’ must be 
assumed to also include Welsh Customs and Excise revenues, adding the Scottish 
Customs 
figures to these gives us with a table representing the total Customs and Excise 
Excise 
revenues for Great Britain in this period. This information is presented in Table 1, 
while Table 2 demonstrates the result of calculating the proportion Scottish revenues 
made up of total British revenues - here presented in percentage terms. 19 
Gross Receipt Net Produce 
f f 
1791 6,045,818 4,076,037 
1792 6,045,818 4,076,277 
1793 5,573,706 3,990,522 
1794 5,841,840 3,563,368 
1795 6,775,995 3,569,836 
1796 6,382,002 3,652,695 
Table 1 .  British Customs and Excise revenues, 1791 -97.20 
~ _ _ _  
Gross Receipt Net Produce 
f f 









Gross Receipt Net Produce Gross Receipt Net Produce 
YO YO O/O O/O 
4.8 3.4 5.1 4.6 






Table 2. The Scottish Percentage of the British Total.*’ 
4.4 2.5 5.0 4.5 
3.7 1.8 5.3 4.9 
3.0 2.0 5.0 4.5 
4.1 2.6 5.1 4.6 
3.0 7.1 6.9 
r Scotland 
Essentially, these figures cannot be said to challenge the conclusions Gunning 
reached with respect to the overall Scottish tax contribution, although the Scottish 
Excise office must be said to have produced a perhaps even steadier stream of 
income for the Treasury, than might have been expected. Gross produce only just fell 
As will appear from the Appendix: H, shillings and pence were only included in the Scottish 
figures, and not in those for England. In order to simplify the procedure, these figures for shillings and 
pence have been omitted in all calculations made here, since they must be presumed to make little or 
no difference to the final result of those calculations. 
As there is one digit missing in the figure for the English Customs Gross Receipt for 1797, this part 
of the table has been omitted in the calculations. See: Appendix: H. 




below five per cent for one year in this period, and was even higher than seven per 
cent in 1797. Gunning’s conclusion that the Scottish tax contribution at best had 
reached a level of about six per cent of the British total by 1800 thus seems to be 
confirmed by these figures, but the Excise revenues had clearly come close to this 
level already by the early 1790s. Overall, the table does not exhibit any particular 
signs of growth or decline over time, indicating that the Scottish revenue - as far as 
these two taxes were concerned - remained stable throughout the period. The table 
also indicates that the Scottish Customs revenues made up a considerably smaller 
proportion of the British total, than did the corresponding revenues produced by 
Excise duties. 
The figures contained in Table 2 are, however, not the only valuable insight 
about the relative Scottish tax contribution that can be gained from John Bruce’s 
statistics on Customs and Excise revenues. Since the tables provided figures for both 
Gross Receipts and Net Produce, it is possible to calculate, and compare, the relative 
‘efficiency’ of the English 
subtracting Net Produce from 
and Scottish Customs and Excise Offices.” By 
Gross Receipt we arrive at a figure representing the 
amount of collected tax revenues, which was not submitted to the Treasury in 
London, and which for that reason can be seen as a ‘loss’ to the government. By 
further calculating the proportion this figure made up of Gross Receipts, we obtain a 
figure for what may be phrased the ‘percentage loss’ to the government. The results 
of making such a calculation for every year in the period covered by Bruce’s tables 
are presented in Table 3. 
12 Gross Receipr is here understood to mean the total amount of tax revenues collected, whereas Ner 
Produce is defined as that part of Gross Produce which was eventually suimitted to the Treasury. The 
difference between the two would indicate how much was spent on the actual collecting, and 
administering the collection of, taxes, as well as any funds which were embezzled or appropriated in 
any way by people involved in the tax-collecting process. In a way, this part of the collected tax 
revenues can be seen as a ‘loss’ to the government, and the size of this loss would be an indication of 
how efficient the collection of a specific tax was. (It should be borne in mind here, however, that some 
taxes could be more expensive that others to collect, so that even if  the collection process was 
extremely efficient, the expenses involved in collecting a given tax might still be considerable.) 
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31.6 16.0 51.4 24.6 
31.1 16.2 61.7 13.3 
27.0 14.6 60.2 24.3 




46.7 13.3 65.8 22.2 
41.9 16.2 63.6 24.2 
14.7 56.5 18.3 
There are two main tendencies that these percentage figures seem to indicate. One is 
that both in Scotland and in England, the Excise offices appear to have been 
significantly more efficient than the corresponding Customs offices. The other is that 
the percentage loss - for both customs and excise - was undoubtedly much higher in 
Scotland than south of the border. This was particularly the case for the Scottish 
Customs office, which was never able to submit to the Treasury as much as half of 
the revenues it had collected. the worst year by far being 1794, when even less than 
30 percent was sent on to London. Compared with the Customs office, the Scottish 
Excise office did not fare quite so badly. Since the collection of Excise duties must 
have been more expensive in Scotland than in England, the fact that the figures for 
the Scottish office do not trail that far behind those for its English counterpart - 
always below 10 percentage points in this period - is an indication that the Excise 
must have been one of the more efficiently administered taxes in Scotland.” Finally, 
by averaging the percentage loss-figures, we can get an impression of the relative 
efficiency of the respective offices over time. The figures we arrive at then, are that 
the average loss for the English Customs and Excise offices were 36.0 and 15.1 per 
cent respectively, whereas they were 61.5 and 21.3 per cent for the equivalent 
Scottish offices. Again this seems to reinforce the impression that the Scottish Excise 
office did not trail very far behind it English counterpart, on average by a mere 6.2 
percentage points. 
~ ~ _ _ _ _ ~ ~  
23 Percentage figures have been rounded to nearest 1/10 per cent. 
The geography of Scotland, the size of the country relative to the size of the population and the 
more spread-out pattern of settlement, all indicate that administering a direct tax on commodities 
would necessarily have to be more expensive there, than in more densely populated England. 
23 
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In the approach to taxation so far we have focused on the Scottish 
contribution in overall terms. It is also of interest, however, to look at how, and by 
whom, this burden of taxation was carried, and whether the situation in Scotland was 
any different from the rest of Britain. In order to form an idea of this it is necessary 
to introduce the concept of incidence of taxation. Thus far, the figures used have 
been those of tax receipts at current values, which means that the effects of inflation 
have not been taken into account. Consequently, these figures do not tell us how the 
tax burden related to increases in wealth or national income, nor do they say very 
much about how the tax burden was distributed among the various groups in Scottish 
society. Both these aspects of the incidence of taxation need closer examination. 
There seems to be little doubt that even when measured in real prices - i.e. 
compensating for inflation - the Scottish proportion of tax revenues still grew slowly 
for the whole of the eighteenth century, and increased more rapidly from 1793 
onwards. This growth in the overall Scottish tax contribution appears to have been 
sufficiently large to offset the effects of the population growth Scotland experienced 
in this period, so that the per capita tax burden increased as well. Thus even when 
taking inflation and population growth into account, the indication is that the real tax 
burden was going up.’.’ To be entirely certain of this, however, it is necessary to 
know how the higher tax-level related to the changing wealth of Scotland over time. 
Unfortunately,. the absence of any Scottish national income estimates makes it 
difficult to pursue this question any further in a strictly Scottish context, but Peter 
Mathias has carried out a calculation for Britain as a whole and he concluded that for 
the eighteenth century: ‘deflating to identify real trends, beyond monetary 
movements, shows tax revenue growing consistently faster than the national 
income’? It would not be unreasonable to assume that this increase also applied to 
Scotland, since the evidence presented above demonstrated that the Scottish 
contribution to British tax revenues was increasing at a faster rate than the British 
total in the revolutionary war period. Of course, national income - could have been 
b crowing faster in Scotland than in England - thereby compensating for the increasing 
15 Gunning, ‘War’, pp. 178-8 1.  
’‘ Peter Mathias, The Transformation of England (London, 1979)’ p. 121. See also: Mathias and 
O’Brien, ‘Taxation in  Britain and France’, JEEH, 5 ( 1  976), 635. 
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tax burden - but there is no clear evidence that this was so, nor is it particularly 
likely to have been the case. Consequently, also when compensations are made for 
inflation, population growth and economic growth, the impression is one of an 
increasing tax burden on Scotland in the 1790s. 
In order to determine the distribution of the tax burden - that is, to answer the 
question of ‘who paid’ - it is necessary to classify taxes according to whether they 
were progressive, proportional or regressive, and the generally accepted view has 
been that - overall - direct taxes were progressive, and indirect taxes regressive.” As 
far as the general development over the course of the eighteenth century is 
concerned, the overall conclusion reached by Gunning was that from an early 
position of rough equality between direct and indirect taxes, the contribution of direct 
taxes on income and property fell progressively after the Seven Years War ended in 
1763.28 John Brewer has projected this argument even further back, stating that the 
most important eighteenth-century direct tax - the land tax - provided a substantial 
part of total tax revenue up until 1714, only to decline in relative importance 
thereafter.29 The reason behind this decreasing importance of direct taxes such as the 
land tax was not simply the lower rate of such taxes, but the steep growth of indirect 
taxes, and particularly of Customs and Excise duties. After 1763 these two types of 
indirect taxes always accounted for more than half of the remittances to the British 
’ 7  - ’  A proportional tax can be described as a tax which is levied in a way that makes i t  non- 
discriminating relative to an individual’s income. The burden of taxation bears equally heavily on all  
taxpayers. in the sense that they al l  have to pay the same percentage of  their income in tax, and the 
incidence of the tax can therefore be said to be ‘neutral’ relative to income levels. It is perhaps 
debatable whether such a tax can actually exist, and the idea of a ‘neutral‘ tax is possibly more of a 
political than an economic question, but the concept of proportionality is nevertheless a useful one in 
shedding light on the other two tax systems. When labelling a tax progressive, the implication is 
normally that the tax burden increases with the level of income, so that higher income-earners pay a 
higher percentage of their income in taxes than lower income-earners. Thus, with a progressive tax the 
burden of taxation is skewed towards the wealthier sections of society. A regessive tax. by contrast, 
has the opposite effect. Such a tax places the heaviest burden on low income-earners, leaving them in  
a position where they pay a larger share of their income in  taxes, than do those with a higher income. 
Typically, regressive taxes are taxes on consumer goods which can be defined as ‘necessities’. From 
this it emerges that progressive and regressive taxation is positioned on either side of proportional or 
‘neutral’ taxation. For a further discussion of these concepts, see: Gunning. ‘War’, pp. 181-86; and 
Mathias and O’Brien, ‘Taxation in Britain and France’, JEEH, 5 (1976), 619. 
/hid., p. 187. A tax would be classified as direct if the money was paid by the tax-payer to the 
c government without going via any intermediaries. An indirect tax, by comparison, would be issued on 
a commodity rather than a person, and be paid directly to the authorities by the salesman, and only 
indirectly by the buyer. Generally speaking, direct taxes were those levied on income or wealth, and 
indirect those on outlay - hence on consumption. See: Gunning, ‘War’, pp. 183-84. 
Brewer, SinenTs of Potver, p. 95. 29 
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Treasury, the Excise being by far the more important of the two?’ Gunning rightly 
stated that such indirect taxes were ‘socially regressive’, since they bore more 
heavily on the less well off in society.” While the land tax - as a tax on property - 
was carried by the landed classes, most indirect taxes were levied on widely used 
consumer goods, and would therefore constitute a heavier financial burden for the 
poor. Indirect taxes could also be levied on goods defined as luxuries - which meant 
that they would fall overwhelmingly on the rich - but, by and large, the majority of 
these duties were placed on such commodities as soap, leather, salt, candles, spirits 
and malt, all of which were commonly consumed, and perhaps even seen as 
nece~sities.~’ Some commodities were taxed because they had previously been 
luxuries, but had since become widely consumed products by the mass of the 
population, and the most important of these by the late eighteenth century were sugar 
and tobacco. Most indirect taxes consequently bore more heavily on low income- 
earners than on those with high incomes, and for that reason were of a regressive 
nature. 
Alan Gunning’s calculation for the period 1797- 18 10 demonstrated that direct 
taxes plus stamp duties and post office receipts accounted for 34.4 per cent of 
remittance from Scotland, whereas customs, excise and salt duties accounted for 65.6 
per cent of these remittances?’ The indirect taxes were therefore clearly the more 
important. and not only did they dominate in the revenue raised in Scotland, Gunning 
also argued that: ’in all probability a far higher proportion of this 65.6% came from 
taxes on articles in mass consumption rather than on items consumed exclusively by 
the rich7? Since a number of commodities which had previously been viewed as 
luxuries were becoming more commonly consumed by the late eighteenth century, i t  
is likely that the indirect tax burden was increasingly being borne by the less well off 
in society. It is important to point out here, however, that this was unintentional on 
the part of the authorities. The prevailing political orthodoxy was that when choosing 
which commodities to tax, the authorities ought to be careful to avoid those goods 
Gunning, ‘War’, p. 197. 30 
-” Ibid., p. 187. 
” In this context, the malt tax would primarily function as an indirect tax on beer, which was largely 
viewed as a necessity. \ 
”Ibid., p. 204. 
Gunning, ‘War’, p. 203. 33 
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which were seen as absolutely essential for everyone - such as bread. The problem 
was that former luxuries, for example whisky, were becoming ordinary consumables, 
and as long as the old taxes levies on them remained in place, the inevitable result 
was that the tax burden was moving down the social ladder.3’ 
A small qualification of the picture presented so far needs to be made, 
however, since the introduction of the income tax in 1799 undoubtedly increased the 
proportion of tax revenue derived from direct taxes. As the income tax was only 
levied on middling and higher incomes, it made the overall incidence of taxation less 
regressive, moving the tax burden slightly towards the better off in society. Even so, 
it is important to stress that this was only a minor alteration to the general 
distribution of the tax burden, and that the bulk of the taxes were still carried by the 
lower c~asses.’~ 
From the point of view of the comparative line adopted here, it seems 
appropriate to ask whether the results presented above serve to distinguish Scotland 
from the rest of Great Britain. In all likelihood they do not. Gunning concluded that: 
the Scottish case seems to have been similar to the British one in the 
sense that [,I because of the high share of indirect taxes which fell on 
consumption and the low share of direct taxes on income and wealth 
[,I it is likely that the main burden of war needs fell on consumption 
rather than [on] savings and investment.” 
The tax burden in Scotland was largely regressive in its social incidence, and in this, 
the situation north of the border did not deviate significantly from that of Great 
Britain in general. 
I11 
Attitudes to Taxation 
Taxation in Scotland was an issue which attracted attention from many quarters, and 
was a topic of some debate throughout much of the eighteenth century. The 
35 See: Mathias and O’Brien. ‘Taxation in  Britain and France’, JEEH, 5 ( 1 9 7 6 ~  619. 
The tax was subsequently abolished as soon as a peace-agreement had been reached in  1802. Ibid., 
614. 
37 Gunning, ‘War’, p. 203. See also: Mathias and O’Brien, ’Taxation in Britain and France’, JEEH, 5 
( 1 9 7 6 ~  621. 
36 
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background for this debate was the seeming inability of the government to raise any 
significant tax revenue in Scotland. Repeated attempts had been made after 1707, 
aimed at setting up a new and efficient tax system north of the border under the 
auspices of the British state. Several commissions were appointed with the task of 
developing and organising a tax regime for Scotland, but the results were far from 
impressive, and for the main part of the century, the Scots remained lightly taxed by 
English standards.’s Indeed, the organising of a well-functioning tax regime in 
Scotland faced so many problems - including smuggling and corruption - that some 
contemporaries thought it hardly worth the trouble to impose any taxes on the Scots 
whatsoever. They were unlikely to yield as much in revenue, as it would cost to 
collect them in any case, the argument went. This apparent failure to tax the Scots 
efficiently gave Scotland a bad reputation in England, and has led Alexander 
Murdoch to conclude that: ‘the problem of taxing Scotland efficiently and effectively 
seems to have been beyond the capabilities of eighteenth-century government’ .39 
None the less, the situation improved towards the close of the century, and when - in 
1790 - a Yorkshire MP raised questions in the House of Commons concerning the 
’small return of the Excise Duties in Scotland’ and otherwise presented some of the 
more well-rehearsed English complaints about the state of taxation in Scotland; he 
received a sharp response from the Commissioners at the Excise Office in 
Edinburgh, who claimed to have solid evidence to the opposite effect.“) 
Cross-border arguments of this kind, or other discussions over the relative 
Scottish tax contribution. became less prominent after 1792. Fewer commentators 
appeared to be interested in, or have time for these old debates, now that the leading 
See: Alexander J. Murdoch, ‘The People Abo\le ’: Politics und Administration in Mid-Eighteenth- 
Murdoch. People AboiJe, p. 20. 
NLS, MS 14. ff. 86-9, Commissioners of Excise to Henry Dundas, Excise Office Edinburgh, 4 May 
1790 [quote: f .  86.1. The Commissioners responded to the allegations by. for example, stressing that 
the annual gross amount raised by Excise taxes in Scotland had increased ‘upwards of eight times Its 
original produce’ of E44.664 in 1708 to E387.982 in 1789, a rise which was proportionately greater 
than that experienced in England within the same period; and that many articles which were consumed 
in Scotland, were either imported into or manufactured in England, and that the duties on them were 
therefore ‘put to the Credit of the English Revenue’, although they were in fact ‘paid by the 
Inhabitants of Scotland’. A particularly glaring example, they thought. was tea ‘the legal importation 
of which, the Legislature has thought fit to confine to the East India Company alone, so that the whole 
Consumpt [sic] of Scotland . . . pays Duty at the India House, and is brought to Account of the English 
Excise’ [see: ff. 86v-87v.l. 
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radicals, with Tom Paine at the front, were attacking taxation in Britain as a whole. 
The issue of taxation thus became drawn into the wider debate between radicals and 
loyalists, where the radicals - following Paine’s scathing attack on the existing tax 
regime in the second part of Rights of Man - argued in favour of lower taxes, while 
the loyalists did their best to defend the current level and mode of taxation? In this 
new and polarised political climate there seems to have been less room for a 
continued debate over the relative Scottish tax contribution, and also those Scottish 
pamphleteers and commentators who addressed the issue of taxation in the 1790s, 
did so primarily within this new British context. We will return to the wider debate 
between radicals and loyalists in the last chapter of this thesis, and address the role 
played by taxation within loyalist ideology, but for the moment, it is necessary to 
focus on the technical side of the argument in favour of taxation. Two particularly 
good examples, which sum up the gist of this argument, can be found in the pamphlet 
The Patriot, written by the Church of Scotland minister and prominent loyalist 
pamphleteer Thomas Hardy, and in an essay by John Young, the Anti-Burgher 
minister at Hawick. 
In his pamphlet, Hardy did concede to the radical claim that there were many 
taxes, but, he argued, it did not necessarily follow that they constituted a burden on 
the people. That, he claimed, would depend on the ability of the country to pay them 
and, in the case of Britain, this question would need to be investigated before it could 
be decided if the taxes bore too heavily on the people. And even if the conclusion of 
such an investigation was that the British paid a substantial part of their income in 
taxes, it could not thereby be stated, Hardy argued, that the people were carrying a 
heavy or undue ‘burden’. Indeed, he went on to construct an argument that taxes 
were actually to the benefit of everyone, since they would have an inflationary effect 
on the 
would 
economy, whereby profits and wages would go up and the effect of the taxes 
be eliminated: 
The effect of the taxes has been to raise the profits of every profession. 
They are chiefly paid by the rich: The heavier taxes are laid 
immediately on the rich, and they relieve the poor of their whole share 
See: Thomas Paine, Rights of Man (London, 1792), part two, chapter 5, ‘Ways and Means of 41 
Improving the Condition of Europe, Interspersed with Miscellaneous Observations’. 
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of the others, as they are the employers of the poor, and must advance 
their payments at or beyond the increased price of the necessities 
which the people must buy; and in these, all their taxes are in~luded.~’ 
The validity of Hardy’s argument is certainly debatable, since it is doubtful if wages 
always increased in line with the raise in taxes, but it is interesting to note that John 
Young argued in much the same way.4‘ Young pointed out that the authorities were 
in a better position than the public to judge what an appropriate tax-level should be, 
and - even if the taxes were high - the British were in that happy situation of having 
their tax burden decided for them by their representatives. He also underlined that 
France had a more unreasonable tax system, or so he believed, and that the French 
poll-tax alone ‘would be heavier than all our taxes together’, on which point he was 
undoubtedly wrong. More central in Young’s essay, however, was his argument 
about the inflationary effects of taxation, which was largely the same as Hardy7s.14 
As it emerges from their line of argument, both Hardy and Young were concerned 
with the level of taxation in general, and neither of them commented on the relative 
Scottish contribution 
Few other loyalist pamphleteers awarded as much time and space to the issue 
of taxation as Hardy and Young had done, but some did at least raise a few points in 
response to the radicals’ and Thomas Paine’s arguments. Alexander Carlyle admitted 
that taxes in Britain ‘no doubt have been increased’, but insisted that ‘the most 
prudent care has been taken, that they shall as little as possible affect the labouring 
poor’, and claimed that ‘a person in that condition, if he lives with becoming 
frugality, has not to pay in taxes for all he purchases during a whole year, above the 
value of the wages of five days labour’ .45 One anonymous pamphlet printed in 1793 
argued that the burden of taxes should never be ‘estimated by the amount of Revenue, 
collected by nzeuns of them, but by the ubilig qf  the people ut the time, to pry  
them . Since the brunt of the tax burden was carried by the rich, the pamphlet 7 46 
” Thomas Hardy, The Patriot (Edinburgh, 1793), p. 70. 
John Young, Essays on the following Interesting Subjects (Edinburgh, 1794). 
Ibid., p. 12 1 .  
45 Alexander Carlyle, National Depravih? the Cause qf National Calamities (Edinburgh. 1794). p. 19. 
Anonymous, A NeH, Year’s G$, to the People of Great Britain (Edinburgh, 1793). p. 20 [original 
italics]. See also: Robert Thomas, The Cause of Truth, Containing, besides a great varieh. of other 
matters, A Refutation of Errors in the political rtvorks of Thornas Paine, and other publications ? f a  





claimed, this was not a problem at the current stage, and, in any case, those taxes 
which ‘chiefly affect the poor, such as those on candles and leather, are the same 
they were 70 years ago’.47 A similar point was stressed by another anonymous 
and the Reverend James Roger stated that, as far as taxation was 
concerned, ‘the most numerous class, those in the lowest order, especially in 
Scotland, pay little or nothing to government’, since they were neither subject to 
‘poll tax or house duty’, nor paid excise duty on the most important means of 
subsistence ‘barley, oats, milk, butter, cheese, [and] eggs’ .49 Roger also emphasised 
that some degree of taxation was absolutely necessary in order to sustain civil 
government, and that the British taxes were in any case ‘so well regulated’ that ‘they 
cannot be called oppressive , while Andrew Hunter saw the ‘regular payment of 
taxes’ as but one of many duties the subject owed to the government of the land? 
7 so 
In spite of the disagreement between loyalists and radicals over the general 
level of taxation, there seems to have been a continued consensus over who should 
carry the main burden of taxes. As Alan Gunning has argued: ‘Whether owing to 
fears about the possible repercussions of political discontent or from philanthropic 
motives there does seem to have been an almost unanimous opinion that 
“necessities” of the poor should only be lightly taxed and taxes on them increased 
only in instances of utmost need’? General consensus or not, as has been pointed 
out in the discussion on taxation above, gradually passing the tax burden on to the 
poorer sections of society was exactly what happened, even if the authorities had no 
intention of doing so. 
IV 
The Repeal of the Coal Tax 
To the extent that members of the general public held any opinions about taxation, 
they tended to be focussed more on individual taxes and duties, than on the general 
Ibid., p. 21 [original italics]. 
’A Friend of Order’, A few Plain Questions to the uTorkirzg people of Scotland (Edinburgh I?. 1793). 




‘O Ibid., p. 45. 
” Andrew Hunter, The Duties of Subjects (Edinburgh, 1793). p. 10. Robert Thomas made a similar 
point. Thomas, Cause of Truth, p. 396. 
” Gunning, ‘War’, p. 21 1 .  
223 
tax level, and in Scotland, there was one duty in particular which attracted a 
disproportionate amount of attention. This was the so-called ‘coal tax’, which was 
probably the single most unpopular tax in Scotland at the beginning of the 1790s, and 
in this case, the discontent was concerned with the relative tax burden carried by the 
Scots. Although it was used at the time, it is worthwhile pointing out that the term 
‘coal-tax’ is potentially misleading in this context, and therefore in need of a 
clarification. 
The specific tax in question was not levied on coal as such, but rather on the 
transportation of coal by sea, or as some contemporaries phrased it - on coal carried 
coastwise. Coal, which was distributed over land, did not carry a similar duty. This 
distinction was part of the English system of duties on coal, which was supposed to 
have been introduced in Scotland in its entirety with the Union treaty of 1707. At the 
time, however, the Scottish coal producers along the Firth of Forth had managed to 
obtain a temporary exemption from the duties levied on English coal, for all Scottish 
coal used within Scotland, thereby shielding themselves from English competition. 
This exemption was only conceded for three years in the original Treaty, but in 1709, 
the Forthside coalmasters had asked for a continuation of their privilege, and had 
obtained a more limited benefit. From then on, coal shipped within what was defined 
as the estuary limits of the Firth of Forth was to be exempted from the transport tax, 
whereas all shipment of coal to other parts of Scotland had to carry the duty. The 
consequence was that coal provided for the largest part of the Scottish market - the 
Lowland area - by producers within that same area, did not have to pay transport 
duties, and this exemption served to give Scottish coal producers some degree of 
protection from the cheaper and better quality Newcastle coal, thereby enabling them 
to retain a monopoly of coal provision in the Lowlands.s‘ In the rest of Scotland, 
however, where the coal tax had to be paid on seawards deliveries, it was deeply 
resented, and believed to have the effect of making this important fuel unnecessarily 
expensive. Such feelings ran particularly high in the north-eastern parts of the 
5 3  - See: Christopher A. Whatley, ’Salt, Coal and the Union of 1707: A revision article’, Scottish 
Historicuf Rel-fierzi, 66 (April 1987), 26, 32-3, 40-1; Christopher A. Whatley, ‘New Light on Nef‘s 
Numbers: Coal Mining and the First Phase of Scottish Industrialisation, c. 1700- 1830’, Sociery in 
Scotland since 1700: Essays presented to Professor John Butt, eds., A. J. G. Cummings and TI M. 
Devine (Edinburgh 1994), pp. 7-8; and Michael Fry, The Dundas Despotism (Edinburgh, 1992), p. 
166. 
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Highlands, which were remote from any of the major coal producing areas of 
Scotland, where there was little local coal mining taking place, and where coal 
consequently had to be brought in by sea.s4 Whether the coal tax actually did make 
coal markedly more expensive in those parts of Scotland where the duty had to be 
paid, than in those areas which were exempted, is not entirely clear - the difference 
may have been only marginal, although sufficient to make the untaxed Scottish coal 
slightly cheaper than the taxed English coal - but there is little doubt that the tax was 
disliked in any case. 
Complaints about the coal tax surfaced in late 1792, when a letter to the 
Home Office stressed that an easy way of removing some of that discontent the 
authorities attributed to radicalism, would be to ‘to take off the duty on Exportation 
of English Coal into Scotland. At present it amounts almost to a Prohibition and the 
poor suffer extremely by it in many places particularly on the Shores of Galloway 
and Dumfries-shire’.5’ A similar point was made in a petition from the local elite in 
Dumbartonshire, where a period of heavy autumn rain in the Highland districts of the 
county had made the normal source of fuel - peat and turf - partially unusable. This 
had, according the petitioners, exposed the ‘lower Classes of the People’ to ‘great 
additional hardships’, since they could not afford to buy coal in the place of peat and 
turf, and they concluded that: 
This being the Situation of the Poor in Dumbarton Shire where the 
Coasting duty upon Coals is not paid we cannot but be Sensibly 
affected at the Calamatous Conditions of those Countys more distant 
from Coal and exposed to a high Coasting duty which we must 
consider as a real and unequal Grievance Artificially oppressing in a 
high degree those extensive and northern districts in an Article which 
nature has totally denied them? 
Further petitions for a repeal of the coal duty emerged in the press in mid-January the 
next year. By then, however. Henry Dundas had already taken the initiative for a 
removal of the tax, by launching a motion to that effect in the House of Commons, 
Inland transportation of  coal over anything beyond very short distances was not an economically 
viable option until well into the nineteenth century. See: Whatley, ‘Nef‘s Numbers’, p. 16. 
55 National Archives o f  Scotland [NAS], RH2/4/66, f. 220, Will Keyden (‘?I to [ .  . .I, 6 December 1792. 
NAS, RH2/4/68, ff. 3-5, Meeting of  the ‘Freeholders, Commissioners of Supply, Justices of  the 




and most of these petitions consequently focussed on expressing their support for 
Dundas’s bill?’ One of the earliest petitions came from the Annual General Meeting 
of the Highland Society, and read: 
COAL - DUTY FREE 
There is but one sentiment among the people of this country with 
respect to the motion made by Mr DUNDAS for taking off the duty 
upon Coals carried coastways north ... This measure is truly a national 
concern, and is of a vast deal more importance to the country than the 
reform so anxiously sought for by the Boroughs? 
Similar petitions were sent by members of the local elite on Orkney,” from the 
Stewartry of I(lrkcudbright,60 the burgh of T a i d l  and by the Easter Ross Farming 
Society,62 while the Sheriff Substitute of Caithness wrote to Dundas: ‘wishing all 
Success to your patriotic endeavours to remove the Duty on Coals so universally 
complained of in the poorer and more northern Counties of Scotland’.h3 Henry 
Dundas thus appears to have had a solid backing from across Scotland for the motion 
he presented on 1 January 1793. and when he spoke to the House of Commons on the 
issue, his argument was based partially on the points put forward in the two earliest 
petitions. The motion seems to have run into little resistance in parliament, and was 61 
reported to have been ’carried unanimously’ when Henry Dundas first presented it. 
Part of the reason for this lack of opposition must have been the reassurances Dundas 
I n  December 1792, Dundas had received a direct request of promoting a repeal of the coal tax from 
Sir William Maxwell in Dumfries, who acted on behalf of a meeting that had been held there t o  
discuss the circular letter Dundas had sent out to all the sheriffs of Scotland. asking for information 
about the situation with respect to grain and fuel. See: NAS, GD224/31/6. ff. 18-19, Sir William 
Maxwell to the Duke of Buccleuch, Springkell. 17 December 1792; and Henry W. Meikle. Scotlund 
and the French Retvlution. (Glasgow. 191 2), p. 101. 
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Ibid., 4 Feb. 1793. ‘Meeting of the Freeholders and Commissioners of Supply of the County o f  
NAS, RH2/4/69, ff. 197-98, ‘General Meeting of the Freeholders. Commissioners of Supply and 




Heritors of the Stewartry of Kirkcudbright‘, 17 Jan 1793. 
Tain’. 
“Ibid. ,  1 April 1793. 
NAS, RH2/4/68, f. 144. Brodie [ ? ]  Sheriff Substitute of Caithness to Henry Dundas, Thurso, 12 
January 1793. See also: ihid., f. 168, ‘Meeting of the Magistrates Town Council and Inhabitants of the 
Town and Borough of Tramburgh[?] and Neighbourhood’, 14 January 1793. 
gj See: The Times, 3 Jan. 1793, ‘PARLIAMENTARY INTELLIGENCE, HOIJSE OF COMMONS, 
Wednesday 1 Jan., Scotch Grain and Fuel’. Dundas argued that the duty on importation of coal to 
Scotland was so large ‘as almost amounted to a prohibition‘. and that ‘the people of that country had 





gave the House that - as far as ‘the revenue of the United Kingdoms’ was concerned 
- ‘any measure he proposed for the relief or benefit of one part, should not be 
injurious to the general interest of the whole’, i.e. the removal of the coal duty in 
Scotland should not affect the overall revenue-returns from the country.65 In practical 
terms this meant compensating for the revenue lost through the repeal of the coal tax, 
by introducing a new, or increasing an old duty in Scotland - what was later termed a 
‘commutation’ tax - and the manner in which the repeal of the transportation duty on 
coal in Scotland was subsequently administered, points to a degree of interaction and 
compromise between the needs of the government and the popular demands of the 
public? One particularly unpopular tax - that on the transport of coal - was 
removed, only for the lost revenue to be at least partly recovered by increasing the 
duties on another, less controversial tax. As David Brown has pointed out: ‘In early 
1793 in order to lower fuel prices, government removed the tax on coal carried 
coastwise. For the ordinary people of Scotland it was the single most popular act of 
Henry Dundas’s career. Part of the revenue lost to the Treasury was recouped by a 
further distillery act’.67 As it turned out, increasing the license duty did not make 
whisky more expensive, nor did it raise the anticipated amounts of revenue for the 
5 oovernment, but this could not be foreseen in early 1793.‘’’ Success or not in terms of 
raised revenue, for Dundas the offering of a compensation tax may have been crucial 
in persuading Parliament to support his scheme, since even as prominent a politician 
The Times, 3 Jan. 1793. 
George Home of Wedderburn had warned Dundas as early as in February 1793 against removing 
the coal tax without a compensation for the loss of revenue. and he argued that - i f  repealed - ‘the 
Coal duty hitherto paid in Scotland should be commuted for some new Tax peculiar to Scotland’. 
NAS. GD267/1/17, George Home to ‘Dear Sir’, Edinburgh. 20 February 1793. 
David J. Brown. ‘The Politicians, the Revenue Men and the Scots Distillers, 1780- 1800’. Re\,ierr, of 
Scotrish Culture, 12 (1999), 51-52. [The distillery act raised the licence duty. which a whisky distiller 
had to obtain in order to produce whisky legally.]. Many commentators were deeply concerned about 
the increasing consumption of cheap whisky among ordinary people in the 1780s and 90s. and 
therefore supported a higher duty on distillation since they assumed this would have the effect of 
making whisky more expensive, thereby reducing, or at least containing. the use of this spirit. 
Exchanging the coal tax with a raised duty on whisky production was therefore unlikely to cause 
much popular opposition. 
Due to innovations in the distillation of whisky. the large Scottish distilleries were selling rapidly 
increasing amounts of cheap, poor-quality whisky in the 1790s, and whisky was gradually replacing 
beer as the main alcoholic drink of ordinary people. See: Brown, ‘Scots Distillers’; Vivien E. Dietz, 
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as Dundas might have struggled to gain support for a tax cut, at a time of looming 
war. By raising the licence duty on whisky distillers, however, MPs may have felt 
reassured that an unpopular tax could be removed without any significant loss of 
income. To steer this legislation through Parliament probably required quite some 
effort from Dundas’s side, and the quality of his work did not go unnoticed. Once the 
news of the eventual repeal of the coal tax reached Scotland, letters of thanks from 
many parts of the country were either sent to Dundas, or printed in the press, and 
some of them showed an appreciation for the need to introduce a commutation tax. 
William Walker at the Exchequer Office in Edinburgh was among the first to 
express his satisfaction over the removal of the tax, which he did in a letter to the 
editor of the Edinburgh Evening Courant in late June. Walker held that: 
A fair and beneficial law has thus, in my humble opinion, been now 
obtained for this country; and Mr. Dundas, without sinking the 
revenue, has the sole merit of repealing that coal-duty, which has been 
so oppressive to a great part of Scotland, and for which. I have no 
doubt, he will receive that grateful acknowledgement from his 
countrymen which so meritorious an act deserves.” 
The magistrates and council of Dumfries County were of a similar ~ p i n i o n , ~ ”  as was 
the Scottish Chamber of C ~ m m e r c e , ~ ’  and the elite of Inverness C ~ u n t y . ~ ’  From 
Montrose, it was reported that upon the arrival of the news from London. ‘the bells 
were immediately set a-ringing, and the colours belonging to the town. the different 
corporations, and ships in the harbour. displayed. under a general discharge of the 
b Guns of the battery’,73 while the magistrates and council in Aberdeen expressed their 
a oratitude to Dundas by ‘unanimously’ voting ‘him the Freedom of their City’, due to 
be presented ‘in an elegant Gold Box, with a suitable in~cr ip t ion’ .~~ The local elite in 
the county of Forfar. however, probably went further than most, when they requested 
‘the favor of Mr. Dundas to sit for his Portrait at the Expence of the county to be 
Edinburgh Evening Courunt, 24 June 1793, ‘To the PRINTER’. 
Caledonian Merc iq ,  27 June 1793. 
Edinburgh Advertiser, 5-9 July 1793. 
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placed in the County Hall’, and also asked the same favour of their MP, David Scott 
of D~nninald.’~ 
For Dundas, however, the repeal of the coal tax was not only a matter of 
national political strategy. He also had a personal political interest in removing the 
duty. In the northeast, where coal had to be imported, the supply and price of this 
particular commodity was a political issue, and Dundas was seeking to build up his 
political strength in this area. If he could be seen to be promoting the interests of the 
people living there, by removing a tax which was particularly burdensome for them, 
then that was unlikely to harm his popularity and influence there.76 When this could 
be done without causing damage to his ‘interest’ in other parts of the country, or to 
his influence among the leading classes of Scottish society in general, then so much 
for the better. It is worth noting in this context that, whereas it was considered safe to 
repeal the coal tax, the also very unpopular corn laws, which placed restrictions on 
the trade of grain between different parts of Britain, remained in place. Henry Meikle 
has argued that Dundas was well aware that the basis of his power was the landed 
classes, and to retain the corn laws was important for their continued wealth. It 
would therefore not be in Dundas’s interest to alienate himself from this group by a 
removal of the trade restrictions on grain, no matter how popular it might have been 
in trouble-spots such a.; Dundee.” 
As the repeal of the coal tax demonstrates, the government was prepared to 
listen to, and act upon complaints from people in general and, in a decade when the 
survival of the state in large measure depended upon its ability to rally the people 
behind its struggle against domestic radicalism and the threat of a French invasion, 
this was not without significance. The last two chapters will address the issue of 
Scottish support for the government in the 1790s in more detail. 
75 NLS, MS 1058, Melville Papers, ff. 25-28, ‘Meeting of the Freeholders, Justices of the Peace and 
Commissioners of Supply of the County of  Forfar’, 16 August 1793. See also the address of  thanks to 
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So far, this thesis has discussed how the 1790s saw a new kind of challenge to the 
British state and its political system, and how the government in Scotland responded 
to this challenge. In the last two chapters we will address the issue of Scottish 
support for the government, and the extent to which Scots were prepared to rally to 
the defence of the British state at this time of crisis. Loyalism is divided here into 
two separate categories, those of ‘Demonstrations of Loyalty’ and ‘Loyalist 
Ideology’, the first of which will be the focus of this chapter. Before we go on to 
address the different ways in which Scots demonstrated loyalty to the British state, 
however, it is necessary to look briefly at the encouragement the government gave to 
loyalism, as well as the various events of the decade that sparked a loyalist response. 
I 
Incentives 
The overall government policy for enlisting the support of people in general - as well 
as the many reservations the authorities had when it came to encouraging loyalism - 
was outlined in chapter two, and most other aspects of the government’s efforts to 
encourage public support for itself and for the war were addressed either in relation 
to military recruitment. or the challenge of radicalism. This chapter will therefore 
provide only a brief summary of these, while also addressing a few government 
incentives which have so far not been mentioned. 
The first initiative the government took to encourage loyalty was to issue the 
Royal Proclamation against seditious writings in May 1792. Although the 
proclamation was aimed primarily at the representatives of local government, as well 
as the local elites - who were asked to assist the central government in its attempt to 
suppress radicalism - William Pitt and his ministers had taken the first step towards 
facilitating and encouraging the involvement of the general public in the political 
debate on the French Revolution; a decision which was reinforced by the second 
proclamation in December of the same year. To an extent, this amounted to an 
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attempt to fight the radicals on their own ground, by appealing to the support of the 
general public just as they did and, as such, it was a strategy which involved a 
considerable risk for the government. Perhaps for precisely that reason, no further 
encouragements of a similar kind were given once the radical movement began to 
falter, and, for the remainder of the decade, government attempts to rally the support 
of the general public tended to be aimed at more specific issues, rather than at the 
suppression of radicalism in general. 
The first of these attempts was the Royal Proclamation issued after the first 
attack on the king at the state opening of Parliament on 29 October 1795. Published 
within two days of the attack. the proclamation condemned the attempted assault on 
the monarch’s person, and enjoined ‘all Magistrates, and all other [ofl our loving 
subjects, to use their utmost endeavours to discover and cause to be apprehended the 
authors, actors and abettors concerned in such outrages’. A reward of E1000 was 
promised for information which would lead to the conviction of the perpetrator, but, 
despite the widespread view that radicals had been involved in the incident, no 
further mention was made of either radicals or seditious activities in the 
proclamation. The other attempts the government made to encourage loyalism were 
mainly related to either recruitment of men for armed service, or to the public’s 
financial contributions to the war effort. Both the invitation to arm in 1794, and the 
Defence of the Realm Act of 1798, included clauses which encouraged subjects to 
offer their personal service to the state on a voluntary basis, whereas the three Navy 
Acts of 1795 set out specific quotas of the men which needed to be raised in the 
different localities; these were similar to the Militia Act of 1797.’ While several 
incentives were thus given to encourage service in the armed forces, only one major 
effort was made to convince the general public that it should give its financial 
support to the government on a voluntary basis as well. Entitled a ‘Voluntary 
Contribution for the Defence of the Country’ the scheme - which had been devised 
by 1798 - was primarily an appeal from the government to the wealthy classes of 
Britain, and an attempt to let them demonstrate their loyalty and patriotism by giving 
I 
Caledonian Mercuq, 5 Nov. 1795, ‘BY THE KING, A PROCLAMATION’, Court of St. James’s. 1 
31 October 1795. 
’ For a discussion of the Navy Acts of 1795, see: chapter 4, pp. 146-37. 
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their financial support to the state voluntarily, rather than through a new levy of 
taxes.’ This attempt at creating a nationwide subscription campaign was part and 
parcel of the government’s programme for a truly national defence against invasion, 
and was therefore complementary to the Defence of the Realm Act of the same year. 
It aimed to provide the financial basis for the defence against invasion. Similar to the 
Defence Act, the initiative behind the Voluntary Contributions scheme appears to 
have originated from outside the cabinet, and possibly in Scotland.‘ The Duke of 
Buccleuch had at least written to Henry Dundas in the early summer of 1797, 
offering to contribute nine-tenths of his income to the government, rather than to 
submit to the ‘disgraceful1 conditions of Peace’. and whereas this may not have been 
the only incentive the central cabinet ministers obtained, it none the less seems clear 
that Dundas had taken inspiration from Buccleuch’s proposal.s Although primarily 
aimed at wealthier Britons, the proclamation was also addressed to ordinary people, 
encouraging them to contribute as best they could. In the current ‘critical situation’, 
the address stated, ‘money is as necessary as men; and those fleets and armies which 
fight in our defence must be paid and provided for by the country they defend’. 
Admittedly, most of th.is new revenue was intended to be raised from ‘men of large 
monied capitals, without families, or in situations which do not occasion, or lead to, 
an expence in living nearly adequate to their fortunes’, or otherwise in proportion to 
the means of the contributors, but it was emphasised nevertheless that ‘it is not from 
the rich only that such contributions may be expected. Persons of every station and 
condition, we are confident, will readily come forward in aid of this measure, as their 
ability and circumstances may allow’. It was further stated that those people whose 
situations in life ‘do not admit of their present contribution in money’, would instead 
be given the opportunity of ‘aiding their country ... by their personal services and 
Culedoiiian Mercun., 8 Feb. 1798. 
J .  E. Cookson, The British Armed Nation 1793-1815 (Oxford, 1997), pp. 72, 215-18. Cookson did 
not state where the idea came from, only that i t  ’originated outside the Cabinet’, Ibid., p. 215. 
’ Whether the Duke was genuinely prepared to make such a sacrifice may be an open question, but 
since Henry Dundas had subsequently asked him if the ‘publick feeling in the Country’ was such as 
would make them willing ‘to undergo the want of a tenth of their present contents [‘?I and expenditure 
to save the Country from disgrace and ultimately destruction’. this may indicate that Buccleuch’s 
suggestion had at least set Dundas thinking along the lines of a voluntary type of financial 
contribution from the public. NAS. GD224/30/3, ff. 17-18, Henry Dundas t o  the Duke of Buccleuch, 
Wimbledon, 19 June 1797. 
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labour, which the public funds will compensate’.6 The plan was, in other words, for 
those who had any money to spare to contribute financially to the defence of the 
country, whereas those who had no money to offer could offer their personal service 
instead, for which they would be given a monetary compensation. Beyond the 
initiatives mentioned so far, however, the only direct involvement the government 
had in the development of loyalty and loyalism over the course of the 1790s was the 
decision to back the Reeves Association in 1792 at the cost of the other fledgling 
loyalist societies that were emerging at the same time, but demonstrations of loyalty 
were also triggered by events and developments outside of the government’s direct 
control, either concerning the war, or related to the situation at home.’ 
A striking feature of Scotland in the 1790s is how well informed the general 
public appears to have been about political events at home and abroad. Some of the 
more prominent demonstrations of loyalty that took place were clearly responses to 
key events during the decade - on both the domestic and the overseas front. The 
three most crucial British naval victories of the 1790s - Lord Howe‘s victory over 
the French on the ‘Glorious first of June’ 1794, Admiral Duncan’s defeat of the 
Dutch fleet at Camperdown 1797, and Nelson’s famous and decisive victory over the 
French fleet at the Battle of the Nile on 1 August 1798 - all drew loyalist responses 
of one kind or another, as did the less successful campaigns fought by the British 
army in Flanders.’ The French Revolutionaries’ attitudes to war and peace was 
another issue to which people responded, as were the political developments within 
France itself. Many Scots also used any appropriate opportunity to express a more 
t Oeneral support for the war and for the government’s war policies. At home, the most 
obvious causes for demonstrations of loyalty were the two attempts on the life of 
George 111, in 1795 and 1800 respectively, and within Scotland, the King’s Birthday 
riots in Edinburgh in 1792 and the activities of the British Convention in 1793 both 
sparked a loyalist reaction. Not all demonstrations of loyalty were, however, direct 
responses to either specific events or to government initiatives, and a crucial element 
~~ ~~~ 
‘ Cnledotiian Merciin,, 15 February 1798, ’ADDRESS TO THE INHABITANTS OF SCOTLAND from 
the COMMITTEE -FOR CONDUCTING THE VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION FOR THE 
DEFENCE OF THE COUNTRY‘, signed by the Duke of Buccleuch and Thomas Elder. 
7 
8 
On the government’s support for the Reeves Association, see: chapter 2, pp. 70-2. 
Nelson’s second major victory at the Battle of Copenhagen in 1801 does not appear to have attracted 
a similar response in  Scotland. 
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of any discussion of loyalism must therefore be the extent to which people took their 
own independent initiatives, and whether this led demonstrations of loyalty to 
become a political force outside of the government’s control. Since there were many 
ways in which Scots might demonstrated their loyalty to the British state that have 
not been recorded for posterity, this chapter will not aim to provide an exhaustive 
discussion of all possible kinds of loyalist demonstrations, but rather focus on those 
that were particularly prominent, involved a substantial number of people and were 
of significance for the war-effort. These will be addressed under the four broad 
categories of ‘Loyalist resolutions’, ‘Information and initiatives’ given by the 
Scottish public to the government, ‘Personal service’ and ‘Financial support’, but 
first it is necessary to look at the loyalist association movement, which marked the 
beginning of explicit demonstrations of loyalty to the British state. 
I1 
The Loyulist Societies 
It was pointed out in chapter two that loyalist associations began to emerge across 
much of Britain in late 1792 in response to the upsurge of political radicalism and 
popular unrest that year. and that this occurred hefore the government had finally 
decided to encourage popular support for itself and for the British state. In Scotland, 
this response was slower to materialise than in England, and more hesitant at first. 
which may have been partly because of the later outburst of radical activities there. 
Following the rioting in Scotland in 1792, however, an increasing number of reports 
were sent to the central government in London, stating that people were coming out 
in support of the government and against the activities of radicals and politically 
motivated disturbances. George Home in Edinburgh - who held the position of Clerk 
of Session, and was a man trusted by the government - wrote to his cousin Patrick 
Home in London in late November 1792 stressing that: 
The Spirit of Reform as you know was first begun among the master 
manufacturers, in many places particularly about Glasgow they are 
now come to repent of it when it is too late, they foresee that any 
convulsion must produce unavoidable ruin to them, and are now doing 
every thing in their power to check and restrain that spirit of sedition 
they have raised, in so much that the Reform societies about Glasgow 
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are daily diminishing in numbers, and do now consist only of the very 
refuse of the People.’ 
Less thaD a month later, he wrote that the establishment of a loyalist association in 
Edinburgh had had a very favourable effect in subduing the ‘Spirits of the Levellers’, 
and that ‘a General1 understanding to give no Employment to Tradesmen or Shop 
keepers who have adopted the new fashioned Doctrines’ had developed.” This, in 
turn, had caused many of them to withdraw their names from the societies 
established by the Scottish reform organisation the Friends of the People. About a 
week later he reported that ‘this Country is getting into better temper’, so much so 
that a recent attempt at instituting a Friends of the People society in Berwickshire 
had been abandoned due to a lack of interest.” Similar views were expressed by 
William Craig, the sheriff depute of Ayr, who informed Henry Dundas that ‘at 
present in Ayrshire all factious meetings are very much disliked and that the same is 
the case with the farmers and tenants’.’’ and an anonymous letter sent to John 
Reeves in London from Edinburgh in January 1793 stated that: 
Here. as in London, People begin to cool greatly about Reform. - Few 
talk in favors [sic] of it, - and these few are pointed out, and laughed 
at. - I have hardly to doubt that in less than Six Months, it will be 
almost forgotten, and this happy Country, restored to its former Order 
& Happiness. 13 
This gradually emerging support for the government notwithstanding, the 
Association for the Preservation of Liberty and Property against Republicans and 
Levellers does not seem to have gained such a strong foothold in Scotland, as it did 
in England. Reeves’ societies were never as numerous on the ground in Scotland as 
they were south of the border/ and the amount of Scottish correspondence that has 
NAS, GD267/1/16, George Home t o  Patrick Home Esq. of Wedderburn M.P. Gower Street London. (1 
Edinburgh, 25 November 1792. 
l 0  Ibid., George Home to ’Dear Sir’ [Henry Dundas‘?], Edinburgh. 12 December 1792. 
Ibid., Letter dated: Edinburgh. 21 December. 
NAS, RH2/4/65, ff. 82-3, Will Craig, Sheriff depute of Ayr to Henry Dundas, Edinburgh 24 
British Library [BL], Reeves Manuscripts, Add. MSS 16928. f. 1 1 ,  ‘the Author of the Reformers & 
Austin Mitchell, ‘The Association Movement of 1792-3‘. Historical Journal, 4, (1961 ), 62. 
November 1792 [original italics]. 




survived in the organisation’s own records is not very e~tens ive . ’~  This is not to say 
that the association did not receive a positive welcome from many Scots, however. 
John Mackenzie in Cromarty, for example, wrote to John Reeves in late January 
1793 to inform him that at a loyalist meeting in the town, the ‘Minutes of the day’ 
had received ‘ 120 Subscriptions’, and that another 150 had signed the ‘Subscription 
Book’ since then. This was particularly impressive, Mackenzie thought, when 
considering that ‘there are only about Three Hundred Heads of Families in this Town 
& Parish’, and he predicted that ‘if the Book was left open a few days longer there 
woud [sic] not be three non Subscribers’.’6 At Kirkcudbright, a meeting called for the 
purpose of ‘taking into consideration the state of the country’ had been attended by 
6 1, and received ‘Letters and intimidations’ from another 32. *’ Nevertheless, since 
there is little evidence of a similar kind from other places, it is difficult to say 
whether the examples of Cromarty and arkcudbright applied more generally in 
Scotland, and, in some areas, the movement was certainly given a more lukewarm 
response. A correspondent in Edinburgh, for example, wrote to the secretary of the 
association in London in January 1793 expressing his dismay at the lack of 
enthusiasm for the movement which seemed to prevail there: 
I . . .  regret that I have not heard of any Proposition having been made 
here for establishing associations on a smaller Scale; - such as these 
recommended by your Committee to be erected in different Parts of 
London & its Environs - the Expediency of which applies, in a certain 
Degree, to Edinburgh, & every large Town. 18 
The association’s programme for distributing loyalist pamphlet material also seems 
to have received a mixed response. An anonymous letter to the secretary in London, 
written in late November 1792, stated that since ‘the principles on which you act 
must meet with the approbation of every fine friend to his country in this part of the 
Island - where I am sorry to say the dangerous doctrines your society reprobates 
l 5  Material relating to Scotland can be found in BL. Add. MSS, 16919, 16920, 16924, 16928, 16930 
and 16931. 
BL, Add. MSS, 16924, ff. 128-29, John Mackenzie Preses & Walter Ross Secr. to John Reeves 
Esq., Cromarty 22 January 1793. See also: BL, Add. MSS. 16931. f. 48,  ‘At a numerous Meeting of 
the Inhabitants of the Town & Parish of Cromarty’ [Loyalist address in which it is stated that the 
resolutions were ‘Subscrib’d by 280 Heads of Family out of 300 of which the parish consists’.]. 
l 7  Ibid., f. 88. ‘AT KIRKCUDBRIGHT, 17 January 1793. 
I h  
BL, Add. MSS, 16928. ff. 1-2, J. Marjoriebanks to J. Moore, Canongate Edinburgh, 1 January 1793. 18 
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have made more impression on the lower classes than they have done in England’, 
the publications that the association had already been disseminating in England ‘will 
therefore be of use if circulated in Scotland’.’’ Some time later, the Sheriff of Fife 
wrote to John Reeves reporting that ‘above 2000 Pamphlets have already been 
distributed in this County and I am happy to acquaint you that the ferment and 
irritation of mind that persuaded many of the lower order of People in this Country is 
greatly subsided at least for the time?’ Others, however, were not equally convinced 
of the necessity of circulating loyalist material in Scotland. Matthew Campbell, the 
sheriff substitute of Wigton, for example, also wrote to John Reeves, informing him 
‘that this County is in the most perfect Tranquility [sic] and that distribution of Loyal 
& Constitutional Publications in this Country is only administrating Good medicine 
to a Healthy Body’.” Majoriebanks, who had complained of the lack of enthusiasm 
for the movement in Edinburgh, also admitted that the necessity of forming such 
organisations were, to some extent, ‘superseded by the Declarations published by 
most of the Incorporated Trades & Societies in the City & Liberties; expressive of 
this Loyalty, Attachment to the Constitution, &c’? This was a central point, 
because, whereas John Reeves’s organisation may not have made as strong a 
breakthrough in Scotland as in England. Scots demonstrated their loyalty as 
forcefully in other ways. 
111 
Loyalist Resolutions 
By far the most extensive source of evidence on demonstrations of loyalty to the 
government and support for the war effort in the 1790s - in terms of the sheer 
quantity of material that has survived - is that of loyalist addresses, resolutions and 
declarations. More than 400 of them were sent from Scotland alone during the 
~~~ ~ 
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Revolutionary War, and they remain one of the chief sources of loyalist sentiment 
and ideology in this period. A loyalist resolution would normally be addressed 
directly to the brig, but resolutions expressing loyalty and support were sometimes 
also sent to the representatives of local government. As demonstrations of loyalty, 
resolutions were almost invariably written and sent in response to specific events, 
and were therefore also addressing specific issues. This did not stop them from 
carrying a more general loyalist message, or from adopting loyalist arguments used 
in other contexts, nor did it prevent them from often following a standardised set-up 
and structure; but there was no steady output of addresses year by year. Instead, 
loyalist resolutions came in waves, responding to some of the more crucial events of 
the decade. 
Sending loyal resolutions or addresses to the king and his ministers was, 
however, no novelty by 1792, but followed a long-standing British tradition of 
demonstrating support for the monarch and the government at times of national 
emergency, crisis, or celebration? The most recent event to have sparked a wave of 
loyal addresses was George III's recovery from his mental illness in 1789, when 
hundreds of congratulatory addresses were sent to the king from all corners of the 
country,24 but there had also been significant numbers of resolutions sent on earlier 
occasions in the eighteenth century." Indeed, an address to the king was often the 
prime way by which a large proportion of the population could show their interest in, 
concern about or support for given policies. in a legal manner. As such, the address 
was the direct opposite of the petition, which was the only legal way in which most 
people could present grievances to the authorities. The loyal resolution's long 
tradition notwithstanding, mass-issuing of addresses had not been as common in 
Scotland as it had been in England before the 1790s and, in this sense, the waves of 
resolutions emanating from Scotland in 1792 and afterwards were unprecedented, 
and represented a new aspect of Scottish society as far as its willingness to display 
support for the British monarch and government in London was concerned. 
7 1  
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Loyalist addresses were - apart from being sent to the king - usually 
published in the press, and since only a small sample of these addresses were 
retained in the government’s own correspondence, newspapers remain the best 
source of information on this type of evidence. The most reliable in this respect was 
the government’ s own publication the London Gazette, which printed addresses 
during all the major waves of resolution-writing, but resolutions were also published 
in other newspapers - both national and local. Since many loyalist addresses were 
printed in more than one newspaper and the details of some addresses may not have 
survived, it is impossible to determine the precise number of resolutions that were 
actually drafted and sent. Furthermore, in the case of those addresses which were 
sent in response to the two Royal Proclamations in 1792, it is clear that the London 
Gazette did not publish all the resolutions that were sent, but focused on those 
originating with local public officials, or other members of the local elites, whereas 
local newspapers such as the Caledonian Mercury in Edinburgh omitted most of 
these addresses and instead concentrated on those that came from the general public. 
The figures presented here for the total number of addresses are therefore estimates, 
although more precise figures can be given for the respective newspapers. 
The first of the three large nation-wide waves of addresses - which also 
contained the very first resolutions to be sent from Scotland in this period - began in 
the summer of 1792, following the Royal Proclamation of 21 May 1792. The 
country’s response to the proclamation was a veritable flood of addresses to the king. 
streaming in from all corners of the kingdom. and indicating that the proclamation 
had struck a cord with a significant number of people, who had so far remained in 
quiet disapproval of the activities of political radicals. To begin with, it was 
predominantly local public officials who sent addresses. The first Scottish resolutions 
to be printed came from ‘the Lord Provost. Magistrates and Council of the City of 
Edinburgh’, and of Stirling, and were published in the 2-5 June issue of the London 
Gazette? Addressing the King directly, the Edinburgh officials opened their 
resolution by emphasising ‘their Zeal and Attachment to the Constitution 
Country’ as well as ‘their Loyalty to their Sovereign, and their Gratitude 
of their 
for that 
” Lordon Gazette, 2-5 June 1792. 
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warm Manifestation of his fatherly Affection to his People, which is displayed in his 
late Royal Proclamation’. They then proceeded to express their abhorrence at the 
‘alarming Attempts of those Enemies to their Country, who seek to poison the Minds 
of the people of these Realms ... by raising up the Shadows of Grievances which 
were never felt but in Imagination’, activities which could only lead to disaster 
unless they were timely checked.” The Edinburgh address set a standard for the 
resolutions which were to follow. Typically, an address would open by expressing its 
signatories’ thanks to the king for issuing the proclamation, then go on to praise the 
blessings which subjects enjoyed under the British constitution and present 
government of Britain, as well as their support for that government and attachment to 
that constitution - which they swore to protect against its enemies - before 
expressing their disgust at the activities of political radicals, and pledging to suppress 
all sedition and attempts by ‘evil-minded and designing Men to disturb the Public 
Tranquillity’, as an address from Argyllshire phrased it.’* A number of addresses 
also wished the monarch a long and happy reign, and a few stressed that if the British 
constitution had any ‘imperfections’ which were in need of being redressed, then the 
‘wise and temperate Means which the Constitution itself has provided for its own 
Preservation’ would not only be more than sufficient to achieve this end,” but also 
far safer than reform ‘by the dangerous Hands of Political Empyries [sic]’.30 Political 
reform - if there was to be any - ought in other words to be left to parliament itself, 
which knew best how to conduct this in a successful manner. From February 1793, 
most addresses - while still responding to the royal proclamation, and condemning 
seditious activities - were also addressing the recent outbreak of war with France. A 
second address issued by the provost and magistrates of Edinburgh in January 1793, 
for example, argued that to express support for the war against France was nothing 
but a logical consequence of the earlier decision to support the government against 
its domestic enemies: 
77 Ibid., ‘WE, your Majesty’s most dutiful Subjects, the Lord Provost. Magistrates and Council of this 
your ancient City of Edinburgh’. 
78 Ibid., 2 1-23 June 1792, ‘the Freeholders, Heretors and Justices of the Peace of Argyleshire’. 
” Ibid., 7-10 July 1792. ’the Magistrates and Town Council of Forfar, in North Britain‘. 
the County of Ayr’. 
lbid.. 28-30 June 1792, ‘the Noblemen, Gentlemen. Freeholders and Commissioners of  Supply of 30 
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We should hold ourselves unworthy of the Name of Britons, if in this 
alarming Crisis of imminent and common Danger, we did not rouse to 
a Man to repel the hostile Aggression of an Enemy, who, after tearing 
to Pieces every Bond of Society within her own Dominions, has raised 
a frantic Arm against the general Peace and Happiness of Europe? 
The French - together with those British radicals who had ‘traitorously courted the 
Fraternity of France’ - were wholly to blame for Britain’s entry into the war, they 
claimed, while the British government emerged as innocent in this unfortunate 
development. j2 
By the time the second Royal Proclamation had been issued on 1 December 
1792, a total of 80 Scottish loyalist resolutions had been printed in the London 
Gazette, nearly all of them from local elites, and the majority by the beginning of 
August? The second proclamation did not lead to such an outpouring of addresses 
from local officials - there were only another 22 Scottish ones published in the 
London Gazette - but instead the number of resolutions sent from the general public 
now saw a substantial increase? To some extent, Frank O’Gorman has argued, the 
response to the first proclamation must have been beyond the authorities’ 
expectations, since the proclamation had merely ‘urged magistrates to be watchful of 
seditious literature and its authors’ as well as ‘to stamp out riot and agitation . 9 3 j  At 
the same time, however. it is clear that the local public officials who wrote back to 
the government assuring the king of their wholehearted cooperation in the 
lbid., 23-29 Jan. 1793. See also: ibid.. 2-5, 26-30 March and 7-1 1 May 1793. 
” Ibid., 23-29 Jan. 1793, ‘the Lord Provost. Magistrates and Council of the City of Edinburgh’. 
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suppression of seditious activities, were essentially only confirming that they would 
follow the instructions they had been given. If the response to the two proclamations 
overwhelmed the government, it was therefore perhaps more related to all those 
resolutions which were sent by different organisations, societies, associations and 
religious communities. Of the more than 120 addresses printed in the Caledonian 
Mercury from June 1792 until the beginning of May 1793, only a handful came from 
public officials, while the majority originated from the general public. Among those 
who sent addresses were presbyteries, as the largest group, various incorporations or 
associations of different professions, such as advocates, physicians, bakers, 
hammermen, merchants, manufacturers, shoemakers, traders, tailors and weavers. 
other groups consisting of farmers, landholders, tenants, freemasons, some times 
even labourers, or just simply the ‘inhabitants’ of a county, burgh, town or parish. 
Relatively few of these addresses were issued and published before the second royal 
proclamation, or even by the end of 1792, which meant that the majority of them 
came much later than those printed in the London Gazette. Only six had been printed 
by 1 December 1792, and 40 by the end of the year. By and large, it was therefore 
mainly local government officials who replied to the first royal proclamation, 
whereas the Scottish public in general responded to the second proclamation and. 
based on the figures presented here, i t  can be safely concluded that the number of 
loyalist addresses sent from Scotland in response to the two proclamations must have 
amounted to at least 200.’‘ 
The second large nation-wide wave of addresses came in the wake of the 
alleged assassination attempt on the king at the state opening of Parliament on 29 
October 1795. Unlike the loyalist resolutions of 1792-93, the addresses to the king in 
1795 were rarely published in the local press, and the London Gazette is therefore the 
main source of information about them. Addresses from Scotland were published 
from early in November 1795 until the end of January 1796, and the total exceeded 
Over the same period, another Edinburgh newspaper - the Edirthurgh Erlening Courant - printed 
nearly 60 Scottish resolutions. most, but not all, of which were also published in the Culedoniuri 
Mercu?. See: Edinburgh Evening Courant, 30 June 1792 - 7 February 1793. For resolutions which 
have survived in the government’s own correspondence, see: NAS, RH2/4/64. ff. 260-6 1 ; 66, f f .  23 1 - 
298; 70, ff. 88, 105-6, 131, 181; 71, ff. 209, 226-27; and 206, ff. 301, 307, 310, 314, 316, 325. 345. 
36 
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170. Most of these addresses opened by either expressing abhorrence and 
astonishment at the recent attempt on the king’s life, or by congratulating the 
monarch on his fortunate escape. Although it varied from address to address which 
of the two they included first, and which would receive the more emphasis, it is 
worth noting that all the addresses included both points. The difference between 
them tended to be whether they stressed the positive factor of the king surviving an 
attempt on his life - in which case the address was likely to mention this first - or the 
negative fact that someone had attempted to assassinate the monarch. Having thus 
made an initial decision on whether to take a generally positive or negative approach, 
these addresses then went on to cover themes such as a belief that divine providence 
had shielded the kmg’s life, and hopefully would continue to do so in the future; 
some even held the king’s escape to be proof that the British system of government 
was not ‘meant’ to be tampered with. It was stressed that only a few deluded men 
supported the attack, whereas the majority of the population was appalled, and most 
addresses concluded with reassurances of the addressers’ firm attachment to both the 
person of the king and his government. More significant. perhaps, was the 
connection made in some of the addresses between the attack on the king and the 
activities of people promoting radical policies. About 25 of the Scottish addresses 
suggested that there was such a link. Not all of them argued that the attack had in fact 
been carried out by political radicals themselves. Many of them merely stated that 
something like this was to be expected when designing men were trying to stir up the 
people against their rulers, or that all the recent radical propaganda and agitation 
could have led some unthinking soul astray, and caused him to commit this 
deplorable deed - the radicals were in other words at least indirecdy responsible for 
what had happened. A handful of addresses did, however, make the link between the 
attack and radicalism more explicit; of which the declaration sent by the Royal 
Paisley Volunteer Corps was particularly poignant. The Paisley Volunteers found it 
appropriate to: 
express their highest Indignation and Abhorrence at the late daring 
Attempt on the sacred Person of your Majesty by a Band of cowardly 
Assassins, the Engines of a desperate Faction, whose Views, under the 
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specious Pretext of Reform, evidently are to subvert the Constitution 
and deluge that Land with Blood.37 
Other themes touched upon in these addresses were a declared willingness to risk life 
and fortune in defence of the lung’s person, reassurances that the addressees would 
do everything in their power to combat sedition and tumult, support for the 
government’s planned legislation against seditious activities, and a hope that those 
who were behind the attack would be apprehended and punished according to the 
severity of their crime. Unlike the loyalist resolutions of 1792-93, not as many of the 
addresses of 1795 came from public officials. The biggest single group was still 
provosts, magistrates and councils, but out of the 170 Scottish addresses published in 
the London Gazette, only 47 originated with this group, while 33 where issued by 
freeholders, heritors, justices of the peace and commissioners of supply - a group 
which contained some public officials, but also other members of the local elite who 
did not hold public office. At 80 addresses in all, nearly half of the total number had 
thus been sent by the local elites. 37 addresses were sent by presbyteries, whereas an 
entirely new group sending loyal addresses was the volunteer corps, as was seen 
above, and 24 corps sent addresses in 1795-96. h addition, there were six university 
addresses, and the remaining 23 originated with a whole range of different groups.” 
The third, and last, big wave of addresses to be sent during the Revolutionary 
War was triggered by a repeat of the same event which had caused the second wave 
- an attack on the king’s person. The reaction from the public was much the same as 
it had been five years earlier, although the number of addresses sent from Scotland 
was probably lower than in 1795. A total of 107 addresses printed in the London 
Gazette from the end of May until the end of September can be identified as 
originating in Scotland, and this was fewer than after the first attack. The proportion 
of addresses sent by public officials was now higher than five years before, at 75 out 
London Gazette, 5-8 Dec. 1795. 
A batch of 38 of the original addresses which were sent to the king following the assassination 
attempt can be found in  one of the supplementary volumes to the Home Office Correspondence for 
Scotland, and of these, ten came from presbyteries or synods, nine from magistrates and town councils 
and six from volunteer corps, with the remaining 13 originating with a whole variety o f  sources. See: 
NAS, RH2/4/21 1 [the whole volume consists of addresses]. See also: NAS, RH2/4/79, f. 179, Address 
from ‘the Ministers and Elders of the Church of Scotland, met in the General Assembly of this 
National Church’, Edinburgh, 2 1 May 1796: and 1 1 addresses printed i n  the Culedonian Mrrcuq?,  12, 




of the total 107,'9 but there were fewer addresses sent by presbyteries, and only about 
the same number from the Scottish uni~ersities.~' Once more, the remaining 23 
addresses came from a wide range of sources including the 'Corporation of 
Candlemakers in Edinburgh', 'the Faculty of Advocates', 'the Gentlemen of every 
Description, and whole inhabitants of the County and Town of Nairn' and 'the 
Weavers' Society of ~ r i e f f  .41 
The survival of this evidence - from 1795 and 1800 respectively - concerning 
two very similar events, but written at different stages of the war, makes it possible 
to conduct a thorough comparison of the general views that were presented on these 
two occasions, and there are a two marked differences to be observed. A main theme 
in the 1795 addresses had been the threat posed by radicalism and sedition and, as 
was mentioned above, quite a few addresses had expressed a belief that political 
radicals had been involved in the attack. h 1800. however, not a single address 
mentioned either the word reform, radicals or sedition explicitly, nor was any form of 
indirect reference made to the political opposition in connection with this second 
attack on the king. To some extent, the reason for this may have been that the 
perpetrator had now been seized immediately after the attack, leaving little doubt as 
to who had committed the deed, but it is none the less striking that none seemed to be 
interested in exploiting this opportunity to smear the radicals."' Instead they chose to 
focus even more strongly on the person of the king, and on how anyone could even 
imagine harming such a virtuous and admirable man. The magistrates and town 
council of Dunfermline. for example, wrote: 
From whatever Motive this foul and nefarious Deed may have sprung. 
whether originating in the dark and bloody Conception of Treason. or 
the melancholy but dreadful Workings in the Mind of a Maniac, it is 
equally a Source of Wonder and Astonishment. that such an horrible 
Idea could have found Place in the Imagination of any Person living 
under the Protection of your Majesty's Government. Happily through 
the Interposition of Divine Providence Assassination has missed its 
Of these 75 addresses, 19 were sent by Provosts, Magistrates and Councils, and the remaining 26 by 
There were only four addresses from presbyteries and five from the universities. 
London Gazerre, 3-7 June 1800, 'the Deacon and Members of the Corporation of Candlemakers in 
Through the reports on the attack in  the press, people would also have been aware of' the alleged 
19 
Freeholders, Heritors, Justices of the Peace and Commissioners of Supply. 
40 
11 
Edinburgh', 7-10 June [Advocates]. 17-21 June [Nairn], and 24-28 June 1800 [Weavers]. 
insanity of the perpetrator, James Hadfield. See: Culedoniun Mercu?, 19 May 1800. 
12 
245 
Aim, and the British Empire is relieved from the Apprehension of 
suffering from so direful a Calamity.43 
This passage is also representative of the other main difference from the 1795 
addresses. After the event talung place on the state opening of parliament five years 
previously, many addresses held it to be as much an attack on the British constitution 
and form of government as on the king as a man of flesh and blood. By 1800, 
however, no address appeared to see, or choose to see, the assassination attempt as an 
attack on the government. Several addresses did use the word ‘treason’, but did not 
seem to view the attack on the sovereign’s person as an attempt to overturn the 
British state. Emphasis was instead placed on the dreadful fact that someone had 
tried to murder the king, or, in the words of the bishops and clergy of the Scotch 
Episcopal Church: ‘to take away a Life so justly dear as that of the beloved Monarch 
of the British Empire . Moreover, it was not just any king whose life had been put 
in jeopardy. Indeed, George 111 was portrayed as the ‘best of Kings’, the ‘Patriot 
IOng’, the veritable pillar upon which the happiness of the whole British empire 
depended - some even claimed that the empire would crumble, if the king was to 
perish - and. most importantly, as the ‘Father of his People’. The County of 
Dumfries, for example, declared a wish that, ‘your majesty may long live and reign 
the Ornament of the Throne, the Guardian of constitutional Liberty, and the Father 
and Friend of a grateful People’.4s This change from a focus on the assassination 
attempt as an attack by political radicals upon the British form of government, in 
1795, to an attack upon the sacred person of the king, in 1800, can be seen as the 
result of two main developments in this period. First, it underlines the argument that 
domestic radicalism no longer posed a significant threat to the state in the second 
half of the 1 7 9 0 ~ , “ ~  and second, it indicates that the government’s policy of 
presenting the George I11 as the benevolent Father of his People had been taken in by 
the general public. It is the argument of Linda Colley that a shift in the royal image, 
towards stressing the king’s public, paternalist and national role, had set in as early 
7 44 
London Gazette, 17-21 June 1800. 43 
Ibid., 2 1-24 June 1800. w 
Ibid., 24-28 June 1800, ‘the Freeholders. Justices of the Peace, and Commissioners of Supply for 45 
the County of Dumfries’. 
See: chapter 1 ,  p. 36. 46 
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as the mid-l780s, and that this image had been decisively reinforced by the advent of 
the French R e v ~ l u t i o n . ~ ~  The addresses sent in 1800 seem to indicate that this shift of 
image had eventually made its impact in Scotland. 
Although the responses to the royal proclamations and the two assassination 
attempts represented the most significant waves of loyalist addresses in this period - 
at least in quantitative terms - addresses were also sent to London on several other 
occasions, albeit then in considerably smaller numbers. In 1797, at least six Scottish 
addresses were sent to the king following the second naval mutiny,“ condemning the 
mutineers for the action they had taken, and a further three resolutions appeared in 
the press, without there being any clear indications of whether they were also sent to 
the government in London? A common theme in these addresses was a firm belief 
that enemies of Britain - either domestic radicals or French revolutionaries - had 
been at work in the fleet and had deluded the good-natured, but perhaps slightly 
gullible, British seamen, and that this was the real cause of the mutiny, rather than 
any deeply held discontent or grievance on the part of the sailors. As the address 
from the county of Stirling stated: ‘Daring and evil-minded Persons have betrayed 
the open Frankness and Candour of British Seamen’,”’ and the Banffshire Volunteers 
- appalled by the ‘attempts made by designing Traitors & Incendiaries to corrupt the 
Fidelity & allegiance of his Majesty’s Forces’ - assured the authorities that in the 
case of anyone attempting infiltrate their corps in a similar fashion, they would ‘save 
the Civil Courts the trouble of a Trial of such lnfamous Traitors’.‘’ 
Linda Colley. ‘The Apotheosis of George 111: Loyalty. Royalty and the British Nation 1760 - 1820’, 
Ynsr & Present. 102 (1  984), 102-6. 
NAS, RH2/4/80, f. 105, ‘the Corps of Banffshire Volunteers’, 15 June 1797; and London Gazette, 
20-24 June 1797, ‘the Ministers and Elders of the Presbytery of Irvine’, ‘the Merchants. Ship Owners, 
and others, concerned in the Trade of the Port of Ayr’ and ‘the Merchants. Ship Owners and Ship 
Masters of the Town and Port of Irvine’; ibid., 24-27 June 1797. ‘the Magistrates, Common-Council 
and Inhabitants of the Royal Burgh of Banff ;  and ibid., 27 June-] Ju ly  1797, ’the Noblemen, 
Gentlemen, Justices of the Peace, and Commissioners of Supply of the County of Stirling’. 
They were not addressed to the king specifically, as was the norm for loyalist addresses, but rather 
stated a set of resolutions, which had been reached at a ‘General Meeting’. See: Caledonian Mercun, 
12 June 1797, ‘a General Meeting of the Merchants, Ship-owners, Ship-masters, and other Inhabitants 
of the PORT of LEITH’, ‘Meeting of the Merchants, Ship-owners, Shipmasters, and other Inhabitants 
of  the Port of KIRKALDY’. Ibid., 15 June 1797, ’a General Meeting of the MERCHANTS. SHIP- 
OWNERS, SHIP-MASTERS, INSURERS, and the others in Borrowstounness’ . 
j0 London GaLette, 27 June- 1 July 1797. 




A very few addresses were also sent to London following the two failed 
rounds of peace negotiations with the French in October 1796 and July 1797, and on 
both occasions, they showed a deep-seated indignation at the approach adopted by 
the French.” Writing to the king after the first attempt at reaching an accord had 
failed, a group of ‘Noblemen, Freeholders and Heritors’ in Haddington expressed 
their concern to see ‘the late Negotiations for peace humanely set on foot by our 
Majesty, abruptly broke off by the haughty and insolent Conduct and ambitious 
Views of the French Directory’? A similarly fierce reaction followed the failure of 
the second round of negotiations, where it was generally held that Britain had taken a 
moderate and accommodating approach, whereas the French had refused to even 
contemplate peace on any other terms than complete French world domination. A 
meeting of the principal inhabitants of Lanark claimed that Britain had offered terms 
‘little short of unconditional Submi~s ion ’ .~~  whereas a similar meeting in Nairn 
observed that: ‘We have seen, with a Mixture of Regret and Indignation, that 
reasonable Overtures made by your Majesty for restoring Peace to these Realms 
rejected by our hostile and implacable Foe: that Openness and Moderation have been 
met by unexampled Evasion, Subterfuge and Duplicity’.” Far more joyous occasions 
for sending a loyal address to the king were the vital and spectacular naval victories 
of 1797 and 1798. At least eleven Scottish addresses were published in the London 
Gazette from early December 1797 until the end of 1798 concerning naval victories, 
and another three have survived in the correspondence of the Home Office.” Most of 
these addresses expressed a sense of relief, because these victories seemed to fend 
5q 
- -  For an account of the peace negotiations, see: Ian R. Christie, WLir.5 arid Revolutions. Rrituin 1760 - 
1815 (London. 1982), pp. 239-4 1 .  
53 NAS. RH2/4/80. f. 13, address from ‘the Noblemen The Freeholders and Hcritors of the County o f  
Haddington’, Haddington, 17 January 1797. 
London Gazette. 26-30 Dec. 1797. ‘the Noblemen, Gentlemen. Freeholders. and Justices o f  the 
Peace of the County of Lanark. 
- -  /hid.. 12- I6 Dec. 1797, ’the Gentlemen, Freeholders. Justices of the Peace. and Commissioners of  
Supply of the County of Nairn’. The reverend James Roger raised the same issue in his Essaj, or1 
Gm’er-rzrtzerzt in 1797. In Roger’s view, the British peace-proposals had been ‘insolently rejected’ by 
the French. National Library of Scotland [NLS], 5.792(23), p. 59. 
See: London Gazette. 26-30 Dec. 1797; ibid., 6-10 March, 27-30 Oct.. 30 Oct.-3 Nov.. 20-24, 24-27 
Nov., 27 Nov.-1 Dec., 4-8 Dec. 1798; NAS, RH2/4/82, f .  223, Address from Inverness. Inverness. 27 
October 1797; ibid., f. 225. address by the Magistrates and Council of Aberdeen, Council Chamber 
Aberdeen, 23 October 1797; ibid.. f. 262, ‘the Presbytery of Tain in the County of Ross’, Tain, 29 
November 1797: and NAS. RH2/4/84, ff 238-39, ‘the Ministers and Elders of the Church o f  Scotland, 
met in  the Commission of the General Assembly‘. Edinburgh, 2 1 November 1798 [also printed in the 





off the most immediate danger of invasion, and thus gave the nation a respite from 
the strains and anxieties of the past two years, but some also found it difficult to 
disguise their satisfaction at the defeat of the French so soon after the Directory had 
declined British peace proposals. French ambitions of ruling Europe had been halted, 
and - in the words of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland - the Battle of 
the Nile had provided no less than ‘a Victory which has given a fatal Blow to the 
Maritime Power of that usurping Nation who wish to give Law to the World’. First 
and foremost, however, this was an occasion to rejoice at the ‘irresistible Bravery 
and Skill’ of the ‘Admirals and Officers and Seamen’ of the Royal Navy, who had 
saved the nation from disaster.“ The town council of Edinburgh - which had ‘voted 
a congratulatory Address to his Majesty, on account of Admiral Duncan’s victory’ at 
Camperdown - also decided to give its thanks to the Admiral himself, ‘presented in a 
gold box, value one hundred guineas’? 
As an exception from the general rule outlined above, a few addresses were 
also sent at different times expressing more overall support for the government at a 
time of war, and by and large, these addresses were responding to the ‘war’ in a 
b general sense, rather than to any specific events. There was a certain degree of 
overlap between ‘war-resolutions’ as such, and the first wave of loyalist addresses - 
since many resolutions sent after 1 February 1793 were responding to both the royal 
proclamations, and addressing the threat posed by the outbreak of war - but a few 
resolutions were none the less written, concerning the war alone. The first of these 
appeared in 1793, and was produced by the General Assembly of the Church of 
Scotland. The assembly had asked their moderator, Thomas Hardy (a noted loyalist), 
‘to present a loyal address to his Majesty on the Subject of the war in which this 
country is at present engaged with the French Nation’. and ‘to express their 
abhorrence of the attempts made by that people to disturb or to overturn the other 
London Gazette, 27 Nov.-1 Dec. 1798. 
Glasgow Courier, 4 Nov. 1797. The same issue also included an address from ‘the Magistrates and 
Council of Aberdeen’, concerning the same victory, and from the ‘town of Dundee’, which had 




9 59 governments of Europe . The view that the French were to blame for the outbreak 
of the war was repeated by the same assembly exactly one year later,60 and was 
supported by an address from the General Convention of the Royal Burghs? Several 
years later, the General Assembly again felt it opportune to ‘Express the Sentiments 
which we feel on occasion of the Arduous Contest in which this Nation is engaged 
with a Neighbouring Hostile Power’ - which were those of loyalty to the king - and 
the synod of ‘Burgher Seceders’ expressed similar views about the same time!’ 
Overall, however, war-related resolutions such as these remained rare. Resolutions 
condemning the activities of radicals in Britain, and accusing them of attempting to 
start a revolution at home, also continued to be issued from time to time, but in very 
small numbers compared with the massive waves of addresses in 1792 to 93. In May 
1794, for example, the synod of Moray, found reason to take ‘into their consideration 
the state of anarchy and confusion universally prevailing in a neighbouring nation, 
and reflecting with horror upon the attempts of some designing men to propogate 
[sic] these dangerous principles in several parts of this kingdom’, it decided to issue 
an address of ‘unshaken loyalty to the &ng’.63 
All the above-mentioned addresses came in response to events which affected 
every inhabitant of Great Britain. In a few cases, however. loyalist resolutions were 
sent to local government officials, and addressed events or issues of a more local 
concern. Shortly after the IOng’s Birthday riots in Edinburgh in 1792. for example, a 
meeting was held by the Company of Merchants in the city, in order to consider a 
response to these disturbances. The outcome was a public address, in which the 
company pledged to ‘give every aid in their power‘ in support of the local 
authorities, expressed their thanks to the lord provost, magistrates and sheriff for 
’’ NAS, RH2/4/71, f. 230, Thomas Hardy to Henry Dundas, Edinburgh, 18 May 1793. Ibid., ff. 226- 
27 [the address by:] ‘the Ministers and Elders of the Church of Scotland‘, Edinburgh, 18 May 1793; 
or: Caledonian Mercun, 30 May 1793. 
6o NAS, RH2/4/76, ff. 22-3, ‘the Ministers and Elders of the Church o f  Scotland’, Edinburgh, 17 May 
1794. 
Ibid., ff. 172-73, ‘The General Convention of the Royal Boroughs o f  Scotland’, Edinburgh, 9 July 
1794. 
62 NAS, RH2/4/84, ff. 234-35, ‘the Ministers and Elders of the Church of Scotland met in the General 
Assembly’, Edinburgh, 22 May 1798; and London Gazelle, 8-12 May 1798, ‘the Ministers and Elder 
in their Synod assembled, of that Body of Dissenters from the Church o f  Scotland, commonly called 
Burgher Seceders’. 
63 Caledonian Mercug,, 1 May 1794. See also: Ibid., 15 Feb. 1794, ‘the Presbytery of Inverness’. 
61 
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their handling of the crisis and offered a reward of 50 guineas ‘for the discovery of 
the leaders and instigators of the late disturbances, or of the writers of any of the 
incendiary letters or seditious advertisements which have lately appeared’ .“ The 
initiative taken by these merchants was quickly followed by eight different 
‘incorporations’ in the city, although none of them offered a similar reward. Instead, 
the ‘corporation of Skinners and Furriers’, for example, pledged to ‘watch over their 
families and servants, or other respectively under their charge. and employed by 
them, and not only to warn them of the danger of being concerned in such outrages, 
but to do every thing else that lies in their power to restrain them from engaging in 
all lawless proceedings’ .65 Similar statements were made by another four 
incorporations. 66 
When the Edinburgh authorities decided to put an end to the radical activities 
of the British Convention on 6 December 1793. the two men in charge of breaking 
up the assembly - Thomas Elder, the lord provost of Edinburgh and John Pringle, the 
sheriff-depute - published a proclamation the next day explaining why they had 
found it necessary to take this dramatic step. This was immediately met with a 
favourable response from many inhabitants in the city.” In the following issue of the 
Caledoriinn Mercury, no fewer than 16 incorporations and other professions in 
Edinburgh published addresses of thanks to the authorities for the resolute action 
they had taken? and over the following two months another twenty similar 
addresses were printed in the Edinburgh press.69 The members of the Dalkeith 
6-1 lhid., 9 June 1792, ‘Meeting of the COMPANY o f  MERCHANTS of the City of’ Edinburgh, 
’’ Ibid., ‘At Edinburgh, niithin the Skinners Hall there, the 8’’’ of Jitne I792’. The other incorporations 
were those of: Hammermen, Bakers, Websters, Tailors, Shoemakers and Waukers and Hat-Makers, as 
well as ‘the United Incorporations of St. Mary‘s Chapel’ [Edinburgh]. 
MERCHANTS-HALL, JUNE 7 1792’. 
The Shoemakers. Tailors and Waukers and Hat-Makers did not make such a promise. Ibid. 
See: Caledonian Mercun,  or Edinburgh Evening Courant, 7 Dec. 1793; or Edinburgh Ad\iertiser. 
6-10 Dec. 1793. ‘PROCLAMATION, by the Right Hon. Thomas Elder. Lord Provost of the City of 
Edinburgh and John Pringle, Sheriff-Deputy of the County of Edinburgh’. 
These were: ’the Royal College and Incorporation of Surgeons of Edinburgh’, ’the Convenery of 
Canongate’, ‘the United Incorporation of St. Mary’s Chapel’, ‘the Corporation of Bakers‘, ‘the 
Incorporation of Goldsmith‘s’ [Hall]. ‘the Company of Merchants of Edinburgh’, ‘the Deacons of 
Crafts’. ’the Society of Barbers of Edinburgh’, and the Incorporations of Bonnetmakers. Fleshers, 
Hammermen, Skinners and Furriers, Shoemakers, Tailors, Websters and Waukers and Hatmakers. 
Caledonian Mercury, 12 Dec. 1793. 
See: Caledonian M e r c u y ,  19, 26, 28 and 30 Dec. 1793, and 16 Jan. 1794; Edinburgh Advertisor, 
10- 13, 13- 17, 17-20, 27-3 1 Dec. 1793; and Edinb iqh  Evening Coilrunt, 12, 14 Dec. 1793, 2, 4, 6, 16, 






Farmer’s Society, for example, were of opinion that - although they had just recently 
issued a declaration of loyalty to the British constitution - they would have been 
inconsistent had they not now come forward to express their abhorrence at the 
proceedings of the British Convention, as well as their gratitude to Thomas Elder and 
John Pringle: 
It is the opinion of this Society, that the propagation of similar 
principles and doctrines, if not timely checked, could scarcely fail to 
unhinge civil Government, and introduce into this happy island all the 
wild anarchy and confusion, the rapine, irreligion, murder, cruelty, and 
injustice, which for some time past have rendered France an universal 
scene of horror and pity to surrounding  nation^.^' 
The views expressed by the Dalkeith farmers were typical of those that appeared in 
other addresse~,~’  and the Convenery of the Trades in Edinburgh even pledged that 
they would ‘give no employment or support to such deluded and seditious persons. 
until they shall become peaceable members of ~ociety’.~’ The majority of the 
addresses which were sent in response to Thomas Elder’s proclamation came from 
Edinburgh and nearby a rea7 ’  but there were also addresses from as far away as 
Inverness, and so impressed were the Edinburgh authorities with the response from 
the citizenry, that they published an official statement, thanking the inhabitants of the 
city for their support and a ~ s i s t a n c e . ~ ~  
74 
Overwhelming though this mass of loyalist resolutions at first sight may 
appear, a certain degree of caution ought still to be applied when attempting to 
determine the extent of genuine loyalty to the British state, and reverence for the 
British constitution, that can be derived from this outpouring of apparent support for 
the government. Although all the resolutions proclaimed their support for the 
government and expressed loyalty to the British constitution, the very fact that they 
Edinburgh Evening Courant. 4 Jan. 1794. 
The Prebytery of Dalkeith, for example, presented similar views. See: Edinburgh Advertiser, 10- 13 
Dec. 1793. 
7’ Edinburgh Evening Couratit, 23 Jan. 1794, ‘the Convenery of the Trades in Edinburgh’. Edinburgh. 
Magdalen Chapel. 2 1 Jan. 1794. 
See for example: NAS, RH2/4/74, ff. 154-55, Resolution by the ‘Magistrates and other Principal 
Inhabitants of Paisley’, 17 Dec. 1793 [who condemned the British Convention for advocating 
universal suffrage]. 
74 Ibid.. 13 Feb. 1794, ‘the Presbytery of Inverness’. 





came in large waves is in itself a good reason to be careful about ascribing too much 
importance to them, without further investigation. This is not to say that loyalist 
resolutions should, or can, be dismissed altogether, but rather that quality in content 
does not necessarily follow from quantity in numbers. As with other ways of 
demonstrating loyalty to the state, the crucial question to ask in connection with 
loyalist resolutions is whether the writing and sending of a loyal address to the king 
required much e@ort on behalf of those who did so, or to phrase the question slightly 
differently: what - if any - was the ‘cost’ involved in sending a loyalist resolution? 
Could an address be sent off to London without much thought going into either its 
wording, or the reason for sending it, and to what extent was resolution-writing 
perceived as a serious undertaking? To answer such questions, we need to look at 
those who sent the addresses, and at the content of these addresses. 
On the first issue, the mere quantity of addresses does provide a few 
indications. As was pointed out above, most resolutions were drafted and sent by 
either public officials or other representatives of what may be termed the 
‘establishment’ in Scottish society. In the first wave of addresses, magistrates, town- 
councillors, justices of the peace, commissioners of supply, noblemen, gentlemen 
and freeholders were the typical signatories of loyalist resolutions. and for this social 
group, support for the government and the existing political system must have been 
more natural than opposition. It was they - as the main property-owners and 
franchised classes of Scotland - who had most to lose from a wholesale reform or 
change of the British political system along the lines proposed by the radicals. Since 
this arguably gave them a vested and personal interest in upholding the political 
status quo, the cost of not supporting the government when it was under threat could 
thus be all the greater than the cost of providing such support - after all, sending a 
loyalist resolution represented a very small sacrifice. 
For many other groups in society, however, it was less clear what interest they 
had in upholding the existing political arrangements, and this was perhaps 
particularly the case for ordinary working people, or the ‘lower classes’ as they were 
most commonly denominated by contemporaries. Ordinary people had little or no 
vested interest in the existing political system in Britain, and it was not immediately 
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clear that they would have anything to lose by an extensive reform of that system 
either. Indeed, many radicals argued - and argued quite convincingly - that they 
would have everything to gain from such reforms.76 Thus, for ordinary people, 
attending meetings to draft loyalist resolutions must have required more effort than 
that required of their social superiors, and it is therefore significant that a number of 
loyalist resolutions were sent by people who were not part of the e~tabl ishment .~~ 
There were, for example, addresses sent from weavers’ societies, from the dissenting 
churches and the Scottish Episcopalian Church, from lodges of freemasons and from 
farmers or farmers’ societies. Occasionally, addresses in the Scottish press were also 
accompanied by a list of those who had attended the meeting - normally stating their 
professions - and sometimes these lists included people of widely different 
occupations and varied backgrounds. An address sent by the inhabitants of Dunbar 
early in 1793, for example, was followed by a list of all those who had attended the 
meeting and had signed the resolution, and among them could be found: a merchant, 
a tobacconist, a writer, a physician, a shipmaster, a baker, an excise-officer, a 
bookseller, a brewer, a mason, a worker, a tinplate-worker. a carpenter, a shoemaker 
and so In most cases, however, such lists of names and occupations were not 
included, and this makes it difficult to determine the extent to which people outside 
of the establishment attended loyalist meetings and signed addresses or re~olutions.’~ 
Moreover, if the address had been sent by ‘the magistrates and council’ of a town or 
burgh, then it was most likely to have been only the local officials who had attended 
the meeting and signed the resolution. 
The content, or wording, of loyalist resolutions is significant, mainly because 
there were so many written documents responding to the same incidents, or 
government incentives. It was pointed out above that those resolutions, which were 
Loyalist pamphleteers would, of course, later argue that ordinary people had as much of an interest 
as anyone else in maintaining law and order and as much to lose by a revolution on the French model. 
Since - in the view of these pamphleteers - the British constitution provided the best security for law 
and order, also ordinary people had a vested interest in retaining the political sfarus quo. See: chapter 
76 
7, p. 292. 
This was the case for the assassination attempts of 1795 and 1800 in particular. 
Professions were given for all the 63 signatories of the resolution. Edinburgh Advertiser, 12- 15 Feb. 
1793, ’the Burgesses and other respectable Inhabitants of the burgh of Dunbar’. 
There may be a large undetected well of popular loyalism behind the waves of loyalist addresses, 
since typically vague indications of signatories to resolutions, such as the ‘inhabitants’ of a parish. 





sent during the three major waves, tended to touch upon many of the same themes, 
and often adopted a similar set-up or structure. To some extent, this was perhaps to 
be expected when a large number of addresses were sent in response to the same 
event, but in very many cases, the similarities were sufficiently many, obvious and 
striking, to give the impression that a bandwagon effect had been created. One can 
imagine that if the local public officials in one county had decided to issue a loyalist 
resolution, their colleagues in the neighbouring county might have thought it best to 
follow that example, in order to make sure that they too looked just as supportive of 
their superiors. In many cases, they may well have believed that this could be 
essential for obtaining patronage and other favours in the future. Consequently, when 
the local elite of a county, town or parish decided to meet and issue a declaration of 
loyalty to the government, the main reason for doing so may therefore simply have 
been the pressure they felt from all the other resolutions that had been issued, and a 
wish to avoid standing out at a time when ‘everyone’ was showing their loyalty to 
the government. More than any particular reverence for the British state, or 
commitment to the existing form of government, it may have been the intimidatory 
effect of sheer numbers which was decisive. Although it is difficult to provide 
absolutely solid evidence of such a bandwagon effect, there is little doubt that the 
majority of addresses were very similar, and in some cases also straight copies of 
earlier resolutions. After the second assassination attempt on George 111, for 
example, the magistrates and councillors of Inverkeithing and Culross both sent 
exactly the same relatively bland and uninspired address to the king, in which they 
resolved to, ‘beg Permission to approach the Throne with this humble Tribute of our 
sincere and heartfelt Congratulation of the recent providential Preservation of your 
Royal Person, and of a Life so justly dear to the People over whom and in whose 
Hearts you reign’.” Copied addresses notwithstanding, there were none the less a 
number of resolutions drafted, which were sufficiently original and individual - in 
terms of their wording, structure and themes - to justify the conclusion that at least 
some degree of thought and effort must have gone into the work of drafting the text, 
and that those who wrote them, had done so independently of others writing 
London Gazette, 16-19 Aug. 1800. Unfortunately, the notices in the London Gazette do not reveal 
who had copied whose resolution. 
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addresses in response to the same event. These more original addresses were, 
however, in a minority. 
Although the degree of genuine loyalty that can be derived from the mass of 
loyalist resolutions may be difficult to ascertain, the sheer number of addresses that 
were sent, does at least indicate a political consciousness among the people in 
general, and a propensity to pay attention and to respond to dramatic political events. 
In this sense, the floods of addresses were perhaps a mixed blessing for the 
government, in that they seemed to demonstrate precisely that political education of 
the general public that the radicals were working to promote and the government 
wished to avoid. There were, however, other ways in which people demonstrated 
their loyalty to the state that arouse fewer doubts, although, as we shall see in the 
next sections, the evidence on these is not as abundant as it is on addresses and 
resolutions. 
IV 
Irzformution and Initiatives 
From the outbreak of popular disturbances in the spring of 1792 until the peace of 
Amiens in 1802, many Scots provided the government with information about 
radicals and evidence of potential unrest, or presented ideas and initiatives for 
government policies of their own making, without any incentive or remuneration 
from the authorities. These amateur spies and would-be policy-makers often acted 
out of concern for themselves, their own businesses or other personal interests. or the 
welfare of their localities, but just as often they seem to have thought that the 
information they brought forward, or the suggestion they presented, could be of 
crucial importance for the authorities and the well-being of British society in general. 
In most cases, the information and policy suggestions thus provided by Scots were 
related to domestic affairs - and predominantly with radicalism - but on one or two 
occasions, they also addressed the activities of the French. 
In early 1793, for example, a former soldier who had recently been in France 
wrote to the authorities to warn them of a French plot to assassinate George 111, 
which he had heard about while in Paris. Denoting himself ‘a True Born Briton’, the 
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ex-soldier stated: ‘I assure you that there are 37 Frenchmen in London who were 
sworn before a party of the National Convention at Paris to assassinate his Majesty 
on the first Opportunity even though in open day’. These French agents had received 
their instructions from Chauvelin - the former French ambassador to Britain - he 
claimed, and in an attempt to make sure that his warning was taken seriously, the last 
line of the letter read: ‘You perhaps from the bad stile of the letter think it is all a 
sham but my early Introduction into the Military life hindered me from getting [a] 
Good Education’.*’ More typical of the kind of information some Scots would send 
to the authorities was the case presented to Henry Dundas in an anonymous letter 
from Dundee in late December 1792. The author of the letter - who may have chosen 
to remain anonymous for security reasons - enclosed a radical pamphlet entitled: On 
the foZZy and wickedness of War, which he claimed had been ‘distributed very 
industriously about this town’. Having obtained the pamphlet, he wrote: 
I asked the Bookseller I got it from who was the author of this paper he 
declined to inform me of this but said it was taken out of some essay & 
altered to suit the understanding of the comon [sic] people & that i t  
was printed in this Town. You will no doubt readily perceive the 
tendency it must have on the minds of those for whom it was wrote.” 
A similar case occurred in Perth about a month later, when the circulation of a 
resolution issued by the Friends of the People in Perth entitled: Solenzrz Protestatiorz 
Agairzst the War prompted one of the town’s inhabitants to write a fiercely worded 
letter to Henry Dundas. ‘Would it not be proper to look after the rascals who signed 
the inclosed?’ he asked, before pointing out that ‘these papers are circulated with 
much industry thro this part of the Country’.*’ In other cases, those who wrote to the 
authorities merely wished to inform them about the general state of radical societies 
in their area, or alternatively to reassure them that no seditious publications had yet 
been disseminated there. 
NAS, RH2/4/69. f .  280. ‘A True Born Briton’ to ‘Sir’ [Henry Dundas?], Edinburgh. 5 February 
1793. 
NAS, RH2/4/67, ff. 523, 525, Anonymous letter to Henry Dundas, Dundee, 30 December 1792, and 
the pamphlet On the folly and ttlickedness of War. 
NAS, RH2/4/69, f. 359, Anonymous letter to Henry Dundas, Perth, February 1793; and ihid.. f. 361, 
Resolution on the War issued by ’a meeting of the Delegates of the Societies of the Friends o f  the 
People in Perth’, Guildhall Perth, 29 January 1793. 
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This was still the case in the parish of Culross as late as in December 1792, 
when a letter to Robert Dundas stated that ‘no Seditious Publications have been 
circulated here’, but that ‘A  worthless Individual from Dunfermline, formerly a 
recedenter [resident] in this place, attempted to cause disperse some Lead Medals 
with Transcriptions on them, calculated to inflame the minds of the Ignorant, & 
unthinking’, though without achieving much success.x4 A similar incident at Falkland 
shortly afterwards led the locals to expel a traveller who had attempted to 
‘disseminate seditious and licentious principles’ in the ‘most public part of the 
t ~ w n ’ . ~ ’  Charles Hope - the sheriff depute of Orkney and Shetland - could give 
similar reassurances for the Orkney Islands in January 1793, when he wrote in 
response to the second royal proclamation: ‘It shall be our business to exert our 
utmost vigilance to prevent such publications finding their way to Orkney, in which I 
believe, they are as yet, unknown’. Instead of being influenced by radical literature, 
Hope wrote, the inhabitants of the islands were ‘warm in their loyalty to the TOng & 
attachment to the Constitution & very decided in their detestation of French 
principles, and French Proceedings’ .86 In other places, however, the situation was not 
as favourable as in Orkney, and in March 1793 Henry Jaffray in Stirling reported on 
a recent event where ‘the Jacobin Club or friends of the people as they improperly 
call themselves, went about collecting the manufacturers here and in the 
neighbouring villages for the purposes of meeting and sowing sedition against the 
Ministry on account of the present war with France’. A handbill had been issued, 
which Jaffray enclosed for Dundas’s ‘perusal’ .*7 
Occasionally, people in Scotland would also write to the authorities 
suggesting policies the government could adopt, and one of the first - and probably 
most influential - of these proposals was the suggestion of instituting a national day 
of fasting. It was ostensibly the French Revolutionaries’ attitude to religion that had 
prompted the idea, and one of the earliest suggestions came in a very brief 
NAS, RH2/4/66, f. 218, John Panton [‘!I to the Lord Advocate of Scotland, Culross, 6 December 84 
1792. 
s5 Edinburgh Adrvertiser, 18-22 Jan. 1793. 
January 1793. 
is missing from this volume of letters]. 
NAS, RH2/4768, f. 102, Charles Hope, Sheriff Depute of Orkney, to Henry Dundas, Edinburgh. X 




anonymous letter to Henry Dundas in February 1793. ‘The Atheism of the French is 
much declaimed against’ the letter stated, and it continued: ‘What say you to a day of 
Fasting in this Country, on the event of the War? Accompanied with a proper 
Proclamation it would do much good in Scotland’.88 The same point was reinforced 
by the Rev. Mr. Lapslie, the minister of Campsie, at the end of the year, who wrote 
to the Lord Advocate: ‘You know the tendency of people’s minds in Scotland 
(especially of what may be stiled the Commonalty) is to be Religious [and] any thing 
therefore which shocks their opinions on that subject, they view with horror’. With 
‘the late attempts . . . in France against Christianity’ fresh in mind, Lapslie reasoned, 
‘I cannot help thinlung if Government was as soon as possible to appoint a national 
Fast for the purpose of averting these horrid scenes of impiety . . . which perverts the 
minds of the people in France, I presume it might be political wisdom to do so’.*’ 
The central authorities in London took up the suggestion, and several national fasts 
were subsequently held, the first in April the same year.’” Other proposals that were 
put forward spanned a range of different issues, and they generally had little in 
common other than a wish to show loyalty and support for the government. 
Many people were concerned about how the influence of radicals on the 
general public could be thwarted. One such was James Mathison, an accountant in 
Edinburgh, who, in November 1792, wrote to Henry Dundas pointing out that as 
many as seven out of eight of those who attended the meetings of the Friends of the 
People, were ’Tradesmen and many of them Members of Incorporations’. Since the 
membership of these societies was increasing rapidly, Mathison thought that the best 
way of halting that expansion, and suppressing the movement, would be for the local 
authorities to call in the deacons or masters of the incorporations and to inform them 
that if any of their members continued to attend such illegal meetings, the 
consequence would be that ‘their Right as a Corporation would be withdrawen [sic] 
NAS, RH2/4/69, f. 32 1 ,  Anonymous letter to Henry Dundas, Edinburgh, 13 February I793 [original 
NAS, RH2/4/73, ff. 268-73, Mr. Lapslie to Lord Advocate, Campsie, 6 December 1793 
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italics]. 
9* Caledoniari Mercu?. 30 March 1793, ‘DECLARATION, OF THE BISHOP AND SCOTCH 
EPISCOPAL CLERGY WITHIN THE DIOCESE OF ABERDEEN’ [mentions that a National Fast 
has been appointed for 18 April]. 
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and the liberty of working within the City or Burgh ... shall be laid open’.’’ Such a 
timely use of intimidation, he reasoned, would be an effective way of putting a stop 
to the problem before it got completely out of hand. The merchants of St. Andrews 
devised a slightly different approach to the same problem later the same year. At a 
loyalist meeting called by the local magistrates of the town, they declared their 
intention ‘not to employ any Tradesmen or other person whatever who discovers 
principles adverse to the spirit of our Resolutions’, and since the meeting was 
intending to publish its declaration, this decision was a clear warning to any 
tradesman with radical sympathies to think twice about joining a radical society.” A 
more positive suggestion - which appeared in the late summer of 1794 - was to 
institute parochial ‘Friendly Societies’ consisting primarily of ordinary workers, 
which would then ‘act as a counter-balance in raising a party amongst the commons 
friendly to Government, in opposition to those who have been deluded by designing 
men, to join the societies calling themselves Friends of the People’? 
The repeated harvest failures of the 1790s, with the consequent impact this 
could have on the lives and dispositions of ordinary people, prompted some Scots to 
suggest various means of preventing any wastage of flour. In July 1795, an editorial 
in the Caledonian Mercury warned that, ‘any unnecessary consumption of grain. at 
such an alarming period as the present, one cannot help considering as highly 
reprehensible’. The ‘unnecessary consumption’ alluded to was the use of flour as 
‘hair-powder’. that is, to powder and preserve wigs, and the editorial suggested that 
this practice should be placed under a temporary ban.94 According to the newspaper’s 
own estimates for the whole of Britain, by ‘a total suppression of its use for three 
months, the surprising quantity of 46,867 hundred weight of choice wheat would be 
saved to the community! ”’ A slightly different, yet related, suggestion was inserted 
in The Times later the same year, and concerned the possibility of saving wheat by 
NAS, RH2/4/65, ff. 19-20, James Mathison, Accountant in Edinburgh to Henry Dundas, Edinburgh 
NAS, RH2/4/67, f. 508, Loyalist address by the inhabitants of St. Andrews, St. Andrews 28 
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93 Caledonian Mercuy, 2 5  September 1794. Article by ‘A FRIEND OF ORDER’. 
introduced - the views presented in this editorial must have gained a general following. 
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increasing the use of oatmeal for bread - in England as well as in Scotland. Probably 
written by a Scot living in London, the article stated that: 
As much has been wrote upon the scarcity of wheat, and many 
methods have been proposed to prevent the unnecessary consumption 
of it, I beg leave to mention ... a mode, which though not common in 
England, yet has been practised in London to a pretty large extent, 
during the present scarcity. It is the using of oat meal, which is the 
common bread made use of in Scotland; and though it does not much 
accord with the feelings of an Englishman, it may vie with any other 
sort of grain either for being nutritious or healthy. 
The London dwellers who had used oatmeal were not the poor people of the town, 
but ‘a great number of respectable Scotch families’ residing in the city, who 
‘prompted by a laudable desire to mitigate the sufferings of their fellow subjects, 
have betaken themselves to the use of this kind of bread . Clearly, this was a , 96 
Scottish example, which, it was suggested, Englishmen would do well to follow. 
Five years later, by contrast - during a period when there was a particular shortage of 
oatmeal - the Scots needed similar encouragement in order to be persuaded to 
exchange their traditional oats for wheat and barley. The Edinburgh authorities even 
found it necessary to issue a public address, assuring the inhabitants of their city that 
‘wheat meal. mixed with one half of barley meal, makes most excellent food’, and 
encouraged them to ‘consume as little oat meal as possible, and to make wheat and 
barley meal their chief article of food’.” Later the same year, a meeting held by the 
local authorities in Midlothian even recommended ‘the general use of rice and Indian 
corn’, in order to reduce the consumption of oat meal.98 
In the wake of the naval mutinies of 1797 a number of Scots involved in 
merchant shipping requested some information from the authorities, which would 
enable them to take action on their own accord. A meeting held by the merchants, 
ship owners and ship masters in Leith resolved that a distinction ought be drawn 
‘between Seamen who have done their duty to their King and Country, and those 
who have conducted themselves as enemies to both’. A good way of demonstrating 
this in practical terms, they suggested, would be for the Admiralty to issue: 
The Times, 29 Dec. 1795, ‘ T o  the CONDUCTOR c f t h e  TIMES’, signed ‘J.M.’ 
Caledonian Mercun,  26 April 1800 [original italics]. 





a list of the names of such Seamen as are from this town and 
neighbourhood, and now on board the ships at the Nore, distinguishing 
such as have joined willingly in the mutiny from those who have been 
forced into the measure, but who have been early in returning to their 
duty, and active in advising or compelling others to do so. 
This list should then be made ‘perfectly public’ so that the instigators of the mutiny 
could be identified, and excluded from any future employment in the merchant 
marine, unless they had ‘obtained his Majesty’s pardon’ .99 Similar resolutions were 
also issued in krkcaldy, Borrowstounness, the port of Ayr and the town and port of 
Irvine. 100 
A few Scots also came up with suggestions which were perhaps as much 
aimed at their fellow countrymen, as at the government, but which none the less 
constituted clear policy-initiatives. An anonymous article printed in the Caledonian 
Mercury in late December 1792 sought to direct people’s attention to the possibility 
that radicals might manage to infiltrate the educational system, and questioned 
whether any ‘Seminaries of Education’ had so far given serious thought to ‘the very 
important object of guarding against the corruption of the minds of the rising 
L generation’. If not, then they clearly should, the article argued, and it  went on to ask 
the rhetorical question: ‘would it not be proper to warn parents and guardians of the 
danger to which their children and wards may be exposed, and to exhort all those 
whose duty it is to attend to their conduct, to examine carefully the state of their 
youthful minds concerning political opinions . The damaging consequences of a +01 
failure to stop radicalism from poisoning impressionable young minds could hardly 
be overestimated. Earlier the same month, the members of the Grand Lodge of 
Freemasons in Scotland had inserted an article in the press in which they expressed 
Caletlonian Mercuq., 12 June 1795, ‘General Meeting of the Merchants, Ship-owner, Ship-masters. 
and other Inhabitants of the PORT of LEITH’, Leith, 8 June 1797. 
Ibid., ‘Meeting of the Merchants. Ship-owners, Ship-masters. and other Inhabitants of  the Port of 
KIRKALDY, County of Fife, North Britain’, Kirkaldy, 10 June 1797’; ibid.. 15 June 1797, ‘General 
Meeting of the MERCHANTS, SHIP-OWNERS, SHIP-MASTERS, INSURERS, and others in  
Borrowstounness, concerned in Commerce and Navigation’, Borrowstounness, 13 June 1797’; and 
London Gazette. 20-24 June 1797, ’the Merchants, Ship Owners, and others, concerned in the Trade 
of the Port of Ayr’, and ‘the Merchants, Ship Owners and Ship Masters of the Town and Port of 
Irvine ’ . 
I o l  Caledonian Mercury, 27 Dec. 1792, Article ‘TO THE PRINTER OF THE CALEDONIAN 




their ‘highest displeasure’ at news they had received ‘that of late some Lodges have 
been Let for the purposes of Political Association’ by those holding questionable 
principles. This use of lodge rooms they found to be ‘unworthy’ of the purposes for 
which they had been ‘originally intended’, and they urged the various lodges to put 
an end to this practice.’”’ Shortly afterwards, the grand lodge received public support 
from the lodge of St. Elgin.Io3 Finally, in February 1797, several newspaper 
editorials appeared, encouraging people to take up arms in defence of their country. 
The editor of the Glasgow Courier stated to his dismay, that: 
While all ranks of people on the eastern coasts of Scotland are making 
every laudable preparation for effectually repelling the attack which, 
there is too much reason to fear, the French are meditating on this 
country, we cannot refrain from endeavouring to impress on the minds 
of our fellow-citizens, as well as of the other inhabitants of the 
Western Districts of Scotland, the urgent necessity of their 
immediately enrolling themselves to the use of arms. ... We cannot 
help thinking that the inhabitants of this part of the country are, in 
general, not sufficiently aware of their danger. I04 
The editor of the Caledorzian Mercury, however, was less impressed with the zeal 
displayed by people on the east coast, and consequently wrote an address to the 
inhabitants of Edinburgh. In this he encouraged more of them to join the Edinburgh 
Volunteer corps, so that the defences of the city could be strengthened at a time of 
national crisis and threat of invasion: 
YOU are numbered at no less than 80,000, yet when your country is 
threatened with invasion, 900 only have armed in its defence, being 
little more than eleven out of every thousand ... Your forefathers 
would not have held it any hardship to have mustered upon emergency 
e v e n  fighting man .from 16 to 60; and why should you, enjoying 
blessings far more secure and numerous, under the present laws than 
they could boast of under theirs, reluctantly comply with less. 1 os 
Edinburgh Adverriser, 13- 17 Dec. 1793, ‘THE GRAND LODGE OF SCOTLAND‘, Edinburgh, 12 
Ibid., 27-31 Dec. 1793. 
Glasgo\tl Courier. 16 Feb. 1797. 
Ccdednninn Mercun., 20 Feb. 1797, ‘ADDRESS TO THE INHABITANTS OF EDINBURGH’ 
[original italics and capitals]. For a similar case. see: Glusgow Courier, 14 March 1797, ‘TO THE 
LOYAL INHABITANTS OF EVERY DESCRIPTION, IN THE TOWN OF GREENOCK AND 
SUBURBS’, by the Magistrates of Greenock. 
Dec. 1793 [original italics]. 
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Although the claims presented about former generations’ readiness to fight may have 
been somewhat exaggerated, and the statement did not seem to take into account the 
unprecedented degree of volunteering for armed service that had taken place in 1794, 
the article was probably representative of the general mood at the time. There were 
not enough men under arms, and the invasion defences were inadequate. An 
imaginative solution to this problem had, however, already been presented by the 
manager of the ‘Glasshouse’ in Edinburgh, in a letter to the lord provost earlier the 
same month. ‘Astonished’, that at a time of ‘general alarm’ over the threat of 
invasion, ‘nothing is doing to call forth the spirit and exertion of the people of this 
country at large, and to put them in a situation for acting with energy and effect in 
defence of every thing that is dear and valuable in life’, the manager had made a few 
investigations among his own workforce, and found that ‘though they express an 
aversion, and even dread the idea of being made soldiers . . . they are to a man willing 
and anxious to be to be trained to arms, and would in that case most cheerfully come 
forward in defence of their f i n g  and C~untry’ .”’~ Thus, if the government made 
preparations to set up a more diversified system of defence, it would have an 
untapped resource to draw upon. I07 
The argument that more Britons could be enlisted in the defence of their 
country, without thereby necessarily becoming soldiers, touched upon one of the 
crucial ways in which people demonstrated loyalty to the British state in the 1790s - 
that of offering personal service, which we will turn to in the next section. 
V 
State Service 
Whereas writing and sending a loyalist address to the king, providing the authorities 
with information about radicals, or suggesting policies which the government could 
pursue, arguably did not carry much ‘cost’ for those who stood behind such efforts, 
offering to serve the state in person undoubtedly did, and therefore constituted a 
greater demonstration of loyalty. Personal service did not necessarily mean military 
Ibid.. 13 Feb. 1797, Printed letter by Archd. Geddes, Edinburgh Glasshouse, Leith, 7 Feb. 1797. 
The Defence of the Realm Act of 1798 would, of course, provide for precisely such a system of  
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defence. See: chapter 4, pp. 165-67. 
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service, but most often it did, as was the case for the best-known, and most widely 
publicised form of offering such service in this period - that of joining a volunteer 
corps. 
Unlike the new fencible regiments - a few of which had been formed in 1793 
- the volunteer corps arose in direct response to the government’s ‘Plan for an 
augmentation of the Forces for Internal Defence’ in March 1794, and to some extent 
constituted an extension of the loyalist association movement which had been formed 
in late 1792.l” One consequence of this was that offers to institute new volunteer 
corps, usually took the form of a loyalist resolution, expressing support for the 
government and a commitment to the British constitution, as well as a condemnation 
of Britain’s enemies at home and abroad. The offer made by the inhabitants of 
Dumfries, for example, stated its signatories’ ‘sincere attachment’ to the king and his 
government, their ‘respect for the happy CONSTITUTION of GREAT BRITAIN’, 
and a firm resolve to resist ‘every attempt of the ambitious and turbulent, who 
threaten to overturn the Laws of our Country, and who, by Anarchy, Sedition, and 
Bloodshed, may endeavour to destroy the sacred Bonds of Society’ . ‘09 During the 
second wave of volunteering in 1797, offers to form new or to augment old corps 
were still phrased as loyalist resolutions, but this time the emphasis was placed on 
the threat of a French invasion. As the resolution from the county of Wigton stated: 
’the French nation, under its present tyrannical rulers ... have invaded, and are 
making avowed preparations to invade this kingdom’, and this meant that all Britons 
now ought to offer their services for the defence of the country.”’ The plan for 
internal defence did, however, provide for a few other ways in which people could 
do armed service, one of which was that of serving in fencible units. 
Although a few of the leading Scottish noblemen had raised fencible forces in 
1793, and a few private offers to do the same had been made the year before, the 
significant increase in the size of the force came only after the government had 
See: chapter 4 p. 154-55. 
NAS, GD224/628/3/7, ‘OFFER OF SERVICE, by certain loyal inhabitants of the Town of 
Dumfries’, undated, but followed by a set of ’RULES, REGULATIONS, and BYE-LAWS’ for the 
established Corps, which is dated: 28 March 1795 [original italics and capitals]. 





issued its plan in 1794.”’ Now the expansion was based on offers from a number of 
towns and counties across Scotland. The majority of these offers proposed to raise 
‘two troops of fencible cavalry’, but in a few counties, offers of three or more troops 
were made, though some of the smaller places only offered to raise one troop.’” As 
was the case with volunteer corps, offers to raise fencible forces also tended to be 
framed as loyalist resolutions. A meeting in the county of Roxburgh, for example, 
resolved ‘that in the present conjuncture, when we are engaged in war with our old 
and implacable enemies . . . it becomes our duty as well-disposed subjects, to evince, 
by substantial ofers,  our loyalty to our IOng, and our attachment to that happy 
Constitution’. It was therefore decided that ‘the landholders of the county of 
Roxburgh’ should ‘raise Two Troops of Fencible Cavalry’ in accordance with the 
third article of the plan for internal defence; similar decisions were reached in many 
other counties. In some cases it is not entirely clear which type of force the town 
or county was in fact offering to raise, and the vague wording of the Plan for an 
augmentation is partly responsible for this. The use of the word ‘volunteer’, both for 
the companies that were intended to augment the English militia and for the fencible 
cavalry in Scotland, but not - curiously enough - for those cavalry units which came 
to be referred to as ‘volunteer corps’, appears to have created a certain degree of 
confusion at some of the meetings that were held.”? In the county of Forfar, for 
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In December 1792, for example, Andrew McDowall had offered to raise ‘a Corps of Fencibles’ in 
Galloway, to consist of between ‘two to five hundred men ... from amongst that Class of people I 
know to be true to the constitution, and attached to me‘. NAS, RH2/4/67, f .  432, Andrew McDowall 
to Henry Dundas, Edinburgh, 19 December 1792. See also: NAS, RH2/4/66, f .  305, D. Macpherson to 
Henry Dundas, Downing Street No 20, 12 December 1792. 
A meeting of the local elite in Dumbarton offered to raise one troop. as did their peers in 
Linlithgow, whereas an offer of three troops was made in Perthshire, and a promise was made to raise 
a regiment of 1000 men in  Orkney. See: Edinburgh Evening Courarzt, 10, 12 May and 22 November 
1794, ‘meeting of the Noblemen. Gentlemen, Freeholders. Commissioners of Supply and Heritors of 
Dumbarton’. meeting in  Linlithgow, and ‘Letters of service’ issued by Major Balfour, of the Orkney 
and Shetland fencibles; and Caledonian Mercun. ,  14 August 1794, ‘meeting of the Freeholders, 
Commissioners of Supply, Justices of the Peace and Heritors of Perthshire’. 
Caledonian Mercuq?,  26 May 1794, ’Meeting of the Justices of the Peace, Commissioners of 
Supply and Landholders of the County of Roxburgh’. Jedburgh, 15 April 1794 [original italics]; or 
Edinburgh Evening Courant. 26 May 1794. For other offers to raise fencible forces, see: ibid., 24 
March, 28 April, 5 ,  7 June. 2, 7, 14 August 1794; and Edinburgh Evening Coiirant, 28 April, 10, 12, 
15,26 May, 23 June 1794. 
The term ‘volunteer corps’ was used about both infantry and cavalry units, and the first of these 
two was referred to as ‘Volunteer Companies’ in the second article of the Plan for Internal Defence, 
whereas the second was denoted as ‘other Bodies of Cavalry’ in the fourth article. For the provisions 
set out by the Plan for Internal Defence, see: chapter 4, pp. 154-55. 
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example, the local meeting resolved to offer a ‘Fencible Infantry Corps’ to go under 
the name of ‘the Angus Volunteers , and there were several instances of offers to 7 115 
raise infantry troops, where no indication was given as to whether it was fencibles or 
volunteers the meeting was intending to raise.’ l 6  In other cases, offers were made to 
raise troops of ‘light cavalry’, a concept which was not even mentioned in the 
plan,l17 whereas a meeting in the county of Inverness decided that - rather than 
raising any troops - it would: 
make a voluntary offer to Government, of a sum equal in amount to 
the land tax assessed upon their several properties for the ensuing 
year, over and above the said assessment, as a free gift, to be 
employed for the internal defence of the kingdom, in any manner 
that to the wisdom of Government shall seem proper.l18 
Those who offered to raise fencible troops or light cavalry did not, however, 
necessarily intend to serve themselves, and in most cases, the decision to present an 
offer was primarily one of subscribing funds, whereby bounties - or ‘levy-money’ - 
might be given to those who wished to volunteer for service. The 53 attendants at 
the meeting in Roxburgh, for example, had subscribed a total of 1600 pounds by the 
I I9 
time they adjourned, and to open a subscription in this manner appears to have been 
the normal practice. In most cases subscriptions would continue to be issued after the 
meeting had been held. so that those ‘principal inhabitants’ of the town or county 
who had not attended could still give their contributions.”’ The meeting of ‘the 
Caledoniuri Mercun- .  7 August 1793. 
See for example: Caledonian Mercuq. ,  26, July, ‘General Meeting of the Freeholders, Justices of 
the Peace. and other Heritors of the Shire of Ross’, 15 July 1794; ibid., 28 July 1794, meeting of the 
’Noblemen, Freeholders, Justices of the Peace, Heritors. and Landowners of Argyleshire’, Inveraray, 
12 June, 1794; and ibid., 9 August, ‘Meeting at Jedburgh on the 17 of July,  of the Noblemen, 
Gentlemen and Heritors of the County’. 
The County of Midlothian, for example, offered to raise ‘Two Troops of Light Cavalry’. 
Edinburgh Evening Courant. 29 March 1794, resolution by ‘the County of Mid-Lothian’, Edinburgh. 
24 March 1794. For similar offers, see: Caledonian Mercuq,, 5 May, 25 Aug. 1794. 
Ibid., 15 May 1794, ‘General Meeting of the Commissioners of Supply, Justices of the Peace, 
Freeholders and other Heritors of the County of Inverness’. 
One exception from this rule was ‘the good and Loyal People of Abertarph’ in the Highlands. 
almost all of whom offered ‘either a Son or a Friend’ for the Fencible Regiment that was in the 
process of being raised there. NAS, RH2/4/212, f. 255, James Fowler to ’Sir’ [Henry Dundas], Fort 
Augustus, 18 March, 1797. 
These subscriptions were invariably aimed at the wealthier inhabitants of the towns and counties, 
and there appears to have been an underlying agreement that this specific burden should be carried by 
the local elites, and not be passed on to ordinary people. The attendants at the meeting convened for 







Landholders in the County of Edinburgh’, however, probably went further than most 
when it decided to send out letters to those landowners who had been absent, 
‘informing’ them that a decision had been made to ‘raise two Troops of Fencible 
Cavalry, by a voluntary contribution of a Sum equal to eighteen Months Land tax . 
Forty-five landowners responded, of whom only two raised objections, on the 
grounds that they had already contributed substantially to the defence of the 
country. Occasionally, the funds thus raised through subscriptions far exceeded the 
sum required for the specific number of bounties that needed to be issued and, in 
these cases, the usual practice was to make an offer to raise more troops. The county 
of Lanark, for example, having first offered to raise two troops of fencible cavalry, 
later resolved to increase this offer to four troops.133 The many offers of this kind that 
were made in 1794 were, perhaps, as much a matter of demonstrating loyalty to the 
state by giving financial support to the government, as of offering personal service. 
We will return to the issue of financial support below, but for the moment, it needs to 
be stressed that there were many Scots who offered their personal service to the 




One particularly celebrated case was the offer made by a group of fishermen 
in Newhaven in November 1796. Having observed ‘from the debates in Parliament, 
and general rumour. that our enemies threaten an actual invasion of Great Britain’, 
the Newhaven fishermen decided to offer their services to crew gunboats stationed 
on the east coast of Scotland. They restricted their initial offer to ‘the station’ going 
from Redhead to St Abb’s Head, but agreed ‘that in any very pressing situation we 
may go further, if necessity urges’. A total of 59 volunteers signed the resolution 
they issued, which must have included most of the men in this fishing village, since 
valued rent, with which no tenant under any pretence, is to be charged’. Caledorziari Merczq,, 14 April 
1794. 
‘’I NAS, GD385/21/4, Alex Marjoribanks to James Clerk Esq. Sheriff, Balbardie, 23 April 1794. 
’” NAS, GD385/21/5-6, no. 8-49. Henry Trotter in Edinburgh objected because his brother had 
‘already paid for the whole valuation of his Estate including that part whereof I am temporary 
superior‘, and John Stewart in East Craiges complained that it  had already cost him ’E1000 to send 
My Son to Gordon the 26 Regt. where He has Lost Every Shilling He had, in the world’, and he 
therefore thought it unreasonable that he should have to contribute even inore. No: 15, Henry Trotter 
Esq. to James Clerk Esq. Sheriff, Edinburgh. 9 April 1794; and no: 41, John Stewart to James Clerk 
Esq. Sheriff, East Craiges, 3 April 1794. 
Edinburgh Evening Coiirant. 28 April and 15 May 1794. 
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the list included a number of fathers, sons, and brothers; the youngest of these 
volunteers was 15 years old.’24 Very soon after the fishermen had presented their 
offer, the Duke of Buccleuch called a meeting of all the gentlemen of Midlothian, 
which praised the Newhaven men for their initiative, and resolved to present them 
with a medal ‘as a mark of the sense the County entertained of their bravery and 
public spirit . The fishermen of Fisherrow and Mussleburgh subsequently made 7 125 
similar offers, for which they were also presented with a medal from their local 
authorities.”6 Unlike most of those who joined volunteer corps in the 1790s, the 
fishermen in Newhaven also had a chance to demonstrate that they were prepared to 
adhere to their commitments, when - in late October 1798 - rumours of a French 
invasion fleet heading up the Firth of Forth, led to the activation of the local coastal 
defences. The Newhaven men responded by manning their gun-boats ‘with great 
cheerfulness , and for this admirable demonstration of loyalty, they were later , 127 
rewarded with ‘a plentiful repast’ by the lord provost and magistrates of 
Edinburgh. Naval protection of the Forth, and of Edinburgh in particular, remained 
a very specific issue, however, and there are few, if any, indications that similar 
offers were made elsewhere. 
Of more wide-ranging consequences were the offers made by many members 
of the local elites t’o serve as part-time constables in their local town or village. The 
initiative to volunteer for this kmd of service had probably originated in Edinburgh, 
where a ‘Society of Constables’ was already in existence by the beginning of 1794. 
Aimed chiefly at policing the streets of the city, and maintaining law and order, these 
constables came close to resembling a police force, and were mustered on occasions 
when unrest was expected. A prominent occasion for this was the day of Maurice 
Margarot’s trial, when the constables were called out in the morning, ‘in order to 
prevent any disturbance that might happen’. 12’ Those who volunteered for this type 
Cufedoniun Mercury, 17 Nov. 1796, ‘NATIONAL DEFENCE’, Newhaven, 12 Nov. 1796; or The 
Times, 17 Nov. 1796. 
‘ I s  Ibid., 24 Nov. 1796, ‘From the MINUTES of the MEETING of  the JUSTICES of the PEACE and 
HERITORS of MID-LOTHIAN’, Edinburgh, 2 1 Nov. 1796. 
Ibid., 10 Dec. 1796, ‘NATIONAL DEFENCE AGAINST INVASION. TO THE HON. 
MAGISTRATES OF MUSSLEBURGH’. 
Ibid., 25 Oct. 1798. 
Ibid.. 8 Nov. 1798. 
1’9 Caledonian Merciiq-, 13 Jan. 1794. 
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of service in Edinburgh were undoubtedly also very satisfied with the task they were 
performing, since, in February 1794, they requested ‘that such of the Society as are 
entitled to retire, be permitted [to] continue their services for another year’, to which 
the Edinburgh authorities gave their approval. 13’ The popularity of this service was 
further underlined in late May the same year, when upwards of 500 ‘of the most 
respectable inhabitants’ of the city voluntarily enrolled themselves to serve as 
extraordinary constables,’ possibly in response to the recently discovered ‘Pike 
Plot’. 13’ Following the Edinburgh initiative, similar units of constables were 
subsequently formed elsewhere. The Heritors of knross  called a meeting in the 
beginning of August, where they decided to offer their services to the lord lieutenant 
of the county ‘to serve in case of emergency . . . as assistant Constables’. 133 Some 120 
inhabitants in Leith had enrolled themselves as constables by September.134 and 
some 96 named individuals in the county of Mid-Lothian had stepped forward to take 
on ‘the office of Extraordinary Constables’ at a meeting held in Dalkeith.’” From the 
western part of the Lowlands it was reported that ‘a considerable number of 
gentlemen of Glasgow have enrolled themselves as constables. or peace officers, for 
assisting the civil power, in suppressing riots and disturbances’, and that a plan 
had been devised to establish ‘extraordinary Peace Officers’ in Paisley. due to be 
equipped in a similar fashion to the constables in E d i n b ~ r g h . ’ ~ ~  In Aberdeen, ‘a 
number of gentlemen who, from particular circumstances, are prevented [from] 
entering as Volunteers’, had stepped forward and ‘offered to serve the office of 
Constable . Once established the service appears to have remained both useful for 
the authorities, and popular with those who served, because constables continued to 
be deployed at times of popular unrest - most notably during the Militia riots in 
136 
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lhid.. 20 Feb. 1794. 
Edinburgh Evening Coilrant, 3 1 May 1794. See also: Culedonian Mercun.. 5 .  7 June 1794. 
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British Journal of Eighteenth-Centun Studies, 23 (2000), 155. 
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1797, when they were called out to support the local schoolmasters drawing up the 
lots of those eligible to be drafted.”9 Moreover, an entirely new unit of ‘Special 
Constables’ was raised in Lanarkshire as late as in December 1800, ‘in order to assist 
the Magistrates in more effectually preventing tumults, and illegal practices’. These 
special constables were to be recruited ‘from amongst the Farmers and most 
respectable inhabitants of the County’. 140 
Of potentially greater significance for the war effort, however, were the many 
offers made by farmers and tenants in early 1797, whereby they volunteered to place 
their ‘carts and horses’ at the disposal of the government in the event of an invasion. 
Precisely where, and with whom, the idea behind this initiative originated is not 
entirely clear, but it probably preceded Alexander Dirom’s defence plan - which was 
published the same year - and therefore also the Defence of the Realm Act of 
1798.14’ One of the very first offers to be made came from ’a number of farmers in 
the vicinity of Edinburgh’, who on 6 January had ‘come forward with their horses 
and carts to assist Government without any expence, to convey troops, baggage. &c. 
to where their services may be wanted .., in case of Invasion’.132 The idea was 
clearly to employ civilian resources in the defence of the country by offering 
logistical support for the military - much as it would later be set out in the provisions 
for ‘driving the country’ in the Defence of the Realm Act of 1798. Since these offers 
were presented before the government had devised its own defence plan, it is likely 
that Pitt and his ministers drew inspiration from them. At the same time as the 
farmers around Edinburgh had made their offer, a meeting of the members of the 
Dalkeith Farmer Society declared that ‘they will individually and collectively have in 
readiness a Man and a Pair of Horses, with one or two Carts . . . for each ploughgate 
of land in their possession’ for the purpose of ‘conveying Troops, Baggage. &c, 
through the county of Mid Lothian . . . in the event of an Invasion taking place in any 
part of Great Britain’,’‘’ and shortly after, ‘a number of Farmers in the eastern 
Ibid., 4, 7 Sept. 1797. The Edinburgh constables. for example, were later sent in to assist in the 
Ibid., 8 Dec. 1800, ‘Meeting of the Noblemen, Gentlemen, Freeholders. Justices of the Peace, 
See: chapter 4, pp. 165-67. 
Glasgow Courier, 7 Jan. 1797. 
Caledonian Merciq,  12 Jan. 1797. 
139 
quelling of a grain riot in  the city in  late April 1800. [hid., 1 May 1800. 




district of East Lothian’ reached a similar decision at a meeting held at Dunbar.’“‘ 
These proposals soon caught on elsewhere in Scotland and the number of individual 
offers that were made eventually ran into double figures. Some of these offers were 
also quite substantial in terms of the total number of carts and horses that were being 
placed at the disposal of the authorities. The farmers in the parish of Llmalcolm east 
of Glasgow ‘agreed to furnish above one hundred carts and horses to convey troops 
and baggage’ ,14 ‘  those of ‘the village and parish of Auchterarder in Perthshire’ 8O,la6 
the ‘Heritors, Farmers and others’ of the parish of New Monkland promised to offer 
180 carts in the case of invasion, with the possibility of augmenting this n~mber , ’ ‘~  
and it was suggested that the parish of Lesmahagow in Lanarkshire would be able to 
supply up to 500 carts and horses if necessary.148 At the county level, the number of 
carts and horses offered in East Lothian continued to rise after the first meeting, and 
stood at 500 by the middle of February 1797? By the beginning March, it had 
increased even further, and it was reported that ‘the list of double horse carts now 
signed for by the farmers and others in this county . . . exceeds eight hundred, besides 
single horse carts . The farmers on the Earl of Aberdeen’s estates in the county of 
Aberdeen were able to muster an even higher number. 1200 carts were their estimate, 
and twice the number of horses. 
’ 150 
151 
Of those who offered their carts and horses to be used for military purposes in 
this manner, the majority belonged to one of two social categories. They were either 
farmers - such as those referred to above - or tenants working on the estates of a 
large landowner. A few offers were also made by others such as the postmasters in 
Edinburgh - who resolved to put their professional ‘Carriages and Horses’ at the 
disposal of the government - and the company ‘Thomas Jamieson & Son’ in Leith, 
but these remained exceptions.”’ The first tenants to make an offer, were those on 
the Earl of Kinnoull’s estates in Perthshire, who wrote a loyalist address on 17 
Ibid., 14 Jan. 1797; or Glasgow Courier, 26 Jan., meeting at Dunbar. 12 Jan. 1797. 
Ibid., 2 3  March 1797. 
Ibid., 2 March 1797. 
Ibid., 23 Feb. 1797; and Caledonian Mercuns. 25 Feb. 1797. 
Caledonian Mercun, ,  16 Feb. 1797. 
Glasgow Courier. 9 March 1797. 
”’ Caledonian Mercun-, 13 April 1797. 
15’ Ibid., 25, 27 Feb. 1797 
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January 1797, in which they offered ‘50 One Horse Carriages & 129 Two Horse 
Carriages . Similar offers were made by the tenants at General Campbell’s estates 
in Perth~hire,”~ at ‘Lord Blantyre’s estate in the counties of East Lothian, Renfrew, 
Dumbarton, &c’, by the Duke of Montrose’s tenants in Perth, Stirling and 
Dumbarton,’” and by the ‘feuars and tenants on the Estate of Tillicoultry’ in the 
county of Clackmannan,’s6 From the parish of Renfrew it was also reported that 
‘every person . . . having horses (except two tenants and a distiller) has offered them 
to Government’. 15’ 
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In the case of the tenants in particular, one might legitimately ask whether 
they were likely to have been placed under any kind of pressure from their superiors 
before they made these offers. Since the local elites generally seem to have approved 
of these initiatives, they could have used their influence to intimidate their tenants 
into making ‘voluntary’ offers. While this may be difficult to determine in many or 
even most cases, the evidence that has survived indicates that it was not the case. The 
Earl of IOnnoull himself revealed in a letter to the Home Secretary that he had had 
no hand in the offer from his tenants, although he admitted to ‘feeling a Pride & 
Satisfaction that it comes from those so nearly commited with me’. His tenants, he 
wrote, had held a ‘Voluntary Meeting’ without his knowledge, at which they had 
decided to offer ’their Services of Carriages & Horses free from expence to 
Government’.158 The offer made by IOnnoull’s tenant was, of course, an early one, 
and may not have been representative of those made by other tenants later on, but, in 
the absence of any clear evidence of intimidation in those cases, the impression that 
remains is one of a genuine demonstration of loyalty to the government. Presenting 
the authorities with an offer of carts and horses did not, however, necessarily imply 
personal service on the part of those who offered to supply these means of 
Is’ NAS. RH2/4/80, f. 19, Address by ‘the Tenants of the Earl of Kinnoull’, Dupptir Castle, 17 
January 1797. See also: Glasgow Courier, 26 January 1797. 
Ibid., 9 March; and Caledonian Mercun,. 25 February 1797. 
Is’ lhid., 16 March 1797. 
Glasgow) Courier. 23 March 1797. 
‘” Caledonian Merciin., 25  Feb. 1797. 
NAS, RH2/4/80, ff. 17-18, Drummond Hay Kinnoull to the Duke of Portland, London, 26 January 
1797. See also: ibid., f. 20, George Keir to ‘My Lord’. Dupptir Castle 20 January 1797 [George Keir 





transportation. In quite a few cases, the offer was not just of carts and horses, but also 
included servants’’’ - and this was probably with the intention that they would be 
driving the carts - yet, in those cases where servants were not included in the offer, 
there were no indications that the farmers or tenants were prepared to do the driving 
job themselves.160 As a demonstration of loyalty, offering carts and horses to the 
government therefore came closer to being a financial, or material contribution to the 
war effort, than one of personal service, and it is the financial aspect of loyalism that 
we will turn to in the next section?’ 
VI 
Finunciul Support 
Rather than offer their personal service to the government or give material assistance 
such as carts and horses, many Scots volunteered instead to provide funds in support 
of the war effort or for war-related purposes. These financial contributions could be 
offered for a number of reasons and were given by a wide range of people, but most 
contributions were either a subscription, or to a bounty-offer. 
The most widely adopted method of making a voluntary financial 
contribution in the 1790s was that of opening a subscription. We have already seen 
how subscriptions constituted the first step in the process of raising a volunteer 
corps, to man fencible regiments, as well as to provide substitutes for the new militia 
force in 1797, but subscriptions were also begun for other reasons. It is only in 
these cases that they took the form of a more concerted ‘campaign’. aimed primarily 
at raising funds. Although these campaigns could be initiated for a variety of reasons, 
they usually came in response to a specific event in the war and responded to a 
specific problem. 
163 
The tenants, and sub-tenants on the Estates of Charles Gordon of Wardhouse, for example, offered 
‘what horses, carts, and servants we have, for the purpose of carrying troops and military stores’. 
Caledonian Mercury, 20 March 1797. 
In some cases - such as with the farmers on the Earl of Aberdeen’s estates - those who offered 
carts and horses also offered ‘to be trained to the use of arms’, but these two offers were independent 
of each other. 
For offers which have not been referred to above, see: NAS, RH2141212, f. 255; Caledoniun 
Mercun, 21, 28 Jan., 4, 1 1 ,  18, 23, 27 Feb., 16 March, and 13, 15 April 1797; and GlusgoMf Courier, 




See: chapter 4. 162. 
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As far as the initiating of new campaigns was concerned, Edinburgh seems to 
have taken a leading role in Scotland. One of the very first subscriptions to be 
opened was begun there in early October 1793, and concerned the British army in 
Flanders. It had come to public attention that the British soldiers fighting in the Low 
Countries had insufficient clothing for the coming winter in what was held to be a 
‘cold and damp country’, and a subscription was consequently initiated to procure 
‘flannel waistcoats’ for the soldiers, whereby it was hoped that ‘the lives of many 
brave men’ might be saved?’ The campaign went on for four months until the end 
of February the next year, by which time over 51600 had been raised through the 
subscriptions of between 600 and 700 people in the The lists of new 
subscribers - which the organisers of the campaign published in the press on a 
regular basis - included not only the amounts given by each and every individual 
donor, but also their professions. A closer examination of these lists reveals that the 
subscribers came from a cross-section of society, although with a certain degree of 
bias towards wealthier people. Typically, there would be larger sums - in the area of 
&5 to 230 - subscribed by establishment figures such as noblemen, merchants, 
magistrates, and advocates, whereas smaller sums, often less than a pound, would be 
contributed by various kinds of craftsmen and artisans, and sometimes even by 
labourers. The variety of professions and occupations represented can be seen from a 
list published in the middle of November, which showed that subscriptions had come 
from a clerk in the Post-office, a writer to the signet, a family in Fifeshire, an 
advocate, an accountant, a coppersmith, a farmer, a baker and ‘a week’s earnings 
from a Poor Woman, the Mother of a Soldier serving in Flanders?” The Edinburgh 
initiative was soon imitated elsewhere in Scotland,lb6 and had also been noticed as 
far away as in London, where a meeting held at the Crown and Anchor Tavern in 
Edinburgh Evening Cnurant. 24 Oct. 1793. 
163 Ibid.. 24 Feb. 1794. 
Ibid., 14 Nov. 1793. Contributions to subscriptions were also given by institutions, organisations 
and military units, such as the soldiers and officers of the Strathspey Fencible Regiment, who resolved 
to contribute ‘a day’s pay to furnish flannel vests to their brother soldiers in Flanders’. Ibid.. 9 Nov. 
1793. 
16‘ Evidence on this is scarce, but a notice printed in Nov. 1794, stated that the example given by 
Edinburgh. ‘was followed with great zeal throughout the kingdom’. Caledonian Mercuqv, 10 Nov. 
1794. Linda Colley has argued that campaigns to provide warm clothing for British troops were begun 
in ‘al l parts of the country’ shortly after the outbreak of war in 1793, and that women took a leading 




November 1793 had resolved to open a new subscription, aimed at providing 
‘worsted stockings and flannel caps’ for the British troops fighting on the continent. 
This new campaign drew its inspiration from, and was due to be modelled on, ‘the 
Contribution set on foot by a Committee at Edinburgh for the purchase of Flannel 
Waistcoats . One year later, an attempt was made to renew the now lapsed 7 167 
subscription in Edinburgh on the grounds that the soldiers, who had been ‘cloathed 
and nourished’ in their success, should not now be neglected ‘in their misfortunes’, 
but there is little evidence to suggest that this second campaign was as successful as 
the first.168 
To an extent, the ‘flannel waistcoats’ subscription of 1793-94 set a standard 
for the campaigns that were to follow. The majority of subsequent subscriptions were 
also highly publicised affairs, where a running total of the funds that had been 
collected at any given time - together with lists of new subscribers - were published 
in the press on a regular basis. Most of these subscriptions were also opened in 
response to a specific event in the war, and the social composition of those who 
contributed funds was largely similar to that of the first Edinburgh campaign. 
Nevertheless, most of them differed in one crucial respect. Rather than being aimed 
at supporting British forces abroad, they were concerned with the domestic 
consequences of war. and with helping people at home in Britain. The first of these 
campaigns was begun a few weeks after Lord Howe’s victory over the French fleet 
in the battle of the ‘Glorious first of June’ in 1794, and was intended to raise funds 
for the ’relief of the Sailors, Mariners, or others on board Lord Howe’s fleet, disabled 
during the late gallant action, and for relief of the Widows and Children of Sufferers 
on that occasion’.’‘’ One week later, sufficient funds had already been collected to 
enable the organisers to print notices, giving instructions on how those who were 
eligible for support could lodge their claims. Although begun in Edinburgh, the 
subscription attracted contributions from other places as well, such as the counties of 
Fife and Stirling,’71 whereas Aberdeen started its own separate campaign, which 
170 
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raised more than E400 by the middle of J~1y . l~ ’  One of the more original 
contributions to the Edinburgh subscription came from the Edinburgh Musical 
Society, which decided to give a concert ‘for the benefit of the sufferers in Lord 
Howe’s fleet’ on 8 July,’73 and, by the end of that month, a total of E1324 had been 
collected. 174 This appears to have been sufficient for the Edinburgh-area, since funds 
from the campaign were now being directed to other purposes, but a new 
subscription was nevertheless opened in nearby Leith only a few weeks later. 17.5 A 
more general ‘Ladies Subscription for the relief of the Widows and Children of 
Soldiers and Seamen’ was reported to have collected over E400 by the end of June 
1793. 176 
Similar subscriptions were also initiated after the two subsequent naval 
victories at Camperdown in 1797, and the Nile in 1798. A campaign to provide 
financial support for the ‘Widows and Families of our Countrymen who lost their 
lives’ in the battle against the Dutch fleet in 1797 ran from late October the same 
year,177 until it was officially closed in mid-January 1798.178 By then a total of E3143 
had been collected from subscribers who included many military units such as the 
Dundee Volunteer Corps, the North Fencible Regiment. the Duke of York’s Royal 
Fencible Highlanders, the Reay Fencibles, as well as the Presbytery of Leith, and 
Lord Adam Gordon. A subscription to provide relief for the families and relatives 179 
of the sailors who died in the battle of the Nile was opened by the local authorities in 
Edinburgh on 11  October the same year,lX0 and over E700 had been collected within 
two months.’” Subscriptions were. however, also opened for other reasons than to 
provide support for those who suffered as a consequence of naval battles, and they 
were in some instances of a more local orientation and conducted on a significantly 
smaller scale. 
17’ Culedonian Mercun., 14 July 1794. 
17‘ Culedonian Mercun,  3 1 July 1794. 
Edinburgh Evening Courant. 28 June 1794. 
Ibid., 16 Aug. 1794. 
Edinburgh Advertiser, 18-31 June 1793. 
Culedonian Mercuq?, 28 Oct. 1797. 
Ibid., 13 Jan. 1798. 
Glasgow Courier, 4, 14 and 18 Nov. 1797. 
Caledonian Mercun,  13 Oct. 1798. 









In mid-November 1793 it was reported that a number of the inhabitants in 
Edinburgh - ‘sensible of the great utility of the EDINBURGH VOLUNTEERS, and 
wishing to assist this Corps in defraying a part of their necessary expences’ - had 
come together and subscribed over 5300 for this purpose,’” an example which was 
later followed by the clergy in the city.183 A subscription was opened in Edinburgh in 
March 1796 to provide for the widow and children of a sailor who had been killed 
onboard a merchant vessel in an engagement with a French privateer. The officers 
and crew of the ship had immediately subscribed 15 guineas, and it was expected that 
their example would be followed by others in the city, since ‘a defect in charitable 
contributions ... is not one of the vices of the present age, or of the city of 
Edinburgh . The magistrates and council of the burgh of Irvine were reported to 
have given 100 guineas to a fund which had been set up for the purpose of ‘carrying 
on the war , and a campaign aimed at providing relief for the ‘Wives and Families’ 
of British soldiers serving with the army in Holland was begun in November 1799,1g6 
and ran until the end of that year.’87 Lastly, a meeting held by the local elite in 
Lanarkshire in December 1800, had subscribed &9000 ‘for the purpose of purchasing 
from the merchants, such quantities of grain as may be necessary for the regular 
supply of the inhabitants of this county’ during the prevailing scarcity of food, which 
had been caused by the harvest failure of 1799. 188 Although these subscriptions 
undoubtedly were varied and imaginative. and in some cases also raised significant 
amounts of money, they were none the less completely dwarfed by the ‘Voluntary 
Contributions’-campaign - which the government initiated in early 1798 - and this 
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The voluntary contributions were as successful in Scotland, as in the whole of 
Great Britain, and they laid the foundation for all the subsequent national 
subscriptions which were conducted in Britain in the early nineteenth century.i89 
Lists of new subscribers - together with the amounts they had contributed - were 
again published regularly in the Scottish press for the whole duration of the 
subscription, which lasted from early February until it was officially closed on 1 
December 1798. 190 Among the Scottish newspapers, the Caledonian Mercurv, for 
example, printed lists throughout the whole of this period, and with the number of 
individual subscribers averaging about 200 in each single issue, the final number of 
people giving voluntary contributions must have run into many thousands.'"' 
Although no running total appears to have been kept for the whole of Scotland, the 
majority of those who gave seem to have contributed in accordance to their means, 
and this - together with the sheer number of contributions - indicates that the sums 
collected must have been very significant indeed. Furthermore, a running total was 
kept for Edinburgh, at least for a while, and by the end of April 1798, a total of 
f69.743 had been collected in the city - a sum which amounted to more than half the 
net Scottish customs revenues of the previous year.'" 
In the early months of the campaign, the subscribers were largely those at 
whom the government had set its primary aim - the wealthier section of society. 
Gradually. however, more and more ordinary people also gave their contributions, in 
accordance with the official encouragement they had received. The response from 
the public must have been largely in line with government hopes, and was also 
similar to earlier subscription campaigns. Larger contributions were again principally 
given by the local elite of a town or county, such as the gentlemen of Dumfries who 
gave in excess of f3000,'93 by establishment figures such as Robert Dundas, who 
subscribed B O O  out of his own p ~ c k e t , ' ~ '  by prestigious institutions, among which 
Cookson, Armed Nation. pp. 21 6- 17. 
Caledonian Mercun.  29 Nov. 1798 [notice that the subscription will be closed on 1 December]. 
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the Faculty of Advocates stood out by its conspicuous donation of &2000,19s or by 
military units, of which the Grantown Strathspey Volunteer Company was an 
example. They had decided by a unanimous vote to contribute ‘fourteen days pay . . . 
to the defence of the state . Lady Arniston, Henry Dundas’s mother, initiated a 
separate ‘Ladies Subscription’ in Edinburgh, because she believed that when ‘the 
whole property of the country is at stake, it makes no difference, in, a rational point 
of view, whether that property is built by male or female hands’, and that ‘the 
contributions of individuals, of either sex, ought to be in the due proportion to their 
fortunes . The example thus set by the elite of society was then imitated by less 
wealthy and even quite poor people who came forward to contribute smaller 
amounts. In the parish of Wemyss, for example, a total of &57 was given by 84 of the 
local inhabitants, of whom 24 were denoted as labourers, 14 as weavers and the 
remaining 46 as different kinds of artisans, mostly shoemakers and tailors.’”8 Above 
370 of the inhabitants in the parish of Longside in Aberdeenshire had together 
subscribed E97, and it was held that ‘almost every family except the inrolled poor’ 
had given their contributions. The lists of subscribers to the scheme occasionally 
included people of such limited means as servants. Those employed by the Arniston 
family had made their contribution about the same time as their master, Robert 
Dundas, and the list of names that was published, included ‘four servant maids’ who 
had given ‘half-a-crown each’.’00 In March a number of Catholics residing in 
Edinburgh decided to step forward as a group and offer their contributions, and they 
only regretted that ‘the small ness of their numbers, and, the narrowness of their 
circumstances, do not permit them to assist their Country in the manner they would 
wish’. A total of 521 had been collected from 30 subscribers, who included such 
varied professions and occupations as: clergyman, grocer, shoe-maker, wright, 
porter, weather-glass maker, spirit-dealer, silver-smith, clock-maker, smith, 
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glass-cutter, servant man, mason and ‘a poor woman’.’’’ The employees at the 
Carron Shipping Company followed a similar procedure, by also stepping forward to 
give their contributions as a group,”’ and the workmen at the Duntocher Mill in 
Dumbartonshire declared that they would ‘not only contribute their money, but give 
their personal service in any part of the country, if our cruel enemies should have the 
temerity to set foot in our happy country’? 
Although the sums contributed by the wealthier subscribers undoubtedly 
made up the lion’s share of the funds collected in all the subscription campaigns of 
the 1790s - partly because their individual contributions were significantly larger 
than those given by subscribers of lesser means, and partly because in most cases 
there were more of them giving money - it did not thereby follow that theirs 
represented the greatest sacrifice. We have already mentioned how the wealthier 
sections of British society probably had more to lose than most ordinary people by 
not supporting the existing political regime. It is also clear, however, that many 
artisans and workers gave sums that must have been very significant for them, even 
if they were not very notable in absolute terms. Many ordinary people may well have 
been placed under a certain degree of pressure contribute, particularly to the 
‘voluntary contribution’, but the financial support given by poorer people cannot be 
dismissed as merely a product of intimidation. The ‘Poor Woman‘ who had given up 
one week’s wages to the flannel waistcoats-subscription is perhaps as good an 
example as any that ordinary Scots - who had little or no direct stake in the British 
state - were prepared to make sacrifices in its defence when it seemed to be of some 
direct relevance to their own lives. 
Besides subscription campaigns, the main way of giving financial support to 
the government in the 1790s was to offer rewards or bounties to volunteers for 
service in the armed forces. Most of these bounties were used to enlist men in the 
Royal Navy, but there were also a number of them issued for fencible units, and a 
few for Volunteer ~o rps . ” ’~  As with the subscriptions campaigns. the offering of 
bounties was a largely newspaper-based activity, and local government officials 
”’ Caledonian Mercuni. 22 March 1798. 
Ibid., 24 May 1798. 
’03 Ihid., 10 March 1798. 
There were few, if  any, bounties for regular line regiments published in the Scottish press. 201 
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again provided a lead. Thomas Elder, the lord provost of Edinburgh, took the first 
initiative, when, on 20 December 1792, he placed an advertisement in the Edinburgh 
press under the heading of ‘BOUNTY TO SEAMEN’, by which he offered a reward 
of: 
TWO GUINEAS over and above his Majesty’s Bounty, to every Able 
Seaman, and ONE GUINEA to ever Ordinary Seaman, not under 
Twenty nor above Fifty Years of Age, who shall, during the 
continuance of his Majesty’s Bounty, appear in the Council Chamber, 
and voluntarily enter himself to serve in the Royal Navy. 
To be immediately paid by the City Chamberlain, on such able or 
ordinary seamen respectively being approved by the Regulating 
Officer here as fit for service, and residing in or belonging to the City, 
Leith, Newhaven, or other Liberties of Edinburgh. 
Elder’s offer was made on behalf of the magistrates and city council in Edinburgh 
and it concluded with the patriotic words ‘GOD SAVE THE KING!’, followed by 
his own name.”’ For the next two years, Thomas Elder’s advertisement was printed 
in the press on a regular basis - undergoing only minor alterations during that time - 
and this was the longest period that any Scottish bounty offer ran in the 1790s. It also 
came to form a template upon which most subsequent bounty-offers would be based, 
both those issued for the navy and those which were aimed at raising men for the 
defence forces.’“ The Edinburgh bounty was, of course, issued before Britain had 
entered the war, and relatively few other offers seem to have followed in its 
immediate aftermath, whereas bounties for the defence forces were first issued in 
1794, after the government had issued its invitation to arm. From February 1793 
onwards, however. new advertisements from different parts of Scotland appeared in 
the press, offering bounties to volunteers for service in the navy. 
Although it was the local authorities in Edinburgh who had first taken the 
initiative, these subsequent navy-bounties were in fact remarkably varied in terms of 
’05 Caledonian Mercuny and Edinburgh Eiming  Courant, 20 Dec. 1792, ‘BOUNTY TO SEAMEN. 
By the Right Hon. The Lord Provost, Magistrates, and Council of the City of Edinburgh’ [original 
capitals]. 
The last advertisements of the Edinburgh bounty-offer appears to have been in October 1794, when 
James Stirling had taken over as lord provost in  Edinburgh, and at which point the bounty had been 
upgraded to three guineas for ordinary seamen, and one guinea for able-bodied landsmen. No mention 
was made of able seamen. See: Culedonian Mercury, 9 Oct. 1794; and Edinburgh Erming Courunt, 
13 Oct. 1794. 
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who offered them. In order to offer a bounty, it was obviously necessary to raise or 
have access to funds, and the different ways in which navy-bounties were financed, 
give an indication of who stood behind them. Many bounty-offers were sustained by 
subscriptions, usually initiated by the elite of a town, county or parish, but to which 
all ranks of society were normally allowed to contribute. Other bounties were issued 
by local government officials such as magistrates and town councils, who would be 
able to draw upon public funds to support their respective schemes, whereas a third 
category were bounties given by different kinds of societies, institutions or 
businesses, and a fourth by individuals who were setting up their own self-funded 
offers. Most of these bounties were issued several times, making the number of 
advertisements published in the press significantly larger than the number of 
individual offers that were actually made, but although a mere count of 
advertisements may therefore be misleading, the geographical spread of offers 
reveals that the idea had at least caught on across most of Scotland. Moreover, this 
had occurred without any other incentive than Thomas Elder’s initiative. Apart from 
Edinburgh, bounties to volunteers for naval service were issued by the local 
authorities in Perth, Stirling, Montrose, St. Andrews, Aberdeen, Linlithgow, 
Dumfries, Dundee, Greenock, Banff, Mussleburgh, Inverness, Forfar, Pittenweem, 
Thurso, Paisley and krkcudbright. as well as by the authorities in the burghs of 
Wigton, Culross. Dysart and N e ~ b u r g h . ” ~  A bounty of one guinea was offered to 
able-bodied seamen by the ‘Collector of his Majesty’s customs at Alloa‘, although it 
is unclear whether this bounty was sustained by public or private funds.?”* Bounties 
based on subscriptions could either be presented by a committee - which had been 
set up for this specific purpose - or simply by groups of individuals who had come 
together and resolved to make an offer. Edinburgh again provided the lead for the 
former category. by setting up a ‘committee of subscribers’ in February 1793, which 
offered a bounty of two guineas to every able-bodied seaman, and one guinea to 
every ordinary seaman and able-bodied landsman, due ‘to be paid along with that 
given by the City of Edinburgh’, whereas the bounty offered by the heritors, 
Caledonian Mercun. 5 ,  7, 1 1. 18, 21, 25, 28 Feb., 4, 16, 23 March, 1 ,  4 April 1793; and Edirzhurgh 
Caledonian Mercun. ,  9 Feb. 1793. 
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merchants, ship-masters, traders and inhabitants of Leith was representative of the 
latter category. They offered ‘a Bounty of TWO GUINEAS to every able Seaman 
belonging to the port of Leith’.’o9 Other subscription-based bounties were issued in 
the counties of Berwick, Fife, Perth, Aberdeen, kncardine, Wigton, Stirling, Lanark 
and Ayr, as well as in Haddington, and by Patrick Heron and ten other ‘gentlemen’ in 
the stewartry of Qrkcudbright. ‘A society of Gentlemen in krkcaldy’ had done the 
same, as had the ‘Heritors, Merchants, and Owners of Ships in Orkney’, while a 
committee of subscribers was formed in Glasgow.”’ Among the societies and 
businesses which offered bounties were the Inverkeithing Sailor Society, which set 
up their own bounty of three guineas to able seamen in early February 1793,”’ the 
Goldsmith’s Hall Association in Edinburgh, which opened a fund to raise money for 
bounties a week later,”2 and the Carron Shipping Company.”’ Bounties were, 
however, also presented by individual Scots, and in the context of demonstrations of 
loyalty, these are perhaps of even greater interest than the above. 
Apart from taking the initiative to present a bounty, inserting advertisements 
in the press, and otherwise organising all the practical aspects of handing out the 
actual rewards, those who offered their own individual bounties would also have to 
rely exclusively on their own personal funds to support the scheme. Since no one 
could be entirely sure of how many recruits their bounty would attract, this approach 
clearly involved a greater risk for them than to contribute to a subscription. The two 
Linlithgow merchants George and Andrew Bartholomew had decided to take this 
risk, when, in March 1793, they resolved to ‘offer a Bounty, over and above all other 
bounties, of One Guinea to all Seamen and Landmen belonging to this burgh and 
parish ... and to continue this Bounty till the French are made to march back into 
their own country’. No specific restriction was placed on the number of bounties that 
could be issued, only that to receive one, the claimant would have to be from ‘their 
own town and parish’.”” Similar private bounties were issued by James Erskine of 
lo9 Ibid., 14 Feb. 1793 [original capitals]. 
’ Io  Ibid., 7, 1 1 ,  21, 28 Feb., 7, 1 1. 23 March 1793: and Edinburgh .4dverriser, 19-22 March, 29 March- 
2 April, 5-9 April 1793. 
’I Caledonian Mercur)’, 7 Feb. 1793. 
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Cardross, who offered three guineas to able seamen belonging to the town of 
kncardine or the parish of Tulliallan, by Sir James Riddell in Edinburgh,”’ by John 
Taylor, a perchant in Queensferry,”‘ and by Thomas Mitchell, a merchant and soap- 
manufacturer living in D ~ n b a r . ~ ”  In the case of John Taylor, the advertisement he 
had published included one important restriction. The bounty of one guinea, which 
Taylor offered to every able seaman in his own burgh, was due to commence on the 
date the offer was published, and ‘to be continued as long as there is no impress at 
this port’. Taylor was not alone in stressing this point. 
Traditionally, the main alternative to bounties was the use of press-gangs, 
which were no more popular in Scotland than anywhere else in Britain.”8 Although 
few advertisements stated explicit restrictions similar to that Taylor had included, a 
hope of avoiding renewed use of impressments may have been a main incentive 
behind many bounty-offers. An editorial in the Caledonian Mercury, for example, 
pointed out as early as in mid-January 1793, that ‘a greater number of seamen’ had 
entered into his Majesty’s service as a consequence of the Edinburgh-bounty ‘than 
was ever known in such a short space of time’, and this, i t  was hoped, ‘will preclude 
the necessity of resorting to press warrants . The same point was re-emphasised a 
week later, when it was clear than London had followed the lead provided by 
Edinburgh. It was argued that ‘if every parish and town in the kingdom was to follow 
such a laudable public-spirited example, there would be no occasion for that 
unpleasant mode, impressing’ .I2’ An anonymous article in July 1794 even suggested 
that any surplus funds from the Lord Howe subscription should be set aside so that 
there would be ‘no occasion for a press warrant’ in future.?” Repeated pleas of 
avoiding press-gangs notwithstanding, impressments were authorised, and in at least 
one case, the issuers of a bounty took what to them seemed the natural consequence 
3 319 
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’ I 6  Caledonian Mercuiy, 4 March 1793. 
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of this government policy. In late March 1793 the hverkeithing Sailor Society 
published a notice, in which they stated that since ‘a house of rendezvous has been 
erected, and a press-gang established within this town, which has of late committed 
several illegal and oppressive acts of violence, unprecedented in all other places, 
upon the inhabitants and neighbourhood’, they could see no other possible outcome 
than to ‘UNANIMOUSLY recall their former advertisement offering a bounty’ .132 
By the late summer of 1793 the issuing of new and the reissuing of old 
bounties largely came to an end and throughout 1794 and the beginning of 1795, 
relatively few advertisements were printed, offering bounties to navy recruits. 
Shortly after the passing of the three Navy Acts in March 1795, however, a number 
of new bounty-offers were published in the press, and this time there was a clear 
incentive; the need to fill the specific quotas set by the two acts which applied to 
Scotland.’’3 The shortage of available manpower was now beginning to make its 
mark, and this - together with the specific quota requirement - was reflected in the 
much higher rewards that were offered in these newly issued bounties. The 
commissioners who had been appointed to raise volunteers at Leith, under the Act 
for supplying men from British ports, offered bounties of twenty guineas to seamen 
and fifteen to landsmen, and not only promised to cover ‘travelling charges’ and 
‘every other reasonable expence’ for the recipients, but also to ‘REWARD 
HANDSOMELY those who take trouble in their service, by recommending 
Volunteers or otherwise’. The commissioners in the port of Anstruther went even 
higher, and offered bounties of twenty-six, and seventeen pounds to seamen and 
landsmen respectively, while those in the port of Borrowstounness stated that they 
would give bounties ‘as HIGH as at any Port in Scotland’.’’‘ The commissioners at 
Dunbar also offered twenty and fifteen guineas,’” whereas the merchants and ship 
owners at Stornoway restricted their offer to ten and seven guineas respectively.’” 
After 1795 there were hardly any bounties offered to volunteers for naval service, 
”’ Culedonian Mercugq, 3 0  March 1793 [original capitals]. 
--- The provisions of the Navy Acts are included in Appendix: D. ’” Culedonian Mercun,, 6 April 1795 [original capitals]. 
’‘5 Ibid., 20 April 1795. 
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and the same was largely the case for fencible units?’ Before 1796, however, 
bounties were frequently issued to volunteers for fencible regiments - as could be 
expected for a force predominantly raised on the basis of subscriptions - and these 
bounties formed the second large group of rewards offered for voluntary military 
service. 
Although the subscriptions for fencible forces only began in 1794, bounties 
were already being offered in 1793 for the few regiments which were raised that 
year. The town of Dunfermline, for example, presented a bounty of two guineas to 
volunteers for the Breadalbane Regiment in late March,’’8 as did the magistrates and 
town council of St. Andrew~,’’~ whereas the same amount was offered by the 
‘Principal Inhabitants’ of Borrowstounness and the county of Ayr to recruits for Lord 
Hopetoun’s South Fencibles and the West Lowland Fencibles respectively.’” A few 
of these early regiments benefited from the issuing of more than one bounty for their 
recruits, and the Earl of Hopetoun’s Regiment appears to have been in a particularly 
advantageous position, enjoying multiple bounty-offers’ which included several 
presented by the Earl’s own tenants. The ‘Vassals and Tenants of the Estate of 
Annandale’ had, for example, offered their bounty of two guineas for the regiment in 
April, together with those of the Earl’s own tenants residing in the parish of Humbie 
in East Lothian.”’ The Earl’s tenants in the ‘Barony of Byres’ raised funds for a 
larger bounty of five guineas in May,”’ as did five named tenants in the parish of 
Crawford in Lanarkshire,’33 while the inhabitants of the parish of Crichton in Mid 
Lothian offered a the more conventional sum of two guineas.’” Further 
advertisements were printed in 1794, and in early 1795, offering rewards which were 
largely similar to those given to fencible and navy recruits in 1793. The magistrates 
227 Bounties for volunteer corps remained an exception throughout the war. In the case of the cavalry 
units, this was probably primarily because they consisted of wealthier Scots who needed no financial 
incentive to join. 
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and town council of Auchtermuchty, a burgh in Fifeshire, for example, offered a 
bounty of ‘one guinea over and above his Majesty’s Bounty, to any person enlisting 
the new regiment under the command of Colonel Graham’ in February 1794. 
more substantial offer was rnade by ‘the Farmers in the Lordship and Inhabitants of 
the Town of Huntly’ in Aberdeenshire, who offered five guineas to those ‘who shall 
inlist with Captain John Gordon, Commanding Officer at Huntly’ ,236 while an 
‘Additional Bounty’ of one guinea was presented by the inhabitants of the town of 
Wick ‘to every Spirited Young Man belonging to the Town’, who would enlist with 
the Rothsay and Caithness Fencible Corps.”’ Several more bounties were issued by 
farmers and tenants. A meeting held by the farmers in the county of Berwick on 17 
June resolved to offer an additional bounty of three guineas to those volunteers for 
the Berwickshire Cavalry ‘who shall enlist in said corps within the space of Three 
Weeks from this date’,”’ and the same reward was issued by the farmers in the 
county of Roxburgh.’” Bounties for fencibles were in some cases also issued by 
local government officials, such as the magistrates and town councils of Stirling and 
Forfar, who had raised money for Colonel Robertson’s Regiment, and of Thurso, 
who offered three guineas to recruits in the Rothsay and Caithness Regiment.’““ 
Lastly, as was the case with naval bounties, some of those given to fencibie recruits 
came from the funds of individual Scots. In early 1795 a bounty of two guineas was 
offered by ‘SOME Friends of Lieutenant George Hunter’ to the first ten men who 
would enlist with the Reay Fencibles - with whom the Lieutenant in question 
served,241 while Colonel Ilay Ferrier offered a ’Double Bounty’ of ten guineas to any 
volunteers for his own Third Regiment of Scotch Brigade, which he was trying to 
235 A 
’j Edinburgh Evening Courunt, 27 Feb. 1794. The authorities in Perth and of the burgh of Falkland in 
Fife offered two guineas to volunteers for the same regiment, and a number of gentlemen in  Inverness 
offered three guineas to volunteers for the Inverness-shire regiment. Ihid., 6, 22 March 1794. 
’’‘ Ibid., 10 April 1794. 
7 3 7  Ibid., 4 April 1794. ”’ Ibid., 26 June 1794. 
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Estates’ for the Drummond of Perth Fencible Regiment, and those working on the Estate of Rosehall 
offered one guinea to volunteers for the Angus-shire Fencibles. Ibid., 1 1  Dec. 1794. 1 ,  3 Jan. 1795. 
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complete, only to change this to ‘a HIGHER BOUNTY than any now offered by any 
Regiment in his Majesty’s service’ shortly  afterward^.'^' 
VI1 
How loyal were the Scots? 
The first part of this chapter pointed out that, although the Reeves’ association never 
seemed to make quite as strong an impact in Scotland, as it did in England, the 
subsequent demonstrations of loyalty - as they have been described above - show 
that Scots were prepared to go to great lengths to support the British state. In this 
respect, the range of the different types of demonstrations of loyalty in Scotland is 
striking. Many demonstrations were - admittedly - initiated by the government, and 
in quite a few cases, local officials needed to provide a lead before the general public 
took up the idea, but people did respond to the encouragements they were given by 
the authorities. and often in an overwhelming fashion. More crucially, a significant 
number of Scots also showed a willingness to initiate ways of demonstrating loyalty, 
entirely of their own making and without any initiative or remuneration from the 
authorities. The fact that so many people. from all social categories, were prepared, 
not only to make an effort. but also to make concrete sacrificcs - either by offering 
financial support, or personal service - in order to achieve this end, further 
underlines the impression of genuine loyalty among very many Scots. Moreover, the 
various demonstrations of loyalty also give an impression of loyalty on the 
b oovernment’s terms. Loyalism remained moderate in its outlook. and although 
people in many cases demonstrated their support for the government in an 
enthusiastic manner, this support never seriously threatened to develop its own 
political agenda and become an independent political force. In this sense, the risk Pitt 
and his ministers had taken with the Royal Proclamations of 1792 must be seen as 
having ultimately turned out a success. 
Demonstrations of loyalty were, however, only one side of loyalism and the 
support given to the government in the 1790s. The other was the argument presented 
’Q Ibid.. 26 June, 3 July 1795. 
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by those who sought to defend the existing political system in the British state, and it 




In 1792 - when the spread of popular radicalism and politically-inspired rioting 
brought up the issue of ideological support for the government - it was not 
immediately obvious which approach the supporters of the government would adopt 
when arguing their case. There were differences between those who argued in favour 
of the existing political system and against any wide-ranging changes of the 
government of Great Britain on the French model. Broadly speaking, there were two 
competing views of how best to protect the British Constitution, and both were 
concerned with the avoidance of revolution. 
I 
1792-93: HOW to avoid revolution in Britain 
On the one side stood those who claimed that a moderate reform of the British 
political system was the only way a revolution could be avoided. In the current 
political climate, it was argued, the best approach the government could adopt was to 
give some concessions to the demands put forward by many people. By doing so, the 
authorities would show themselves to be listening to the grievances of the people, 
and to be acting upon their complaints, but without placing the fundamental structure 
of the British constitution at risk. This strategy, they thought, would defuse the 
situation, because most people were sensible and moderate, and would be content 
with piecemeal changes aimed at redressing the specific issues they had raised. Few 
people had any wish for extensive changes in the system of government, let alone for 
a revolution, but if those legitimate concerns raised by the people were not 
addressed, then they might be persuaded by the radicals to support more extreme 
political demands. A persistent refusal by the government even to contemplate 
reform was likely to fuel the anger of ordinary people, and the inevitable 
consequences of this would be a revolution on the French model. This line of 
argument had considerable appeal to those who had already been campaigning for 
moderate reform for some time, not least because it suited their political agenda. 
29 I 
Seen from the point of view of most conservative thinkers, however, this was 
a deeply flawed analysis. In their opinion, the only way to avoid revolution in Britain 
was for the government to stand firm against the radical claims, and to refuse any 
demands for change. Concessions would only be perceived as a weakness, with the 
inevitable result that the radicals would press for further reforms. Once the 
government had given in to one single demand, there would be no turning back, and 
the country would slide down the slippery slope to revolution. Essentially, these two 
analyses could both be seen to present a ‘loyalist’ argument, in that they were both 
concerned with how revolution could be avoided and the existing system of 
government preserved. Where they differed, was in their respective views of the 
people and of how the general public would react to political reform. 
The upsurge of radicalism all across Britain in 1791-92, however, made it 
increasingly difficult to maintain a position in the middle ground and to defend 
moderate reform as a loyalist argument. When Louis XVI was executed in January 
1793 and war broke out between Britain and France on 1 February the same year, it 
became near untenable to advocate such views. Placed somewhat awkwardly 
between the radicals on the one side and the more conservative supporters of the 
stutus quo on the other, moderate reform - as a loyalist and pro-government 
argument - withered and all but disappeared from the debate. Political opinions now 
increasingly revolved around two poles - loyalist and radical, or patriotic and pro- 
French - and in this political climate there was little room for any more nuanced 
views. The moderate reformers, were lumped together with the more extreme 
radicals, and branded as pro-French, potential revolutionaries, and even traitors. 
Despite this hostile political environment, Emma Vincent Macleod has recently 
argued, ‘at least seventy or eighty’ Scottish opposition Whigs remained active 
throughout the decade. Although ‘conservatives identified them with or passed them 
off as nearly as bad as radicals‘, these Whigs were not subdued, and ‘continued to 
1 
For a discussion of the moderate reformers, see: H. T. Dickinson. Liberns und Property: Political 
Zdeolog). in Ei~hree i i th -Cenfun  Britain (London, 1977). pp. 237-40: Donald E. Ginter. ‘The Loyalist 
Associations Movement of 1792-93 and British Public Opinion’, Historicul Jnnrnul, 9 ( 1966), 184; 
and Clive Emsley, Britain and the French R e i d i t i o n  (Harlow. 2000), p. 40. Emma Vincent Macleod 
has argued that, already by 1795, Robert Dundas had found i t  difficult ‘to conceive cf’ any medium 
between loyalty to government and wholesale republicanism’. Emma Vincent Macleod, ‘The Scottish 
Opposition Whigs and the French Revolution’ [forthcoming]. 
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steer a middle course between conservatives and radicals’ .? In the main political 
debate of the 1790s, however, the battle was largely fought between the radicals on 
the one side and those loyalists promoting a conservative ideology in defence of the 
existing political system on the other. The argument of the latter will form the main 
focus of this chapter. This involves loolung at, first the conservative defence of the 
British constitution, then how loyalists writers attacked the ideas and policies of the 
radicals at home and the revolutionaries in France, before moving on to related issues 
of morality and religion, a dilemma facing loyalist ideologues, and finally examining 
the attempts that were made to adapt the conservative argument to a Scottish setting. 
I1 
The Conservative Defence of the British Constitution 
Since most radical pamphleteers made significant efforts to identify and reveal 
deficiencies, flaws or ‘abuses’ within the British political system and generally 
painted a picture of a political regime ripe for reform, a natural starting point for 
loyalist writers, hoping to mount a defence of that regime. was to emphasise those 
particular advantages which they believed the British constitution secured for all 
Britons. They stressed the uniquely favourable situation in which Britain found 
herself, blessed as she was with ‘the best constitution in the world’,-’ ‘the envy of 
surrounding nations’.‘ and ‘the grandest effort of political wisdom ever exhibited on 
the earth, the pride of Britain, the glory of the isles’, as the reverend Thomas 
Macknight phrased it.’ The British form of government was held to have reached a 
level of ‘maturity and perfection unequalled on the face of the Globe’,‘ and for 
loyalist writers it was of paramount importance to make all Britons aware of the 
unsurpassed benefits which this uniquely successful political system bestowed upon 
’ Ibid.. pp. 13- 14. 
Anonymous. Some of Mr .  Pairie ’ s  Principles and Schemes o f  Gor~errzment exaniined, urid His Errors 
Detected (Edinburgh, 1792), p. 53. 
The Times, 31 Jan. 1793, General Meeting of County Delegates in Scotland. Edinburgh. 10 
December 1792. ’ The Rev. Thomas Macknight, The Mearis oj’ National Secwit_),, Considered as U Ground fiir 
Thankfiilness to Di\,ine Prorjidence (London, 1795), p. 16. 
Laurence Moyes. Gratitude to God (Falkirk, 1794), p. 14. Similar statements can be found in: 
Thomas Hardy, The Patriot (Edinburgh. 1793), p. 20; and George Hill, The present Happiness cf 




the British people. The fallacies of the radicals’ accusations needed to be exposed, 
and if such a political education of the people could only be achieved, then, the 
growing support for radicalism ought be halted as a consequence, many conservative 
supporters of the government seemed to believe. Most loyalist writers therefore went 
to great lengths to explain precisely why the British constitution produced a political 
regime superior to any other in the world, and why it would be foolish to attempt to 
make any changes. 
Central to the argument was the emphasis placed on the particular advantages 
derived from a mixed government and ‘balanced’ constitution such as the British. 
There were only three pure or simple forms of government - monarchy, aristocracy 
and democracy - but the British constitution was unique in that it combined all three 
of these, and achieved a balance between them. This placed it in an unrivalled 
position. Whereas every simple form of government had some advantages, each of 
them also had certain disadvantages, and these tended to become accentuated if they 
remained unchecked by another form. A monarchical government, for example, 
could easily descend into an absolutist tyranny if there was no balancing power in the 
state, while an unchecked aristocratic regime could turn itself into a factious 
oligarchy. and democratic regimes were held to have a tendency of disintegrating 
into mob rule and anarchy.’ The British constitution, by contrast, was able to balance 
and rectify the ‘defects’ of these simple forms by combining them all in ‘one 
complicated, and yet harmonizing system’, as one anonymous pamphlet concluded.8 
This was done by establishing a single sovereign legislature which was made up of 
three elements representing the three forms of government: monarchy (the King), 
aristocracy (the House of Lords), and democracy (the House of Commons). Each 
balanced the other two because each had its own separate function: the Kmg was the 
head of the executive; the House of Lords was the supreme Court of appeal; and the 
See, for example: Hardy, Patriot, pp. 59, 60-1. Robert Thomas held i t  to be: ‘a great excellence of 
the British Constitution, that these three powers, the legislature, the executive, and the judicial, are 
separated, or lodged in different hands’, since this meant that no one man, or body of men, could gain 
control over the ‘whole power of the state‘. Robert Thomas, The Cause of Truth, Containing, hesides 
U great variety of other matters, A Refutation of Errors in the political M’orks of Tliomus Paine, uiid 
other publications of a similar kind (Dundee, 1797), p. 378. See also: Ibid., pp. 337, 35; -92. 




House of Commons initiated all taxes.’ The balance thus achieved was, however, 
very delicate, and could easily be disrupted and damaged if any one of the three 
constituent parts of the legislature increased its power at the expense of the other 
two. This was precisely what many loyalist writers feared in the 1790s, and it was 
argued that the parliamentary reforms promoted by the radicals - if they were carried 
through - would make the democratic element of the constitution, the House of 
Commons, far too powerful relative to the other two, thereby endangering the 
balance of the constitution and the stability of the country.” Combining the three 
simple forms of government into one legislature could eliminate their individual 
flaws, while preserving their benefits. The Reverend James Roger argued that, under 
the British constitution, ‘all the beauties of the three simple forms . . . are selected and 
combined’.’ * A few loyalist writers admitted that, although the British constitution 
was the best in the world, there might still be room for small improvements, since 
‘no system framed by men is absolutely perfect’, but they denied that any ‘abuses or 
corruptions’ could have ‘crept into the constitution’ since the time of the Glorious 
Revolution in 1689, as many radicals claimed.’’ Striving to achieve an ideal form of 
government would be futile, since there could never he ‘a perfect government, until 
perfect men be found to govern and to be governed’ . I 3  There was, in any case, no 
evidence to suggest that the British public had suffered as a consequence of any 
imperfections in the British constitution. *’ 
Although considerable efforts were thus made to explain the theoretical side 
of the advantages offered by the British form of government and the potential 
For a discussion of the principles underlying the balanced constitution in Britain, see: Dickinson, 
LiberCV and Propert?., particularly pp. 142-59 
See: Hill. Happiness of Great Britain, p. 21; and Dickinson, Libern and Propere,  pp. 272-75. 
Earlier in the eighteenth century, it had been argued by - first the ‘country’ opposition in parliament, 
and later by radicals from the 1760s onwards - that the careful balance of the British constitution was 
threatened by the (allegedly) increasing influence of the Crown. ‘Country’ politicians had been 
concerned about Crown patronage and the corrupt methods of the Court in the first half of the century, 
while many radicals had believed that ‘George I11 wished to increase the power of the Crown by 
unconstitutional means’ after he acceded to the throne in 1760. Although the ‘country’ politicians may 
have had a case to make, there was little hold in the allegations made against George 111. See: ihid., p. 
206 [quote], and pp. 174, 179-81, 192, 195-97. 
The Rev. James Roger, E s s q  on Government (Edinburgh, 1797), p. 28. See also: Thomas Hardy, 
Fidelih- to the British Constitution (Edinburgh, 1794), p. 17. 
Hardy, Patriot, p. 20 [original italics]. See also: ‘A Clergyman of the Dissenting Interest in 
Scotland’, Civil and Religious Subjection (Edinburgh, 1798), p. 9. 
l 3  The Rev. James Hall, David and Goliah; or Great Britain & France (Glasgow, 1793), p. 25. 
I‘ Thomas Somerville, Observations on the Present State of Britain (Edinburgh, 1793), p. 27. 
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dangers involved in attempting political reforms along the lines suggested by the 
radicals, the main thrust of the loyalist argument was concerned with the practicul 
benefits of the British constitution. The merits of a political system should not be 
measured against abstract theoretical principles, but by its actual achievements. To 
find evidence that the balanced constitution of Britain provided the best political 
system in the world, Britons need only observe the unequalled benefits they had 
enjoyed throughout the past century. In the opinion of Adam Whyte, who was clearly 
influenced by Edmund Burke, the crucial advantage of the British political system 
was that it had stood the test of time: 
I judge of governments, not as they do in France, by any abstract 
notions of perfection, but by the effects which they actually produce; 
and from the effects which our Government has produced for more 
than an hundred years, you and I are justified, I think, in maintaining, 
that it is the huppiest civil Constitution in Europe.I5 
To their own satisfaction, the loyalists were able to demonstrate that - over the past 
one hundred years - the British constitution had secured and safeguarded precisely 
those rights and principles they held to be necessary to maintain a stable, safe, liberal 
and prosperous society. Under such a ‘civil government’, one anonymous author 
stated, ‘we require security of person, property, and reputation’ as well as ‘protection 
from foreign foes, and vigorous measures against domestic enemies’, and ‘freedom 
of speech and writing, if our words and writings be not injurious to others. or the 
public peace’. Only in the ‘British dominions’ were all these requirements fulfilled 
by the existing political arrangements. l 6  Thomas Hardy argued that the essential 
rights in a civil society were ‘religious liberty’, ‘personal safety’ and ‘security of 
property’, all of which were enjoyed ‘under the British constitution’ , I 7  while Robert 
Walker held that the British political system was ‘adapted equally to secure the 
blessings of LIBERTY and RELIGION’,’8 and the reverend James Steven claimed 
that, in Britain, ‘liberty of conscience is allowed to the inhabitants in religious 
Adam Whyte, Political Preaching (Glasgow, 1792). p. 16 [original italics]. 
NAS, RH2/4/66, f. 321 [excerpt from the Gfasgmt Courier, 13 Dec. 17923. ‘To the PEOPLE OF 
15 
I6 
SCOTLAND’, by a ‘FELLOW SUBJECT’. 
l 7  Hardy, Fidelih, pp. 20, 22, 26. 
capitals]. 
Robert Walker, A Sermon Preached in the Church of Canongate (Edinburgh, 1794). p. 42 [original 18 
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matters’, and that ‘justice lies open to the meanest of the people’.” The Reverend 
William Porteous emphasised that the people should look for ‘two effects’, which 
could be produced ‘by a good civil constitution, and a wise administration of 
government’ and by ‘no other cause’. They were ‘the security and the prosperity of 
the people’ .20 Other loyalist writers made similar points, and, in essence, the loyalist 
case came down to the four crucial principles of liberty, property, the rule of law and 
equality before the law. 
The meaning of liberty was not the right to vote or to have any other kind of 
direct influence in the political decision-making process in the way the radicals 
imagined, but freedom from oppression and the right to a live free life in a society 
regulated by just laws. For some writers, liberty was the principle upon which the 
whole British constitution rested. Thomas Macknight argued that ‘in the fabric of our 
constitution, liberty forms the materials, liberty is the basis’, the ‘superstructure’, the 
‘pillars’ and the ‘ornament’. Every inhabitant of Great Britain was free to do as he 
pleased, Macknight stressed, as long as his actions remained within the law of the 
land, and this was the essence of true liberty.” ‘To talk of liberty without constraint’, 
he stated. was nothing but ’mere delusion’, since ‘true liberty is as far removed from 
anarchy, as it  is from despotism’.” A natural consequence of this interpretation of 
liberty was the view that all Britons also had equal opportunities to make their own 
living and to rise in society.27 ‘Subjection to good laws, is true liberty’, Alexander 
Shanks argued,” while an anonymous pamphlet stated that ‘true freedom is freedom 
from irzjun’.25 Freedom of action was of little value, loyalists claimed, unless it was 
restrained by reasonable laws which stopped people from inflicting injury on each 
other, and liberty was therefore as much a matter of protection and safety, as it  was 
of freedom. Indeed, the strong emphasis which some loyalist writers placed on 
equality of opportunities, but not in the right to vote, was closely related to the 
l 9  James Steven, A Public Testinzony of Loyult>$ to the British Constitution (Glasgow. 1793). pp. 1 1 - 
12. See also: James Wemyss, A scriptural vie\$, of Kings arid Mugistrutes (Edinburgh, 1794), pp. 33-5. 
” Macknight. Meam of Nutional Securit!’. pp. 15- 16. 
-- Ibid., p. 24. 
William Porteous, The Good Old Wu?, reconmended (Glasgow, 1793), p. 30 [original italicsl. 
7 1  
See: John Young, E s s q , ~  on the following Interesting Siibjvcts (Edinburgh, 1794), p. 48. 
Alexander Shanks, Peuce und Order reconznierided to Societ?. (Edinburgh, 1793), p. 18. 
27 
24 
‘5 ’A Friend of Order’, A fekt. Pluin Questions to the Working People of Scotland (Edinburgh’?, 1793), 
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second principle, that of property. If all inhabitants had the same right to create a 
livelihood for themselves, then, in the opinion of most loyalist writers, it followed 
that they must have the right to retain the fruits of their labour, since it would make 
little sense to have the right to create wealth, but not to retain it. The protection of 
property was therefore seen to be closely wedded to the principle of liberty, as a 
prerequisite for any civil society. As John Erskine found reason to clarify: 
I mean not, by liberty, that licentiousness, which permits any, without 
dread of punishment, to be as false, injurious, and malicious, as they 
choose, in their words, writings, and actions. I mean, the liberty, by 
which every one enjoys, undisturbed, his just rights and property; is 
uncontrouled in his lawful pursuits; and entitled, boldly, though 
decently, to present his complaints to his su eriors, that they may be 
examined, and, if well-founded, be redressed. !6 
Furthermore, the right to property was held to be of equal importance for all 
members of society, those who owned little as much as the very rich. When the 
radicals challenged the property rights of large landowners and rich financiers, they 
were also threatening the property of everyone who actually owned something. ‘If a 
Duke or Earl has not right to his great estate, what right has the portioner or feuer in 
any village to his?’, one pamphlet asked,” while another stated that, in Britain, ‘the 
poor man has everything belonging to him as well secured as the greatest,? Unless 
property was protected ‘as it happens to stand’, no one could feel safe for their 
belongings, because: 
What right has the shopkeeper to his shop, the tenant to his tack, the 
corporation to its privileges and freedoms, the master-tradesman to the 
work of his apprentices and servants. or any working man to his 
comfortable meal, while there is a beggar in the street that wants it?’’9 
Once the sanctity of property was questioned there was no telling what the ultimate 
consequences might be. The only group of people who could possibly have anything 
John Erskine, The Fatal Consequences arid the General Sources of Amrchjs (Edinburgh. 1793). p. 
‘A Friend of Order’, Plain Questions, p. 12. 
Anonymous, Mr. Paine ’ s  Principles. p. 28. 
’A Friend of Order’, Plain Questions, p.  12. A similar point was made by Alexander Carlyle, who 
argued that: ‘The King is not more secure in his right to his palace, than the labourer to his hut’. 







to gain from a weakening of property rights were the utterly destitute; those who 
owned nothing and therefore had nothing to lose.30 For everyone else, such policies 
spelled little but plunder and social anarchy, and no one should expect to be able to 
reap any advantages for themselves, if the sanctity of property was destroyed. 
The argument which was advanced to demonstrate that the defence of 
property was in the interest of all members of society was also used to defend the 
propertied franchise, as well as to argue that only men of independent means should 
be elected to sit in parliament. Only men who owned property themselves could be 
safely relied upon to defend vital rights such as liberty and property once they had 
been elected to the House of Commons, and only propertied men could be expected 
to exercise a free choice among the candidates in parliamentary elections?’ ‘Power 
without property’, Thomas Hardy stated, ‘is the very engine of plunder, and lets 
loose those hands which good laws are meant to restrain’.-’’ Security for person and 
property was not merely a matter of regulating the interaction which took place 
between individuals, but also a way of circumscribing the powers of the state, so that 
the rulers of the country could not abuse their position. Just as the inhabitants of 
Britain had to live their lives in accordance with the laws of the land, so the 
L‘ government also had to abide by certain rules and regulations. It was this 
requirement whxh formed the basis of the principle of ‘the Rule of Law’. The 
concept of ‘the Rule of Law’ could, however, also be interpreted in a wider sense, 
where it referred to a society regulated by just and reasonable laws, both with respect 
to the relationship between government and citizen or subject, and between the 
inhabitants of the country. Moreover. it could be seen to include the principle of 
equal laws for all the inhabitants of the realm. In Britain, it was argued, no man could 
be thrown in prison without first being accused of a crime, tried before a court of law 
and convicted by a jury of his peers, and this made Britain stand out in sharp contrast 
to continental Europe. Referring to the practices of the pre-revolutionary regime in 
France, John Young pointed out how the rule of law in Britain protected British 
subjects from similar abuses of state power at home: 
Tam Thrum, Ten minutes Reflection on the late events in France (London, 17921, p. 7. 30 
I ’  Dickinson, Liberty and Properh-, pp. 279-8 1 .  
37 Thomas Hardy, The Importance cfReligicrn t o  National Prosperih, (Edinburgh, 1794), p. 24. 
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We have no Lettres de catchet [sic],33 by which a man may be seized, 
when going about his lawful business, or even in his own house, 
carried he knows not where, and kept . . . without ever knowing whom 
he had offended, or how. We have no BastiZZes, in which an innocent 
person may be forced to spend his whole life in a dungeon, without 
trial, without appeal, and even without allowance to prefer a petition 
for justice. No man’s will is our law. Neither the king himself, nor any 
of his ministers dare touch a hair of our head, nor a farthing of our 
property, unless in execution of the law.’4 
It was clear to everyone that the rule of law also secured freedom of speech, 
the press and of religion in Britain; liberties some loyalists accused the radicals of 
abusing.” Should ‘Mr. Paine’ choose to write pamphlets against the current regime, 
while in France, as he had done in Britain, Thomas Hardy hypothesised, ‘he would 
experience a brief prosecution, quite unencumbered with those legal forms of which 
he complains in England . Thus, under the British constitution, even those who , 36 
wished for its demise were given the full protection of the law, and this was closely 
linked to the fourth main principle underpinning the constitution, that of equality 
before the law. A ‘particular excellence in the Constitution of Britain’, the reverend 
James Steven argued, is that ‘justice lies open to the meanest of the people’.” There 
were no legal privileges for the nobility or other distinctions between subjects with 
respect to the law in Britain, and ‘if a dispute arises between a peer and the meanest 
commoner, the law determines the dispute impartially’ Equality before the law was 
crucial for the principles of liberty and property, since a man would not be free to ‘do 
what he chuses’ and to accumulate wealth, unless the same rules applied to 
e~eryone.~’  True equality, Thomas Somerville observed, consisted in having ‘the 
Lettres de cachet: Royal warrants in France ordering the imprisonment of a named individual. 
Young, Essajis, p. 37 [original italics]. The later, and repeated, suspensions of the Habeas Corpus 
were, of course, in breach of this principle, government reassurances that i t  was merely a temporary 
measure aimed at safeguarding Britain against domestic revolutionaries notwithstanding. See: chapter 
’’ See for example: NAS, RH2/4/69, ff. 246-47, ‘SPEECH delivered from the  Chair o f the  Court qf 
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same undistinguishing protection of the laws’, and ‘the same rule of justice 
applicable to every one’ .40 
The optimal conditions thus set by the British constitution had also secured 
material benefits. References to the prevailing prosperity of Britain was used 
extensively to demonstrate the practical advantages of the British form of 
government. ‘Know the tree, I say, from the produce’, one anonymous pamphleteer 
wrote, because, surely: ‘It cannot be a poisonous and rotten stock that produces such 
abundance of excellent and wholesome The progress of commerce and 
manufacture, and the growing wealth of Britain over the past century was a direct 
result of that liberal political regime which secured freedom under equal and just 
laws. Only in a country where the political arrangements guaranteed true liberty for 
the individual, and thus gave unrivalled opportunities for entrepreneurs, could the 
economic progress witnessed in Britain over the past one hundred years have been 
achieved.42 ‘The prosperous fruits of our political government afford an argument for 
its excellence’, Thomas Somerville claimed. before arguing that ‘our prosperity . . . 
must be exposed to dreadful hazard by a total subversion of government, or indeed 
by any essential change in it’? It was also argued that the increasing wealth of 
Britain had not merely disappeared into the pockets of wealthy landowners and rich 
financiers. but had been to the benefit of all members of society. ‘The truth is’. 
Thomas Macknight wrote, that ‘there never was a country, or a period, in which 
prosperity and happiness were more universally diffused throughout a nation in all its 
ranks, and in which, particularly, the poor were better provided for, or their interest 
more consulted, than they are, at this moment, in this land’.44 When the practical 
achievements of the British constitution over the past century produced such an 
‘unusual degree of private happiness and public prosperity’, as the Reverend Andrew 
Hunter concluded,4s in whose interest was it to make any changes to this venerable 
Somerville, Observations, p. 5. 
‘A Friend of Order’, Plain Questions. p. 1 1. 41 
‘’ See for example: Porteous. Good Old Way, pp. 9, 30, 32; and NAS, RH2/4/69, ff. 246-47, 
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political system? The answer to this question, most loyalist writers seemed to agree, 
was a handful of radicals of questionable morality and not the public at large. 
I11 
The Attack on the British Radicals and French Revolutionaries 
The main theme running through the loyalists’ direct criticism of radical ideas was 
the contrast between theory on the one hand, and practice and experience on the 
~ t h e r . “ ~  Just as they defended the British constitution primarily on practical grounds 
and on the evidence of experience, the loyalists also attacked the radicals for relying 
on theoretical ‘first principles’ of government in their proposals for a reform of the 
British political system, and for misleading the public with idealised visions of a 
government and society based on such theoretical concepts. The ideas and arguments 
put forward by radicals were generally too far removed from the reality of everyday 
policy-making, and were therefore of little relevance to the actual running of a 
c~unt ry .~’  Other loyalists were more concerned to emphasise the potential dangers 
involved in attempting to reform a political regime on the basis of untried theoretical 
principles of government, precisely because no one could know the exact outcome of 
such an experiment, and the government of a country was far too important to be the 
object of such experimentation. Universal suffrage, annual parliaments and an 
extensive reform of the system of representation were all held to be untried schemes, 
and the consequences of implementing them could therefore not be foretold. As 
loyalist writers never tired of emphasising, true liberty had to be limited and did not 
involve the right to vote. nor should equality be anything other than equality before 
the law. Radical claims that the British were ‘not a free people’, because they ‘have 
no vote in the choice of the members of Parliament’ were utter nonsense, because 
neither had ‘nineteen out of twenty of those whom the reformers chuse to call your 
For a comprehensive account of radical ideology in  the 1790s. see: Dickinson, Lihertl- cznd 
Properhs, chapter 7, pp. 232-69. 
A number of pamphlets and sermons were written solely for the purpose of refuting Thomas Paine’s 
ideas and arguments and, at least as far as his public welfare schemes were concerned. the main 
argument raised against them was that they were ‘impracticable’. See: Emma Vincent. ‘The 
Responses of the Scottish Churchmen to the French Revolution, 1789-1 802’, Scorrish Hisrorical 




oppressors’.“* It was also false to claim that those who did not possess the vote were 
without representation in parliament, since MPs were not elected to represent only 
those who voted for them, but also those who voted for a different candidate, and 
indeed the whole nation. As John Young argued: 
Every member of the House of Commons represents those who voted 
against him. Yea, whenever a man is chosen, he ceases to be a 
representative of that city or county only, by which he was chosen: and 
becomes a representative of the British people at large. And every 
individual among that people is represented, not by any particular 
members of Parliament only; but by the whole house.49 
The argument that all Britons were thus ‘virtually’ represented in parliament 
had been a crucial element in the conservative case against both an extended 
franchise and a reform of the representation in parliament since the 1760s.“’ After 
1792, virtual representation was developed as the main counter-argument to the 
radical case for reform? It was supported by another argument based more on 
practical experience, and aimed specifically at the demand for an extension of the 
right to vote: the purpose of the propertied franchise was to ensure that the ablest 
men were elected to sit in parliament. ‘The truth is, my friends’, one anonymous 
article stated, ‘that it is not the manner of electing in this or that burgh, or this or that 
county, that maltes a good Parliament - it is the kind of men generally elected’.’’ 
Why worry about the electoral procedure when the propertied franchise ensured that 
the ablest men were elected to sit in parliament? People ought to focus less on the 
theoretical imperfections of the election procedure and more on the practical 
achievements of the British parliament. ‘When we are in possession of the end’, one 
anonymous pamphleteer remarked, ‘why in the name of wonder would we quarrel 
with the means by which we have gained it?’s3 Furthermore, when the existing 
‘A Friend of Order’, Plain Questions, p. 8 [original italics]. 
Young. Essays, p. 76. 
See H. T. Dickinson, Liber03 and Property, pp. 217-1 8 .  For a discussion of the principles of virtual 
representation, see: ibid., pp. 279-85. 
- In addition to John Young, see: ‘A Lover of His Country’, An Address t o  The Associated Friends of 
the People (Edinburgh 1792), p. 22. 
- Caledonian Mercun,. 1 March 1793, ‘TO THE PEOPLE OF SCOTLAND’, by ‘AN OLD 
TRADESMAN’. See also: James Thomson, The Rise, Progress, urzd Consequences of the Nehi 
Opinions and Principles lately introduced into Frurzce (Edinburgh, 1799). p. 158. 
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system had produced such favourable results, why take the risk of implementing 
reforms, the consequences of which could not be known, merely to obtain a 
supposedly ideal or rational system of representation? Surely it must be better to 
retain an imperfect, but well-functioning arrangement, it was argued, than to hazard 
everything on an experiment, only to find that ‘our political theories, perhaps, when 
too late, turn out to be impra~t icable’ .~~  Thomas Macknight went one step further, 
and claimed that political reform based on untried schemes could only be expected to 
end in disaster: 
May heaven preserve us, from the horrors of sudden and violent 
change! We know not the value of our blessings till we lose them. It 
would be well that men seriously estimated the advantages they enjoy, 
before they rashly yield themselves to dangerous novelties, of which 
the evil is certain, but the good precarious, and which, at any rate, are 
wholly inadequate to correct the evils they profess to remedy. - - If by 
a spirit of change and groundless discontent, we were unhappily to 
plunge ourselves, in all the miseries of anarchy, with what bitterness of 
regret should we look back, on our former blissful condition, then lost 
forever! 55  
The radicals’ understanding of equality was as dangerous as their concept of liberty. 
‘Extreme equality’, the Reverend James Steven remarked, ‘teaches every man to say, 
I am king, the next man fancies himself a king, and the third is upon an equal 
footing. So many kings clashing together, must end in affront, rage and blo~dshed’.~‘’ 
This was precisely what had happened during the disturbances of November 1792, 
when the activities of radical agitators led to a ‘wish for ideal equality’, and was a 
main cause of rioting.” In conclusion, ‘Tam Thrum’ stated, it is ‘not an easy matter, 
even for the wisest and the most virtuous of men to make a Government for a Nation’ 
as the radicals were suggesting. On the contrary, the best political system was that 
which had come ‘by degrees, as necessity requires and as the situation of the people 
admits’, just as the British constitution had done.” The people ‘have a right to be 
well governed, and to possess all the privileges of free born Britons’, but ‘they have 
53 Moyes, Gratitude to God, p. 29. 
jf( Macknight, Means of National Securih, pp. 25-6. 
Steven, Public Testinion?> of Loyalh., p. 20. 
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no right or title to govern’.59 Political affairs should therefore be left to those who 
knew best how to conduct them, and who had the necessary experience to do this. If 
there really were any need for reform, then it was best conducted by parliament 
itself, and ought to be postponed until after the war!’ 
Many loyalist writers wrote to defend of both the level of taxation in Britain, 
and the National Debt. The defence they developed consisted of two main parts. One 
argument claimed that taxes, although considerable, did not constitute as heavy a 
burden as the radicals claimed, and that they were paid predominantly by the 
wealthier members of society. Moreover, they were necessary to sustain the war 
effort!’ Of greater relevance to the defence of the British constitution, however, was 
the other claim that the British financial system was essentially fair and honest. 
People had no reason to be concerned about the level of taxation or the size of the 
national debt, it was argued, when both of these were in the hands of the people’s 
own representatives in parliament, many of whom had a stake in the debt and 
therefore a personal reason to make sure that the system worked well. Although the 
taxes paid in Britain were ‘numerous’, James Roger admitted, they were nevertheless 
‘so well regulated’ that they ‘cannot be called oppressive’, and the national debt was 
merely the result of Britain having fought a sequence of just and necessary wars 
against the French since 1689? An anonymous pamphleteer reminded readers that 
‘the creditors of the nation are, for the most part our own people - British subjects’, 
the majority of whom were ‘traders, manufacturers, and artists’, people who had 
‘trusted to the nation, as to a safe bank, the savings and earnings of the industry of 
their whole lives’.63 Andrew Hunter argued that taxes were necessary to maintain 
both a government and a military defence against foreign enemies, and held it to be 
‘evident that government in no country can be maintained but at a very considerable 
59 Glasgobty Courier, 13 Dec. 1792, ‘To the PEOPLE OF SCOTLAND’. 
6o See for example: ‘A Lover of His Country’, Address to the Associated Friends of the People, pp. 9- 
11,  14, 17-18; William Dunn, An Address h, a Scotsman, to his Countn9merr and Fello~y Citizens 
(Glasgow, 1793), p. 16; and George Hill, Instructions afforded by the present war, to the proplc oj 
Great-Britain (Edinburgh, 1793). pp. 14- 15. 
6 1  For a discussion of this argument, see: chapter 5, pp. 221-23. 
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expence’ .64 A certain level of taxation was therefore inescapable in a well-governed 
country. It was ‘an incumbent duty for subjects’, one clergyman argued, ‘to submit to 
such reasonable taxations as may be imposed for the support of public affairs? 
Anyone who was not convinced that Britain had a well-administered tax system, or 
who thought that the tax burden was unreasonably high, need only look at the 
arbitrary tax regimes which existed on the continent of Europe? 
Not all loyalist pamphleteers were content to defeat the radical case by 
rational and pragmatic arguments alone, however. Some also took the debate to a 
personal level, by raising questions about the moral character of those who were 
promoting radical policies, and about their personal motives for doing so. It was 
claimed that most radicals were not men of principles, and that their true intentions 
were very different from those they professed in public. Andrew Hunter commented 
that: 
Frequently the cry about abuses in government and the need for 
reformation in the state, is raised by worthless and seditious persons, 
who have either squandered away their own fortunes in vice and folly, 
or who have been disappointed in schemes of ambition, and are eager 
by such means to raise themselves to situations of honour and 
affluence. 67 
People should be wary of the promises made by the radicals, because, far from 
having the best interests of the public at heart, they were in fact disgruntled misfits, 
who sought to revenge themselves on society by creating chaos. ‘[Tlell me’, one 
anonymous pamphleteer asked, ‘have you often known any of those violent 
Reformers good for any thing as a Merchant, a Tradesman, or a Manufacturer? . . . Or 
was he not, generally, an idle, dissipated, vapouring fellow, harsh to his wife, 
neglectful to his family, a bad paymaster, and an unsafe dealer?’68 The radicals were 
dishonest and evil-designing men who were not to be trusted, and nowhere was this 
more evident than in those corresponding societies which had ‘solicited the aid, and 
courted the friendship of France’; thereby making themselves at least partly 
Hunter, Duties of Subjects, p. 10. 
‘A  Clergyman of the Dissenting Interest’, Civil und Religious Subjection, p. 1 1 
These comparisons are discussed in chapter 5, pp. 21 7- 18. 
Hunter, Duties of Subjects, p. 7. 







responsible for the outbreak of war.69 Moreover, the radicals were deliberately 
attempting to lead people astray - ‘to disturb your peace, and unsettle your minds’, 
as James Wemyss stated7’ - by presenting them with ‘visionary and lofty theories of 
innovation’, the consequence of which, should they be implemented, could only be a 
revolution similar to that which had taken place in F r a n ~ e . ~ ’  Indeed, the British 
Convention, which sat in Edinburgh in December 1793, was repeatedly accused of 
promoting revolution in Britain. The Presbytery of Dalkeith, for example, stated that 
they had ‘observed with sorrow and indignation’ the activities of the British 
Convention, ‘whose open and professed design leads directly to the overthrow of the 
present Happy Government, and to the introduction of a Democratical Tyrrany 
similar to that of the French, with all its dreadful consequences’.’’ The loyalists thus 
came to rely increasingly on the use of the example of France to demonstrate the 
likely consequences of radical policies at home, should they be put into practice. By 
portraying the horrible effects ‘first principles’ had had in France, many loyalist 
writers may also have hoped to strengthen the resolve of a war-wary population. 
When considering the ‘evils of anarchy’, which are ‘severely felt in a neighbouring 
state’, John Erskine wrote in 1793, ‘ought we not take warning, from their 
situation?”’ The radicalisation of the Revolution in France after the declaration of 
the Republic, and the subsequent regime of ‘Terror’, was used as solid evidence of 
the dangers involved in framing a new government on theoretical models and 
abstract principles. Loyalists proceeded to compare and contrast what they saw as the 
hopeless situation in France with the blissful state of Britain. 
Porteous, Good Old Way, p. 12; Anonymous, Three Words on the War (Edinburgh, 1793), pp. 3-4; 
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Whereas the British political system was held to be founded on a slowly 
evolving constitution, which made piecemeal adaptations to suit a changing society, 
the French were seen to have abolished an arbitrary political regime through a violent 
revolution only to replace it with another. Evolution thus stood against revolution, 
and practice and experience against first principles and theory.74 This difference in 
approach had several consequences. While the French revolutionaries claimed to 
represent the will of the people, William Porteous argued, and held this to be the 
fundamental principle upon which the government of a country ought to be based, 
the British constitution represented the collective wisdom of the people as it had been 
developed over ~enturies.~’ The French, who had lived for so long without any true 
liberty, had no real understanding of the concept, and had consequently mistaken it 
for unlimited freedom, or licentiousness. Thomas Hardy wrote that ‘there has never 
yet been any liberty in France. There was licentiousness in abundance ... but liberty, 
which implies first of all the security and protection of innocent individuals, has 
never yet had the reign of a day in that k ingd~m’.~‘  Much the same could be said for 
equality. Under the old absolutist monarchy, the French had lived in a rigid society 
of orders or estates where inequality was determined by law. Although the French 
intellectuals undoubtedly had many theoretical ideas about equality, few Frenchmen 
had any practical experience of living in a society of equals. It was therefore only to 
be expected, that when the revolutionaries postulated universal equality, the French 
public would not see the subtleties of the concept, but simply believe it to mean 
‘levelling’ and an equal right to plunder other people’s property - which was 
precisely what many of them had proceeded to do.77 A sharp contrast was also drawn 
between the rule of law as it applied in Britain, and the mock trials and numerous 
death sentences passed by the French republican tribunals. While all Britons could 
expect their life and property to be safeguarded by the state and by the laws of the 
land, no one appeared to be safe from the guillotine in France - not even the leading 
revolutionaries. Commenting on the fall of the Girondist government in 1793, for 
See, for example: Thomson, Rise, Progress, and Consequences, p. 3 .  
Porteous, Good Old Way, pp. 30-1. A similar point was made by the presbytery of Glasgow: 
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example, one anonymous pamphleteer stated that: ‘on the 3 1“ of October no fewer 
than twenty-one members of the Convention, and the very persons who, about six 
months ago, disposed of every thing at their pleasure, were publicly guillotined in the 
space of thirty-six minutes, amid the applause of the people’.’* First and foremost, 
however, the loyalists were horrified at the breakdown of law and order in France, 
and at a situation where the real power in the state seemed to rest with the mob in the 
street. ‘Be warned’, the reverend James Wodrow wrote: 
of the inconceivable danger of embarking in any rash, bold, untried, 
schemes of reforming an established government, that answers it 
purpose tolerably; for when the minds of the great mass of a people are 
once set afloat, - thrown loose from the usual restraints of religion and 
law, - from their wonted habits of submission to regular authority; - 
when once their passions are roused, and their minds thoroughly 
agitated, it is impossible to say, into what wild lengths of 
licentiousness they may run; what outrageous acts of injustice and 
inhumanity they may perpetrate; what ferocious habits they may 
quickly contract; and when or how this deplorable anarchy may 
termin ate . 79 
The anarchy and general chaos which seemed to prevail in France, together with the 
violent and fluctuating state of the political system there, thus provided ample 
evidence of where an attempt at framing an entirely new form of government based 
on theoretical principles was likely to lead. Genuine improvements in the 
L, government of a country. by contrast, could only be ‘safe, solid, and permanent, 
when they come on in a very gradual way, by the slow and silent working of 
wisdom, reason, and experience’, just as they did under the British constitution.80 
Moreover, this ought to serve as a warning to all those in Britain who thought that 
moderate reform could be achieved without endangering the fabric of the British 
constitution, since the events in France had demonstrated the consequences of 
‘letting loose. under the idea of Reformation, a spirit of Revolution’.’’ 
Many of the arguments advanced by loyalists can be categorised as ‘black 
propaganda’, aimed more at smearing the French revolutionaries than at providing a 
Anonymous, The First Fruits of the French Revolution (Edinburgh, 17931, p. 15 [original italics]. 
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solid case against political reform based on first principles of government. Some 
loyalist pamphleteers made no pretence whatsoever at presenting a balanced case, or 
at giving the French revolutionaries any credit or benefit of the doubt. In the opinion 
of one anonymous writer: 
The present philosophers of France, or rather their operative banditti, 
who have driven them from the stage, hasten, by the impetuosity of 
their conduct and politics, to the wished-for period of their 
government; while the deadly poison of their councils and tribunals 
renders its convulsions and dying agonies more violent and painful, 
not only to themselves, but to all Europe ... Nature shudders at the 
idea of their avowed principles, and sickens at the recollection of their 
professed sentiments, below the dignity of men, and above the malice 
of brutes.82 
‘Revolutions in State have always been attended with much bloodshed, and with 
great disaster’, Laurence Moyes argued. Referring to the recent example of the kind 
in France, he enquired: ‘Can we behold the despotic fury which characterises that 
pretended Republic? Can we behold the hourly murders, the rapine, the desolation, 
the total annihilation of every humane and tender feeling . . . and wish to hasten such 
a dreadful crisis, in this happy land?’83 Thomas Macknight claimed that ‘a 
Revolution, as it is now exhibited’ was far from producing a beneficial political 
change, but merely resulted in ;t ‘transfer of power, into new hands, accomplished, at 
the expence of the blood of thousands; and the new system erected on the ruins of the 
old, differs in nothing from what was, except in being infinitely more atrocious and 
tyrannical’.”‘ The use of black propaganda was extended to the radicals at home, and 
particularly to the Association of the Friends of the People and to Thomas Paine. It 
was questioned whether the radical association - through the choice of its name - 
was trying to insinuate that the current rulers of Britain were not friendly towards the 
people,85 or that by appropriating the ‘proud Title qf the British Converztion’, they 
were hoping to overturn the constitution and introduce in Britain ‘such a republican 
” Anonymous, A Short view of the Politics of France (Edinburgh, 1794), p. 21. 
Moyes, Gratitude to God, p. 30. 
Macknight, Means of National Securigi, p. 19 [original italics]. See also: Carlyle, National 
83 
8.4 
Depravir_)s, pp. 15- 16. 
85 Somerville, Observations, p. 45. See also: Caledonian Mercuq., 8 April 1793, Editorial: ‘FRIENDS 
TO THE PEOPLE’. 
310 
anarchy as that of France? Thomas Paine was described as ‘an itinerant political 
quack’,87 and held to be ‘an avowed disturber of the public peace’, who ‘glories in 
his shame” and ‘wishes to strike at the root of all governments that are contrary to his 
libertine principles’ .” While much of this propaganda was unjustified, there was a 
grain of truth in most of it. As far as the references to actual events in France were 
concerned, they were at least based on irrevocable and correct information. Nowhere 
was this more evident than with respect to the two events which were most used to 
blacken the image of the French revolutionaries - the execution of the French royal 
family, and the National Convention’s decision to ‘abolish’ religion. 
Regicide was a deed which struck horror in most people in the eighteenth 
century, and the execution of the French king in January 1793 consequently played a 
major role in turning the majority of people in Britain against the French 
r e v ~ l u t i o n . ~ ~  Most loyalist writers were probably as appalled as everyone else at the 
execution of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette, but, while they may have been 
genuinely shocked and disturbed by these events, they were not oblivious to the 
opportunity it gave them of bolstering their own conservative case against reform at 
home and for a continued war on France. The executions were evidence of the 
dangers involved in a political revolution, as well as the of depravity of the French 
revolutionaries. While it is unlikely that many British loyalists would have had much 
sympathy for either Louis XVI or the French absolutist monarchy hqfore the 
Revolution in 1789, in the 1790s, they were determined to defend the French 
monarch. The lives and melancholy fate of both the French king and queen were 
sentimentalised in loyalist literature, and an image was presented of a benevolent 
ruler and virtuous consort, whose lives had been cut short by the deplorable acts of a 
Carlyle, Nutional Depra\~ih~, p. 22. 86 
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gang of hardened ‘Louis XVI. Shall not fall unlamented’, Thomas 
Somerville wrote in 1793, and he predicted that: 
His unmerited degradation; his insulted dignity; his cruel captivity; and 
the last tragical scene shall often be recollected, in the closet and in the 
theatre, with grief and horror. His predominant love to his people, the 
unexampled sacrifices by which it was demonstrated, his patience, 
magnanimity, and piety; shall consecrate his memory to the admiration 
of posterity; and devote that his ferocious murderers to everlasting 
infamy and abhorrence.” 
Louis XVI was held to have been ‘the most moderate of the French princes’,’’ and 
‘the kindest Sovereign that ever sat on their throne’.93 By his execution, the French - 
‘once believed to be civilized’ - had committed the awful crime of ‘putting to death 
that Sovereign who desired their happiness’ .’4 The treatment of the French queen 
was no less deplorable. ‘Even Queen Marie Antoinette whose beauty and 
misfortunes would have disarmed a robber and drawn tears from a savage’, James 
Roger lamented, ‘was forced to surrender her delicate person to the awful ax of 
death’ .95 This had occurred under the most degrading of circumstances: ‘After fifteen 
months imprisonment, prolonged for no purpose but to insult and torment her’, and 
during which she had been ‘separated from her children’. one anonymous pamphlet 
exclaimed, ‘the wretched and helpless widow’ of the French monarch was brought to 
the scaffold only to be ‘exposed to the insults and reproaches of all her enemies, and 
of the vilest of the people’.’6 Distressing as these executions were in themselves, 
people should also be aware of their potential long-term consequences, Thomas 
Somerville warned: ’what prince will dare to hazard the slightest relaxation, or resign 
the minutest particle of his power, in concession even to the just and reasonable 
demands of his pe~ple’!’’~ The actual effects of the French Revolution thus seemed to 
90 For a comprehensive discussion of the sentimentalisation of the fate of Louis XVI, see: John 
Barrell, Imagining the King’s Death: Figziratilve Treason, Fantasies of Regicide 17Y-3-I 796 (Oxford, 
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be very different from those the revolutionaries had predicted at the outset in 1789. 
Considering the many atrocities which had been committed after 1792, as well as the 
general development of events in France, few loyalists held any doubts that Britain 
was justified in fighting a war against the French Republic. 
It was, of course, the French who had declared war on Britain and not the 
other way around, which made it legitimate for the British to fight in their own 
defence. Although ‘no war is in itself agreeable’, James Roger admitted, ‘what law 
human or divine forbids self defence?’98 Yet, the horrors of the Terror in France also 
made the war justified on a different level. By fighting the republican government, 
the British were in fact showing themselves to be the true friends of the French 
people. One anonymous pamphlet claimed that there was nothing wrong with the 
French people in general. Rather the problem was that when the old regime in France 
fell, ‘a few desperate, abandoned men’ seized the opportunity to stand up and 
‘impudently call themselves the People’ .99 The Reverend James Hall made this point 
very clear. stating that ‘it is not against the French nation that the people of Great 
Britain have declared war. It is only against those destroyers of the peace of nations, 
by whom the people of France are also, at this moment, enslaved’.’”” The logical 
conclusion of Hall’s statement was that Britain had a moral obligation to remove the 
republican regime in France once the war had been won. Although Hall did not make 
this point explicitly, some loyalist writers thought that the French constitution of 
1791 could be seen as the last standing ‘deed’ of the French nation before the 
situation had descended into chaos. and therefore it ought to be restored.“” There 
does not seem to have been a consensus among loyalist writers in Scotland on this 
issue, however, and to interfere in the internal affairs of France in this manner did not 
become government policy until after 1802. ’” 
98 Roger, Essa!., pp. 56-7. As Michael Duffy has pointed out in his article on British diplomacy, the 
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The French revolutionaries’ attitude to religion caused almost as much 
astonishment and dismay in Britain as did the execution of the French king and 
queen, and it was particularly the introduction of the new republican calendar on 5 
October 1793 - with the implications this had for religious worship - that was met 
with widespread consternation. Although concerns had been aired over the treatment 
of the French clergy from the very beginning of the Revolution, the arrangements of 
the new calendar, whereby all Christian holidays including Sunday was abolished, 
went a far step further towards atheism, and confirmed in the minds of many that the 
French revolutionaries were ungodly men. For loyalist pamphleteers this presented a 
situation similar to that which had arisen after the execution of the French king 
earlier in the year. While many of them were undoubtedly as shocked as the general 
public over this recent development in France, they were aware of the opportunities 
it gave them for scoring political points at home. Most eighteenth-century British 
loyalists believed that religion played a crucial role in maintaining good government 
and a stable and prosperous society, and the attack on religion in France was 
therefore clear evidence that the French revolutionaries were neither working in the 
best interest of their own country, nor presenting an example worth following. 
Moreover, knowing the strong position religion held in Britain. they proceeded to 
denounce the latest actions of the French National Convention. 
The legislators of France had first ’banished religion from their assemblies’, 
James Steuart wrote, and were now ‘using every effort to banish it from their native 
land, while they glory in the horrid and impious character of ATHEISTS’.’03 h the 
opinion of the presbytery of Glasgow, the French revolutionaries had ‘defamed 
religion . while Thomas Macknight held that by ‘annulling the services of 
religion’, the National Convention was in fact ‘cruelly wresting from man, the only 
balm of all his miseries, the belief of happiness after death!””’ One anonymous 
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newspaper article emphasised the uniqueness of this most recent development in 
France, but added that it was only to be expected: 
This I believe, is the first time that any Government issued decrees for 
the abolition of all religion, and for the propagation of atheism in the 
world. It was not, indeed, unnatural, that a set of men calling 
themselves rulers of a nation, who had begun with overthrowing all 
civil order in a state, should end in making war against Heaven. 1 06 
Other loyalists held the revolutionaries’ disrespect for religion to be the main reason 
behind the chaos, anarchy and violence which plagued France. In Thomas Hardy’s 
opinion, religion formed ‘the great bond’ of civil society, whereby due respect for 
life, liberty, property, and law and order was upheld, and when its role in society was 
undermined in the way it had been in France, the consequences would be very 
serious indeed: 
In this state of the human mind, all the relations of life will be left 
unprotected by principle; there will be no ready submission to lawful 
authority for conscience sake; no respect to the rights of property as 
they are guarded by justice . . . no horror at the introduction of anarchy, 
and at the sufferings of families in civil broils; no remorse in directing 
the scenes of ruin and bloodshed. 
The French peqde had been ‘cheated out of religion’ by their revolutionary leaders, 
and this was the true ’origin of the whole’, Hardy con~ luded . ’~ ’~  For the people of 
Britain, this ought to serve as a warning, but according to the synod of Glasgow and 
Ayr, there were already worrying signs to be observed at home. While they found 
themselves ‘deeply afflicted with the mournful state of religion in France’, the 
members of the synod claimed that they were ‘still more afflicted and alarmed by 
considering that men have been found even in Scotland who are capable of 
embracing with zeal, and of spreading with industry, those very principles which in 
France have produced anarchy in the state, and the effusion of much human blood, 
which have prepared the way for infidelity, blasphemy, and Indeed, 
when the experience of France demonstrated so clearly the disastrous consequences 
’06 Culedoriiurz Mercury, 23 Nov. 1793, article entitled: ‘ABOLITION OF THE LORD’S DAY’. 
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of an attempt at achieving political reform, based on dubious principles and 
orchestrated by men of questionable integrity, the people of Britain ought to think 
carefully about the moral state of their own country before they embarked on any 
kind of reform of the political system at home.”’ The question to be asked was 
whether the British nation had reached that level of moral reformation which was 
necessary to conduct political reforms without hazarding the safety and stability of 
society. In the opinion of most loyalists it had not. A line of argument, adopted by 
many loyalists - and particularly by clergymen - was that a reform of ‘manners and 
morals’ was necessary before, or even instead of, political reform. 
IV 
‘Manners & Morals’, and the use of Religion 
It was argued by those loyalists who raised ‘manners and morals’-type arguments, 
that no successful reform of the political system could be achieved until the moral 
character of the British population had been revived and improved. It was 
consequently fool-hardy and irresponsible of the radicals to campaign for political 
changes so long as the country remained in a generally unreformed state. Rather than 
complain aboat alleged abuses in the British constitution, or the supposedly 
corrupted nature of Britain’s political class, the radicals - as well as the people in 
general - ought to focus on themselves and on their own moral improvement. An 
anonymous article printed in the Edinburgh Evening Courant in December 1792 was 
probably among the first to raise the issue of personal reform, and presented all the 
basic elements of the manners and morals-argument: 
Sir, I PROFESS myself a friend to real liberty and the constitution, but 
I cannot help thinking that if the present race of men, who set 
themselves up for State Reformers, would apply their attention as 
earnestly to the reformation of their own households, to the religious 
and moral conduct of their families, they would experience more 
substantial happiness themselves, and bequeath to their posterity 
lo9 Wodrow, Measures of Divine Providence, pp. 45-9. For further references to the French National 
Convention’s ‘abolition’ of religion, see: Thrum, Ten Minutes Reflection, pp. 13- IS; and Caledonian 
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superior blessings, than obtaining an ideal liberty, which would most 
probably lead to, and terminate in, licentiousness and ruin. 110 
Others chose to focus on the futility of attempting to improve the political system in 
a country where private morals left so much to be desired. William Dunn, for 
example, argued that ‘a political reform, even though necessary, without this 
previous improvement of private manners, is a vain, an impossible undertaking’. 
Another pamphleteer held that greater prosperity, and ‘more peace’ would be 
achieved if the radicals had been ‘as active and zealous in reforming their own hearts 
and lives as the laws and government of the kingdom7.’” One loyalist clergyman 
wondered why - in an age of unparalleled focus on reform - ‘the only radical and 
effectual one’, a reform of ‘heart and conduct’, of manners and of the soul should 
have become so ‘entirely forgotten . At least one pamphlet suggested that a 
thorough reformation of personal morals would render political reform unnecessary, 
since any abuses or imperfections that there might be in the British constitution 
would be rectified once the people had become more virtuous. This argument, 
however, rested on the assumption that no minister could govern ‘for any length of 
time, without possessing the confidence of  the people’. Moreover, as long as the 
people remained corrupt, so would their rulers, but once the people had been morally 
purified, ‘the corruption of their rulers must decrease’. If this was the case, it 
followed naturally that the best way of reforming the political system would be for 
every individual to begin with his own personal moral improvement.’lJ A few 
pamphleteers made personal moral reform the central point in their argument. The 
clergyman James Steuart envisaged the possibility of achieving a ‘universal’ reform 
by instigating moral reform on the personal level first. A process might be started, he 
thought, whereby individual moral reform could be extended into that of the family, 
and further on to ‘SEMINARIES and SCHOOLS OF LEARNING’, until it would 
gradually reach ‘CHURCH AND STATE’ and eventually produce ‘UNIVERSAL 
7 113 
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REFORM’. Only such a gradual development - beginning with the individual - 
could yield a successful reform of politics on the national level, Steuart claimed.’l5 
As evidence of the potentially dangerous consequences of attempting to make 
political changes without a previous reform of manners and morals, he referred to the 
recent developments across the English Channel, where the French Revolution 
seemed to have descended into chaos, anarchy and bloodshed, precisely because 
extensive political reform had been initiated in ‘an infidel, a corrupt and debauched 
nation’.’ l 6  Underlying this generally poor state of moral integrity in France, Steuart 
argued, was the French revolutionaries’ lack of respect for religion: ‘One thing we 
may certainly predict that their political fabric, however beautiful and magnificent it 
may appear, will be of short duration, because it is not built upon that solid and true 
foundation that gives strength and stability to Empire: a reverence .for God and 
Religion!’ l 7  This emphasis on religion as the fundamental building block of the state 
was perhaps the logical conclusion of an argument which focused on moral 
reformation. 118 
For loyalist clergymen, however, religion was not merely seen to form the 
basis of civil society, but also to contain, in itself, a rich source of arguments against 
politicaI reform and in favour of retaining the existing form of government in Britain 
without alterations. We have already seen that sermons made up a substantial part of 
loyalist literature, and it is clear that by addressing issues of a political nature, while 
preaching to their congregations, many Scottish clergymen were deliberately using 
religion to promote certain political views. Emma Vincent has argued that these 
preachers were, in their own opinion, justified in doing so on the grounds of three 
main spiritual principles: those of ‘divine sovereignty - the belief that God ruled over 
the world and intervened according to His will’; the view that ‘sin is the cause of all 
Steuart, ,4 plan for Rejorni, p. 5 [original capitals]. 
Ibid., p. 20. 
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national evils’ precisely because God would intervene and punish those nations 
which rebelled against His laws; and that ‘national repentance’ was necessary to 
regain God’s favour. On the basis of these three principles, Vincent writes, loyalist 
ministers concluded that ‘religion was not in fact separate from politics’, and that 
they were consequently justified - as clergymen - in promoting that particular 
political ideology in which they found support for their own interpretation of 
scripture. l 9  For most ministers, this simply meant giving their wholehearted support 
for the political regime in Britain as it stood at the present moment, and nothing 
further, but some were also prepared to allow the principle of allegiance to existing 
political arrangements a more universal application. One minister, who published his 
sermon anonymously, argued that all governments were ordained by God, not 
created by man, and therefore ought to be respected as they appeared. God had given 
‘man power over man in various respects’, he reasoned, and these arrangement were 
not to be altered by men: ‘To the father he gave power over his children, to the 
master over his servants, and in the body politic, of whatever kind the government 
may be, whether monarchical of one, aristocratical of many and best, or 
democratical. That which is supreme under GOD in either of these, is immediately 
from him’.’”’ It followed naturally from this viewpoint that Christians had a duty to 
submit to their ‘superiors in office, and act the part of dutiful subjects towards them, 
whatever their persons be: even though strangers to CHRIST the LORD, and enemies 
to his kingdom’.’’] Any other course of action would constitute an act of 
disobedience to the law of God, and was therefore a sin. Although this argument 
came very close to the kind of reasoning resorted to by the defenders of absolute 
monarchy, and for that reason may not have been supported by all loyalists, it 
nevertheless provided a convenient platform upon which it was possible both to 
defend the British constitution and to criticise the French revolutionaries. 
Furthermore, the emphasis this sermon placed on the duties of subjects, rather than 
on their rights, was one shared by most ministers, and was typical of the approach 
adopted by loyalist clergymen. These duties could be divided into two broad 
’ I 9  Vincent, ‘Scottish Churchmen’, SHR, 73 (1994), 195-97. See, for example: Carlyle, Narionul 
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categories; that of being ‘loyal and submissive subjects of the realm’, and of 
practising the ‘private virtues which would lead to national prosperity’.”’ As far as 
the first category was concerned, the duty rested on the relationship between 
sovereign and subjects, as it had been ordained by God. Since a lawful ‘sovereign 
power’ provided every subject of the realm with ‘a right to be protected in his person 
and property, his liberties and privileges, and in the exercise of his religious 
principles’, men owed their ‘ready support and assistance’ in return, ‘for without this 
he should be unable to discharge his duty in behalf of his people’.’’3 Unless people 
showed due submission and obedience to lawful authorities, it would not be possible 
for them to rule according to the laws of God, and anarchy was the likely result. The 
second category consisted of such personal improvements as a conscientious 
‘observance of religious duties, piety, industry, sobriety, justice and the faithful 
discharge of public duties and offices’. ’ 24 
To demonstrate that religion did in fact support the political status quo as they 
claimed it did, loyalist ministers referred to biblical passages or made citations from 
the Bible, which ‘proved’ that the defence of the British constitution was morally 
right, and that demands for reform were wrong. Proverbs 24:21: ‘Fear thou the Lord, 
and honour the IOng, and meddle not with them that are given to change’ was a 
particularly revered quote, and was used extensively to warn the public against 
0 uiving any kind of support to the radicals - precisely because they were men who 
were ‘given to change’.125 Romans 13 and 1 Peter 2 were often used in a similar 
fashion to exemplify the duties subjects owed to magistrates.”6 
V 
The Dilemma of Loyalist Ideologues 
Although the loyalist writers of the 1790s were able to present a largely coherent 
case against political reform at home and in favour of a continued war on France. 
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they faced one significant problem. By condemning the French revolutionaries as 
evil-minded men, claiming the Revolution in France to have been an unnecessary 
folly an& arguing that domestic radicals and reformers were only wishing to replicate 
French horrors in Britain, loyalist pamphleteers were creating a dilemma for 
themselves. The logical conclusion to their iine of argument against revolution would 
be support for the old regime in France, and an insistence on the restoration of the 
French monarchy as soon as possible. Yet, few were prepared to defend the ancien 
regime in France, and many were also aware that conservative writers had previously 
viewed the French monarch as the arch-example of the absolute despotism they all 
loved to abhor. In essence, therefore, the loyalists had to solve the problem of how 
they could mount a convincing criticism of a revolution, which had overthrown a 
regime they had previously condemned. Those loyalist writers who took the trouble 
to address this issue devised different solutions to the problem, not all of which were 
likely to have been approved by the government and, in some cases, such attempts at 
solving the dilemma may only have handed more ammunition to the radicals. 
Thomas Somerville presented probably the most intellectually persuasive 
argument. In his opinion, a distinction ought to be drawn between the first and 
second revolutions in France - those of 1789 and 1792 respectively. ‘It is not easy to 
conceive’, he argued, ‘how any person of feeling, acquainted with the wretched 
condition of France for several centuries past, occasioned by the despotism of the 
prince. and the complicated, diffusive tyranny of a multiplied, and multiplying 
aristocracy, can dispute the propriety, the justice, the indispensable necessity of a 
revolution there,. Indeed, the ‘deliberation, temper, and ability, with which the 
first revolution was concerted and formed’ had given every observer reason to be 
optimistic about the future.’18 If only the first French constitution of 1791 had been 
properly established, Somerville claimed, it might have become ‘a model to foreign 
states and kingdoms, or at least have produced some abatement in the rigours of the 
arbitrary governments through Europe’. The revolution of 1789 was therefore little 
more than a corrective to one of the most despotic governments of Europe. 
Somerville, Observations, p. 58. 
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Unfortunately, however, the French had not been able to stop at a moderate 
revolution, but had proceeded with far more radical changes in 1792, the 
consequence of which had been to ‘open a door for that anarchy which constitutes 
the last state of human depravity, and wretchedness’. Somerville was particularly 
shocked by the execution of Louis XVI, which he saw as a turning point in this 
respect, but otherwise he made no attempts to explain why the events in France had 
spiralled out of control, or what could have been done to avoid this outcome. Such an 
explanation was, however, attempted by Adam Whyte of Glasgow, in a pamphlet he 
had published one year earlier. Although Whyte did not emphasise so clearly the 
distinction between the first and second revolutions in France as Somerville would 
later do, he nevertheless stated that ‘no man rejoiced more sincerely than I did, at the 
opening of the French Revolution’, which had promised to deliver the French from ‘a 
most oppressive and tyrannical Government’. He consequently regretted ‘that by 
reducing things tu first principles, they should have lost the fairest opportunity that 
ever was presented to a nation, of rendering themselves free, and great, and 
happy’.131 Adhering to first principles in matters of government was, of course, a 
recipe for disaster in the opinion of most loyalist pamphleteers. John Young argued 
that the French people had legitimately chosen ‘a hereditary limited monarchy’ as 
their preferred form of government through the constitution of 1791 - a decision to 
which Britain. had no objections. But the events of 10 August 1792, when the ‘the 
government of France was totally overturned ... by an armed mob from the suburbs 
of Paris’, were entirely unjustifiable, and consequently opened for a foreign 
intervention to restore the government instituted by the constitution. ’” The problem 
with the argument put forward by these pamphleteers was that by approving of the 
first revolution in 1789, and the subsequent constitution of 1791, they were 
automatically accepting the principle of revolution as a means of achieving political 
change. 133 Other pamphleteers therefore tried to solve the dilemma without 
130 Ibid. See also: IM., p. 20. 
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many loyalists were none the less reluctant to accept revolution in principle. 
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approving of any of the political changes that had taken place in France from the 
point when the Third Estate declared itself to represent the nation. 
An anonymous article in the Glasgow Courier, for example, admitted that 
‘the French nation had been ruled for many centuries with a rod of iron’, but it 
questioned whether ‘the actions of the French, since their emancipation, recommend 
them to the imitation of any humane or civilized people? Another anonymous 
writer argued that, although the old French government had contained ‘many faults’, 
the changes wrought by the revolution had only made matters worse, while James 
Roger took a more positive view of the French monarchical government. In his 
opinion, the French monarchs, ‘bad as some of them were, they were not worse upon 
the whole than other European kings’. and their rule could not justifiably be 
described as tyrannical. 136 Evidence to support this view, Roger argued, could be 
found in the actions of Louis XVI, who had summoned the Estates General in 1789 
in order to hear the complaints of his subjects and to ‘grant their reasonable 
requests’. It was neither the fault of the king, nor of his ministers, that there were 
‘many turbulent and factious’ men present among the representatives of the French 
nation, ‘who enjoyed in their polluted imaginations an increase of pleasure from the 
magnitude of political mischief they could produce . The French government had 
initiated moderate reform, but evil-minded men had seized the opportunity to take 
advantage of a confused situation and had brought about a revolution. the 
consequence of which had been to the steer the country towards chaos and 
anarchy. Other pamphleteers were less concerned about such nuances in the 
arguments they presented. The reverend Thomas Bums held the French to have ‘long 
been the plague of Europe. They were so under their monarchy, they are now tenfold 
more so, under their shockingly corrupt democracy . William Porteous stated that 
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superstitious, and partly destitute of religion’, who had tried to throw off ‘the yoke of 
tyranny’, but in the process they had discarded all experience, religion and 
government, and laid down the foundations of a system were ‘public expediency is 
the true and only standard of right and wrong . The editor of the Edinburgh 
Evening Courant made a similar statement, claiming that: ‘The rage of despotism in 
France is no more. But tyranny has only assumed another and more terrific form , 
while an anonymous pamphlet made its point in even simpler terms. Since it had 
been ‘long the glory and happiness of Great Britain to resist the efforts ofthe French 
nation, to impose upon us, Popery, Slavery, and Arbitrary Power’, it  should be ‘no 
less our interest, to counteract the attempts they may now make, to introduce among 
us, REPUBLICAN AND LEVELLING principles? The French had been, and 
were still, a threat to British liberty and prosperity, and all French influences ought 




A Scottish Ideology ? 
Although Scottish loyalist pamphleteers took part in a British debate, and addressed 
issues of a British nature, this did not stop them from sometimes adapting their 
arguments to a Scottish audience, or from bringing in particularly Scottish examples 
and elements in their pamphlets. Efforts were made to view the events in France in a 
Scottish context, or to explain them so that they would become more easily 
understandable for ordinary Scots, and comparisons were drawn between well- 
known events in Scottish history and those currently taking place across the English 
Channel. An anonymous pamphlet from 1793, for example, addressed the French 
republican government’s brutal defeat of the city of Lyon - a royalist stronghold - 
and the subsequent execution of many of its inhabitants after it had fallen: ‘It is to be 
remarked, that Lyons was one of the most wealthy and industrious towns in the 
kingdom, - the largest city after Paris, and contained upwards of two hundred 
thousand inhabitants, - that is more than three times as many as the city of 
Porteous, Good Old Wci?$. p. 27. 
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, 143 Edinburgh . Another anonymous pamphlet compared the imprisonment and 
execution of the French queen, Marie Antoinette, with the fate of the Scottish queen, 
Mary Stewart, whom, it was argued, ‘by the laws of justice ought to have swayed a 
the sceptre of England’.’44 Another writer argued that ‘The Friends of the People’ 
was no more representative of the people of Scotland than the old Scots parliament 
had been.14’ Oliver Cromwell was used as a reference point by some in an attempt to 
better convey to their Scottish audience a true sense of rhat brutality and ruthlessness 
they saw as prevalent in France under the leadership of Robespierre and the 
Committee of Public Safety. The Edinburgh Evening Courant, for example, claimed 
in April 1794 that ‘the French Constitution is rapidly approaching to the 
Cromwellian and commented on the death of Robespierre that he had 
‘had a design of makmg himself the Cromwell of this country’. 147 
Other commentators chose to focus on the benefits the Scots had obtained 
from the Union of 1707, and on why the defence of the British constitution was in 
the particular interest of the Scots. An anonymous article printed in the Glasgow 
Courier in December 1792 asked its readers to ‘review the history of Scotland - 
When were her natives happy?’ Was it in the seventeenth century, when she was 
ruled by ‘indigent and wretched Princes‘, and when ‘all was gloom, desolation, and 
despair’, or was it in the present when Scotland enjoyed the ‘security of person, 
property, and reputation’ under the British constitution‘? Clearly, the answer had to 
be that Scotland was currently in a better situation than ever before in her history, 
and when this was the case: ‘are we to hazard the change of a system so manifestly 
productive of the greatest happiness that this or any other people ever en-joyed?’148 A 
related point was made by John Young, who argued that a reform of the 
representation in parliament was unlikely to be to the benefit of Scotland, since ‘we 
could not enjoy an equal share of Scotland’s relative representation in 
parliament, and thereby some of her influence in British politics, would not be 
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improved by an increase in the number of MPs, or a redistribution of seats, Young 
claimed, since the fall-out of such reforms was likely to be primarily to the benefit of 
some areas in England. The Union arrangement had ‘limited’ the Scottish 
representation to 45 MPs, but a reform which increased the number of MPs was none 
the less likely to worsen the relative Scottish position in the House of Commons, 
even if more seats were granted to Scotland, since the English population was much 
greater. The safest bet for the Scots was therefore to resist any attempts at reform.1s0 
James Roger also conceded that the Scottish representation in parliament - in both 
Houses - was small, but thought that this was compensated for by the very modest 
tax burden Scotland carried. He went on to list a number of alleged advantages which 
had followed in the wake of the Union; such as the ‘establishing of Schools in the 
Highlands of Scotland’, the break up of the clan society there ‘which forbade 
industry and excluded civilization’, the offering of ‘premiums on flax, linen, and 
fisheries’ as well as the more recent removal of ‘a severe tax on coals carried 
coastwise . Efforts were also made to adapt the actual language of loyalist 
literature to a Scottish audience and to make i t  understandable for ordinary Scots. 
Hannah More‘s Cheap Repositoi? Tracts - which formed such a prominent part of 
the loyalist propaganda campaign in England, and were aimed at conveying a loyalist 
message to the general public - were translated into Scots dialect and revised to fit a 
Scottish setting, only shortly after they had been published in England.”’ 
, 151 
VI1 
British putriotisin in Scotland 
While it was evident that the union of parliaments of 1707 had meant the 
establishment of a genuinely British state in a way the union of crowns in 1603 had 
never done, it was not clear that the inhabitants of Britain would necessarily develop 
any deep-seated allegiance to this new state, or that they would come to see 
themselves as ‘British’. The question of whether such a truly British identity ever 
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emerged among the inhabitants of Great Britain has been debated by historians, and 
has attracted increasing interest in recent years. Linda Colley has promoted the 
argument that a British identity was forged in the eighteenth century, primarily as a 
consequence of, and in response to, the long succession of wars Britain fought 
against France. The near permanent threat posed by French military might 
encouraged the inhabitants on the British mainland to put their internal differences 
aside and unite against ‘the Other beyond their shores’. Crucial to this development, 
Colley argues, was the ability of the Scots, English and Welsh to define themselves 
as ‘Protestants struggling for survival against the world’s foremost Catholic 
power’.’”j Britishness was therefore an identity created by the existence of this 
external threat, combined with the unifying bond of Protestantism at home. Is’ While 
Colley ’s thesis has been influential for the general interpretation of Britishness, Colin 
K d d  has addressed the issue from a specifically Scottish angle. In his opinion, a 
more distinctive ‘North British’ identity was developed in Scotland in the eighteenth 
century, whereby enlightened Scots rejoiced in the benefits of the Union with 
England. The Union had won English liberties and constitutional rights for Scotland, 
and ensured their ‘liberation from anachronistic feudal institutions’ . I s 6  North 
Britishness thus had a strong and definite anglocentric bias, which made i t  more of 
an Anglo-British than an Anglo-Scottish identity, but this was to some extent 
compensated for by Scottish pride in their contributions to the Union after it had 
been formed. Scottish achievements in ‘arms and letters’, that is, the intellectual 
achievements of the Scottish Enlightenment and the martial prowess of the 
Highlanders in particular, was held to have played a major role in the advancement 
of the British state in the eighteenth century. To an extent, Janet Adam Smith has 




Linda Colley, Britons: Forging thc Nation 1707-1837 (London, 1992). 
Zbid., pp. 5-6. 
See also: Frank O‘Gorman. The Long Eighteenth Centur??: British Political aiid Sociul Histon- 
1688-1832 (London, 1997). pp. 31 1-17. 
Colin Kidd, Sub\*erting Scotland’s Past: Scottish Whig historians and the creutinn c,f an Anglo- 
British Identity, 1689-c. 1830 (Cambridge, 1993). p. 268 [quote] and pp. 254, 270; and Colin Kidd, 





(1 996). 362-64. 
157 
158 
Kidd, Subverting Scotland’s Pust, pp. 214- 15, 272-74, 279. 
Ibid., p. 21 3; and Kidd. ’North Britishness’, 374. 
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’ 159 ‘literary superiority ... by out-Englishing the English . By advancing that English 
legacy they had obtained through the Union, Rosalind Mitchison stated, the Scots 
were aspiring ‘to be super-first-class citizens of Great Britain’.16’ The Scots were in 
other words trying to present themselves as the best of Britons, and they were more 
prepared to accept Britishness as an inclusive concept than were the English. Ned C. 
Landsman has argued that ‘provincials’ - such as the Scots and the Welsh - 
‘probably identified themselves more consistently as Britons than anyone else in the 
empire’, and that ‘in much of England, the term “British” signified little more than a 
synonym for “English”, and “North Briton” became a notorious term of abuse’.’61 
Indeed, English reluctance to accept the Union as a true partnership between equals 
was a constant source of annoyance to the Scots, and kept alive a ‘wounded but 
operative Scottish national tradition’ . I 6 ’  None the less, Colin Kidd has argued: 
‘despite an occasional anglophobia directed against the English nation, North Britons 
retained an enthusiastic commitment to English institutions’ . I h 3  
By and large, the same attitudes were carried on into the turbulent 1790s, and 
the North British identity of the Scots was, if anything. only strengthened and given a 
broader and more popular base during that decade. The particular interest many 
loyalist writers claimed that the Scots had in defending the fruits of the Union with 
England - the stable political regime, rights and liberties, which were now held to 
make up the British constitution - at a time when they were under unprecedented 
threat from both domestic and foreign enemies was outlined above,’h4 while the pride 
many ordinary Scots felt in the specific contribution they made to the British state’s 
war effort was discussed in the preceding chapter.“’ It is also beyond doubt that 
Scotland’s martial traditions were kept up by her contribution of men for armed 
Janet Adam Smith, ‘Some Eighteenth-Century Ideas of Scotland’, in Scotland in the Age of 
lnipro\~emerzt, eds.. N. T. Phillipson and Rosalind Mitchison (Edinburgh, 1970). p. 1 12. 
Rosalind Mitchison, ‘Patriotism and national identity in eighteenth-century Scotland’. in 
Nationalin* and the Pursuit of National Independence, ed., T. W. Moody (Belfast, 1978), p. 94. 
I 6 I  Ned C. Landsman, ‘The Provinces and the Empire’ in An Imperial State at War: Britain from 1689 
to 1815, ed.. Lawrence Stone (London. 1994), p. 259. 
Kidd, Subverting Scotland’s Past, p. 272. See also: lhid., p 270; and Kidd, ’North Britishness’. 
366, 38 1 ; and Colin Kidd, British Identities before Nationalism: Ethnicity and Nationhood in the 
Atlantic World, 1600-1800 (Cambridge, 1999). p. 133. 
Kidd, ‘North Britishness’, 382 [original italics]. 
See: section VI. 






service in the 1 7 9 0 ~ . ’ ~ ~  Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that the identity as 
North Britons had now moved beyond the ranks of the enlightened gentlemen of 
Scotland, and had become the accepted norm among Scots in general. It is, for 
example, relatively rare to see anyone referring to just ‘Scotland’ in letters, articles, 
pamphlets, addresses or resolutions in this period. Rather, the tendency was to use 
‘North Britain’, or ‘that part of Great Britain called Scotland’, or sometimes even 
‘known as Scotland’. Seen from a Scottish perspective, at least, being British seemed 
to have become a self-evident part of life. This was exemplified by an address sent to 
the king after the second assassination attempt in 1800, from ‘the Ministers and 
Elders of the Scottish Churches, in the Cities of London and Westminster’. Here the 
clergymen referred to themselves as ‘a South British Colony from the Church of 
Scotland . As far as the Scots were concerned, the terminology had by now 3 167 
become settled, and the normal practice was to use Britain, North and South, in place 
of Scotland and England. Of course, referring to England as ‘South Britain’ and the 
English as ‘South British’ was a Scottish idea - the direct counterpart to their own 
insistence on being North Britons - and English recalcitrance at adopting this usage 
was a cause of constant irritation to many Scots, who felt that their southern 
neighbours were not interested in partaking fully in the ‘British’ project. As the 
author of an anonymous letter sent to Henry Dundas in January 1793 complained: ‘I 
observe in the Star 16‘h Currt a Copy of Lord Grenvilles Answ. To the French Court 
in which the word England occurs repeatedly. It has given great offence to the foes 
of government, & much distress to its friends. Why not Great Britain . Yet, to an ,3168 
extent, the Scottish insistence on the use of North and South Britain can also be seen 
as a slightly desperate attempt to create an unrealistic sense of equality within a 
union in which Scotland was always going to be the junior partner. And by 
presenting the two constituent parts of Britain as, at least symbolically, two equal 
halves - ‘North’ and ‘South’ Britain - the Scots may as much have been hoping to 
promote their own interests within the union, as the new ideal of a common British 
identity . 
166 See: chapter 4. 
’”’ London Guzette, 2 1-24 June 1800. 
NAS, RH2/4/69, f .  199, ‘Amicus’ to Henry Dundas, Edinburgh, 19 Jan 1793 [original italics]. 168 
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At the same time as many Scots complained about the lack of English 
commitment to (the Scottish interpretation of) Britishness, they continued to cherish 
their separate Scottish identity, and, in given circumstances, would jealously guard 
dearly-held traditions against English intrusion, or interference. The objections raised 
by Scottish lords lieutenant in 1798 against some of the instructions sent from 
London is a particularly prominent example in this respect, and demonstrates the 
resentment some Scots felt against English interference in what they perceived to be 
their own ‘internal affairs’.169 The striking feature of identity in Scotland in the 
1790s is therefore the seeming ease with which the Scots were able to combine an 
inclusive identity as Britons with a separate and distinct identity as Scots. Being 
Scottish and British at the one and the same time does not seem to have caused them 
any conflict of allegiance or identity, and this apparent success of the British union, 
as seen from the smaller partner, must have played a crucial part in the conviction of 
Dundas and the Pitt government as a whole that a similar union between Great 
Britain and Ireland would be the best solution to Irish problems. Nearly a century of 
experience had indicated that union had been a good solution for Scotland, so why 
not for Ireland?17’ Whether this was an over-optimistic assessment in 1798 when the 
decision was made. and whether the subsequent failure of the Irish union to yield 
similar benefits for Ireland as the union of 1707 had done for Scotland, can be held 
against Pitt and Dundas is a topic outside the scope of this thesis and a question to be 
addressed by others. It does, however, underline the extent to which the British 
union - at the end of the eighteenth century - was perceived to have been an 
overwhelming success, particularly when viewed from the perspective of a great 
many Scots. 
171 
See: chapter 2, p. 77-9. 
This was the gist of the argument presented in John Bruce’s report on the union between England 
and Scotland, which formed a basis for the government’s case in favour of an Irish union. See: John 
Bruce, ‘REPORT, On the Events and Circumstances which produced the Union o f  the Kingdoms of 
England and Scotland’. 
Frank O’Gorman has argued that: ‘With the benefit of hindsight, the Union established a 
framework for the development of Ireland in the nineteenth century which was to have tragic 
consequences, but these could not possibly have been anticipated in 1800’. O’Gorman, Long 







Hadding t on 
Berwick 
Lords Lieutenant of Scotland - 1794:' 
Lords Lieutenant. 
Duke of Buccleuch 
Marquis of Tweedale 





Duke of Roxburgh 
Earl of Dalkeith 
Duke of Athole 


























The complete list of Lords Lieutenant can be found in:  NAS, RH2/4/220, p. 7; and a near-complete 1 
list in:  Caledoniari Mercun,, 10 May 1794. 
Sir James Grant 
Earl of Hopetoun 
Duke of Argyle 
Earl of Bute 
Earl of Crawfurd 
Lord Douglas 
Lord Garlies 
George Graham. Esq. 
Duke of Hamilton 
Duke of Queensberry 
Earl of Galloway 
Earl of Eglintoun 
Lord Elphinstoune 
W. Macdowall, Esq. 
Duke of Montrose 
Lord Cathcart 
Earl of Fife 
Earl of Caithness 
Earl Gower 
Earl of Moray 
Humberston Mackenzie, Esq. 
James Brodie, Esq. 
Sir Thomas Dundas, Bart. 
Lord Elibank 
Bruce Zneas Macleod, Esq. 
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Appendix: B 
Scottish Sedition and Treason Trials, 1793 - 1800 
[This list was based directly on: Cobbett's State Trials.] 
Vol. 23. 
587. 
Proceedings in the High Court of Justiciary at Edinburgh, against JAMES TYTLER, on 
an Indictment charging him with Sedition, January 7th: 33 GEORGE 111. A. D. 1793. 
588. 
Proceedings on the Trial of JOHN MORTON, JAMES ANDERSON, and MALCOLM 
CRAIG, on an Indictment charging them with Sedition. Tried before the High Court 
of Justiciary at Edinburgh, on the gth, gth, and 1 l th Days of January : 33 GEORGE 111. 
A. D. 1793. 
589. 
Proceedings in the High Court of Justiciary at Edinburgh, against JOHN ELDER and 
WILLIAM STEWART. on an Indictment charging them with Sedition, January loth: 33 
GEORGE 111. A. D. 1793. 
590. 
Proceedings in the High Court of Justiciary at Edinburgh, against JAMES SMITH and 
JOHN MENNONS, on an Indictment charging them with Sedition, February 4th: 33 
GEORGE 111. A. D. 1793. 
591. 
Proceedings before the High Court of Justiciary at Edinburgh, on an Information 
exhibited by the Lord Advocate of Scotland, against Captain WILLIAM JOHNSTON, 
charging him with a Contempt of the said Court, January 25'", 29'h, 3lS', February 
12'h, 14'h, 15'h, 19'h, 23rd: GEORGE 111. A. D. 1793. 
592. 
Proceedings in the High Court of Justiciary at Edinburgh, against JAMES THOMPSON 
CALLENDER, WALTER BERRY, and JAMES ROBERTSON, for Writing, Printing, and 
Publishing a Seditious Libel, January 2gth, February Bth. 19'h, 2znd, and March lgrh:  
33 GEORGE 111. A. D. 1793. 
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593. 
Proceedings on the Trial of THOMAS MUIR, Esq., the Younger, of Hunter's-Hill, on 
an Indictment charging him with Sedition. Tried before the High Court of Justiciary 
at Edinburgh, on the 30th and 3 1" Days of August: 33 GEORGE 111. A. D. 1793. 
594. 
Proceedings on the Trial of the REV. THOMAS FYSHE PALMER, on an Indictment 
charging him with Seditious Practices. Tried before the Circuit Court of Justiciary, 
held at Perth, on the 12th and 13'h September: 33 GEORGE 111. A. D. 1793. 
595. 
Proceedings before the High Court of Justiciary at Edinburgh, against ALEXANDER 
SCO'TT, on an Indictment exhibited against him by the Lord Advocate of Scotland, 
charging him with Sedition, Feb. 3: 34 GEORGE 111. A. D. 1794. 
596. 
Proceedings on the Trial of WILLIAM SKIRVING. on an Indictment charging him with 
Sedition. Tried before the High Court of Justiciary at Edinburgh on the 6'h and 7'h of 
January: 34 GEORGE 111. A. D. 1794. 
597. 
Proceedings on the Trial of MAURICE MARGAROT. on an Indictment charging him 
with Seditious Practices. Tried before the High Court of Justiciary at Edinburgh, on 
the 131h and 
598. 
of January: 34 GEORGE 111. A. D. 1794. 
Proceedings before the High Court of Justiciary at Edinburgh, in the Case of 
CHARLES SINCLAIR, on an Indictment exhibited against him by the Lord Advocate 
of Scotland, and charging him with Sedition, February 17'h, 241h, March loth, 14'h: 
GEORGE 111. A. D. 1794. 
599. 
Proceedings on the Trial of JOSEPH GERRALD, on an Indictment charging him with 
Sedition. Tried before the High Court of Jusiticiary at Edinburgh, on the 3'd, loth, 
13'h and 14'h of March: 34 GEORGE 111. A. D. 1794. 
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602. 
Trial of ROBERT WATT for High Treason. At a Special Commission of Oyer and 
Terminer, holden at Edinburgh, August 14'h, 15'h, 22nd, 27'h, and September 3rd: 34 
GEORGE 111. A. D. 1794. 
Vol. 24. 
603. 
Trial of DAVID DOWNIE for High Treason; at a Special Commission of Oyer and 
Terminer, holden at Edinburgh September 5'h and 6th: 34 GEORGE 111. A. D. 1794. 
Vol. 26. 
627. 
Proceedings in the High Court of Justiciary at Edinburgh, against GEORGE 
MEALMAKER, on an Indictment charging him with Sedition and administering 
unlawful Oaths, loth, 1 l th,  and 12'h of January: 38 GEORGE 111. A. D. 1798. 
628. 
Proceedings in the High Court of Justiciary at Edinburgh, against ANGUS CAMERON 
and JAMES MENZIES for Sedition, Mobbing, and Rioting, January lSth and 17'h: 38 
GEORGE 111. A. D. 1798. 
629. 
Proceedings before the Circuit Court of Justiciary holden at Perth, against DAVID 
BLACK and JAMES PATERSON, for Sedition and administering unlawful Oaths, Sept. 
20th: 38 GEORGE 111. A. D. 1798. 
[Lord Cockburn has identified another two trials for sedition, which were not 
reported in State Trials. They were:] 
- Case of ROBERT JAFFRAY, Stirling. 6th September 1798.' 
- Case of WILLIAM MAXWELL, Edinburgh, 23d June 1800.' 
Lord Cockburn. An E.ramiriatiori of the Trials f o r  Seditinii \c,hich have hitherto occurred in Scotlcirid, 1 
(2 vols.; Edinburgh, 1888; New York, 1970), i i ,  159-61. 





NAS, RH2/4/83, f. 57. 
Schedule for the quotas of the Militia Force to be raised in the different 
Counties, Stewartries, Cities and Places of Scotland 
350 83 
3 14 74 
I County, Stewartly, city or I Returns of Men as I Apportionment of Men to I 
Haddington 
Berwick 
















































Banff 551 I 131 I 
Caithness I 299 I 71 I 
Total: I 23059 I 5485 I 
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Appendix: D 
Navy Acts of 1795 
[From: Statutes at Large, xvii, 35 George 111 - 38 George 111, 1795 - 1798 (London, 
I798)]. 
CAP. V. 
An Act for raising a certain Number of Men, in the several Counties in EngZand, 
for the Service of his Majesty's Navy. - [5'h March 1795.1 
CAP. XI. 
An Act for procuring a Supply of Men from the several Ports of this Kingdom, 
for the Service of his Majesty's Navy - [16'h March 1795.1 
[Scottish ports:] 
For the Port of Aberdeen, two hundred 
and nineteen Men. 
For the Port of Ayr .  thirty-three Men. 
For the Port of Alloa, ninety-five Men. 
For the Port of Anstruther, fifty-three 
Men. 
For the Port of Borrowstoness, one 
hundred and fifty-five Men. 
For the Port of Cainheltown, one hundred 
and fifty-five Men. 
For the Port of Durnfries, seventeen Men. 
For the Port of Dunhar, thirty-eight Men. 
For the Port of Dundee, one hundred and 
thirty-five Men. 
For the Port of For William, eleven Men. 
For the Port of Ports of Clyde, 
comprehending Glasgow, Greenock, and 
Port Glasgow, six hundred and eighty- 
three Men. 
For the Port of Inverness, forty Men. 
For the Port of Irvirze, one hundred and 
thirty-one Men. 
For the Port of Isle Martin, six Men. 
For the Port of Kil-kculdy, one hundred 
and thirty-six Men. 
For the Port of Kirkcudbright, nineteen 
Men. 
For the Port of Kirkwdl. thirty-one Men. 
For the Port of Leith, two hundred and six 
Men. 
For the Port of Lerwick, six Men. 
For the Port of Montrose, one hundred 
and seven Men. 
For the Port of Oban, twenty Men 
For the Port of Perth, thirty-two Men. 
For the Port of Port Patrick, nine Men. 
For the Port of Preston Pans, three Men. 
For the Port of Rothsay, one hundred and 
sixty-eight Men. 
For the Port of Stornowav, fifty-two Men. 
For the Port of Stranrawer [sic], twenty- 
five Men. 
For the Port of Thurso, twelve Men. 
For the Port of Tobermoray, five Men: 
And 
For the Port of Wigton, twenty-five Men. 
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CAP. XXIX. 
An Act for raising a certain Number of Men, in the several Counties, 
Stewartries, Royal Burghs, and Towns, in that Part of Great Britain called 
Scotland, for the Service of His Majesty's Navy. [2Sth April 1795.1 
;or the County of Aberdeen, one hundred 
n d  forty-one. 
;or the City of Aberdeen, twenty-two. 
;or the Burgh of Kintore, one. 
;or the Burgh of Inverury, one. 
;or the County of Ayr, sixty. 
;or the Burgh of Ayr, five. 
;or the Burgh of Irvine, two. 
;or the Town of Kilmarnock, eighteen. 
;or the County of Argyll, ninety. 
Tor the Burgh of Inverary, two. 
;or the Burgh of Cambeltown, two. 
;or the County of Bute, eight. 
Tor the Burgh of Rothsay, two. 
+or the County of Berwick, thirty-three. 
2or the Burgh of Lauder. two. 
+or the County of Banff, forty-seven. 
:or the Burgh of Ban& seven. 
'or the Burgh of Cullen, one. 
:or the County of Caithness, twenty- 
hree- 
For the Burgh of Wick, two. 
For the Town of Thurso, six. 
For the County of Cromarty, eight. 
For the County of Clackmannan, nine. 
For the County of Dumfries, forty-one. 
For the Burgh of Annan, two. 
For the Burgh of Dumfries, eleven. 
For the Burgh of Lochmaben, one. 
For the Burgh of Sanquahar, one. 
For the County of Dunbarton, sixteen. 
For the Burgh of Dunbarton, four. 
For the County of Edinburgh, sixty. 
For the City of Edinburgh. including the 
Liberties of Canongate, Pleasance, SoutJ 
and North Leith, and Coalhill, sixty. 
For the Town of Dalkeith, five. 
For the Town of Musselburgh, five. 
For the County of Elgin, thirty-eight. 
-7 
- 
For the County of Haddington, thirty- 
five. 
For the Burgh of Haddington, four. 
;or the Burgh of Dunbar, three. 
;or the Burgh of North Berwick, one. 
;or the County of Inverness, seventy- 
our. 
;or the Burgh of Inverness, eleven. 
;or the County of Kinross, six. 
Tor the County of Kincardine, thirty-two. 
:or the Burgh of Inverbervie, one. 
'or the Stewartry of Kirkcudbright, 
wenty-seven. 
'or the Burgh of Kirkcudbright, three. 
?or the County of Lanark. fifty-five. 
:or the City of Glasgow, fifty-seven. 
?or the Town of Humilton, two. 
For the Burgh of Lanark. one. 
For the Burgh of Ruglerz [sic], one. 
For the County of Linlithgofii, eighteen. 
For the Burgh of Linlifhgow, four. 
For the Burgh of Quc.erzsfern, one. 
For the County of Nairnu, six. 
For the Burgh of Nairne. two. 
For Orkne?, thirty-four. 
For the Burgh of Kirkwall, three. 
For Zetland, eighteen. 
For the County of Peebles, ten. 
For the Burgh of Peehles, three. 
For the County of Perth, one hundred and 
fifty-two. 
For the Burgh of Perth, eighteen. 
For the Burgh of Culross, one. 
For the County of Rer!frew, twenty. 
For the Burgh of Renfrew, one. 
For the Town of Paisley, and the Villages 
of New to un , Will iam s bu rg h , S m  it h h il Is, 
Carriagehills. Maxwelltoun. and 
Millerstoun. twenty . 
337 
For the Burgh of Elgin, four. 
For the Burgh of Forres, two. 
For the County of Fife, eighty-eight. 
For the Burgh of Cupar, four. 
For the Burgh of Dunjermline, seven. 
For the Burgh of Inverkeithing, one. 
For the Burgh of Bruntisland, two. 
For the Burgh of Kinghorn, one. 
For the Burgh of Kirkcaldy, four. 
For the Burgh of Dysart, two. 
For the Burgh of Anstruther Easter, one. 
For the Burgh of Anstruther Wester, one. 
For the Burgh of CraiZl, one. 
For the Burgh of Kilrenny, one. 
For the Burgh of Pittenweem, one. 
For the Burgh of St. Andrew 's, four. 
For the County of Forfar, sixty-four. 
For the Burgh of Brechin, three. 
For the Burgh of Dundee, twenty-two. 
For the Burgh of Forfar, three. 
For the Burgh of Montrose, three. 
For the Burgh of Arbroath. three. 
For the Town and Port Glasgow, one. 
For the Town of Greenock, four. 
For the County of Ross, fifty-six. 
For the Burgh of Tuin, two. 
For the Burgh of Dingwall, two. 
For the Burgh of Fortrose, one. 
For the County of Roxburgh, forty-three. 
For the Town of Kelso, five. 
For the Burgh of Jedburgh, two. 
For the County of Selkirk, four. 
For the Burgh of Selkirk, two. 
For the County of Stirling, eighteen. 
For the Burgh of Stirling, five. 
For the County of Sutherland, twenty- 
nine. 
For the Burgh Dornock, one. 
For the County of Wigtoun, forty-nine. 
For the Burgh of Wigtoun, two. 
For the Burgh of Whitehorn, one. 
For the Burgh of New Galloway, one: 
And 
For the Burgh of Stmnraer, four. 
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Appendix: E 
NAS, GD 224/628/3/18 
Internal Defence 1798. 
General Abstract of the Number of Men between the age of 15 and 60 - Infirm - 
Serving in Volunteer Corps - aliens - Quakers - Persons Incapable of removing 
themselves, and of the live and dead Stock in the different Parishes of the County of 
Edinburgh, Made up from the Returns of the Deputy Lieutenants as directed by the 
General Meeting of the County on the 30 April 1798, in term of the Act of the 381h 
Geo 3d. Cap. 27. for the Defence and Security of the Realm, and for indemnifying 
persons who may suffer in their property by the measures to be taken. 
[Two Schedules - one for men and one for provisions. Only men included here.] 
Parishes. 
Cramond 
Part of North Leith 





Kirknewton & EC’ 
Ratho 
Part of Kirkliston 
Glencorse 




















Total of men 
between the 


































































Serving in Volunteer 


































Persons who from age 
Infancy lnfirmity or 
other cause may be 
































Kirknewton and East Calder I ’ Cannot be ascertained. 
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Appendix: F 
Age I Born in I Born in 
NAS, GD 2241429. 
ENROLLMENT BOOK 10TH REGt. N. B. MILITIA. 
1798 - 1802. 
Trade Enrolled Serving for 
General Abstract of Men to be furnished by the several Counties &c, to the loth or 
Edinburgh Regiment of North British Militia. 

















1 James Nisbet 
Edward Stewart 




Rob Thomson €1 0 f 1 David Hodge 
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Jas Lyle dischgd 





















































































































































Aich. Hunter f 10 f 
lames Horsburgh' 
4ch. Bajres[?] f 10 f 
lames W ardlaw 



















































John M Whriter 
JVm. Blyth 
Henry Miles 



































Tho Addison f 11 fs" 
Geo Gourlay €1 2 fs 
P 
James Clannay 
John W hilles 
Edinr. 








Kirknewton & East - 





























Wm Rule €1 0 fine 
Geo Muir f 10 fine 




































Jas Alexander €1 0 f 


































































Pen n yc u i c k 
Parish 8 
John Braid 






































































































































































































































































































































Jam es Dassavi I le 
William Peattie 

















































































































































St Cuth berts 
Dal kei th 











































St Cuth berts 
Borthwick 
Walston 

























































































































































































Cooper I “ John Thorburn 
P 
Rob Philip €1 0 fin. 
















































































Jas Herbert f 10 f. 
Jas Graham f10 f. 


































































































J u riW ri g ht 
79 Men. 
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Thos Noble f l l  fs 
P 1 1  for sub. 
Robert Fairley f 1 1 f: 
John Sheriff f 1 1  fs 
Hugh Lumsden f 8  









































































Wrn. McDonald f 1 Of 






























































































































George Hardy f 1 Of 
David Pollsck 
R Nichol f 10 fine. 
Wrn Allan f 10 fine 
John Miller 
Parishes 12 





















































A Dale f 10 fine. 
John Ilile[?] 






















Dalmeny P jointly 1 




















































































A Hamilton f 10 f. 
T AndersonflO f. 
A Aitken €10 fine. 





































































P. Gentleman €1 0 f 
P 
P 
J Black f 10 fine. 











S Murray f 12 sub. 
A Clark 
R Brownlie f 10 f .  
Weaver 1799 
Woolspinner 1800 
17 Elothian Ormiston I 1799 S hoem. Adam Porteus ILivingston Parish 1 ---pi- Weaver Andrew Allan 24 Linlithgow lnchmahon Wm Neal 
Uphall & 
Livingston 














Henry Potts f 10 f. 
John Morton f 10 f. 
James Bishop f 10 f 
Taylor 
Weaver 
Coal I ier 
on or East Lothian Quota. 137 Men. County of Hadding 
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Moff at 













































Tho Bishop f 10 f. 
Jas Cowan 1 1  G fs 
Wm Hewitt 11G 






























































Tho' Hastie 11 G fs 

































































































































John W i lliamson 
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Chas Wilson 11 G fs 














































John Lamb f 10 f. 
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hddington 
\J eas t h [ ?] 
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James Fair €1 0 fs 


































































































































































Pen tcai tland 
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Thos Heriot 10 G fs 
P 
Humby 

















Rob Wight €10 f .  
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Jas Stephenson f 10 
rho White f 10 f. 























































































vVm Grieve f 10 f. 
3 
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N m  Kirkwood 










Wm Wilson f 10 f 
Pringle Spears f 10 f 
Wm Lang f 10 f 
Robert Watson f 10 f 











































Geo Curni f 12 s. 
Jas Brown f 12 s. 
Alex Wood 11 G s 










































































































Chas King f 10 f .  
Henry Webster' 






























































































































S hoem . 
Weaver 
Alex Thomson Carn wat h 



















IBuncle Parish 4 
Jas Robertson 
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Urquhart Lab. 1799 
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Par ish 7 










Par ish 2 
James Alexander 



































































































Jas Neilson 11 G s. 
Adam Hevit f 10 f .  
























































































Adam J ackson 
Thomas Veitch 




























31dG I en I [ + ?] 
Dalkeith 
Dunbar 











Wm Piffer f12 s. 
















Wm High f 10 fine. 





































17 Mlothian Dalkeith Weaver 1798 Robert Wilson 
24 Haddington Tranent Lab. John Walker €1 0 f .  
34 Inverness Urquhart Lab. 1799 Adam Dalgleish 
Deserted 27 June 1800. 
Died 30 July 1800. ’ Glasgow Barony Parish 
S tockingweaver . 
2 1 0  fine. 
Duncan Robertson S 10 fine. 
John Borrowman S 10 fine. 
James Horsburgh E 12 fine. 
Discharged 29 Septr. 180 1. 
FS: for substitute 
St. Andrews - Auckland. 
Dead: 20th Feby. 1801. 
l 3  Discharged: gfh Sept. 1801. 
&10 for discharged. 
Discharged. 
Discharged: 14 July 1800. 
Discharged: 29 Sept. 1801. 
Discharged: 8 Sept. 1801. 
Discharged: 23 Oct. 1800. 
” Discharged: 24 March 1801. 
” Dead: 22 Decem. 1801. 
” Butcher Ropemaker 
Copperplate Printer. 
” Dan Somerville f 1 1  for substitute. 
” Deserted: 14 May 180 1 .  
26 Deserted: 24 March 1801. 
’’ 24 March 1801. Claimed by the Royal Artillery a deserter. 
’* Discharged: 29 Sept. 180 1. 















Tho’ Bridewood, E1 2 for substitute. 
Discharged: 24 Decem. 1800. 
30 
31  
” Deserted: 4 Febry 1801. 
’‘ Discharged: 15 June 1801. 
Hairdresser & Painter. ’’ Merchants Clerk. 
’‘ Seized for Theft - 2 1 April 1802. 
37 Discharged: 1 Octr. 1 80 I . 
” Jas McClenaham, 10 G for discharge. 
34 
Discharged: 24 January 1801. 
Discharged: July 1800. 
Dead: 15 Decemr. 1801. 













17 Mlothian Newbattle S hoem . 1798 Wm Hermiston 
25 Ayr Ayr S hoem . 1799 James Forsyth 
20 Mlothian Dal kei th Lab. 1798 Waiter Rae f 10 fine 
20 Dumfries Midleby Lab. 1799 John Landels f 15 s. 
43 Discharged: 19 Feby 1802. 
W Turnbull & J Brockie E10 fine each. 
Discharged: 24 July 1800. 
Discharged: 24 March 1801. 
47 Dead: 25 March 1802. 
Dead: 24 June 1801. 
Cockburn Comyn, E 10 fine. 
Dead: Ayr 6 Sept. 1800. 
Discharged: 17 July 1800. 















Name Crime Sentence Pardoned 
or part 
rem i tted . 
1798 
1 Sept. Sleorge Corvie For threatening to strike Serj, 
Watson & Corp. Hume in the 
execution of their duty on 30 
Aua. 
150 lashes 50. 
John Elder For abusing Insp. Sandford and 
Sandladv. [?1 
Not Guilty 1 Sept. 
16 March John Elder For being drunk on parade on 
the morning of Thursday the 14 
Inst. 
300 lashes 100 





Corp. Dav. Reid 






100 lashes Remitted 9 August 
1799 





Refusing to go to drill 
Irregular behaviour &c. 
Insolence 
100 
450 740 do 
Acauitted 23 Oct. 




Corp. John Hume 
Corp. John Gray 
Serj. John Brydon 
Adam Sutherland 
Ditto 






Reduced to Private 
D D 
Makg a false Rep. 
Assailing him in the Exec. of his 
dutv. 
Reprimanded 
Not Guilty 7 May 





Ab from Parade 
Ab. From Sap, balling & comg 
over the Barrack wall. 
Going to a Woman and 
obtaining Bread in Serj. Liddle's 
Susp. for month 
200 lashes 200 
29 Aug. James Renton 300 lashes 
name. 
Suspicion of Theft. 
Out of Quarters on the Evg. of 






200 lashes Pardoned 
Peter Primrose 
Andw Watson Serj. 
Drunk on parade the 3 Inst. 
For disorderly conduct in raising 
the drum of the Main Guard to 
beat the Reveillie before the 
time appointed. 
Being out of Barracks without 
leave on 28 Aug. 
For being absent at Saptoo[?] 





Acquitted by the Court. 
Pardoned 
Reduced to 
& Pay of 
Private 
1 Sept Andrew Allan 250 lashes 
1 Sept. George lnglis Corp. 100 1 Reduced to the Rank & Pay of 
Private & Receive 100 lashes 
100 lashes 1 Seot. Pardoned 4 James Short Will. Cunningham James Falconer Ditto 8 Sept. D Neglect of duty D Reduced to the Rank & Pay of I 
356 
Private. 




receive 300 lashes 
400 lashes 29 Oct. Insolence and disobedience of 
Orders. 
Embezzling par of the mens 
subsistence of S. Coy. 
Taking & fraudulently conceding 
& Keeping a Silver watch 
belonging to Serj. Young since 
1 3 ‘ ~  Sept. last. 
Neglect of duty 
Disobedience of Orders and 
Irregular behaviour 
Disobedience of Orders and 
Irregular behaviour 
SUSD. of Theft 
3 Nov. Will. Pettie Serj. Reduced to Rank & Pay of 
Private 
Reduced to Rank & Pay of 
Private & to receive 200 
Lashes 





100 200 lashes 
200 lashes 50 
I l th  John Hart 24 hours in Blackhole 
1 gth Will. Harkess 300 300 lashes 
1801 
10 Feb. Will. Marshall 300 lashes Pardoned Absenting himself from 
Quarters, without leave. 
Neglect of duty 23 Corp. Dav. Reid Suspended from Rank & Pay 
of Corp. during the Comd 




Suspicion of Theft John Watt 
John McCall 
Geo. Nicol 







Acquitted Rioting on the Streets at 
unseasonable hours 
31 March 






Absent from Evening drill & 
drunk the 17 Inst. 
Insolence 
Absenting themselves from 
Quarters contrary to orders - 












time on the Picket Giard. 
Suspicion of Theft. 
Neglect of duty 
Absenting himself from Quarters 
Insolence to Corporal Murray 





200 James Alexander 
John Moselv 
30 

















Customs and Excise revenues, 1791-1797 
[From: John Bruce, :'REPORT, On the Events and Circumstances which produced 
the Union of the IOngdoms of England and Scotland'.] 
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